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Denver provided detailed help on the American materials examined
in Chapter Four. And beyond specific individuals the ethos of
research within the Faculties of Law and Social Sciences at
Edinburgh enabled my time there to be stimulating and enjoyable.
Thanks to the Economic and Social Research Council's funding of my
studies I do not have to acknowledge an outstanding financial debt
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The Nature and Characteristics of Administrative Guidance
According to Willis, "Parliament is the heart, the Civil
that metaphor administrative guidance could be described as the
impulses travelling through the nervous system from the brain to
the fingers of our governmental anatomy. On a more prosaic level
administrative guidance will be defined for the purposes of this
work as encompassing official written provisions establishing the
views of central government departments on their powers, policy
goals and methods of action. But can such seemingly innocuous
items really deserve a deeper examination when juxtaposed with
the numerous other facets of modern state-citizens relations?
Probably the best way of answering this basic question at such an
early stage in the enquiry is to outline briefly three situations
where administrative guidance played a central role in
determining how various groups of citizens were treated by
different departments so that we may gain an impression of the
types of matters regulated by administrative guidance, and its
potential significance for society as a whole.
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In one instance a woman returned from Hong Kong with some
furniture; after her arrival she completed a customs declaration
inaccurately through "carelessness" and later her error was
discovered by a customs officer. Subsequently special
investigation officers interviewed the woman and came to the
opinion that there was a prima facie case for prosecuting her
Service the head and hands, of our government".
1
Developing
for "recklessly" completing a customs declaration contrary to
S.167(1) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979.
However, in accordance with the terms of their administrative
guidance the officers offered to "compound" the proceedings,
(i.e. not to bring charges against the woman) in return for a
penalty payment of £280. The woman immediately accepted the
compounding offer. Afterwards she reached the conclusion that
the Department had treated her badly and requested the
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration [hereafter P.C.A.]
to investigate her case. The P.C.A. reported that while the
particular officers had properly observed their applicable
administrative guidance, the nature of the proceedings
"...does place a clear responsibility on the Department's
officers to take great care that they have a proper case for
prosecution before they offer compounding, since they are
making quasi-legal judgments, most of which will never be
tested in a court of law. I am therefore concerned to find
that the instructions given to officers, who have to decide
whether someone has been guilty of the offence of
recklessness in completing a Customs declaration, are
fragmentary and imprecise."
He then elaborated upon the defects in the administrative
guidance, including their incorrect legal definitions, the
failure to require officers to notify suspects of their right to
seek legal advice before accepting a compounding offer, and the
rigid correlation between amounts of revenue involved and the
penalty payments specified. In the light of this criticism the
Principal Officer of the Department agreed to review the contents
of the guidance and remit the woman's penalty.
Secondly,^ a man practised accountancy (but was not a
member of any recognised professional body) sought to be
authorised as a company auditor by the Secretary of State for
z
Trade under his power, granted by S.161(1)(6) of the Companies
Act 1948, to approve individuals who have "obtained adequate
knowledge and experience" in the course of employment by a
member of a recognised accountancy body. Despite the fact that
the applicant had been an articled clerk for four years followed
by seven years of private practice, his application was refused.
He complained to the P.C.A., who discovered that the Department
had developed a detailed regime of administrative guidance to
govern the exercise of the above statutory discretion, none of
which had been published. These provisions required a
successful applicant to have inter alia been employed for at
least ten years by a professionally qualified accountant, with
five of those years having been at a senior level; during the
latter period a minimum of seventy-five per cent of the
applicant's time must have been spent on company auditing.
Consequently the P.C.A. concluded,
"it is the complainant's misfortune that he has been unable
to satisfy the Department, but I have found no grounds for
thinking that they have dealt with him harshly or any
differently ^rom any other person with similar knowledge and
experience".
Thirdly, a prisoner complained to the P.C.A about the Home
Office's method of calculating prisoners' Parole Eligibility
Dates. By S.60 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 where the Parole
Board so recommends, the Home Secretary may release a prisoner on
licence once he has served a minimum of one third of his
sentence. However, where a prisoner has escaped during his
period of lawful detention, S.49 of the Prison Act 1952 provides
that his time at large shall be .ignored when calculating the
remainder of his sentence to be served. The Home Office's
relevant administrative guidance interpreted the combination of
these two statutory provisions to require the addition of the
total sentence plus any time unlawfully at large to provide the
time period from which the one third eligibility factor would be
determined. After considering the legislation the P.C.A.
reported,
"it seems to me however that this method was a
misinterpretation of S.49 of the Prison Act 1952, and in
particular of the provision there that no account should be
taken of any time during which the prisoner was absent from
the prison... I suggested to the Department that in computing
the Parole Eligibility Date the proper method of calculation
to comply with the provisions of the Act, was to take
one-third of only the number of days in a sentence... but
taking no account of time at large, and then ty defer the
date thus arrived at by the time spent at large".
Following this recommendation the Home Office altered their
guidance to accord with the P.C.A.'s interpretation, and reviewed
the Eligibility Dates of all affected prisoners.
Without entering into a premature analysis of the above
cases, it can be observed that they indicate that administrative
guidance may be found in many administrative contexts across the
range of central government activities. Such guidance may
establish the procedures civil servants should observe when
dealing with citizens, (e.g. the modifications to the Customs and
Excise guidance requiring investigating officers to notify
suspects of their right to obtain legal advice before accepting a
"compounding" offer), or it may contain interpretations of
statutory provisions, (as the Home Office's guidance on parole
dates did), or it may set out the detailed basis upon which a
broad statutory discretion will be exercised, (e.g. regarding the
Secretary of State for Trade's power to approve individual
company auditors). Furthermore these examples suggest that
administrative guidance touches on significant aspects of
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governmental activity that may impinge upon many citizens' most
basic legal freedoms and obligations, including their liberty,
their ability to engage in business and their subjection to the
processes of the criminal law. Yet they may not know the
contents of the applicable administrative guidance nor that it
even exists! Additionally many questions are raised by these
cases concerning the legal nature of the different forms of
administrative guidance, e.g. the extent to which the departments
can lawfully promulgate and act upon them; the circumstances in
which departments are legally bound by their guidance; and the
forums open to a citizen to challenge administrative guidance
either generally or with regard to its particular application to
him. It is, therefore, to be hoped that the foregoing brief
excursus into the actual world of administrative guidance has
hinted at some of the practical and legal reasons why this
phenomenon deserves our attention.
The next basic questions which must be answered are why
select the nomenclature of administrative guidance for this
phenomenon and what are the salient characteristics of these
provisions? From an examination of the published reports of the
P.C.A., coupled with a fieldwork case study of the Scottish
Education Department's Awards Branch (both of which will be
examined in detail later in this thesis) the following
explanations and discoveries are offered in response to the above
questions. From the P.C.A.'s reports we learn that there is
no consistent official terminology applied to administrative
guidance, with various departments using expressions such as
"standing orders", "standing instructions", "internal working
instructions", "guidelines", "departmental instructions" and
"adminstrative conditions". It was therefore necessary for this
K
work to propose, and utilize, a general expression capable of
5
applying to all the provisions subject to the above phraseology.
Guidance was selected because the provisions have varying degrees
g
of specificity and normativity which can all be brought within
its arab.it. The spectrum of specificity is graphically
illustrated by comparing the Department of Trade's guidance on
what it considered fell within the category "plant and machinery"
in S.l of the Industrial Development Act 1966, which extended to
9
fine distinctions between types of wall insulation ; with the
Department of the Environment's provision that it would order a
party to a statutory inquiry who had behaved "unreasonably" to
pay the costs of the unsuccessful party^. As to the continuum
of normativity embraced by these provisions the Awards Branch
case study revealed how the applicable guidance incorporated
precise rules (e.g. if an applicant's parents home was within
forty five minutes travelling time of the educational institution
attended, only the home rate of grant was payable), and also
suggested aids to decision making, (e.g. questions that might be
posed when determining if an applicant was "ordinarily resident"
in Scotland - such as "where did they go in their school
vacations? ^).
The term administrative was chosen as the other half of the
phrase in order to signify that these provisions have not been
subject to any Parliamentary proceedings during their
promulgation. This distinction is important in distinguishing
such provisions not only from delegated legislation, that is
where Parliament authorises a Minister or other person to issue
rules which when .intra vires have the force of law (e.g. S.73 of
the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 which enables the Secretary of
State to issue regulations governing the award of student
grants); but also from the newer hybrid forms of regulation
emanating from Parliament e.g. the Immigration Rules issued under
(j
S.3(2) Immigration Act 1971*' , directives given to the Civil
Aviation Authority by the Secretary of State for Trade under the
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Civil Aviation Act 1971 and the growing numbers of codes of
practice provided for by statutory provisions such as those on
Picketing and the Closed Shop issued under S.3 Employment Act
1980. Hence administrative guidance is not imbued with any
express statutory or Parliamentary authority which, as will be
discovered later, undoubtedly influences judicial reactions
towards its validity and effects in law.
Other characteristics of administrative guidance include the
fact that in many situations it is these provisions which provide
the official basis for civil servants' actions when dealing with
members of the public. Consequently individual civil servants
frequently justify their treatment of particular cases, to both
their superiors and external agencies, in terms of the contents
of the relevant guidance rather than the legislation upon which
the legality of the administrative process ultimately rests. For
example, until 1976 the Secretary of State for Health and Social
Services exercised his discretion under S.33 Health Services and
Public Health Act 1968 to provide motor vehicles for severely
disabled persons. A woman of fifty eight who suffered from the
effects of polio in one leg sought to obtain a car with an
automatic gearbox from the Department; however, after aptitude
tests they were only willing to offer her a car with a manual
gearbox. Eventually the woman had her complaints referred to the
P.C.A. who found, "the discretionary powers were exercised under
administrative arrangements and these included rules defining the
special categories of people who could qualify for motor
ii 13cars". He later concluded that the Department had applied
those rules of administrative guidance to the complainant's
situation "fairly" and therefore no question of maladministration
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arose. The case clearly demonstrates that the effective criteria
upon which the complainant's request was judged by the officials
were contained in internal administrative guidance, and not the
broad statutory power which was the constitutional source of the
whole scheme.
Another feature of administrative guidance is that it
normally applies to all citizens coming within its scope, hence
guidance tends to demonstrate a degree of generality in
14 15
coverage. An example is that in 1974, due to the
depressed state of the property market, the Financial Secretary
to the Treasury announced in the House of Commons that as a
temporary measure the Inland Revenue would allow a "modest
extension" to the time period during which increases in property
values would be immune from Capital Gains Tax. Later the
Department issued a press release in which details of the
concession were given; essentially these provided that the
statutory immunity for the last twelve months of ownership
(prescribed by S.29 Finance Act 1965) would be extended to twenty
four months, but if the owner had not been living in the property
for over twenty four months when it was finally sold he would
only be given the statutory twelve month immunity. A person left
his house in January 197 4 and eventually sold .it during January
1977; when he applied to the Department for the twenty four month
relief period it was refused in accordance with the terms of the
administrative concession. Eventually the P.C.A. investigated
his complaints noting, "the Department recognise that, as with
all rules, there were bound to be hard cases on the margin; but
they said the complainant had been treated correctly within the
terms of the law and the concession, and it would be unfair to
others who had to accept the rules as they stood to discriminate
in his favour".16 xhe P.C.A. then considered whether the
Department should have been willing to examine individual cases
falling outside the terms of the concession to determine if they
ought on their own merits to have been awarded the benefit of the
twenty four month period; he reached the conclusion that such
treatment would not have been reasonable. Passing over for the
time being, the constitutional .implications of tax concessions
being granted by administrative means, this case unequivocally
presents a Department with the P.C.A.'s subsequent approval
applying their administrative guidance to all taxpayers and
strongly resisting claims to allow exceptions or modifications to
the generality of those provisions in individual cases.
Finally, and following on from the facts of the above
example, administrative guidance sometimes penetrates beyond the
world of departmental civil servants via assorted publications.
The forms of these publications include (a) circulars to other
governmental bodies (e.g. Circular 100 of the Department of the
Environment which set out the types of consultations that
government departments would engage in with local planning
authorities when the former decided to exercise their prerogative
power to undertake "development" without obtaining planning
permission)^; (b) white papers (e.g. the Inland Revenue's
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paper of July 1971 , which announced administrative
concessions regarding income tax legally due but subject to
delayed assessment caused by administrative failures); and (c)
the myriad of official booklets and pamphlets outlining
particular administrative schemes (such as the Department of
Energy's leaflet E.L.I, on the non-statutory Electricity Discount
scheme operated during the winter of 1977)1^ This work would
not be the first to note the potentially sporadic nature of the
above forms of publication; in 1944 the then R.E. Megarry
commented,
"speeches or replies to questions in Parliament,
announcements in the press, miscellaneous official
publications, letters to private organisations written by one
Government Department or another, unofficial reports and so
on, may ^1 constitute the primary sources of this
quasi-law".
Therefore, we shall be examining the extent to which these
publications summarise the actual administrative guidance
utilized by civil servants when the details of the Awards Branch
case study are discussed, together with an evaluation of the
significance of publication of the contents of administrative
guidance for the reactions of the courts and the P.C.A. to such
provisions.
Now that the nature and characteristics of administrative
guidance have been outlined in the context of actual examples, it
is appropriate to undertake a brief review of the literature to
discover how other British administrative lawyers have viewed the
phenomenon and the challenges it presents to legal thought.
The Existing British Literature on Administrative Guidance
In a very rough way it is possible to divide the
consideration, or non-consideration as the case may be, of this
topic in the literature into three broad chronological eras. The
first period included works up to the beginning of the Second
World War and was undoubtedly dominated by Dicey together with
his intellectual legacy. The combination of his constitutional
principles of the Sovereignty of Parliament and the Rule of Law
allied with their denunciation of a distinct body of
administrative law in the guise of French "droit
administratif"21 ushered in the twentieth century and
10.
overwhelmed virtually all pre-Nineteen Forties writings on the
subject of administrative law in Britain. Indeed until 1915
Dicey believed English law had not recognised anything resembling
22
a corpus of administrative law. However, in that year he
appeared to accept that increasingly interventionist legislation
was giving birth to such a development. But he felt that his
principle of the Rule of Law was still protected from this growth
because,
"the fact that the ordinary law courts can deal with any
actual and provable breach of the law committed by any
servant of the Crown still preserves that rule of law^^hich
is fatal to the existence of true droit administratif".
Yet fourteen years later Lord Hewart considered that both Dicey's
principles were under siege from the "new despotism" which he
defined as,
"the various devices of bureaucracy to give departmental
decisions the force of a statute, to prevent them from being
reviewed by any process in a Court of Law, and to ensure that
the mere fact that a departmental decision has been given
must be treated as conclusive evident^ that the requirements
of the law have been duly fulfilled".
In the course of his criticism of "administrative lawlessness",
K
the Lord Chief Justice adversely compared adjudicative
decision-making by civil servants with that undertaken by the
courts noting,
"...it is possible, no doubt, that the public official who
decides questions in pursuance of the powers given to his
department does act, or persuades himself that he acts, on
some general rules or principles. But, if so they are
entirely unknown to anybody outside the department, and of
what value is a so called "law" of which nobody has any
knowledge?"
It appears that Lord Hewart was referring there to what we have
termed adminscrative guidance, with the criticism that the
A
provisions were unavailable to affected citizens. Later
u
commentators also took up this aspect of guidance as we will soon
discover. Despite the fact that Lord Hewart's book was polemical
2 6
in tone and in some places reflected an almost conspiracy
theory attitude towards the advocates of an
interventionist-collectivist state it fired the imagination of
27
influential groups in society , leading to the appointment of
an official committee to review the question of ministerial
28
powers. The report of the Donoughmore Committee impliedly
found Lord Hewart's fears "exaggerated", and went on to suggest
procedural and institutional reforms which they considered would
allow the expansion of state powers without the destruction of
Dicey's two constitutional principles. Generally during this
period administrative lawyers were so concerned with the twin
issues of departmental adjudication and the creation of delegated
legislation that little, if any, consideration was given to
29
administrative guidance
The next era in the literature covers the wartime activities
of the administration and it seems that these prompted a limited
evaluation of administrative guidance by two eminent lawyers.
Reference has already been made to Megarry's note in 1944 on
30
"Administrative-Quasi Legislation" in which he distinguished
two categories of provisions. Firstly there was the "state and
subject type" composed of,
"...announcements by administrative bodies of the course
which it is propose^ to take in the administration of
particular statutes".
He felt that where this consisted of interpretations of statutory
phrases which had not been subject to an authoritative judicial
ruling, the quasi-legislation was permissible; however, where it
amounted to administrative policies which contradicted express
statutory language, such provisions were "undesirable". The
a
second category of quasi-leg.islation was the "subject and subject
type" which involved
"...arrangements made by administrative bodies which affect
the oper^ion of the law between one subject and
another".
This type was also unacceptable to the lawyer because of the
"gloss" it added to statute and case law. Megarry approached
quasi-leg.islation from the perspective of the practitioner who
desires to discover the legal status of his client's position and
therefore,
"...the main objection to administrative quasi-legislation is
its haphazard mode of promulgation".
One year later Allen returned to the subject of "quasi-law" by
broadly viewing it as the product of wartime exigencies.
However, he also acknowledged that aspects of the phenomenon
possessed an extensive lineage as,
"it has long been the practice of the Inland Revenue
Department to issue for official use rulings and
interpretations of the enormously complicated Finance Acts,
as well as codes of 'concessions' to taxpayers. None of
these, in theory, have any legal force, but in practice they
have an important effect, because they are followed by
revenue officials throughout the country - they are, indeed,
the Inspector's Bible - and |^ew taxpayers have the hardihood
to test them in the Courts".
This passage is very important because it indicates that what we
have termed administrative guidance existed many years ago, but
the early administrative lawyers seem to have been unable or
unwilling to probe into this topic further and Allen fruitlessly
commented,
"the defence doubtless is that these are emergency measures
at a time when Parliament is hard pressed, but they are, in
my submission, pessimi exempli, whatever convenience maybe,
and it is greatly to be hoped that they will not be extended
or imitated in peace time".35
IB.
The third era takes us from the post war years to the present
day. Outside the textbook writers administrative guidance has
been subject to little academic analysis. Jowell provided a
theoretical assessment of the costs and benefits of subjecting
3 6
administrative decision-making inter alia to rules , and then
later applied a similar perspective to
an examination of various questions raised by the administration
37
of social security programmes in America . Freedland noted
some of the constitutional and practical implications of
departments operating the bulk of particular social welfare
schemes on the basis of administrative guidance, because,
"it must be a matter for some concern that such a very
important set of, in effect, legislative provisions can be
made entirely within a government department on a totally
discretionary basis and that as a result °^3g these
attributes, they can pass almost entirely unnoticed".
However, in the treatment accorded to administrative guidance by
the contemporary textbooks we can detect a gradual but
significant alteration in the status accorded to the phenomenon
by administrative lawyers. For example in 1967 Griffith and
Street were satisfied to deal with these provisions in one
paragraph, concluding,
"...their effect is^gConsiderable although they are not
legally enforceable".
40
While ten years later Wade and Phillips accorded the
phenomenon a distinct entry in their chapter on delegated
legislation under the guise of "administrative rule-making".
They viewed these provisions as a response to the formalities
and complexities of delegated legislation with the caveat that,
"like any large organisation, a department may wish to give
instructions to its staff on purely internal matters without
publishing them. But it is contrary to both legal and
democratic principles that rules which directly ^ffect the
interests of the citizen should not be published."
Once again, therefore, we can discern the commentator's concern
with the secret nature of much administrative guidance. Foulkes
also examines various types of administrative guidance by
classifying them in relation to the medium of their publication




Garner continues the language of "quasi-law", while
acknowledging that in an administrative, as opposed to a
judicial, context these provisions "have the effect of law".
44
Wade would like to be able to draw a sharp distinction
between the legal effects of "administrative" and "legislative"
rules, but has to admit that the judiciary have not responded in
such a consistent way. However, he is rather dismissive of the
former category:
"mere administrative rules, for example for the internal
management of the civil service, or for extra statutory
concessions to taxpayers are not legislation of any kind. In
the former case the power behind the rules is simply that of
an employer over an employee rather than a power confe^ed by
a statute, and in the latter case no power is needed".
However, Craig, in one of the most recent books on the subject of
administrative law, considers that what we have termed
administrative guidance is of great significance both for
individual citizens and academic lawyers because,
"the precise status of such rules may be unclear; they may be
unknown to the public and are often subject to no external
scrutiny. This does not prevent them from being dispositive
of the result in any particular case. I am not arguing that
we should attempt to prevent the creation of such rules,
\5.
quite the contrary. Rather that we should recognise their
existence, the absence of contjrgls over them and consider
what should be done about them".
He continues by outlining some possible explanations for the
existence of these provisions, several of which have already been
mentioned e.g. the procedural obligations of delegated
legislation and the ability to engage in informal statute law
reform via administrative interpretations; however, for him the
primary stimulant encouraging the growth of administrative
guidance is to be found in the nature of present day large scale
administration, since
"...even where no explicit power to make regulations is
granted, the administration will make rules or policy
statements which indicate how it will exercise its
discretion. This is a natural tendency for bureaucracies
when faced with a recurring problem. The problem is not
thought out afresh each time. This would be a waste of
administrative time and could lead to inequitable results by
treating like cases differently. A rule will be devised
which can be applied ^o those lower down in the
administrative hierarchy".
The reports of the P.C.A. provide numerous examples of the
above process at work. In a subsequent chapter therefore we
shall be examining some of the social science writings upon
organisations to consider what theoretical insights they may
provide on the organisational causes and attributes of
administrative guidance.
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To conclude this overview of relevant publications it can
be noted that the existing treatment of the provisions we call
administrative guidance has been very sketchy. Until the
Nineteen Forties the likely reason for that understandable
neglect was the pre-occupation of the early writers with the
monumental task of creating a coherent and systematic discipline
in the shadow of Dicey's aversion from and dislike of anything
resembling droit administratis Moreover, the major explanation
for post-war responses may have been the practical one of the
difficulty of discovering the extent and influences of
unpublished guidance upon administrative decision-making. Hence
it is .interesting that the lone wartime comments by Megarry and
Allen on "quasi-law" occurred in the context of published
provisions containing constitutionally controversial terms, e.g.
the Treasury's 1943 administrative extension of property owners'
rights regarding requisitioned premises. However, in the last
twenty years virtually all the textbook writers have acknowledged
the practical significance of these provisions, combined with an
almost inexorable rise in their status on the agenda of
contemporary problems; so that by 1983 Craig was subjecting them
to an evaluation co-extensive with that conferred upon delegated
1egislation.
It is the present writer's belief that the present time calls
for a detailed examination of administrative guidance as both
practical and academic forces have coincided to encourage such a
project. At the practical level the creation of the P.C.A. in
48
1967 marked a watershed in the general availability of
materials, revealing how central departments perform many of
their administrative tasks, together with the significance of
administrative guidance in those operations. We have already
seen how his reports may be useful in discerning the
characteristics of guidance and in a later chapter his general
responses to these provisions will be analysed. There are also
indications in the case law that the judiciary are gradually
beginning to alter their traditional denunciation of policy
49
rules j while the expansion of the concept of fairness is
allowing novel legal obligations to be placed on the promulgators
of administrative guidance"*^. The outcome of these apparently
unrelated doctrinal developments is that one can no longer
17
unequivocally state that guidance has no legal force.
Furthermore the publication and analysis of the P.C.A.'s reports
offers administrative lawyers the opportunity to increase their
awareness of departmental usage of guidance just as the courts
appear to be changing their attitudes towards these provisions,
with the possible benefits of cross-fertilization and
harmonization between the reactions of the two agencies.
Finally,
positive transformations in historic legal and executive
practices regarding guidance are being forced upon recalcitrant
domestic judges and administrators by both the European
Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights. One example will serve to make this clear. In the case
brought by Silver and five other prisoners together with a
teacher who had been communicating with another prisoner, the
Commission unanimously found^^ that the censorship of fifty-six
letters written by the applicants violated Article 8 (respect for
correspondence) of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. The Commission discovered that although
the domestic legal basis for the censorship regime was to be
found in the Prison Act 1952, and the Statutory Prison Rules made
under the preceq/d.ing Act, the detailed regulations governing
control of prisoners' communications were to be found in
unpublished administrative guidance.
"In order to ensure uniformity of practice throughout prison
establishments, the Home Secretary issues confidential
management guidelines to the prison governors. These are
Standing Orders and Circular Instructions. Their contents
are not known by the public or prisoners. As regards
prisoners' correspondence the Standing Orders and Circular
Instructions set out the general guidelines along which the
Secretary of State has decided to exercise the discretion
stated in ruJ^s thirty- three and thirty-four of the Prison
Rules 1964."
(8.
The British Government sought to argue that the restrictions
on correspondence contained within the above provisions were "in
accordance with the law" as required by Article 8. However,
following the jurisprudence of the Court regarding the meaning of
this phrase, the Commission determined that it necessitated inter
alia "adequate accessibility" and "sufficient precision" in the
provisions authorising interferences with an individual's
correspondence. When the Commission applied these tests to the
Home Secretary's administrative guidance they concluded,
"...unless particular administrative restrictions could be
reasonably deduced from the Prison Rules 1964, their
application in interference with a prisoner's right to
respect for correspondence could not be said to be 'in
accordance with the law' within the meaning of Article 8(2)
as they would satisfy neither the Court's criteria of
accessibility or foreseeability".
Few of the censorship provisions met these conditions and
therefore the Commission found they .infringed Article 8.
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Subsequently the Court considered this case on its referral
by the Commission. Broadly the Court agreed with the opinion of
the Commission. However, they appeared to allow the British
Government a greater leeway in the use of administrative guidance
by holding,
"...that although those directives did not themselves have
the force of law, they may - to the admittedly limited extent
to which those concerned were made sufficiently aware of
their contents - be taken into account in assessing whether
the criterion of forse^bility was satisfied in the
application of the Rules".
Despite this limited relaxation of the situations in which
governments could claim that their censorship regulations
contained in administrative guidance were "in accordance with the
law", the Court unanimously held that many of the Standing Order
Instruction restrictions were unlawful, and that the censorship
of fifty-seven letters violated the Convention. This litigation
resulted in the Home Secretary altering the substance of his
administrative guidance and for the first time publishing the
majority of its content. Secondly, both the opinion of the
Commission and the judgment of the Court regarding the
applicants' claims under Article 13 (right to an effective remedy
before a national authority) have placed further pressure on the
judiciary to revise their attitudes towards the Prison Rules and
prisoners' rights generally. Finally, the developing
jurisprudence of the Court on the nature of "law" for the
purposes of Articles 8 and 10 poses a significant and desirable
deterrent to the Government's use of administrative guidance to
restrict the scope of these fundamental rights.
Turning now from the above developments in domestic and
international law to another factor encouraging a contemporary
examination of administrative guidance, we can justify this
piece of research in terms of its sympathy with the objectives
of those academics who wish to re-orientate the priorities and
study of administrative law so that they accord more fully with
the processes of modern state decision-making. For instance in
1974 Bradley noted that traditionally,
"the emphasis in legal authorship has been on the principles
of judicial review applied by the superior courts..."
"...in Britain no less than in the U.S.A. there are many
areas of governmental discretion directly affecting
individual citizens where there is no close scrutiny by the
yet
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courts or for that matter by Parliament."
Consequently he advocated the devotion of greater research
efforts towards examining the substance and exercise of official
discretions, with the belief that the results would improve both
the teaching and theoretical understanding of administrative
powers. McAuslan has been critical of administrative lawyers'
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limited theorising , and in his Chorley Lecture returned to
the attack with a penetrating criticism of the direction and
implications of administrative law's focus over the last quarter
of a century. In his own words,
"but, sacrilegious though it may be to say so, Franks, in
some respects, has obscured for administrative lawyers an
understanding of the broad trends of evolution of government
and adminstration in the last 25 years. This is because of
its, and our, concentration on tribunals and inquiries, and
the result is that we now seem somewhat ill-equipped to deal
with, or make sense of, the major clashes of policy and
ideology taking place within our system of administrative
law... The attention of lawyers, in other words, was
directed towards the issues of fair hearings for
individuals in court-like proceedings; and away from the
issues of policy-formulation, the allocation of resources
and collective decisionmaking within the processes of
collective consumption".
Partly in response to McAuslan's call for more theorising
administrative law Prosser has indicated how he believes one
such theory could be developed^. Underlying his proposal is
the belief that the existing attitudes towards administrative
law are deficient because of inter alia the assumption,
"...that what is legally relevant is composed exhaustively
of rules which pass formal tests of legal validity. Thus in
English terms statute and case law provide the basis for the
subject, with an occasional nod towards statutory
instruments. This ignores the multifarious forms of modern
state intervention through less formal devices such as
circulars, tax concessions and the diverse methods of state
economic management".
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In case these analyses appear to be portraying British
administrative law in a too negative manner it may be some
consolation to discover that American academics are also engaged
in similar heartsearching. Mashaw, for example, has stated
that,
"...to be blunt the history American administrative law
is a history of failed ideas".
After outlining the difficulties of judicial interventions in
the procedures and substantive programmes of government bodies
he concludes,
"if then, by 'administrative law' we mean that set of
doctrines concerning the rights of citizens to hold
administrators accountable in court, administrative law has
a simple lesson; the citizen has a right to keep officials
from straying beyond some large and loose requirements of
clear statutory language, procedural regularity, and
substantive rationality. Within these boundaries there lies
a gigantic policy space, invisible to the legal order
because devoid of justiciable rights. Moreover, as the
administrative state has grown, as more 'rights' have been
generated and defined by a combination of legislative and
administrative action, this externally orientated
administrative law, that is, a law orientated towards
justiciable rights enforced against administrators in court,
has become increasingly irrelevant to the realization of our
collective ideals". (emphasis mine)
His answer is to suggest the creation of an agency possessing
several characteristics similar to our P.C.A., that will
scrutinise, promote and enforce the "internal law" of
governmental agencies. From our perspective it is very
interesting to learn that Mashaw considers this 'internal law' to
be composed of,
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"...unpublished written instructions and interpretations
combined with standard bureaucratic Routines and with
developmental and decisional practices".
or what we have termed administrative guidance!
In response to the pleas noted above we have tentatively
shown that administrative guidance is a significant factor in
many different types of administrative decision-making, and that
the decisions finally reached may affect fundamental features of
citizens' lives which, when combined with the relative neglect of
the phenomenon by British administrative lawyers, amplifies the
necessity for a contemporary examination. Furthermore
acknowledging the validity of many of the previously examined
criticisms this work will seek to venture beyond the judicial
case law governing administrative guidance in order to obtain a
clearer understanding of both how administrative guidance is used
in practice, and the responses of the several grievance
6 6
agencies falling within the domain of administrative law.
While this work entertains no pretensions towards establishing a
grand theory of administrative law, it does seek to attempt a
reconciliation between administrative behaviour and legal thought
in the field of these provisions which may enable administrative
law to become more realistic in its demands and therefore of
greater value as a tool for regulating state-citizen relations.
An Outline of the Basic Concerns and Nature of the Research
As the phenomenon of administrative guidance has been defined
and its treatment in the British literature examined, attention
can now be directed towards the structure of this thesis. The
first observation to be made is that the research seeks to
examine the legal implications of administrative guidance across
the range of central government departments, rather than to
engage solely upon an in-depth case study of one or two
departments' use of these provisions. This approach was chosen
in order to demonstrate that guidance is not merely of localised
concern to specialist lawyers (e.g. revenue lawyers enraged about
6 7
extra statutory tax concessions , or civil liberties lawyers
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worried by the legal weaknesses of prisoners rights ), but
raises questions, and presents problems, which are universal to
all public lawyers. Furthermore this orientation allows the work
to analyse the general responses of the courts and the P.C.A.
towards administrative guidance, in order to discover if uniform
reactions regarding similar types of guidance are produced, or
whether distinctions are drawn in departmental usage. Moreover,
comparisons between the responses of the various grievance
agencies to administrative guidance are encouraged by this
breadth of study.
The second strategy adopted by the thesis is to have regard
to the organisational context within which administrative
guidance operates. As the departments' use of guidance appears
to be intimately connected with their functioning as complex
organisations (e.g. the guidance directing Customs and Excise
Officers' exercise of the power to compound proceedings which
covered inter alia the amounts of financial penalties which could
be imposed by the different grades of officer and the procedure
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for passing up difficult cases ) a subsequent chapter will be
examining some of the most prominent social science writings upon-
organisations to discover what insights they may provide into the
theoretical explanations and practical features of administrative
guidance. Those insights will then be applied when we analyse
the results of the f.ieldwork carried out into the Awards Branch's
use of guidance. This fieldwork will also enable us to view a
part of the civil service's operation and application of guidance
at closer quarters than even the P.C.A.'s reports allow.
Thirdly the dissertation will involve a degree of comparative
study in that one chapter will be devoted to evaluating the
American legal attitudes towards administrative rulemaking. The
bulk of this chapter will be devoted to considering K.C. Davis's
arguments in favour of the expansion of such rulemaking and
balancing them against the recent decisions of the Federal
Courts. We shall then be able to discuss the relevancy of the
U.S. experience to British case law.
Turning to the chronological order of the thesis and the main
issues to be examined in each chapter, we shall firstly consider
the organisational nature of administrative guidance, followed by
the American materials, and then present a detailed analysis of
the British grievance agencies' responses. Chapter Two will
outline some of the main social science writings upon complex
organisations, the emphasis being predominantly sociological and
including the following schools of thought, Weber, Human
Relations, Post-Weberian, Decision Making and Systems. After
each school's conception of the nature of these organisations has
been briefly noted, we shall be examining how they portray the
role or roles of rules in these conceptions, together with the
importance ascribed to rules in them. The primary objective of
this chapter will be to discover if the theorists provide any
insights into the organisational causes or attributes of what we
have termed administrative guidance that may be relevant to
administrative law's responses to the phenomenon. So for
example, we shall be looking to see if the writers establish any
classifications of administrative guidance that might be helpful
in systematizing the reactions of the British grievance agencies,
or whether they indicate that aspects of the traditional legal
response may have been wrongly developed from an organisational
perspective (e.g. the judicial dislike of rule governed
decision-making exemplified by the Court of Appeal's decision in
the case of R v Eastleigh Borough Council exp. Betts where
all three members held unlawful a working definition of "normal
residence", as used in the housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977,
f
promulgated by the Association of District Councils with the
approval of the Department of the Environment).
Following on from the above theoretical discussions Chapter
Three will focus upon the case study of the Awards Branch of the
Scottish Education Department. The organisational situation
there will demonstrate many ideal-type bureaucratic attributes
including the processing of a large number of cases by a
hierarchically arranged staff according to the goals of
uniformity of treatment, accuracy in decision making, combined
with low administrative costs. We shall be discovering how the
Branch translates a broad statutory discretion to pay students
educational grants into a number of distinct discretionary
administrative powers which are allocated between grades of
officials in the organisation; and the types of administrative
guidance that are relevant to each hierarchical level of decision
making. The official and unofficial limitations to the staffs'
recourse to their administrative guidance will be examined,
allied with the strategies implemented by senior management to
prevent subordinate officers developing divergent approaches to
the same provisions ( e.g. training programmes and alterations in
the structure of the organisation). Additionally the study will
be used to indicate the link between the nature of the rules
regime governing a particular administrative scheme and the types
of remedies available to aggrieved citizens regarding what they
consider to be unsatisfactory decisions by officials.
In Chapter Four Davis' advocacy of the "confining" and
"structuring" of official discretion via administrative
rulemaking will be subjected to a critical evaluation. His ideas
will then be located withi^their American context by an outline
review of the judicial reactions to Federal Agencies' rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedure Act, thereby enabling the
question of their applicability to the British constitutional
framework to be raised.
Taking account of the American legal approaches to
administrative rulemaking, together with the practice of British
administrators and the responses of our grievance agencies
towards administrative guidance, the thesis will propose a
general classification of guidance. In the ensuing three
chapters this classification will be utilized in a systematic
analysis of the jurisprudence of the P.C.A., the Courts and Value
Added Tax Tribunals regarding the different classes of guidance.
Distinctions between the treatment of identical classes of
guidance by the three grievance agencies will be highlighted
along with convergencies in reasoning and determinations. Within
these broad considerations a number of detailed issues will be
raised such as the lawfulness of departmental decision-making
based upon admin'strative guidance, when and how affected citizens
may challenge either the lawfulness of guidance or its
application in the circumstances of their case, the situations in
which the promulgators of guidance may become bound by its terms,
and the significance of the publication of the contents of




Finally Chapter Eight will provide a conclusion in which an
attempt will be made to reconcile the insights gained from the
organisational materials on adminstrative guidance with the
attitudes of British administrative law, fortified by some
suggestions of how the latter discipline should develop its
responses to this phenomenon in the future.
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CHAPTER TWO
ORGANISATION THKflKY AMD ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE
Introduction
In the eyes of Professor Peter Schuck, "the distinctive
office of administrative lawyers, after all, is to mediate
between the realms of legal meaning and social action."^ While
commentators both from within and out with the discipline could
productively spend many hours debating the general virtues of the
above statement it does accurately encapsulate the nature of this
dissertation with its central theme of discovering how British
administrative law presently reacts to administrative guidance
and what developments in that position might be desirable and
attainable. Therefore, in the next two chapters we shall
consider aspects of the organisational and social environments in
which administrative guidance operates so that the later analysis
of the legal materials can be undertaken against a background of
greater understanding of the theoretical and practical features
of the phenomenon than that provided by the judicial case law
alone.
As administrative guidance appears to be intimately
associated with the functioning of complex organisations (for
2
example, the compounding case outlined in Chapter One
demonstrated the Customs and Excise officers' guidance specifying
the levels in the organisational hierarchy at which offers to
compound offences could be made and the criteria to be taken into
account in making such offers) this Chapter will examine several
of the theories regarding organisational behaviour produced by
social scientists to determine if they can add to our
2
comprehension of the nature and forms of guidance. Inevitably a
choice had to be exercised in the selection of these theories,
because of the numerous disciplines which have focussed upon the
3
features of organisational behaviour ; but this was undertaken
with an awareness of Campbell and Wiles warning about the dangers
/|
of "intellectual subcontraction" . The ensuing discussion
focuses mainly upon those sociologists who are grouped under the
banner heading of "organisation theorists""* (due to their
common concern with organisational behaviour), as the writings of
these different schools of thought appeared prima facie to offer
the greatest degree of relevancy and compatability with the
interests of lawyers studying administrative guidance. Moreover,
the former group's research often utilized case studies of
governmental bodies to discuss questions of internal and external
accountability, hierarchical authority and discipline. But as
Evan points out such a task is not easy because, "compared with
administrative law, the field of organization theory appears to
be highly abstract, diffuse, and even chaotic." With that
caveat in mind this examination will concentrate upon those
writers, and their respective schools of thought, which have
influenced both their own and succeeding generations of
scholars.
During the elaboration and evaluation of these theories we
shall first be seeking to discover the types of conceptions
developed by the theorists regarding the nature of complex
organisations (that is those organisations which have features
similar to central government departments e.g. large numbers of
members divided into distinct 'hierarchical' grades who are
engaged mainly upon administrative activities). In outlining
their conceptions an attempt will be made to briefly note the
major factors underlying their approaches (i.e. what were their
3
intellectual antecedents, to what extent have they rejected or
incorporated earlier conceptions of complex organisations, and
are there any trends towards convergence in these diverse
images?). Secondly, regard will be given to any accounts or
explanations of the forms, nature or significance of
administrative guidance in the theorists' conceptions; however,
these references will not be found in exactly the same
terminology as that used in this thesis and therefore broadly
7 8
synonymous terms such as "rules" , "management directives"
9
and "formal communications", must also be taken account of in
our analysis. Finally the following investigation will be
attentive to any possible categorisations of administrative
guidance by the writers which might be of value to administrative
lawyers. Now our objectives have been stated we can turn to an
intellectual chronology of the various schools' relevant ideas.
(a) Max Weber
It is probably no exaggeration to say that Weber provided the
foundation for modern sociological analysis of complex
organisations in his elaboration of one type of sophisticated
organisation - the bureaucracy. Reflecting his place in the
tradition of universalist scholars, he expounded upon
bureaucratic
organisations from a number of diverse perspectives, including,
their historical origins, the social status of members of
10
bureaucracies and the threat they posed to popular democracy.
However, for the purposes of this chapter his most interesting
considerations of bureaucracy are to be found in his value free
sociological writings, as opposed to his political observations
on the development of bureaucratic entities in early twentieth
century, post-Bismarck Germany. The breadth of Weber's writings,
-4-
combined with only a partial translation of the totality into
English, may account for the tendency of commentators to locate
his sociological thoughts upon bureaucracy in two distinct
analytical frameworks. First Albrow"^ together with CI egg and
12
Dunkerley discuss his treatment of bureaucracy in terms of an
explanation of the generic concept of Verband ("organisation"),
that is social entities composed of leaders, administrators and
members whose functions range from religious activities to
business enterprises. The second approach is to analyse
bureaucracies qua public administrative bodies within a
systematic classification of forms of political authority; this
13 14
framework has been utilized by Bend.ix , Blau and Scott and
Mouzelis^ amongst others. In the light of this work's
orientation the latter exposition is to be preferred because
there Weber was directly addressing his mind to the particular
constitutional characteristics of public administrations;
additionally this conceptual analysis has the advantage of direct
16
translations to aid our comprehension.
Weber stated that in all situations of "domination" political
leaders sought to promote an acceptance of their rule, by the
ruled, via the cultivation of a belief in its legitimacy. He
then defined three forms of legitimation each of which possessed
its own unique type of administration. "Charismatic" authority
was the product of the leader's personal qualities of "sanctity,
heroism or exemplory character" and as a consequence these often
temporary mass movements had unstable and .ill-organised
administrations; "Traditional" authority reflected the inherited
respect granted to a certain office, normally that of a Monarch.
In this system of socio-political relations Weber detailed two
forms of administration, firstly the "Patrimonial" where the
administrators were friends or servants of the ruler and
35
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therefore depended on his goodwill, and secondly the "Feudal" in
which case the administrators were influential individuals who
possessed power in their own right and by a contract with the
ruler exercised their powers on his behalf. Finally in the third
form of legitimacy, which most closely resembles Western
constitutional states^, it was a form of the Rule of Law
concept which provided justification and support for the ruler's
determination. In Weber's words legitimacy rests there,
"... on a belief in the 'legality' of patterns of normative
rules and the rights of those elevated to authority under
such rules to issue commands... obe<J^ence is owed to the
legally established impersonal order."
Under that system he detailed increasingly "rational" forms of
administration which will now be considered.
The most elementary, and therefore least rational, type of
administration was that of immediate democratic administration
where there were no full time administrators; instead the
members of the society implemented their own common rules as in
the early Swiss Cantons and New England Townships. Once the
society became larger and more heterogeneous a second type of
administration emerged which was staffed by "honoratiores";
these were persons whose economic position gave them the time
and prestige to act as quasi-permanent administrators. However,
as the tasks of administration become qualitatively and
quantitatively more complex the bureaucratic administrative
organisation developed. Weber never precisely defined this type
of organisation, although he referred to it as "a continuous
19
organization of official functions bound by rules." But he
did set out the characteristics of the most advanced kind of
bureaucracy - the Monocratic. These included, inter alia; a
6
hierarchy of offices; each office having clearly defined
authority; officials selected on the basis of technical
qualifications; on appointment their office becomes their main
occupation; the offices operate on the basis of written rules
and documents; impersonality governs the relations between
offices - the bureaucracy and the political ruler - the
bureaucracy and the ruled; there are career prospects within the
bureaucracy and the officials are remunerated by salaries.
Albrow notes of this ideal-type construction that it is,
"without doubt the single most important statement on the
subject in the Social Sciences, its influence has been
„ 20
immense .
The first question raised by Weber's analysis above is what
did he mean when he wrote of the "rationality" demonstrated by
bureaucratic administrative organisations? Some indication is
provided by his observation that,
"the fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with
other organizations exactly as doep^ the machine with the
non-mechanical modes of production."
As a result the majority of subsequent writers have taken
rationality to mean efficiency. Hence Mouzelis argues, "an
ideally rational organisation in the Weberian sense, is an
22
organisation performing its tasks with maximum efficiency.
This interpretation accords with the ideal Constitutional view of
bureaucracies contained in Weber's analysis where they are seen
as mere tools of their political masters, concerned only with
achieving their pre-set goals with the greatest speed and at the
least cost. But it has been disputed by Albrow who contends
that, "at the heart of Weber's idea of formal rationality was the
idea of correct calculation, in either numerical terms as with
the accountant or in logical terms, as with the lawyer." To
Albrow therefore, the central element in rationality was the
regular and measured application of the offical's appropriate
technical knowledge to the problems confronting the organisation.
Perhaps it is possible to attempt a reconciliation of these two
.interpretations by suggesting that decision-making based on the
consistent use of technical information and skills is one method
by which policy objectives may be achieved and hence it is a
hypothetically low cost - maximum return, i.e. efficient,
strategy u?ith the consequence that Albrow's interpretation is
merely a narrower form of the majority's view. Therefore in
accepting rationality as equivalent to efficiency Weber was
conceptualising bureaucracy as the most efficient form of public
administrative organisation to have been developed by mankind.
Our next task is to consider what component parts of Weber's
conception enabled this hypothetical efficiency to be achieved.
Undoubtedly one element of the equation was the officials'
knowledge of both the policies to be implemented and the skills
necessary for the smooth operation of the administrative process,
which were gained through a combination of pre-entry education
and subsequent work experience. But as Bendix explains a second
factor operated in symbiosis with the possession of expert
knowledge by the members of the bureaucracy and that was a body
of rules which governed the application and use of the
organisation's collective knowledge:
"the technical superiority of bureaucratic administration
therefore depends on its orientation towards impersonal rules
that enhance the uniform reliability and hence calculability
of its operation."2^
Similarly Mouzelis reveals that within Weber's bureaucracy,
"one finds a common, all pervasive element, the existence of
8
a system of control based on rational rules, rules which try
to regulate the whole organisational structure and process on
the basis of .technical knowledge and with the aim of maximum
efficiency."
Unfortunately Weber did not give much attention to an elaboration
of the nature of these rules and restricted himself to stating
2 6
that they "may be technical rules or norms" . His editor
Parsons simply suggests that the former type are concerned with
27
matters of efficiency whilst the others are not. Albrow by
contrast interprets Weber's categories as corresponding to
28
technical and legal rules. The difference between these two
commentators' positions may not be great, because "norms" and
"legal rules" both imply commands having their origins outside
the bureaucracy itself. This is in accordance with Weber's
analytical framework where the administration is subject to a
political sovereign's will and a Constitutional system operating
under the Rule of Law. On the other hand "technical rules"
suggests control of officials by expert knowledge and as Weber
believed,
"bureaucratic administration always tends to be an
administration of 'secret sessions', in so far ^ it can, it
hides its knowledge and action from criticism."
This may indicate that such technical knowledge can only be
possessed by other officials of the same bureaucracy thereby
giving these rules an internal dimension. However, it is
probably fruitless to continue speculating over the functional
and legal nature of these rules as perceived by Weber, because in
the above writings he was not primarily interested in this aspect
of his conception of bureaucracy but was utilizing it as a
classificatory device for forms of political domination and their
associated administrative structures.
To conclude this brief examination of Weber's bureaucracy it
9
must be noted that in his view rules play a central and strategic
role in shaping the nature of the organisation and its
achievement of rational decision-making. The rules appear to
have origins both within (technical rules) and outside
(norms/legal rules) the organisation, and regulate internal
relations between officials together with external interactions
involving the political sovereign and the individual members of
the society. It is the internal rules of the bureaucracy which
enables the collective wisdom of the organisation to be applied
dispassionately, impersonally and consistently with the
consequent outcome of rational administration. However, we must
appreciate that Weber's analysis was presented within an
.ideal-type format so as to enable reality to be evaluated against
a theoretical conception of a complex administrate ^ C
organisation. As Blau and Meyer observed of Weber's concept, it
was "a pure type, derived by abstracting the most
characteristic bureaucratic aspects of all known
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organisations". Therefore, as the ideal-type was articulated
within an environment of perfect co-ordination and balance
between the constitutional elements of sovereign, administration
and citizens, with an absence of human emotions affecting these
relationships, it is clear that Weber's framework must not be
treated as an actual blueprint for contemporary society. But it
was inevitable that subsequent writers would seek to examine the
extent to which elements of Weber's concept of bureaucracy could
be applied to existing complex organisations, and also to
question the logical integrity of his ideal-type construction.
Regarding this former development of Weber's analysis we shall
now engage in an overview of the scientific, and Human Relations,
schools of thought.
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(b) The Scientific School
As this expository sketch will reveal, the
nomenclature assigned to the school by its founder Frederick
Winslow Taylor nowadays appears rather ironic. However, these
writers merit inclusion in our examination as they represent the
next phase in the evolution of organisation theory. The members
of the school all possessed vastly different intellectual
backgrounds from that of Weber, with their common heritage being
a successful managerial past. Furthermore their orientation was
distinct from his in that they were concerned with promoting the
efficiency of individual organisations in the real world. But
despite these significant differences they appropriated elements
of Weber's ideal-type and principles of organisational
construction. In Self's words, the "traditional theorists tended
to regard staff as so many 'hands' or 'brains', who would respond
r 31
predictably to well desired rules or to economic incentives".
Consequently Taylor and his successors unquestioningly promoted
the idea that large commercial organisations were composed of
hierarchically arranged groups of workers, who lacked personal
feelings and could be as easily manipulated by trained managers
in the interests of increased profitability as pieces of capital
equipment.
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Taylor produced a synthesis of techniques for managements
to measure the activities of their shopfloor workers via time and
motion studies which he considered provided a scientific
foundation for the designing of organisational forms, hence his
choice of title for this school. In his analysis the major
sanction available to management for the control of their
subordinates' behaviour was that of economic rewards. Henri
3 3Fayol expanded the ambit of the above approach by arguing
that the administrative portion of large organisations could also
4 \
be subject to systematic examination for the purpose of
introducing the most efficient structures. Derived from his
years in business management he proposed a series of intuitive
principles, such as the need to develop an esprit de corps, which
were directed at creating, "...the kind of formal structure that
the head of a firm should develop as an instrument of his
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will." Subsequently Gulick and Urwick sought to apply
similar "scientific principles" distilled from successful
business organisations to the functioning of public
administrative bodies. However, they adapted their predecessors'
reliance on economic incentives to control subordinate members'
behaviour by stressing the importance of disciplinary rules in
these types of organisations where remuneration was based on the
grade of office held rather than on material outputs.
3 6
Although Subramaniam has devastatingly criticised these
writers for their "unsophistication" regarding the nature of
organisational structures and behaviour, together with their
"bias" in favour of a managerial perspective upon life in complex
organisations, even in recent times their views have continued to
receive influential attent.iveness (e.g. from the Fulton
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Committee on the Civil Service). Nevertheless from our
perspective the significance of this school's contribution to
organisation theory was less in the substance of its members'
principles and techniques of scientific management than in the
shift towards empirical investigations into organisational
behaviour that they prompted.
(c) The Human Relations School
While this school of thought was eventually to spawn many
distinct offspring they all originated from the research
undertaken at the Western Electric Company's Hawthorne plant
during the late Nineteen Twenties. According to CIegg and
undertaken because production methods based on the Scientific
School's ideas had started to result in the alienation of the
labour force, therefore management was looking for new strategies
to regulate their employees' productivity. Between 1927-1932
Elton Mayo supervised the inquiries undertaken by Roethlisberger
and Dickson, which involved observation and survey questioning of
different sections of the workforce. The eventual results of the
study suggested that the workers' motivations were far more
catholic than the simple material avarice assumed by the
scientific writers. As Brown and Steel concluded,
"the human relations school forced organisational theorists
to recogq^se the importance of private and group
objectives ."
Secondly the Hawthorne data demonstrated the diversity of
behaviour at the work group level, with the "bank wiring room"
personnel's activities achieving academic immortality. At a
more general level of analysis these results indicated the
narrowness and incompleteness of the Scientific School's
conception of organisational behaviour, where individuals were
essentially conceived as malleable components in a large
machine.
Subsequently the above discoveries have been incorporated
within the concept of the informal organisation which Mouzel.is
describes as referring,
"...to values and to patterns of behaviour which are not
instigated by formal rules and policies but arise naturally
from the interaction of people working together."^
Therefore, the Human Relations School's major contribution to the
Dunkerley
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this investigation into workers' motivations was
13
body of knowledge possessed by organisation theory was to provide
the tentative empirical and conceptual basis for an understanding
of the actual social reality found within complex organisations.
However their enunication of the concept of the informal
organisation must be comprehended with regard to the following
caveats. First, the behaviour which constitutes the informal
organisation can only occur within the context of a set of
deliberately created social relationships, i.e. the formal
organisation, as it is in reaction to the latter relationships
that the former develops; consequently the informal organisation
is a complementary not a substitute concept to the formal
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organisation. Secondly, from the sociological perspective
there is the great danger of commentators adopting a normative
position when contrasting these two conceptual views of the
organisation, in that either the behaviour amounting to the
informal organisation is perceived as deviant from that
prescribed by the formal organisation's rules, or the informal
organisation is seen as the actual social organisation and the
formal one a mere myth. But as Blau and Scott observe,
"the distinction between the formal and informal aspects of
organizational life is only an analytical one ancj^should not
be rigid; there is only one actual organization".
Within the next section we shall examine how the conceptual
analysis of complex organisations in terms of the relationship
between their formal and informal parts has developed since the
discoveries of the Human Relations writers.
(d.) The Post-Weberian School
This group of researchers began their theoretical and
empirical investigations into the nature of complex organisations
in the years following upon the ending of World War Two. They
warrant their designation because all the members observed
Weber's approach to sociological research by attempting to
provide a value free analysis, which was in contradistinction to
the one-sided attitudes of the Scientific and Human Relations
Schools. However, their level of analysis differed from that of
Weber's, as the members of this school concentrated upon the
individual organisation, hence the reliance on the case study in
their research publications. Furthermore, although this school
utilized their intellectual ancestor's ideal-type of bureaucracy
in their examinations of specific organisations, they did not do
so uncritically. Indeed the work of this school began with a
theoretical challenge to the logical integrity of Weber's
ideal-type which we shall now consider.
The modern progenitor of this school was an American
sociologist, Robert Merton, who suggested that when Weber's
ideal-type of bureaucracy was transferred into the actual living
world it might have serious dysfunctions. He hypothesised that
certain fundamental structural features of Weber's ideal-type,
notably the strict discipline and career prospects which were
designed to ensure consistency in behaviour, might in practice
encourage the officials to adopt non-rational forms of
decision-making. In his words,
"Adherence to the rules, originally conceived as a means,
becomes transformed into an end in itself; there occurs the
familiar process of displacement of goals whereby 'an
instrumental value becomes a terminal value'... This may be
exaggerated to the point where primary concern with
conformity to the rules interferes with the achievement of
the purposes of the organization, in which case we have the
familiar phenomenon of the tec.hnicism or red tape of the
official."^3
Therefore, he proposed further empirical research into the
effects of bureaucracy upon personality in actual organisational
settings.
Peter Blau took up Merton's hypothesis in his investigation
into a state employment agency and a Federal Law enforcement
body. But he came to the conclusion that it was not the
structure of bureaucracy per se which encouraged goal
displacement, but the presence of insecurity within the
organisation. To him,
"these findings suggest that ritualism results not so much
from overidentification with rules and strong habituation to
established practices as from lack of security in important
social relationships in the organization."
He also found from his case studies that, "...officials who have
most fully incorporated the existing normative structure into
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their own thinking can most easily depart from it." These
findings lead to the conclusion that actual organisations with
structures resembling Weber's ideal-type are capable of producing
well adjusted and secure officials who may be just as likely to
seek the achievement and positive succession of goals as they are
to decline into the negative pattern of goal displacement. The
other important theme of Blau's book is that bureaucratic
organisations contain perpetually dynamic social processes. From
his researches he determined that,
"the only permanence in bureaucratic structures is the
occurrence of change in prec^ctable patterns; and even these
are not unalterably fixed".
These patterns amounted to a never ending series of actions and
re-actions between those senior members of the organisation who
sought to control the activities of their subordinates by formal
rules and the latter's reaction to such rules. He classified
the subordinates' behaviour as "adjustment" when they pursued
the goals of the formal rulers by different but more effective
means, or "redefinition" when they used the procedures
46.
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established by the rules for ulterior objectives, with the
superiors responding by "amplification" of their original rules
to take account of the "adjustment" or "redefinition" which had
occurred and thereby initiating the cycle again. Consequently
Blau concluded, "perfect adjustment is hardly possible, because
the very practices instituted to enhance adjustment in some
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respects often disturb it in others".
Michel Crozier continued the study of the internal dynamics
of bureaucratic organisations by emphasising the distribution of
power between entities within the membership because,
"the behaviour and attitudes of people and groups within an
organisation cannot be explained without ^^ference to the
power relationships existing amongst them".
He based the above assertion on his investigation into the nature
of social relations within the French state tobacco monopoly,
which demonstrated an extremely centralised structure with the
head office in Paris seeking to regulate all significant
decisions at production plant level via managerial directives and
rules. Crozier discovered that at the factory level the group of
workers
who could best control the areas of uncertainty left untouched by
the central directives exercised de facto power over other
workers, who might be above or below them in the formal
organisational hierarchy. In fact it was the machine maintenance
men who had helped create, and then controlled, the largest
source of remaining uncertainty which involved equipment
breakdowns. This group then used their de facto power to extend
their hegemony over the production workers and lower supervisors
together with invoking it as a method of insulation from
managerial control. Consequently Crozier was revealing a
conflictual model of bureaucratic relations in which,
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"every group fights to preserve and enlarge the area upon
which it has some discretion, attempts to limit its
dependence upon other groups and to accept such dependence
only insofar as it is a safeguard against another and more
feared one, and finally prefers retreatism if there is no
other choice but submission".
There he demonstrated the increasing maturity of the sociological
study of organisations compared to the earlier Scientific and
Human Relations schools work, where ideological biases prevented
them from acknowledging that such internal conflict could exist
within bureaucracies.
For the purposes of this chapter the relevant link between
the analyses of Crozier and Blau is that they both see the formal
rules of the organisation as establishing the boundaries to the
informal processes of the members. In Crozier's study the
central directives attempted to confine plant discretions which
in turn provided the battlefields for inter group power
struggles, whilst in Blau's case studies the evolving cycles of
amplification, redefinition, adaptation, amplification etc.
revolved around the rules promulgated by senior management.
These analyses thus demonstrate the enduring significance of
rules within the operations of complex organisations whilst
drawing our attention to some of the other strategic internal
social forces impinging upon those rules and to their frequent
alterations in the intended effects of the rules. However, the
range of these forces combined with their different permutations
between distinct organisational settings, and over time, means
that this school is unable to produce a model of organisational
behaviour which will allow any form of prediction about the
likely effects of specific rules governing particular
bureaucracies.
Yet even the analyses of organisational life presented by the
above writers do not reflect the full complexity of bureaucratic
administration according to this school, because they omit any
discussion of the external forces interacting with the relevant
organisation. Therefore it was left to Philip Selznick in his
classic study of the Tennessee Valley Authority to demonstrate
the importance of the social environment in which an organisation
existed. He examined the ways in which the Authority adapted its
programmes to the demands of influential groups, such as the
pre-existing large wealthy farmers, in order to strike a balance
between the formal authority of the administration and the power
possessed by these groupings. For him the mechanism of
"co-optation", which he defined as, "...the process of absorbing
new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure
of an organization as a means of averting threats to its
stability or existence," was central to the Authority's
ability to reach accords with potentially hostile external
bodies. Consequently Selznick's study indicates that if we wish
to gain an accurate picture of the totality of social forces
influencing organisational behaviour, attention must be paid to
external as well as internal factors.
To summarise the findings of this school which are most
relevant to our enquiry, we can begin by noting that when the
researchers transferred elements of Weber's ideal-type
bureaucracy into the real world, where individuals possessed
emotions and conflict was present within and outside
organisations, they discovered that the use of disciplinary rules
to govern subordinate officials' decision-making did not
necessarily lead to Merton's suggested dysfunctioning. Secondly,
and on a related theme, their case studies demonstrated that the
informal processes of the organisation did not automatically
present a threat to the rationality/efficiency of bureaucracies
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as they might encourage the increased achievement of formal
goals, e.g. via Blau's "adjustment", instead of undermining the
rationality of bureaucratic administration. Consequently
judgments regarding the effects of informal processes on
organisational functioning can only be made for individual
organisations. Furthermore, because these research findings
reveal the dynamic nature of social relations within
bureaucracies, determinations on the effects of informal process
are only valid for the time period during which the examination
was undertaken. Thirdly, derived from the researcher's need to
utilize the case study method in order to ascertain the multitude
of factors affecting organisational behaviour, difficulties arise
concerning the ability to deduce general theoretical insights
from widely differing examples. However, by indicating the
staggering complexity of behaviour within a heterogeneous
collection of bureaucratic organisations, this school's work
provides lawyers with a vivid warning of the difficulties they
face in trying to regulate public bureaucracies with the
institutions and doctrines presently at their disposal.
From the schools of thought discussed so far we have seen a
variety of approaches to the study of organisations. Therefore,
to conclude this review consideration will be given to the ideas
of two theorists who each claimed to have produced grand
integrating concepts of organisations which overcame the
intellectual limitations of the earlier schools.
(e) Simon and Decision-Making
Herbert Simon claimed ^1 ^at conceptualisation of
administration as decision-making had its eclectic origins in
Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy, the Human Rsz/oTiSn^ school's
articulation of the informal aspects of organisational behaviour
So.
-20-
and Chester Barnard's theories regarding incentives in public
administration. He believed that administrators were primarily
concerned with decision-making, but undertook this task with
"bounded rationality" as they generally possessed incomplete
knowledge and only sought to reach decisions that were
satisfactory to their superiors, rather than strive for those
which maximised the attainment of the administration's goals.
The function of the administrative organisation in this scheme
was to provide the structural support for decision-making, by
creating an environment conducive to rationality; this was
achieved via external .influences upon the individual
administrator (e.g. the exercise of authority by superiors) and
internal conditioning (e.g. through training). Central attention
was given to the organisation's role in creating a comprehensive
communications network between the various levels and members of
the administration. In Simon's own words,
"... the administrative processes are decisional processes;
they consist in segregating certain elements in the
decisions of members of the organization, and establishing
regular organizational procedures to select and determine
these elera^gts and t0 communicate them to the members
concerned."
These processes were of two types, formal and informal. The
former category was composed of formal rules in the guise of
memoranda, files, records and manuals, whose purpose he defined
thus, "the function of manuals is to communicate those
organization practices which are intended to have relatively
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permanent application." The category of informal
communications clearly demonstrates how Simon was attempting to
synthesise existing approaches towards organisations within a new
framework, which in this instance fused the ideas of Weber and
the Scientific school with those of the Human Relations
researchers. As Simon declared,
"no matter how elaborate a system of formal communications
is set up in the organization, this system will always be
supplemented by informal channels... the informal
communications system is built around tl^ social
relationships of the members of the organization".
One outcome of Simon's theory was the rev.italisat.ion of the
significance given to the formal organization and its methods of
affecting officials' behaviour, compared to their nadir in the
eyes of the early Human Relations writers. Hence Simon
considered that junior officials should have their
decision-making guided by direct constraints, eg. instruction
manuals (which followed the ideas of Weber and the Scientific
School); but these were to be supplemented by other techniques,
such as training courses, whose usefulness was derived from the
recent discoveries regarding the informal needs and behaviour
patterns of officials within bureaucracies. However, Simon's
concept of the administrative organisation as a decision - making
structure also presents a number of difficulties of both a
theoretical and practical nature. In the first category the
danger of over-emphasising one aspect of organisational life with
a consequent reduction in the attention given to other facets
threatens the validity and utility of Simon's analysis, just as
individual members of the Post-Weberian school risked similar
criticism for their concentration on particular social forces,
eg. Blau on dynamics and Crozier on power. For example, in his
evaluation of Simon's theory Self observed that, "rules of
organization are viewed as no more than flexible devices for
producing satisfactory decisions"^
^ nQfc t^e ruies
created by a complex organisation are directly concerned with
structuring administrative decision-making (to take an extreme
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example, the Civil Service guidance which specifies the office
facilities and furniture available to the varied grades of civil
servants). Secondly it has been claimed that Simon's purported
description of an administrator is not accurate as, "it
postulates a degree of open-mindedness, and a readiness to
explore the costs and consequences of alternatives which cannot
realistically be postulated of an executive, whether he be a
politician or career official.The implication is that
Simon's analysis is based upon normative rather than descriptive
assumptions.
Simon sought to integrate a variety of ideas regarding
organisations through focusing upon the individual decision
maker; in our final examination of attempts to produce general
synthesising theories we shall consider the systems concept
which operates at the opposite extreme with a high degree of
generality.
(f) Parsons and Systems Theory
This chapter has already obliquely referred to the major
theorist in this school, Talcott Parsons, through his translation
and editorship of one of Weber's works. In his important
article on organisations Parsons sought to apply some of the
general categorisations and theoretical insights developed by
sociology to this particular field of study, with the objective
of providing an analytical framework that was capable of
encompassing all forms of organisations in diverse societies.
To that end he conceived the organisation,
"
... as a social system composed of various subsystems




Although Parsons did not explicitly define the meaning to be
ascribed to "social system" in this particular piece of work, he
presumably intended it to have its general sociological usage
which Clegg and Dunkerley give as "a description of a group
of phenomena that is interdependent in such a way that it carries
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out some task or strives to achieve a common goal". He
considered that all social systems had to satisfy four functions
if they were to ^Hrvive, these were "adaptation",
"implementation", "integration" and "pattern maintenance". In
the context of organisations Parsons stated that adaptation
involved acquiring and processing the traditional economic
factors of production (viz. land, labour and capital);
implementation meant devising strategies for the achievement of
the organisation's goals; integration the co-ordinating of
actions and settling of disputes; and finally pattern maintenance
covered the application of general social values (e.g. moral or
cultural) to internal and external organisational relations.
These different functions were allocated between three levels
within the organisation - the "technical", being composed
essentially of manual operatives, were responsible for
adaptation; the "managerial" dealt with implementation and
integration, whilst the "institutional" which covered groups such
as boards of directors tackled pattern maintenance.
Parsons believed that one virtue of his analysis was that it
enabled the above classifications to be used to examine the link
between individual organisations at the next level of generality
- the societal. Hence,
"it seemed appropriate to define an organisation as a social
system which is organised for the attainment of a particular
type of goal; the attainment of that goal is at the same time
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the performance of a type of .function on behalf of a more
inclusive system, the society".
So he was using the concept of a social system in a manner
analogous to a set of Russian dolls, with society representing
the largest doll and the individual organisation one of the
smaller dolls. Each organisation had to satisfy all four
functions upon which the existence of a social system depended,
but from the perspective of the highest order social system - the
society - individual organisations could be classified according
to which one of the four tasks they were performing on behalf of
that social system. Consequently Parsons considered adaptat.ional
activities would be undertaken by business organisations;
implementational via governmental organisations; integrative
through conflict resolving organisations (such as the courts) and
pattern maintenance through cultural organisations (e.g. the
churches). Subsequently Parker and Subramaniam have developed
this analysis as a suggested basis for distinguishing between
"public" and "private" administration which they consider
superior to the traditional instrumental theories of public
administration. They believed that public bodies could be
separated from other organisations in society through their
specialisation "in the process of integration and allocation for
6 0
the society as a whole" , which naturally gave
them a pre-eminent role in regulating the activities of other
organisations.
In Mouzelis' opinion the analysis produced by Parsons had
the advantages of encompassing the various levels of social
action within individual organisations from the work group, as
studied by the Human Relations researchers, to the whole
organisation, which was the domain of the Post Weberians.
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Furthermore the systems approach took cognisance of the
external environment surrounding individual organisations by
examining their relationships with other organisations and the
society as a totality. However, the co nverse aspect of these
achievements is reflected in Blau and Scott's criticism that
Parsons'
"
... extremely abstract conceptions yield a theoretical
scheme devoid of a system of propositions from which
specific hypotheses can be derived; in short, he has only
develope^ a theoretical framework and not a substantive
theory."
While that conclusion may not invalidate the general value of
Parsons' work it buttresses our disappointment that he did not
discuss the role(s) of rules within the various levels of social
systems incorporated in his analysis; presumably the omission
was required by the generality of his coverage but the
willingness of the other schools of thought to tackle the issue
needs to be borne in mind.
Conclusion
In this section of the chapter we shall try and answer the
three questions posed at the beginning concerning the theorists'
ideas on complex organisations and the relevance of
administrative guidance for understanding organisational
behaviour, together with establshing some tentative suggestions
l>
regarding administrative law's future response towards
administrative guidance derived from the work of these writers.
The first question we raised was how did the theorists
conceive of complex organisations in conceptual terms?
Undoubtedly the short answer is - with diversity, because the
5b
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different schools of thought viewed such organisations as, inter
alia, human machines, decision-making bodies and social systems.
These varied concepts were the product of the divergent
orientations and levels of analysis utilized by the theorists,
with the consequence that the separate schools of thought based
their conceptions on distinct perspectives which both revealed
and concealed a range of facets of organisational life.
Regarding the orientation of the theorists towards the study of
organisations, Weber and the Post-Weberians believed that the
researcher should suspend his normative beliefs and seek to
create a value-free analysis of the particular organisation being
studied. In contrast the scientific school and Human Relations
writers possessed unashamedly pro-managerial attitudes which at
first prevented them from accepting the social needs of junior
members of bureaucracies and then later limited their ability to
incorporate the notion of conflict within their concepts of
organisations. As for the di^rent levels of
analysis chosen by the theorists they covered the spectrum from
Parsons and Weber examining organisations at the societal level,
to Simon concentrating upon the individual decision maker within
an administrative organisation. Between these extremes the
Post-Weberians together with the Scientific school focussed upon
the single organisation, whilst the Human Relations researchers
preferred the work group level. Therefore, recognising these
different research perspectives, we must acknowledge the
impossibility of integrating such heterogeneous concepts within
any synthesising theory on the nature of complex
6 2organisations.° Simon does not provide such a theory through
the narrowness of his decision-making approach and Parsons does
not, due to the abstractness of his systems theory. However, it
is possible to discern several common elements in the various
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conceptions articulated by the different schools of thought. One
standard component is that of a hierarchically arranged structure
with those members in the highest grades having formal authority
over those below them in the hierarchy. Weber, the scientific
school, the Post-Weberians and Simon all incorporated this
feature within their distinct conceptions. Furthermore, from the
Human Relations school onwards, the theorists sought to
incorporate the characteristic of dynamics into their images of
complex organisations; hence it was no longer permissible to view
the organisation solely in terms of the formal hierarchy of
authority, but internal struggles for power and independence were
acknowledged, along with external influences upon organisational
behaviour. Consequently the theorists demonstrated the continual
need to widen the scope of social
forces included within the analysis in order to produce an
accurate picture of organisational life. This trend towards
extending the variables considered by individual theorists has
had a profound effect upon their treatment of administrative
guidance as we shall discover next.
The second question asked at the beginning of this chapter
was concerned with the nature and significance of administrative
guidance (or its equivalent) in the theorists' conceptions. We
can now answer that all the theorists with the exceptions of the
Human Relations School and Parsons made specific references to
administrative guidance (usually in the form of internal rules
and instructions) in their analyses. This reflects their
collective view that administrative guidance was a significant
factor affecting individuals' behaviour within complex
organisations; additional weight is given to that conclusion
when we take into account the variety of orientations and levels
58.
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of analysis adopted by the theorists with the majority still
incorporating aspects of administrative guidance into their
distinct concepts. Furthermore, their conceptions revealed a
degree of commonality of treatment towards administrative
guidance, with the phenomenon being closely associated with the
hierarchical nature of complex organisations as senior members
of the organisation utilized it to regulate the behaviour of
subordinates in order to attain the formal goals of the
organisation in more rational ways. For Weber and the
Scientific School administrative guidance in the guise of rules
contained commands from the senior staff to the junior members,
whereas Simon broadened the idea of formal communications beyond
superiors' orders into the realms of regulation by education and
information conveying.
However, as organisation theory has evolved the theorists
have sought to comprehend and explain the totality of behaviour
patterns discovered within organisations and therefore they have
increased the range of social variables influencing these
patters recognised by their analyses. One consequence of this
k
development has been a reduction in the prominence given to
administrative guidance in the later conceptions. Hence, Weber
in his ideal-type bureaucracy conceived of rules as the basic
method of regulating officials' behaviour. Inter alia, they
established the duties of individual officials, specified the
relationship between officials throughout the hierarchy and
determined the manner in which officials were to interact with
members of the public when engaged upon governmental business.
Subsequently the Scientific School in their somewhat
authoritarian concept of the organisation machine viewed economic
incentives and disciplinary rules as the two major mechanisms
5<V
for controlling subordinate staff. But by the era of the
Post-Weberians the researchers' attentions were captivated by
the informal aspect of organisational life, with their case
studies emphasising these hitherto relatively neglected
behaviour patterns. Therefore the features of internal rules
tended to be taken for granted, whilst the intellectual
spotlight was cast upon intra and inter organisation struggles,
the pursuit of individual and group objectives, and the process
of constant change in the social relations between members of
the organisation. Simon did reiterate the importance of the
formal organisation and its rules in his writings, but there
they were subsumed, along with virtually all other
characteristics of organisational life, by the function of
decision-making.
From the discussions above we can conclude that, almost
irrespective of the way in which complex organisations are
conceptualised, what this thesis calls administrative guidance
forms an elementary component of the concepts thereby produced
because of its prevalence and significance in the functioning of
actual bureaucracies. Nevertheless we have learnt from the
Human Relations School that organisation theorists no longer
consider it accurate to comprehend the organisation purely in
terms of its formal structure. Therefore, as administrative
guidance is undoubtedly the product of deliberate human effort
and consequently a part of the formal organisation, behaviour
patterns in bureaucracies cannot be explained solely by
reference to administrative guidance. Accordingly the Post
Weberians' analyses of their individual case studies seek to
demonstrate that one cannot expect actual officials to
unquestioningly follow the administrative guidance promulgated
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by their superiors (unlike the assumptions of Weber and the
Scientific School), nor is it possible to predict the practical
effects of administrative guidance upon officials by only
considering the formal distribution of authority within the
organisation. Consequently, from that perspective, if we wish to
discover how existing administrative guidance really affects
particular civil servants we must conduct our own empirical
investigations. These findings are of potentially great
relevance to lawyers trying to understand the implications of
administrative guidance for contemporary judicial and other
grievance handling agencies' reactions to the phenomenon.
Therefore, after seeking to answer the third question posed of
our examination into the writings on organisation theory, we
shall conclude this chapter by considering how these writings
should influence both our future research on administrative
guidance and the attitudes of administrative law to it.
Our third question was directed at discovering if the
organisation theorists had produced any classifications of
administrative guidance which might enlighten administrative
lawyers on the nature of the phenomenon. Unfortunately for us
the succinct answer is no, as the above theorists did not
consider this issue a fundamental one from the orientations of
their analyses. Understandably, .in the light of our previous
deliberations, the Human Relations and Post-Weberian schools of
thought concentrated upon the informal as opposed to the formal
aspects of organisational life thereby restricting any
discussion of the forms taken by formal rules. Moreover, the
other theorists who dwelt upon the formal organisation were
governed by the objectives underlying their conceptions, hence
Parsons' desire to provide an integrating analytic framework
resulted in his adopting a degree of abstraction which prevented
any evaluation of administrative guidance and similarly the
Scientific School's aim of creating universal principles to
regulate the construction of organisational structures diverted
their attention away from the forms of administrative guidance
found in complex organisations. As we discussed earlier in this
chapter Weber's purpose of utilizing his ideal-type bureaucracy
to distinguish between different administrative organisations
meant that he did not expand on his observation that the rules
regulating officials were either "technical rules or norms".
Furthermore Simon's concept of decision-making meant that in his
writings all types of administrative guidance were subservient to
that activity; however, the ' fact that he considered "formal
communications" to be composed of inter alia, manuals, memoranda
and files, is important for our definition of administrative
guidance (cf Chapter One) because it reaffirms both the diversity
in physical forms of these provisions, together with their varied
contents ranging from specific rules, to texts explaining the
objectives of particular administrative schemes to junior
officials.
We must conclude our answer to question three by noting that
the assumptions underlying the
question over-optim.istically expected the organisation theorists
to possess similar interests to those of administrative lawyers
and therefore to embrace co-extensive quests. Additionally, as
we shall discover later (see the Prelude to Chapter Five), to
create a classification which seeks to clarify the responses of
the legal system towards administrative guidance requires a
fusion of organisational and legal insights which it would be
unreasonable to expect of the organisational theorists.
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Turning finally to the general implications of the theorists'
ideas for this research we should note that despite the range of
concepts regarding the nature of complex organisations produced
by the distinct schools of thought, the majority of the members
examined reserved a place for administrative guidance in their
analyses, thereby reflecting their common acceptance of its
significance as an important factor affecting behaviour within
such organisations. Therefore, we can argue on the basis of this
widespread recognition of administrative guidance that it
represents a fundamental feature of bureaucratic administration
and that so long as central government departments demonstrate
features resembling this form of organisational structure (i.e.
large numbers of staff, ordered hierarchically and formally
working towards the attainment of official goals) these
provisions will need to exist as one of the basic regulators of
officials' behaviour. Consequently if British administrative law
is going to provide effective and workable remedies for citizens
who are aggrieved about the ways in which civil servants' conduct
governed by administrative guidance, has affected them, it must
accept the inevitability of the existence of such guidance and
direct its energies to elaborating principled responses to the
phenomenon. This development is not only required because of the
practical demands of enabling the redress of citizens' legitimate
grievances, but is also mandated by the theoreticl necessity for
administrative law to encompass the range of norms currently
be clearly developed so that citizens can know inter alia what
types of guidance are acceptable to the law and what forms are
not, the different grounds for challenging the legality of
guidance, and the circumstances in which legal enforcement of
regulating official decision-making. The legal reaction must
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guidanc.e is possible. Furthermore taking account of the
Post-Weberians' disclosures regarding the subtleties of
organisational dynamics and the complex roles of administrative
guidance within those processes it would be unreasonable to
expect all the grievance handling agencies to be capable of
achieving similar penetrations into the details of the actual
administrative process; but these institutional limitations
should not prevent the Courts, the P.C.A. and Tribunals from
operating within a common appreciation of the nature of
administrative guidance nor even of evolving related responses
to the different types of guidance.
Although we have argued above that many of the writings
discussed in this chapter have acknowledged the importance of
administrative guidance as r a factor governing organisational
behaviour, the findings of the Post-Weberian school also
revealed that it is only possible to assess the degree of
influence exerted by specific guidance on particular officials
by conducting wide ranging field studies into the relevant
bureaucracy's operations. As British administrative law
desperately needs such information in order to enlighten itself
regarding the forms, uses, and intra departmental attitudes
towards guidance the next chapter will present the results of a
modest investigation into one department's utilization of
administrative guidance.
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STUDENT GRANTS IN SOGtCLflND : A CASE-STUDY OF A GOVERNMENTAL
PROGRAMME'S USE GF AdtLNISTRATIVE GUIDANCE
Introduction
In the previous chapter we saw how many of the organisation
theorists incorporated those provisions which this thesis terms
administrative guidance, into their diverse conceptions of
bureaucratic organisation. A degree of congruence was detected
in their treatment of the phenomenon when a comparative
examination revealed that Weber, the Scientific School,
Post-Weberians, and Simon, all viewed administrative guidance as
a device for regulating officials' behaviour in order to secure
the efficient achievement of the organisation's goals. However,
in the light of the Post-Vfeberians' discoveries regarding the
complexities of actual behaviour within bureaucracies caused by
the continual reactions between formal and informal processes, it
became clear that to go beyond the above generalised explanation
of administrative guidance necessitated empirical investigation
into the features, forms and effects of these provisions as found
in present day central government administration. Therefore,
this chapter contains the results of a fieldwork case-study"'" into
the Scottish Education Department's operation of the students'
Allowances Scheme (hereafter for brevity referred to as
the Scheme) which disclose, inter alia, the tasks assigned to
administrative guidance by the Department; the nature of their
guidance; how the different grades of civil servants reacted to
it; the extent to which the guidance affected the outside world;
and how dissatisfied citizens have challenged the contents and
application of this particular regime of administrative
guidance.
The Department's administration of the scheme was selected
for study because of a range of attributes it possessed. First,
the intrinsic importance of the scheme for many individuals,
groups and institutions in society, including students (and
their parents) who received a total of £63 million in allownaces
during 1981-2, and institutions of higher education which were
paid £52 millions in fees during the same year under the ambit
2
of the Scheme. Secondly, as the Scheme involved direct
administration by the Department it offered the possibility of
examining the roles of administrative guidance regarding both
policy formulation and the subsequent implementation of those
policies by the same government department. Thirdly, the fact
that the Scheme was administered by one organisation housed in a
single building (the Awards Branch of the Scottish Education
Department) reduced the problems associated with ensuring that
the officials interviewed and observed were representative of
all those engaged in the relevant activities. Fourthly, whilst
no previous academic research had been carried out into the
operations of the Branch there were indications frcm other
sources (namely reported investigations by the P.C.A. and the
Branch's annual guide to the Scheme) that administrative
guidance appeared to be a significant factor in the processes of
Branch decision-making. Finally, despite Professor K.C. Davis'
assertion of the ease with which research into British central
departments might be undertaken -
"I could go to a building, look at the directory in the
entrance hall, select an administrator, go to his office,
introduce myself, explain that I had questions to ask, get
him interested in the questions, be given information on
almost any subject not properly considered confidential,
develop sane interplay of minds, and even be invited back
for further sessions" -
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our civil service is not noted for its openness, and
therefore the practical possibility of being able to undertake
research within the Branch encouraged the selection of this
programme for investigation.
(1) Background to the Administration of the Scheme by the Awards
Branch
Prior to analysing the current administration of the Scheme
by the Branch, it is desirable to consider briefly the previous
Scottish system of public grants for full time degree level
students, as the implementation of that programme had a profound
effect on the contemporary situation. During the post-war
period grants to students attending institutions of higher
education were payable at the discretion of local education
authorities. Under section 43 of the Education (Scotland) Act
1946, Scottish education authorities were empowered to pay
allowances to persons over school age and resident in their
areas so that they might, " ... take advantage, without
financial hardship to themselves or their parents, of any
educational facilities available to them ... " This power
was subject to annual regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of State under the above statute. However, these regulations
did not affect the substantive discretion of the education
authority; they merely set out what types of payments should be
made (e.g. matriculation and class fees), together with those
which could be made (e.g. food allowances) if the authority
decided to award a grant under section 43 of the 1946 Act.
By the late Nineteen Fifties, university numbers in Britain
had doubled to around 100,000 students and this increase coupled
with developing concerns over discrepancies between education
authorities' award practices encouraged the Secretary of State
for Education (with responsibility for England and Wales) and
the Secretary of State for Scotland to establish a joint
committee to review the systems of student grants. The Anderson
Report"7 was published in 1960 and reflected an optimistic and
expansionist attitude towards the financing of higher
educational study. It recommended that one coherent national
policy govern all applications for degree level grants and that
such a policy should include the following principles: similar
treatment for males and females, freedom for the applicant to
choose between heme or away study, and the absence of
discrimination between courses. Regarding the administration of
student grants the Committee stressed the requirement of
"equivalent treatment" of applicants because,
"
... uniformity alone cannot secure fair treatment for all.
As we have already shown, we consider a flexibility of
approach essential so that the special factors which affect
many students can be taken into account. We think this can
be achieved only if discretion is given to the award-making
bodies on several important matters; and yet we know that,
70.
if tilings are left as they are, with a large number of
award-making bodies, different decisions would inevitably be
taken on precisely similar cases by different bodies."
Therefore they recommended two broad models of administration
each of which had advantages and disadvantages. First there was
the option of continued administration by local authorities,
subject to a regime of detailed rules enshrined in delegated
legislation which limited their discretions and imposed duties
upon them. Such a system would have the advantages of utilizing
the established experience of local authority officers in dealing
with student grants, whilst maintaining close geographical
contact with the applicants. However, the Committee felt that
this method still raised problems in the securing of equivalent
treatment for applicants. Consequently they considered that it
must be accompanied by an appeals structure allowing the relevant
Secretary of State to determine appeals against the exercise of
all discretions left with the local authorities. Alternatively,
grants might be administered by central government departments
with an obvious reduction in the number of distinct
decision-making bodies, thereby reducing the opportunities for
divergencies in the treatment of similar applications (though, as
we shall discover later, this argument did not take into account
the difficulties of ensuring consistent decision-making within
one large bureaucratic organisation). Additionally the Committee
believed that central government administration offered the
possibilities of "streamlining and mechanisation". But weighing
against those advantages was the objection that handling grants
at a national level," ... would involve an unwelcome amount of
9
bureaucratic remote control ...". Consequently, after out¬
lining the evenly balanced options, the Committee left the final
selection to the politicians because,"there are many practical
considerations affecting the choice between these possible
courses, seme of these concern a much wider range of government
policy than we can be expected to pronounce upon"
It appears that in Scotland the decision to opt for central
government administration of student grants following the
publication of the Anderson Report was motivated by general
cross-party criticism of the existing education authorities'
performance of the task. This unanimity is succinctly summarised
in an exchange during 1961 within the Scottish Grand Committee
between the Conservative MP Mr Ian MacArthur and the then Labour
MP Dr J. Dickson Mabon. The former stated his concern that
Scottish students were receiving smaller grants than their
English counterparts and continued, "that whether the County
Councils are controlled by the Tories, by Labour or by anybody
else, thirty five different scales of grant are now being
awarded in Scotland and this must be a bad thing". To which Dr
Mabon replied, "I accept that".
The statutory foundation of the Allowances Scheme
administered by the Awards Branch is located within sections 73
and 74 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980, which re-enacts
similar provisions dating back to 1962. Section 73 provides
that the Secretary of State may in accordance with regulations
made by himself pay allowances, "to or in respect of persons
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attending courses of education", whilst section 74 allows him to
attach conditions to the payment of allowances vdiich the student
must observe. Under the above statutory authority the Secretary
of State has promulgated The Students' Allowances (Scotland)
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Regulations 1971. These provide inter alia that he may pay
an amount in respect of travel expenses, maintenance and other
expenses incurred in taking advantage of available educational
facilities; that a student's allowance shall be subject to a
parental contribution; that overpayments must be repaid; and that
recipients of allowances must satisfy the Secretary as to their
13
conduct and progress. Also regulations issued in 1974 add
that the Secretary may take a spouse's income into account when
assessing an applicant's allowance.
Frcm the above description it should be clear that statutory
provisions only provide a rudimentary framework for the operation
13 jfc
of the Scheme and contain few substantive details. Within the
borders delimited by the Act and its associated Regulations the
detailed topography of the Scheme is to be found inside
intra-Branch administrative guidance. This guidance (whose
precise extent and forms will oe examined later in this chapter)
defines the specific contours of the Scheme by elaborating those
principles recommended by the Anderson Report which subsequent
governments have endorsed (e.g. the freedom of students to choose
between studying at local or away institutions), plus the policy
objectives of the incumbent Executive (e.g. only to allow grants
for repeat years where the student has medical or
73
compassionate grounds for his/her failure). As we shall discover
when we analyse casework decision-making in the Branch, the
officers base the overwhelming majority of their individual
determinations regarding applicants' eligibility and financial
entitlement on the contents of this administrative guidance.
Consequently in administrative terns the Scheme is composed of
the totality of this guidance (cf. our elaboration of the ccmmon
features of administrative guidance in Chapter One where it was
noted that frequently guidance represents the official basis of
civil service decision-making, and demonstrates generality of
coverage).
To enable interested citizens to perceive the basic shape of
the Scheme as it alters over time the Scottish Education
14
Department pubishes an annual "Guide to Students' Allowances"
This begins with the somewhat cryptic declaration that, "this
booklet is intended as a general guide to the Students'
Allowances Scheme and it should not be regarded as a statement of
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the statutory position". Presumably what that caveat seeks
to do is to inform the legally aware reader of the wide statutory
discretion possessed by the Secretary of State and hence warn
that ultimately it is up to him to decide whether he will award
an allowance in any particular instance or not (as we shall learn
later judicial review has offered little constraint upon this
power). However, as far as this research was able to elicit it
is only when an MP refers a constituent's case to the Secretary
of State or the Minister of State with responsibility for
education that an application may receive ministerial
consideration and even then the ministers are advised by the
Branch on the basis of their administrative guidance. Therefore
it is normally this regime of administrative guidance which
forms the practical basis of both ministerial and officals'
decision-making regarding applications for grants under the
Scheme. Consequently the Guide goes on to summarise the major
features of the intra-Branch guidance on questions such as
eligibility criteria (e.g. residence, course of study and
previous study by the applicant), how to apply for an allowance,
and the factors taken into account in calculating the amount of
an allowance, in over approximately twenty five pages of print.
The extent to which the Guide condenses Branch guidance is
indicated by the fact that junior officials within the Branch
receive manuals and general instructions totalling several
hundred pages of text. Nevertheless the officer responsible for
producing the Guide considered that it provided a satisfactory
balance between ccmprehensiveness and intelligible brevity; to
achieve that equilibrium he kept a record of all protests
received by the Branch concerning the Guide and these were
considered when the next edition was written. Yet the Guide can
still fail to convey the essence of the Branch's administrative
guidance to affected citizens as our subsequent discussion of
the P.C.A.'s investigations into the Branch's operations will
show.
Although the Secretary of State for Education decided that
England and Wales should have their student grants programme
administered Dy local education authorities implementing
mandatory rules enshrined in delegated legislation^ which
could be enforced through judicial review by aggrieved
17 ...
applicants, there are board similarities between the
substantive contents of the two programmes, allied with close
links connecting the Department of Education and Science and the
Scottish Education Department. Following the Anderson Report's
recommendation of national principles to govern student grants
18
the D.E.S. and S.E.D. have generally observed similar
principles (e.g. on allowing students to choose between studying
at local or away institutions) in the evolution of their
respective schemes. No doubt this harmony has been encouraged
by a standing joint working party which reviews proposed policy
changes in the two schemes. This research was unable to
determine the balance of power on that committee, but a senior
officer in the Branch ccmmented that the inequality in size and
resources between the D.E.S. and the S.E.D. meant that, "we are
always running on the D.E.S.'s coat-tails". It may be observed
that even under the English/Welsh system of administering
student grants administrative guidance exists in the form of a
forty-page set of "Notes for Guidance" issued by the D.E.S. to
all the L.E.A.s. According to the former,
"In these Notes the Department offers advice on what appears
to constitute a reasonable interpretation and method of
application of the Regulations. Authorities may find it
helpful in the interests of consistency to adopt this
advice. Responsibility for decisions in respect of awards
matters rests with the L.E.A. concerned and these Notes
should not be treated as if they were authoritative; only
■the courts can provide an authoritative interpretation of
the Act and Regulations."
Hence interpretative guidance may explain statutory rules while
the Branch's guidance elaborates the policies governing the
Secretary of State's statutory discretion.
(2) The Annual Cycle of Tasks Performed by the Branch
Now that we have considered the statutory and administrative
history of the Scheme it is possible to detail the range of
functions performed by the Branch in administering student
grants in Scotland. As to the basic salient facts of the
Branch, it was established in 1961 in the S.E.D.'s Division
dealing with higher and further educational matters. By the
middle of the. Nineteen Seventies the Branch had become
physically unified in one building and almost simultaneously a
large portion of its operations were computerised. At the time
of this fieldwork (early 1983) it consisted of approximately one
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hundred and thirty officers who were handling about 61,000
applications for grants per year, with over £123 millions being
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disbursed in tees and allowances.
From April of each year onwards the Branch begins to receive
applications for allowances covering the next academic year, and
these are initially dealt with by the Registry Section who check
to ensure that all relevant documents have been included (e.g.
acceptance letters frcm educational institutions) and that the
application form itself has been completed (incomplete
applications are returned for completion by the applicant).
After this filtering, Registry establish a computer record for
new applicants by filling out a card for the Scottish Office
Computer Service (S.O.C.S.) with basic details frcm the
application fom (e.g. applicant's name and address) , whilst
continuing applications have these details checked and where
necessary amended. Then the forms are sent to the relevant
Territorial Section for processing.
The Territorial Sections are the prime loci of routine
casework decision-making within the Branch and usually consist
of two Clerical Officers (C.O.) supervised by one Executive
Officer (E.O.). Each C.O. handles about seven hundred
applications per year. Applications are distributed between
Territorial Sections by allocating responsibility for different
institutions and courses covered by the scheme to particular
sections, consequently one C.O. might be dealing with all the
applications relating to a number of small colleges or a
proportion of those applicants attending a large University.
Once the application forms reach the appropriate section the
E.O. will divert new ones to himself (N.B. the male form will be
used throughout for ease of reading, but it should be borne in
mind in the interests of accuracy that whilst a majority of
E.O.s and senior officers are male a majority of C.O.s are
female) so that he can ascertain their eligibility under the
Scheme on a number of fundamental criteria (such as residence of
the applicant within the U.K. and Scotland, and the nature of
the course). If he has doubts about their acceptability he is
required to pass them up to his Higher Executive Officer (H.E.O.)
who may in turn pass them to his Senior Executive Officer
(S.E.O.). When the E.O. approves the application on the
preceding grounds it goes to his relevant C.O. for "coding",
this means processing the information contained on the
application form so that the computer can calculate the amount
of allowance to be paid to the applicant. Coding involves the
C.O. in transferring the application form information (e.g. on
term-time residence) into a code number provided by the Branch
Box Code Manual. For example the Manual may provide that
applicants living in Halls of Residence are entitled to the
higher "elsewhere" rate of maintenance allowanceand this will be
designated by a certain code number which should be placed in
the appropriate code box on the application form by the C.O. if
the applicant has signified that he is going to be living in
such accommodation. Hence the C.O. is not merely transferring
the applicant's disclosure into information intelligible to the
computer, but is making decisions as to the amount of the
applicant's award in accordance with the rules and categories
contained in the Manual. When the C.O. has finished coding the
application it must be passed back to the E.O. who will check
the C.O.'s processing and if the former officer is satisfied
with the decisions reached the completed form will be returned
to the Registry section.
With the aid of a number of temporary summer staff Registry
transfer the digital information contained in the application
forms code boxes onto other forms which go to the S.O.C.S. for
entry onto the computer and calculation of the amount of the
applicant's award. The S.O.C.S. then send out letters of award
to the applicants and their parents, with payable orders being »
dispatched to the appropriate educational institutions for
distribution to the applicants at the beginning of each term.
During November and December the Territorial staff have to
begin obtaining final information frcm the parents of applicants
who have only been able to disclose estimates of their income
for the former financial year, and any corresponding adjustments
to the award calculations must be made and notified to the
S.O.C.S. Then throughout January and February the officers are
e
responsible for paying the aplicants' approved fees to their
h
educational institutions; together with checking if any
applicants have given up their courses and where necessary
determining what overpayments must be recouped. Finally, to
round off the Branch's year the Territorial officers have the
task of scrutinising their applicants' claims for travel
allowances and authorising their payment, in accordance with
Branch General Instructions, by the S.O.C.S.
These then are the distinct administrative tasks undertaken
by the Branch together with a brief description of its general
internal organisational structure. In the next section we shall
deepen our analysis regarding the determination of individual
grant applications, by examining the types of decisions which
are made at the different levels within the Branch and the
influence of administrative guidance upon them.
(3) Casework Decision-Making Within the Branch
One significant feature of the Branch's administrative
process in transforming the Secretary of State's wide statutory
discretion into thousands of individual aecisions concerning
students' applications, which sought to be consistent and fair
SO.
to each particular applicant, involved the distribution of a
series of casework discretions across the hierarchy of grades in
the organisation. In this context discretion is given Jowell's
meaning of, " ... the rocm for decisional manoeuvre possessed by
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a decision-maker," with the qualification that these
discretions detected in the Branch were either granted by the
internal administrative guidance or by unwritten practices to
which the senior officers gave their official approval.
Consequently this notion of discretion differs frcm K.C. Davis'
concept which he defines as occurring where, " ... the effective
limits on (a public officer's) power leave him free to make a
22
choice among possible courses of action or inaction". Thus
our modified version of Jowell's definition distinguishes between
decisional freedoms which are legitimate according to the
distribution of formal authority within the organisation and
those which are illegitimate, whereas Davis' definition does not
allow for such distinctions. Hence frcm this perspective we can
understand why Reiss criticises the breadth of Davis' usage,
noting, "I am inclined to conclude that Professor Davis means
discretion occurs wherever a public official makes a decision,
and I assume that by a decision he means that a choice is made
23
among alternatives". However, our idea of discretion is
compatible with Dworkin's observations that,
"The concept of discretion is at heme in only one sort of
context; when someone is in general charged with making
.decisions subject to standards set by a particular authority
... Discretion, like the hole in the doughnut, does not exist
except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of
restriction. It is therefore a relative concept. It always
makes sense to ask, 'Discretion under which standards?' or
'Discretion as to which authority?'"
31
because the principles of the scheme enshrined in the Branch's
administrative guidance provide the main ingredients for these
varied doughnuts. But the features of Branch discretions do not
fully accord with Bull's comment on Dworkin's discussion of
discretion,
"I am concerned that the tern 'discretion' tends to be used
in respect of at least three activities in which officers
engage: interpreting rigid rules; taking decisions in areas
where it is decreed inappropriate to have such rules; and
using their freedom to depart, in exceptional circumstances,
frcm these rules. I prefer to reserve the term 'discretion'
for the last of ^hese three freedoms and to call the first
two 'judgement'."
For the reason that this dissertation has consistently argued
that administrative guidance is not solely ccmposed of specific
rules (and this case-study will shortly re-iterate that point),
therefore, the boundary between situations where rules govern
officers' decision-making and where rules do not exist is not
always a clear one; instead various forms of non-mandatory
guidance (e.g. ccmposed of hypothetical questions) may aid
officers' decision-taking. Now that we have ascribed the
meaning to be given to the term discretion in this context it is
possible to elaborate upon the range of official discretions
existing in the Branch.
At the level of Clerical Officers the major discretion which
was noted concerned their decisional freedom to demand
verification of the financial declarations submitted by
applicants and their parents. For example the C.O. training
programme notes provided the following advice, "use your common
sense to determine if claimed mortgage interest relief seems
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reasonable in relation to total income declared, if it looks
high demand verification frcm the Inland Revenue." However the
C.O.s were bound by the documentary evidence originating frcm
professionals such as accountants or other government
departments supplied by applicants. Consequently this
discretion only allowed C.O.s to affect the amount of allowance
paid to a particular applicant where he could not support his
statements with appropriate documentation.
Executive Officers, on the other hand, were given a number of
discretions which empowered than to directly determine the size
of applicants' allowances. One of these governed the
authorisation of travel grants, as Branch General Instruction
Number Seven provided that E.O.s were responsible for approving
travel claims up to the value of £500. This Instruction told
E.O.s that they should try and familiarise themselves with the
geographical areas around the educational institutions covered by
their section (e.g. through studying maps and public transport
fare lists) so that, "if this is done and if common sense is used
staff should become experienced in spotting questionable claims".
This guidance was supplemented with the basic provision that only
claims equal to the cheapest form of public transportation should
be allowed. Yet the Instruction did not leave E.O.s with a mere
yes or no freedom when faced with actual claims, instead they
could either accept the application or substitute their own
calculation of what they consider would have been the cheapest
form of transportation - and that is by no means a simple
mechanical selection when the myriad of types of fares and
transportation are taken into account.
It was possible to establish a rough perimeter around the
areas of E.O. discretion by outlining those types of cases which
were normally dealt with at more senior levels. Ihese fell into
two broad categories, of vtfiich the first was the smallest and
easiest to define as it consisted of those classes of cases
which under Branch guidance had to be passed up to S.E.O. level
and encompassed inter alia, suspected fraud and requests for
repeat years on compassionate grounds. The second category was
more nebulous and included those cases which individual H.E.O.s
expected their E.O.s to pass on to them. In practice this
category was not rigid and depended upon the relationship
between the particular E.O. and H.E.O. under consideration.
This can be illustrated by reference to one H.E.O. who had
promulgated a list of twenty one classes of cases entitled
"Cases to be referred to H.E.O." and which under head twenty
included, "in general, appeals against earlier decisions,
difficult cases and cases of interest for information".
Permeating the compiling of this list was the application of
hindsight regarding those types of cases which had led to
complaints and appeals by applicants in the past. Nevertheless
despite its potential ambit the H.E.O. did not actually expect
every case earning within the list to be referred up, only "the
difficult ones". But as one of his E.O.s explained, the
definition of a difficult case alters and becomes less expansive
as the E.O. increases in experience and competence. Therefore,
it was very problematic to list the cases caning within this
second category in abstract terms as they could only be detailed
for a particular E.O.-H.E.O. relationship at one point in time.
We can conclude that all E.O.s had sane similar discretions in
relation to processing specific aspects of students'
applications (e.g. in approving travel claims) but this common
core was added to, and also delimited by, the individual nature
of their relationship with their H.E.O. and his requirements on
passing up cases.
Turning now to the H.E.O. grade, this represented a watershed
within the formal organisation of the Branch as it was the
highest level concerned mainly with territorial casework. In
the words of the official job description, a H.E.O. was
responsible for the "supervision and management of a section
comprising Executive Officers, Clerical Officers and Clerical
Assistants dealing with the assessment and payment of student
grants under the computer system. Guiding junior staff on
points of difficulty arising in the eligibility of applicants,
in the assesment of student grants ... ". Therefore
H.E.O.s played an important role in linking the casework
officers (or interestingly "the troops" as the senior officers
informally designated them - a choice of terminology which would
have suited Weber's ideal-type bureaucrats and have conformed
with the images of the Scientific School) together with their
viewpoints and problems, with those of the Senior Branch staff.
This position thereby enhanced the significance of the H.E.O.'s
general discretion covering the volume and types of cases they
decided to refer up to their S.E.O.s and those which they
retained for personal determination. This discretion was
broadly similar to that possessed by the E.O.s except that none
of the three S.E.O.s had produced any lists of classes of cases
that must be referred up. Additionally the S.E.O.s appeared to
leave the onus of forwarding cases upon the H.E.O.s more than
the latter did to their E.O.s. Generally the H.E.O.s tended to
pass cases upwards where they considered that their proposed
decisions might produce future repercussions such as complaints
to Members of Parliament or where they beleived the particular
case raised issues of importance for the Scheme as a whole.
Apart from the above discretion common to all H.E.O.s
individual officers had further discretions conferred by
specific responsibilities. For example one H.E.O. was in charge
of the Overpayments section which had the task of obtaining cash
repayments frcm former students who had been overpaid by the
Branch (e.g. because they withdrew frcm their courses before the
end of term) . Under Branch Policy Minute Number One this
officer had a discretion to write off overpayments between £20
and £200 in value after he had written two official letters
requesting repayment without obtaining satisfaction. He was
left free to decide when or whether he would invoke his
authority, though for amounts over £200 Treasury approval for
writing off was required.
The next tier of authority within the Branch was that of the
three Senior Executive Officers. Each of these officers was
responsible for approximately one third of the total number of
Territorial Sections plus a particular functional responsibility
frcm the aggregate of internal administrative guidance revision,
computer services and the Education Authorities Bursary Scheme.
Therefore, it was possible to broadly divide S.E.O.s' tasks into
two categories; firstly there was the personnel aspect vdiich
essentially concerned itself with deploying officers in their
Territorial jurisdictions to the greatest effect, together with
conducting the important annual reporting exercise (S.E.O.s are
countersigning officers for reports on E.O.s and reporting
officers on H.E.O.s). Whilst S.E.O.s' discretions within that
area of responsibility probably had an influence upon the
casework operations of the Branch it was too extraneous to be
pursued in the fieldwork. However, the second category of
S.E.O. duties - casework supervision - was of central concern to
our research. The volume of that work could be gauged frcm one
S.E.O.'s statement that he expected to receive about six or
seven live cases frcm his H.E.O. during an average week. But in
practice the significance of those determinations was much
greater than their mere numbers, because as observation revealed
they normally involved wide-ranging issues which went beyond the
facts of the particular case in point. Hence they tended to be
treated by the S.E.O.s as establishing precedents for the
Scheme.
Frcm a scrutiny of cases determined by S.E.O.s it appeared
that they exercised two major discretions regarding grant
applications. First there was the question of deciding the exact
scope of the Scheme in relation to the courses covered by the
programme. In one case the Branch had granted an allowance to an
applicant for three years so that he could complete a Bachelors
degree in Architecture at an English university; then he
re-applied for an additional allowance to enable him to gain his
R.I.B.A. part two qualification from one of a number of English
institutions. Tne S.E.O. reacted to this application by
consulting Department of Education and Science administrative
guidance to elucidate how they would reccmmend Local Education
Authorities in England and Whles to treat such an application,
and concluded in accordance with the guidance that a further
allowance should be given provided the course did not involve
higher degree work. Another case involved a Psychology graduate
who was undertaking a two year post-graduate course in
Educational Psychology which included both a teacher training and
an M.Sc. element. She subsequently applied for a further
allowance in respect of the teacher training portion of the
course claiming that it came within the ambit of the Scheme. But
the S.E.O. refused the contention on the grounds that the whole
qualification was subject to the Scottish Post-Graduate Quota
Scheme and as the applicant had been unsuccessful under that
programme she should not obtain a grant via the 'backdoor'.
Secondly, the S.E.O.s appeared to possess the discretion to
dispense with the detailed rules enshrined in the intra-Branch
administrative guidance where the particular circumstances of the
case were deemed to demand such treatment in the light of the
underlying principles and policy goals of the Scheme. This
demonstrates the existence of a discretionary power which was
motivated by a concern to provide individualised justice within
the parameters of a programme essentially based upon formal
justice. An example of that discretion in operation involved the
case of a student who had been given a one year suspension of his
allowance during his last term at university because of intense
personal problems. The Branch determined that he had been
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overpaid but notified him that they would not demand a cash
repayment, instead they would deduct it frcm his final term's
grant in one year's time. His university then refunded one third
of his last year's fees to the Branch. After the lapse of his
suspension the student returned to university and completed his
degree, but without bothering to re-apply for an allowance
(presumably because he knew it would be subject to a large
deduction in respect of his repayment). When his university
sought the payment of his final term's fees from the Branch the
latter organisation informed them that they could not pay the
fees as the Scheme only covered the fees of students who applied
for allowances. Nevertheless the university continued to press
for payment of the fees over a two year period and eventually
they were paid. The S.E.O. responsible noted that there were no
similar cases recorded in the Branch's Policy Files and that it
would be unfair to punish the university financially for the
student's technical emission in not applying for an allowance to
cover his final term. So here it was an educational
institution and not a student which gained frcm the exercise of
that discretion! A further example, where it was a student who
sought the benefit of the discretion, revolved around the closing
date for applications under the Scheme. According to the annual
application form, continuing students should return their
completed applications by the 15th May preceding the relevant
academic year; however, the Branch would in fact accept
applications up to the 31st December but this latter date was
strictly observed. In this case the applicant had applied for,
and been granted, a minimum award for the previous academic
year. She then telephoned the Branch in early December claiming
that her father had not completed or forwarded her application
form for that year as he wanted her to join him in business.
The Branch responded by sending her a new form but this was not
returned until the 7th January when the applicant brought it in
personally claiming that her father had again refused to return
the completed form to the Branch and that she had been forced to
steal it frcm him. In considering whether to accept the
application after their final closing date the S.E.O. telephoned
the applicant's university who stated that she had not contacted
anyone there for help. After taking into account that the
applicant's sister had applied for, and been given, a minimum
award for the last three years the officer concluded that the
applicant had a large degree of responsibility for ensuring that
her application was completed and returned by her father and
that she should have brought the matter to the Branch's
attention earlier; therefore, he would not waive the final
closing date in that case.
Frcm the above cases we can note that the S.E.O.s exercised
their discretions on the basis of an evaluation of the
attributes demonstrated by the applicant's case assessed against
the fundamental features of the Scheme (e.g. not to finance
higher degree research - to pay the fees of eligible applicants
- not to unnecessarily interfere in applicants' domestic
circumstances). As these decisions were extremely difficult to
make, there was a general practice that all three S.E.O.s should
unanimously agree with the decision reached in order to reduce
the chance of arbitrary determinations occurring. For certain
types of cases the officers formally sat in committee (e.g.
applications for repeat years on compassionate grounds), but
normally consultation was achieved informally by personal
discussion (the officers all had adjoining offices) or written
memos. In those rare situations where unanimity could not be
achieved the case was referred for determination to the
Principal or Senior Principal, who had final responsibility for
deciding all exceptional cases within the Branch.
Paralleling the above hierarchy of official discretions it
was possible to differentiate the forms of internal Branch
administrative guidance governing those powers together with the
other decision-making responsibilities of the officers. C.O.s
had their decision-making regulated by numerous rules contained
within various forms of administrative guidance whose disparate
origins appeared to owe more to historical events than
administrative logic. First there was the Box Manual, which has
already been mentioned; it was composed of about one hundred
loose-leaf pages and solely guided C.O.'s coding of the annual
application forms. To that end the Manual sought to provide
answers to difficulties and problems the C.O.s might encounter
in processing the bulk of those applications by providing
detailed administrative rules which implemented the general
policies of the Scheme. For example it set out a specific
definition of what amounted to a reasonable daily travelling
distance for applicants, lists of situations where the
"elsewhere" rate of grant was paid and the types of inccme to be
disregarded when Dependents' Allowances were calculated.
Complementing the Box Manual were the Branch General
Instructions which were contained in one file almost as weighty
as the Manual. The General Instructions established how the
C.O.s should perform their tasks beyond coding the annual
application forms. They differed slightly fron the Manual in
that they had both a procedural and policy element. In regard
to the former aspect the Instructions provided for the
allocation of functions between the various parts of the Branch
(e.g. the Registry, Territorial and Overpayments Sections);
while their policy content specified rules governing inter alia
the approval of travel claims, the granting of special equipment
allowances and provisions for study abroad. Finally the C.O.s
had copies of all four Branch Policy Minutes which elaborated
upon topics dealt with in both the Box Manual and General
Instructions, however, their training only covered two of them.
The first of those dealt with circumstances involving a
student's withdrawal frcm his place of study and the calculation
of any possible overpayment made to him which must be recouped.
That Minute offered an outstanding example of the extent to
which a general Ministerial statutory power (that covering the
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authority to require overpayments to students to be repaid )
may be subject to extensive administrative development, which in
that case went so far as to cover the type of letter to be
written by an officer to the executor of a student who had died
owing money to the Branch1 The second Minute covered the
provision for repeat years and changes of course by students.
Frcm the preceding exposition we can conclude that C.O.s
were subjected to an extensive amalgam of precise administrative
rules when exercising their powers. Irrespective of the
nomenclature assigned to the form of the administrative guidance
(i.e. whether it was derived from the Box Manual or the Branch
Policy Minutes) it demonstrated the same common characteristics
of specific binding requirements. Therefore, it was not
surprising to discover that one train of thought amongst seme
senior officers favoured the ultimate incorporation of all the
above provisions within one comprehensive manual. However, their
more immediate concern was to try and achieve the annual revision
of all the forms of guidance used in the Branch to take account
of recent alterations in a rapidly changing Scheme. Such a goal
had not been achieved for several years with the consequence that
individual officers were responsible for amending their own
copies of the relevant Manuals, Instructions and Minutes; thereby
increasing the possibility of different officers making different
decisions on the basis of conflicting guidance as seme failed to
keep up with the changing rules.
Executive Officers also had their discretions regulated by
the above forms of administrative guidance. But they received
additional training in the use of the two Branch Policy Minutes
excluded frcm the C.O.s' ambit. Those Minutes differed fron the
other two by reason of the generalised nature of their contents.
For example the Minute dealing with residence eligibility of
applicants stated that they must have been "ordinarily resident"
in the U.K. for at least three years prior to their application;
however, it continued by observing that such a condition was
"extremely difficult to define" and suggested that officers
broadly equate the phrase with a person's "hone" which might be
ascertained by asking questions such as where did the applicant's
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parents live? or where did he go during his school/college
vacations? Similarly the Minute covering post-graduate courses
which were within the scope of the Scheme formerly relied upon
the somewhat nebulous notion of qualifications for a "first and
basic career". Hence the majority of decisions reached by E.O.s
were governed by specific rules, but unlike the C.O.'s situation
seme of the administrative guidance applying to the former grade
was not composed of rules but instead consisted of recommended
tests and illustrative guides to decision-making.
Higher Executive Officers had access to policy papers on
specific topics (e.g. residence requirements) that were not
available to their subordinates. Futhermore a major source of
guidance to H.E.O.s was the Branch Policy Files. Although these
files were nominally open to officers of all grades it was
generally accepted that H.E.O.s were the lowest grade in the
Branch whose decision-making responsibilities warranted regular
recourse to them. The Files differed from the forms of
administrative guidance already examined in that they were not
duplicated statements of Branch policy and procedure; instead
they were composed of papers covering inter alia, casework
decisions made by the Senior Principal or Principal, discussions
with Ministers, intra civil service deliberations, consultations
with outside bodies (e.g. universities or professional
associations) and any related newspaper cuttings. Each file
dealt with a major issue or problem encountered by the Branch in
administering the Scheme (e.g. the introduction of a
post-graduate quota scheme), and their objective was to provide
any officer reading a file with sufficient information to
understand the basis and evolution of the policy underlying a
particular facet of the Scheme. So the files provided
guidelines for H.E.O.s, but their format required different, and
greater, skills in extracting the appropriate policy factors and
applying than to the individual cases under determination
ccmpared with the rule-governed decision-making of the lower
Territorial staff.
The Senior Executive Officers also relied upon the Policy
Files, together with their own previous casework decisions. One
S.E.O. had chosen to keep a personal index of all the cases he
had been involved in determining and that was used by the other
two officers to aid them in tracing helpful previous cases and
thier explanatory minutes. However their previous decisions
were not automatically binding upon the S.E.O.s, and one officer
explained that their usefulness was diminished by a rapidly
changing Scheme (e.g. fundamental recent changes have
enccmpassed residence qualifications, postgraduate study and
repeat years) and differences in the material circumstances of
individual cases which reduced the opportunities for deciding by
analogy. It appeared that at that level in the Branch, rule
based administrative guidance in the form of the Box Code Manual
etc. played a minor role in decision-making. Indeed one S.E.O.
proclaimed that because of time pressures she had never been
able to read through the Box Manual and General Instructions
properly!
Ultimately at the Principal Officer grade the criteria
governing casework decision-making reached their most abstract
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and generalised form. One officer admitted that when the
arguments in favour of a decision were evenly balanced he fell
back on the dictates of "canmonsense and fairness within the
parameters of a scheme funded by public money", which might be
termed his subjective morality.
The process of casework decision-making was notable for the
increasing breadth of the "rocm for decisional manoeuvre"
provided by the hierarchy of official discretions the further
upwards in the levels of decision-making one travelled. As we
have seen the discretion of C.O.s was essentially limited to
deciding whether they would require applicants to provide
documentary evidence in support of their financial claims. By
contrast in a tiny minority of cases S.E.O.s exercised their
discretion to reach determinations which were in accordance with
the philosophy of the Scheme but nevertheless technically in
breach of the rule-based internal Branch administrative guidance
(e.g. to pay the formerly suspended student's final terms fees).
Almost symbiotically co-existing with that decision-making
structure was the regime of administrative guidance which became
progressively less rigid and specific as one moved away from
routine Territorial section casework. Hence at the Principal/
S.E.O. grades the primary emphasis was upon promoting the
objectives of the Scheme, v^iilst at the C.O. strata it was to
ensure a correct application of the Box Manual and General
Instructions to the individual applications. However, these
different emphases were not incompatible as they had as their
ccmmon objective the satisfaction of the Anderson Report's major
administrative recommendation regarding the "equivalent
treatment" of all applications for grants. Indeed it was by a
combination of rule based decision-making for the overwhelming
majority of applications combined with provision for exceptional
cases to be passed upwards for individualised consideration
according to their merits in the light of the policy goals of
the Scheme that the Branch sought to comply with Anderson's
recommendation. But the facility for those exceptional cases
needed to be triggered by an E.O. referring the particular case
upwards and that mechanian suffered frcm the possible weakness
that the officer was under little external pressure to do so, as
affected applicants neither knew of the provision for such cases
nor of the appeals procedure (to be discussed later) which had
the effect of bringing the case to the relevant H.E.O.'s
attention.
Frcm a broader organisational perspective the system of
administrative guidance operating in the Branch suggests that
while the content of guidance may remain consistent throughout
the office its forms and nature may differ. Therefore, it would
be inaccurate to state that the Branch's guidance consisted
merely of the generally distributed Box Manual or Policy Minutes
without also having regard to the Policy Files of the Branch.
Additionally we must be aware that particular pieces of
administrative guidance may possess varied significance for the
decision-making of distinct grades within the same organisation.
Hence all the officials within a single bureaucracy are not
equally rule bound!
c\7
(4) Situations Where Officals Acted in a Manner Contrary to the
Requirements of the Branch's Administrative Guidance
In the foregoing analysis of the influence of administrative
guidance upon casework decision-making, no reference was made to
situations in which the officials disregarded the applicable
guidance. In this section we shall examine sane of the instances
where that occurred, the possible motives encouraging such
behaviour and the action taken in the Branch to prevent the
detrimental effects of similar behaviour recurring. Presumably
officials could have disobeyed the relevant guidance by taking
decisions which were assigned to other officials (e.g. an E.O.
rather than an S.E.O. deciding to allow an applicant a repeat
year on compassionate grounds) but such a flagrant disregard was
not observed during the fieldwork. Instead the examples
discovered involved an official making authorised decisions
without paying heed to the formally correct requirements of the
appropriate administrative guidance. As that behaviour occurred
in a variety of decision-making contexts and appeared to be
influenced by heterogeneous motives, for clarity the subsequent
examination will locate individual instances along a spectrum
ranging from situations of intentional flouting of the guidance
at one extreme to unintentional flouting at the opposite end.
At the intentional flouting pole one example centred upon
the payment of placement travel expenses incurred by special
groups of students (e.g. those studying social work) over and
above their ordinary daily travelling costs. According to the
Branch's administrative guidance at that time placement travel
claims should be paid in full, but ordinary travelling expenses
should have had the nominal travel element in the maintenance
provisions the majority of affected Territorial Officers paid
placement travel claims in full irrespective of Aether the
students claimed ordinary travel expenses or not. But the effect
of that approach meant that seme placement students were
obtaining their full placement travel costs even where their
combined placement travel and ordinary daily travel expenses fell
below the nominal maintenance allowance travel element.
Consequently a minority of officers had been deliberately
ignoring the requirements of their administrative guidance by
deducting the nominal travel element frcm placement claims and
then paying any subsequent daily travelling claim in full. At a
meeting of Territorial staff the minority's practice was
discovered and later the Branch's guidance was amended to
incorporate their approach. Although the minority's practice was
clearly contrary to the requirements of the relevant guidance it
was presumably motivated by their desire to ensure the more
effective attainment of the Branch's policy (i.e. to pay
placement students the total amount by which their placement and
daily travelling expenses exceeded the travel element in their
maintenance allowances) and therefore provided an exemplary
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demonstration of Blau's process of "adaptation" at work.
However, the practice undermined the Anderson Report's principle
of "equivalent treatment" of all applications so far as placement
students were concerned, because these travel claims being
processed by the majority of Territorial officers were being paid
in full virile the calculations made by the minority of officers
allowance deducted from the claimed total Under those
deducted the travel element.
Another example of a situation where an officer stated that
he had deliberately reached a decision contrary to the precise
demands of Branch guidance involved the granting of exemptions
frcm a parental contribution to mature students. Under the
applicable administrative guidance the student must satisfy the
officer that he has supported himself financially for three
years, nevertheless the officer said that he had been willing to
allow such exemptions where the student had failed to meet the
three year period by a "couple of months". Again the official
considered that he was positively promoting the policy
objectives of the Scheme by having regard to the spirit rather
than the letter of the guidance.
Not all examples of officials intentionally disregarding
administrative guidance can be justified in terms of the
officers' wishes to secure the achievement of the Branch's
policy goals. For example several Territorial officers claimed
that sometimes they did not utilize the Box Manual of General
Instructions to guide their decision-making through simple
laziness. The existence of such a tendency was independently
confirmed by one H.E.O. when he described the syndrome of "old
hands" who, once they had mastered the administrative guidance
produced by the Branch during one period of time, demonstrated
great reluctance to observe or implement changes in that regime
because of the effort required frcm them to keep up to date with
the alterations.
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Moving towards the middle of the spectrum of situations
where officers flouted the requirements of Branch guidance as
formally understood by the senior staff, we encounter the
development of idiosyncratic interpretations of those provisions
by individual Territorial sections. Whilst reflecting neither a
wholly intentional nor unintentional rejection of the officially
correct interpretation, that occurrence was said by one E.O. to
be the product of the unique combinations of personalities
involved. The officer then characterised that trend as one of
"evolution" hereby over a period of time a particular
interpretation would grow within the section only to be
challenged if a new incoming E.O. disagreed with it or senior
staff became aware of its existence. Obviously these
developments undermined the uniformity of decision-making across
the Territorial sections and the senior officials were
accordingly anxious to minimize their occurrence and detrimental
effects, as we shall discover when we examine their strategies
to ccmbat the practice later in this section.
Finally, at the unintentional disregarding end of the
spectrum, seme officers reached decisions on the basis of a
complete misunderstanding of the relevant administrative
guidance. Therefore, those officers presumably thought that
they were observing the guidance, but in fact judged from the
standpoint of their fellow officers they were ignoring the
correct meaning which had received the approval of senior
officers. An example of such behaviour manifested itself in the
administrative repercussions following the protests of George
Cunningham M.P. to the Department of Education and Science about
the treatment accorded to life insurance premiums in the
Branch decided to review their decisions given during the
preceding academic year in a category of similar cases. A
number of C.O.s were selected to conduct the review and
according to one H.E.O. they were given "idiot-proof"
instructions as to how the re-assessment was to be implemented.
Yet at the end of the exercise it was discovered that two of the
officers had so mis-applied the administrative guidance that
their cases had to be reconsidered again.
Irrespective of the forms or motivations of Territorial
officers' disregard for the generally observed and formally
correct requirements of the Branch's administrative guidance,
such behaviour undermined the consistency of overall casework
decision-making. Therefore, senior management had progressively
introduced various mechanisms to reduce the incidence of that
behaviour and to try and limit its detrimental effects upon
individual cases. Those will now be examined beginning with the
system of intra Branch checking.
In a forceful advocacy of the virtues associated with
internally reviewing administrative decisions Davis observed,
"what may be called the 'principle of check' means simply
that one officer should check another, as a protection
against arbitrariness. The most usual checking authority is
a superior of the officer who acts initially, who in turn
may be checked by his superior in a hierarchial organisation
... Paradoxically, the principle of check is often at its
best when it is limited to correction of arbitrariness or
illegality, and it may be relatively ineffective when it
includes de novo review. This is because of the important
calculation of parental contributions.
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Subsequently the
fact, scmetimes overlooked, that a de novo determination may
itself introduce arbitrariness or illegality for the first
time and not be checked, whereas a check may be limited to
the one objective of eliminating arbitrariness or
illegality, so that almost all final aggion is subject to a
check for arbitrariness or illegality."
In many ways the system of intra-Branch checking accorded with
Davis' analysis, however it possessed two distinct origins.
First these were those checks which were explicitly provided for
by the procedural element of the Branch's administrative
guidance. General instruction number six required E.O.s to
check all the annual application forms coded by their C.O.s
although in practice because of the time constraints suffered by
E.O.s they tended to ignore those parts of the coding which had
only a general statistical value as opposed to a substantive
financial implication for the applicant. Mareover, H.E.O.s
were- obliged to check a randan selection of one hundred
applications coded by their section before the end of June and
another one hundred before the end of October. The second
category of checks were those arising out of the particular
processes of the Branch. For example, where urgent payments had
to be made to students the authorisation for those "manual
payments" must have been given by a S.E.O., and one officer of
that grade had developed the technique of using such cases as a
mechanism for scrutinising the operation of her subordinate
staff via a detailed inspection of the case notes accompanying
the request for payment authorisation. Ihat method neatly
solved seme of the problems of supervising a nunber of staff
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engaged in administrative, as opposed to physically productive,
tasks without the need for a constant personal presence.
Additionally modern technology appeared to be increasing the
opportunities for senior staff to check their subordinates'
decision-making by remote means. The Branch received weekly
feedbacks fran the Scottish Office Computer Service which inter
alia, revealed how each officer who had used the on-line
computer facilities had inter-acted with the machine (i.e.
listing how many false or cancelled actions they had made) , and
provided undisclosed checks on any possible staff fraud.
It can be concluded that the Branch had developed an
extensive system of checking vdiich sought to ensure that much
casework decision-making was subjected to regular review by
E.O.s, supplemented by randcm examination by H.E.O.s.
Furthermore seme of the Branch's processes enabled even more
senior officers to monitor the decision-making being made by
their Territorial sections without the need for a potentially
negative physical presence within the offices occupied by those
officials. Computerisation takes that practice one stage
further by increasing the opportunities for unknown and yet
factually objective checking of subordinates' determinations and
will presumably grow in significance as a method of achieving
the demands of the principle of checking.
Secondly, in a move to promote consistency of
decision-making across the Territorial sections the Branch
during the late 1970s introduced a ccmmon training programme for
C.O.s and E.O.s Prior to that reform new recruits were merely
presented with the aggregate total of operative administrative
guidance to be read through before they began work in the
Territorial sections. Apparently many newcomers were reaching
such vastly differing interpretations of those extensive
provisions, coupled with a greater susceptibility to the
idiosyncracies of their first Territorial section, that it was
decided to strengthen and standardise the initial training given.
In the words of one S.E.O. the contemporary training was designed
to prevent the development of "quirks" in the decision-making
habits of new officers. Essentially the programme consisted of
two weeks training on a one to one basis by designated
experienced training officers, generally with a C.O. training a
C.O. and mutatis mutandis for E.O.s. A notable feature of the
course was the formal verbatim dictation of training notes given
on difficult rules, definitions or calculations, with the
objective of providing a uniform guide that the new recruits
could turn to first when faced with problems in their territorial
work. Hence the Branch gave guidance on its own internal
administrative guidance. The initial course was supplemented by
a further period of training after the new entrant had
experienced case-work for a few months so that any problems
encountered could be dealt with.
Thirdly, adjustments in the structure of decision-making
within the Branch had been introduced in order to encourage
uniformity in the application of internal administrative
guidance. Examples included the allocation of all the complex
parent-child assessment cases to one long-serving officer, and
the distribution of territorial supervisory jurisdiction between
the S.E.O.s so that all the courses of a particular specialist
type (e.g. theological training) fell within the responsibility
of one S.E.O., thereby encouraging comparability in
interpretation and subsequent casework determination.
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To conclude this section we should note that the examples of
officials disregarding the appropriate administrative guidance
examined above were merely isolated illustrations of the informal
processes of the Branch as foreshadowed by the analyses of the
Post-Weberian theorists. As we discovered in Chapter TWo those
informal processes could either aid the rational achievement of
the organisation's goals (e.g. the minority of oficers' treatment
of placement travel claims) or undermine than (e.g. the
deliberate disregarding of new administrative guidance by some of
the so-called "old hands"). Furthermore these examples
re-iterated the variety of motives underlying such behaviour
including self-interest (e.g. the avoidance of the effort of
keeping up to date with a constantly changing scheme) , the desire
to provide subjective/individualised justice to applicants (e.g.
the officer's treatment of mature students), and the wish to see
the Branch achieve the fundamental objectives of the scheme (e.g.-
placement travel claims). In the light of Blau's articulation
of the continually dynamic relationship between formal and
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informal processes within a complex organisation it would
appear that senior staff in the Branch will never be able to
eradicate completely those unplanned reactions of their
subordinate staff to the internal administrative guidance. At
best they can hope to minimise their occurrence - (e.g. through a
standardised training programme coupled with a comprehensive
checking system designed to reveal the detrimental consequences
of the various informal processes. The diversity and
adaptability of those processes means that responsibility for
detecting their existence and effects must be placed
mainly upon the senior staff of the Branch because only they have
sufficient proximity to the daily evolution of decision-making
within the organisation. External grievance handling agencies
may have a subordinate role in bringing the individual effects of
such processes to the attention of senior officials, as will be
examined below, but ultimate responsibility must remain with the
latter group; in Mashaw's words,
"the quality of justice provided in such a system depends
primarily on how good the management system is at dealing
with the set of conflicting dero^ids that define rational,
fair and efficient adjudication."
On a more general level the experiences of the Branch
regarding its officers' reactions towards administrative guidance
suggest that the framers and promulgators of similar provisions
must strive for a fine balance between comprehensiveness and
intelligibility. Failure to achieve such an equilibrium may
undermine consistent and equivalent decision-making, either by
omitting to clarify important areas of policy (e.g. did the
notion of "illness" in the rule allowing repeat years
necessitated because of illness enccmpass a student suffering
frcm regular menstrual problems?) or by creating such a "dismal
swamp" of extensive guidance that officers are unable to find the
shortest and safest passage through it (one Branch C.O.
expressed the view that "we have exceptions for every rule
here.") Furthermore the history of the Branch indicates that
where administrative guidance is used to govern sophisticated
decision-making by large numbers of officers it needs to be
combined with institutional mechanisms to monitor and adjust
those officials' responses to the guidance if the official goals
of the organisation are to be efficiently achieved. Davis
recognised that officials' discretionary decision-making could
not be "confined" or "structured" simply by the use of
administrative rules but also required "checking". Branch
practice confirms that thesis whilst demonstrating that the
institutional measures may have to be more elaborate by
incorporating inter alia rigorous and repeated training courses
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together with re-arrangements in decision-making processes.
(5) Remedies Available to and Pursued by Aggrieved Applicants
Taking account of the informal processes of the Branch and
the inevitable occurrence of simple human mistakes in casework
decision-making the question arises of what forms of remedies
were available to dissatisfied or disappointed applicants? In
the ensuing section we shall examine these remedies utilized by
such applicants whilst seeking to discover the frequency of
resort to the various types, their respective strengths and
weaknesses frcm the applicant's and Branch's points of view, and
the nature of the feedback they may provide to senior staff
concerning routine decision-making by the Territorial officers.
According to a very senior officer of the Branch, the most
frequently exercised remedy was that of a direct ccmplaint or
appeal to the Branch regarding a specific grant determination.
He believed that the nature of the Scheme, involving relatively
large amounts of money at least frcm the perspective of most
log
applicants allied with a fairly articulate clientele, meant that
the Branch was definitely at "the interface of public
accountability". Thus where applicants beccme displeased with a
decision or calculation made by Territorial officers, they were
"immediately on to the Branch." However, such an assessment must
be counterbalanced by the observation that applicants might not
know about the relevant policies or guidance of the Branch (the
possibility of differences existing between the published Annual
Guide's summaries and the internal guidance of the Branch will be
examined below in the analysis of the P.C.A.'s investigations
into the administration of the Scheme), nor of their undisclosed
"right" to have their case reconsidered by a higher level officer
within the Branch. Although the Branch did not operate a formal
appeals system, there was a general practice that objections to
particular decisions should be reviewed at one grade above the
original decision-maker. Hence in the light of these procedural
weaknesses we can understand why Oda has termed the filing of a
ccmplaint against an administrative agency as "the most primitive
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form of administrative remedy."
The volume of objections handled by that method could be
twenty to thirty appeals against his determinations during an
average year. As most of the appeals related to the assessment
of the maintenance allowance for which E.O.s were responsible,
the H.E.O.s bore the burden of deciding the majority of appeals.
Normally the appropriate E.O. would write a minute in reply to
the dissatisfied applicant's contentions and upon these
conflicting written views the H.E.O. would reach his decision.
roughly by one E.O.'s estimation that he received about
Occasionally appeals would be passed up to the S.E.O. level,
where the H.E.O. concluded that the deciding officer had made a
major mistake or where the appeal raised wider issues. One
S.E.O. stated that a dominant factor in the referral of appeals
to him was the possibility of external repercussions about the
case (e.g. ccmplaints to M.P.s by aggrieved applicants).
Therefore, the S.E.O.s were motivated by a desire to reach
decisions which could, if necessary, be "justified" to strategic
outsiders. Those comments were interesting in linking internal
appellate processes with external accountability.
The primary external agency involved in the securing of
redress of aggrieved applicants mentioned by Branch officers was
that of Members of Parliament. Where M.P.s decided to pursue a
constituent's grievance against the Branch, by parliamentary
convention they referred the matter to the Secretary of State
for Scotland or the Minister of State in the Scottish Office
with responsibility for education. The case was then dispatched
to the Branch for reply within a ten day period. Compared with
direct appeals to the Branch, M.P.s cases followed an inverse
path because when they reached the Branch they were normally
sent dovm to the relevant Territorial H.E.O. who was required to
"marshall the facts and quiz the E.O.", according to one officer
of that grade, whereupon the response to the M.P.'s letter then
proceeded back through the hierarchy of the Branch and on to the
Minister's private office. Officers within the Branch claimed
that irrespective of the route followed by the ccmplaint/appeal
the same reply should be given, but whether that happened in
practice could not be ascertained by our fieldwork. However,
one fundamental division noted in the responses to applicants'
1 \o.
objections (vtfiether made directly or via an M.P.) was that
between cases alleging administrative mistakes (e.g. Territorial
officers reaching faulty financial calculations) and those
challenging particular policies and rules of the Scheme. In the
former category the reviewing officer would be more likely to
agree with the applicant's contentions than in the latter
category, where the relevant provisions would have been
formulated at a much higher (possibly Ministerial) level of
authority. Ihat distinction between challenges to administrative
action and the merits of specific policies could also be found
permeating the decisions of the P.C.A., who is the next external
agency to be considered.
The fact that students' allowances are administered by a
central government department in Scotland has uniquely brought
than within the jurisdiction of the P.C.A. compared with the
situation pertaining to English and Walsh students. By June 1984
seven reports of investigations by the P.C.A. into the
implementation of the Scheme by the Branch had been published.
In five reports the P.C.A. found no incidents of
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maladministration , and in another he discovered that the
Branch had erroneously paid an allowance to a student who was
already receiving an RAF scholarship but that the student had not
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suffered any injustice as a consequence of the mistake.
However, in his most recent investigation he encountered an
applicant suffering injustice through the Branch failing inter
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alia to follow its own administrative guidance.
Frcm the earliest Branch case onwards the P.C.A. has
rigorously observed his Sachsenhausen doctrine (the details of
which will be examined in Chapter Five) in refusing to question
the merits of the policies contained within the organisation's
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administrative guidance. For example, in one case the
father of a student complained that the Branch required him to
disclose his earnings generated in Ethiopia for the purpose of
determining the size of his assumed parental contribution.
After noting the nature of the statutory foundations of the
Scheme the P.C.A observed that,
"the Department have adopted guidelines (which have, in
themselves, no statutory force) to ensure that this
discretion is exercised fairly between applicants and these
are published annually in a booklet ..."
Those provisions contained a requirement that parents disclose
all their sources of inccme, consequently the P.C.A. concluded,
"I do not question government policy regarding the parental
contribution on the gross inccme of parents, wherever it is
earned.-,7I therefore do not uphold the complaint as presented
to me."
Even where he found that the correct application of the Branch's
administrative guidance caused financial hardship to a mature
student, the P.C.A. had to express his inability to criticise the
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policy content of the relevant rules.
In a more recent case the P.C.A. has accepted the legitimacy
of the Branch altering its interpretation of its own
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guidance. As we saw earlier the scheme used to allow
applicants to obtain allowances for postgraduate courses of study
where they were necessary in order for the student to be
qualified for a "first and basic career". During an
investigation into the refusal of an allowance for one
applicant's postgraduate study the P.C.A. found that in 1980 the
Minister of State in the Scottish Office "... had decided that
the Department had previously been erring on the generous side
in making awards to students who he considered were already
discovered, "it was decided to adhere more strictly to the
principle set out in paragraph five of the Department's booklet
'Guide to Student's Allowances' that awards should be made only
where both the first degree course and the postgraduate course
are the normal requirement for admission to a first and basic
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career...." Therefore as the complainant's application had
been properly assessed under the new approach the P.C.A.
concluded that no maladministration had occurred and that
"in times of financial restraint Departments have to
consider what savings can be made in areas where they have
discretion. In the case of the S.E.D. this has included
postgraduate allowances. The inevitable outcome has been
disappointment for sane students who^ on t^rie basis of
precedent, had expected to receive one."
Presumably the statutory restrictions upon the P.C.A.'s ability
to review policy decisions coupled with the ministerial origins
of the demand for a changed interpretation underlaid the
Commissioner's response in that case.
In his latest report the P.C.A. openly criticises the Branch
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on several grounds. The case concerned a student who had
withdrawn fran courses of study twice during the nineteen
seventies. In 1980 she was given a grant for a two year diplana
course and in 1981 she repeated the first year, but because of
qualified for a first career."
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Subsequently the P.C.A.
an error on the part of Branch staff they continued her grant
under the impression that she was completing her final year of
study. Then in 1982 when she applied for a grant to pursue her
second year the Branch refused on the basis that the rules of the
scheme only allowed an applicant to claim an allowance for the
minimum period necessary to complete a second course where she
had previously been funded for part of another course.
Eventually the student complained to the P.C.A. about the
Branch's alleged sudden decision not to fund her final year of
study. After investigating the Branch's refusal he reported that
the relevant Territorial officer should have written to the
student in 1980, when her allowance was awarded, informing of the
applicable rule of the Scheme. In the P.C.A.'s words,
"I have seen the relevant departmental instructions which
clearly state that such a warning letter must be sent ... I
must criticise the Depart^pnt for their failure to follow
their own instructions..."
Nevertheless the S.E.D. argued that the student had been given a
sufficient warning of the rule by paragraph fourteen of the
1982/2 Guide which stated "where a student is permitted by the
academic authorities to transfer to another course before the
start of the second year of a course for which a Student's
Allowance has been granted, the award will be continued for the
minimum period required to complete the new course but the
student will not be assisted to repeat any year of the new
course." But the complainant claimed that she had read paragraph
fourteen as applying only to second courses taken up immediately
after withdrawal from a first course. The P.C.A. decided that
"I can see sane justification for the complainant reaching
the conclusion which she did. Indeed I think it is
unfortunate that the guide is less definitive on the matter
than the Department's internal instructions are. These say
quite unequivocally that a student is regarded as changing
course if, for any reason, he or she withdraws prematurely
from a course and immediately or subsequently applies for a
grant in respect of another course. If advice on these
lines had appeared in the guide, it would, I think, have
been clear to the complainant that a period of employment
between courses did not alter the principle that grants were
to be refused for repeat years of study for the new course.
As it was, 4jthe guide left sane room for
misunderstanding."
Consequently, in the light of the several errors made by the
Branch, the P.C.A. found that the complainant had suffered
injustice as a result of maladministration by officers within
the organisation and recommended that the S.E.D. pay the
complainant's fees and allowance for her second year, and should
reconsider the phrasing of paragraph fourteen. The Prinipal
Officer of the Department agreed to abide by those
recommendations.
The above case is significant not merely because it involved
the first finding of injustice caused by maladministration of
the scheme by the Branch, but also because of the P.C.A.'s
critique of the Annual Guide's comprehensiveness. Undoubtedly
departments administering a major governmental programme on the
basis of a wide statutory discretion is the agency's monopoly of
one of the inherent weaknesses from the citizen's perspective of
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control over the dissemination of information regarding the
policies and detailed administrative guidance governing te
exercise of the discretion in individual cases. The citizen
cannot have recourse to statutes or delegated legislation for an
authoritative statement of the basic premises of the programme
but must rely solely upon the department's release of what it
considers to be sufficient information. Whilst the Branch's
Annual Guide contains many of the fundamental principles of the
Scheme, the inevitable disparity in size of such a booklet
compared with the totality of the internal administrative
guidance we have encountered suggests that a difficult
compromise must be reached over the contents of the Guide.
Despite the confidence of the Branch concerning their
achievement of that delicate equilibrium this case demonstrated
that it had not been attained.
Frcm the standpoint of officers within the Branch they
sought to place the reports of investigations by the P.C.A. in
the context of over 600,000 applications for allowances
processed in ten years. But despite the remote statistical
chance that any one determination by a particular officer might
be followed up by an investigation, senior officers were highly
sensitive to the P.C.A.'s existence; one officer semi-seriously
touched his desk top and said (accurately at that time) , "touch
wood he has not found against us yet." However, below the grade
of H.E.O. the possibility of censure by the P.C.A. did not
appear to be a very significant factor in influencing
Territorial officers' case work decision-making, a finding which
accords with Gregory and Hutcheson's similar conclusion.^
The final, and least used external agents to whan
dissatisfied applicants resorted when faced with what they
considered to be objectionable Branch decisions were the
professions of law and accountancy. According to several
Territorial officers those representatives were employed by
applicants to deal with technical matters such as accountants'
queries over the calculations of parental contributions, or
solicitors' documentation concerning questions of custody and
divorce. The specialists did not often appear to be involved in
the formulation or presentation of disappointed applicants'
challenges towards the merits of Branch guidance, but whether
that result was the product of the applicants' own abilities or
their belief in the inappropriate nature of the two professions'
distinct skills could not be ascertained by our fieldwork. The
reasons why lawyers did not advise their clients to seek a
judicial remedy will be examined a little later.
To summarise, direct appeals/complaints to the Branch by
dissatisfied applicants had the advantages for them of cheapness
and speed. Nevertheless the legitimacy of the procedure by
which those representations were evaluated may be undermined
fron the viewpoint of citizens affected by Branch
decision-making because of the absence of publicity surrounding
its existence or requirements. Furthermore the fact that
applicants who do make representations to the Branch are
unlikely to be aware of the formal structure of decision-making
within the organisation may mean that they experience less than
optimum respect and satisfaction with the official response
because they do not appreciate the significance of a decision
made by an H.E.O. as opposed to one reached by an E.O. These
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propositions suggest that it may be important to strive for the
openness of procedural guidance, as well as that of policy
guidance, if public understanding and acceptance of significant
administrative decision-making is to be promoted.
Secondly, despite the fact that the limited resources of the
P.C.A. mean that he can only conduct a very few investigations
into complaints against the handling of the Scheme by the Branch,
his existence provides seme benefits for both dissatisfied
applicants and senior officers within the Branch. For those
members of the former group whose cases he pursues his reports
may help to assure them that they were treated fairly within the
provisions of the Scheme by explaining how and why an adverse
decision was reached on their application Ie.g. the mature
student's case), or by securing redress for them when he finds
that they suffered injustice as a consequence of
maladministration (e.g. the repeat year student). Senior staff
may for their part gain the advantage of having an experienced
external specialist review aspects of the administrative process
operating in the Branch. Although they can be proud that in the
overwhelming majority of instances the P.C.A. dismissed the
complaints against their organisation's determinations, the
continual possibility of further investigations may prevent any
complacency in their monitoring of Territorial casework
developing.
Finally, the research indicated a likely connection between
the legal nature of the regime of rules regulating a governmental
programme and the range of remedies available to aggrieved
citizens. That was a factor vhich the Anderson Committee did not
include in their assessment of the various systems of
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student grant administration, despite its importance for
individuals. However, under the Scottish Scheme the combination
of a programme where many of the basic principles (as well as
their detailed elaboration) were to be found in administrative
guidance, allied with the judiciary's historically underdeveloped
responses to the doctrinal questions raised by those types of
provisions (see Chapter Six for details) presumably explained why
no legal actions had ever been raised against the casework
decisions of the Branch. If it had not been so difficult to
formulate a successful legal claim on the basis of administrative
guidance we might have expected sane of the disappointed
applicants to have sought a judicial remedy, particularly in the
context of a large scale programme which has been experiencing
major changes in the last few years with the likely consequential
increase in aggrieved applicants (e.g. postgraduate and repeat
year students). Nevertheless those applicants were effectively
denied a judicial evaluation of their entitlements and instead
had to seek other forms of redress (e.g. through their M.P.s)
Therefore, the fact that a programme is based upon administrative
guidance may severely curtail the possibility of judicial review
of individual determinations, which is a consequence that ought
to be openly considered when the legal and administrative nature
of such a scheme is being decided upon. Whether the absence of
judicial review is considered to be advantageous or detrimental
can ultimately only be determined according to the multiplicity
of relevant criteria governing the format of the specific
programme but they should always include an examination of the




While the specific features of the Branch's operations
detailed in this chapter may not be replicated elsewhere across
the range of central government activities, many of the insights
that we have gained regarding the forms and uses of
administrative guidance are likely to have much wider
applicability. One reason for that universality can be found in
the nature of contemporary central government administration.
Wiere large numbers of civil servants are engaged upon
implementing numerous ccmplex programmes (e.g. immigration
control, taxation and environmental planning) the writings of
the Organisation Theorists and this case study indicate that the
general organisational requirements for the regulation and
co-ordination of such large-scale and sophisticated
decision-making necessitate the use of administrative guidance
to inter alia allocate decision-making powers within the
various organisations, establish the criteria governing the
decisions distributed between the distinct grades of officers,
and to explain the procedures by which those powers are to be
exercised. Furthermore, where Parliament merely delegates to a
Minister (i.e. to the department) the responsibility for a
particular task (e.g. paying student grants) without elaborating
the principles upon vhich the power is to be used,
administrative guidance will be frequently utilized to fill in
the policy foundations. Therefore, these features of the modern
administrative process in Britain should warn us that
administrative guidance is an inevitable element of contemporary
I 20.
government. Consequently we must not view the "L code"
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regulating legal aid officers , or the "S Code" governing
48
supplementary benefit officers , or the "Circular
Instructions" detailing censorship rules for prison
49
governors , as isolated and idiosyncratic devices for
conducting specific departmental business, but instead must seek
to comprehend them as component parts of the largely unexamined
and unpublished phenomenon of administrative guidance.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Ackninistrative Rule-Making Under the United States'
Federal Arkni nistrative Procedure Act
Introduction
In this chapter we shall preface our consideration of the
domestic legal responses to administrative guidance with an
element of comparative study. Ihe benefits flowing from
examining how the heritage of a foreign legal system has
responded to these provisions, which we have termed adminstrative
guidance, include the prevention of intellectual parochialism and
the potential infusion of insights derived from the experience of
another legal system (e.g. regarding the classification of
guidance) into our subsequent analysis.
Although it is vital to appreciate the differences between
the legal and governmental systems of individual nations,
lawyers in several distinct jurisdictions have written about
provisions broadly similar to British administrative guidance.
For example Jan H van Kreveld has published his doctoral
dissertation on Dutch "policy rules" which he defines thus,
"policy rules are general rules which are adapted and followed
by an administrative authority in the exercise of its
discretionary powers".1 Later he elaborates upon their
essential components which are, "(1) it is a general rule, (2)
which concerns the exercise of a discretionary power of an
administrative authority towards the citizen, (3) of which the
legal base is not to be found in the relevant statute but
2
implicitly in the administrative power Despite the fact
that these rules are not imbued with specific statutory authority
the author observes, "the duty to follow policy rules originates
frcm the legal principles of proper administration: particularly
frcm the principle of equal treatment, the consistency principle
3
and the principle of legal security." Frcm a Japanese
perspective Hiroshi Shiono details the existence of "regulatory",
"reconciliatory", and "promotional", "administrative guidance",
which he describes collectively as, "administrative actions taken
by administrative organs, although without legal binding force,
that are intended to influence specific actions of other parties
(feasance or nonfeasance) in order to realize an administrative
4
aim." He continues to explain graphically how the unique
cultural context of governmental activity in Japan encourages the
use of "administrative guidance"; "to have administrative organs
formally and strictly exercise regulatory powers basically is not
preferred in our country ... the approach preferred in Japan is
to create a situation that is acceptable to both the
administrative organs and the other parties through informal
5
negotiation." Hence we learn that the detailed characters of
these provisions are naturally shaped by particular national
forces. However, the fact that roughly analogous provisions
exist in several administrative systems suggests that they may
have common origins in the tasks being undertaken by contemporary
welfare/interventionist states through bureaucratic
administrative organisations, which are then faced with the
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universal problems of applying complex governmental programmes
to large numbers of individual citizens. If that is so then the
virtues of comparative study may be even greater because other
legal systems will probably have had to contemplate identical
questions to those facing British law (e.g. how can these
provisions be classified?; should they be subject to judicial
enforcement?; what degree of public participation in their
formation should be required?; and should the public have access
to their contents? etc.).
We shall concentrate upon the U.S. Federal experience of
administrative rule-making for two reasons. First because of
the importance assigned to that practice by significant
participants in the U.S. legal system, and secondly due to the
fact that it is within the parameters of U.S. law that Professor
K.C. Davis has vociferously advocated the merits (for both
America and other countries) of administrative rule-making to
control the exercise of discretionary governmental powers and
thereby promote the provision of justice to individual citizens.
Consequently by seeking to discover in greater detail the actual
legal response to such rule-making we will be in a better
position to comprehend Davis1 arguments and to assess their
applicability to British administrative guidance.
The Ideas of K.C. Davis Regarding Administrative Rule-making.
Davis begins with the question, "in our entire legal and
governmental system, how can we improve the quality of justice
for individual parties: how can we reduce injustice?" His
short answer is that it requires us, " ... to open our eyes to
the reality that justice to individual parties is administered
more outside courts than in them, and we have to penetrate the
unpleasant areas of discretionary determinations by police and
prosecutors and other administrators, where huge concentrations
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of injustice invite drastic reforms." In a subsequent
publication he explains why he wants to concentrate upon that
facet of administrative activity,
"The reason I am searching for ways to eliminate unnecessary
discretion and to control necessary discretion is not that
human beings cannot exercise unlimited and unguided
discretion wisely, justly, and beneficiently. Many can.
Many do. The reason is we do not know how to select the
ones who can and do; most of our European and American and
other administrators in fact exercise discretion wisely,
justly, and benef iciently only a part of the time. Out of a
thousand officers, no matter how well screened, a large
portion may be expected to abuse their discretionary power
to a considerable extent, and seme - perhaps only a few -
are likely to gngage in occasional abuse of power that is
quite serious."
Against that backdrop of human failings Davis believes U.S.
administrators have unnecessarily wide discretionary powers as
Congress has been forced to delegate extensive decision-making
authority to them because, "no matter how expert their helpers
may be, legislators are less than omniscient and usually are
wise, when they establish an agency, to attempt no more than to
legislate broad frameworks for administrative policy-making."9
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Additionally he considers that administrators frequently
(sometimes unlawfully) extend the range of their particular
discretions."^ Therefore, whilst continually reminding us that
a balance must be maintained between necessary and unnecessary
discretion, "let us not oppose discretionary power commensurate
with the tasks undertaken by government; let us oppose
discretionary power that outruns those tasks.""'"''' As he
acknowledges that, "discretion is a tool; indispensable for
individualization of justice ... rules alone, untempered by
discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of modern
government and of modern justice. Discretion is our principal
12
source of creativeness in government and in law." He
concludes that the existing equilibrium is too far towards the
unnecessary discretion part of the scale as, "perhaps nine-tenths
of unjustice in our legal system flows frcm discretion and
13
perhaps only one-tenth from rules." Consequently he
reccmmends the "confining" of unnecessary discretionary powers.
"By confining is meant fixing the boundaries and keeping
discretion within them. The ideal, of course, is to put all
necessary discretionary power within the boundaries, to put all
unnecessary such power outside the boundaries, and to draw clean
14
lines." To establish these boundaries, " ... the chief hope
for confining discretionary power does not lie in statutory
enactments but in much more extensive administrative rule-making
15
..." Davis continues,
"The procedure of administrative rule-making is in my opinion
one of the greatest inventions of modern government ... The
usual procedure is that prescribed by the Administrative
Procedure Act, the central feature of which is publishing
proposed rules and inviting interested parties to make
written comments ... The procedure is both fair and
efficient. Much experience proves that it usually works
beautifully."16
12.8.
He then claims that administrators should utilize the above
procedure to promulgate legislative administrative rules (see
below for definition) in order to set limits around their
necessary discretionary powers; furthermore, where the officials
do not possess delegated legislative powers they should still
use the rule-making procedure to create policy statements and
interpretative rules. Once the boundaries of necessary
discretion have been fixed the next task is to "structure" the
exercise of the remaining discretionary power; that requires the
administrators to, " ... regularize it, organize it, produce
order in it, so that their decisions affecting individual
17
parties will achieve a higher quality of justice."
According to Davis the foundation of structuring is openness
because it
"
... is the natural enemy of arbitrariness and a natural
ally in the fight against injustice. Wte should enlist it
much more than we do. When plans and policies and rules are
kept secret, as through confidential instructions to staffs,
private parties are prevented from checking arbitrary
or unintended departures fran them ... The goal should be to
close the gap between what the agency and its staff know
about the agency's law and policy and what an outsider can
know. The gap can probably never completely closed, but
the effort should always continue."
Again, administrative rule-making is recommended as a technique
for the promulgation of policy statements and rules to structure
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official' discretions. Finally, as we have already
discussed in Chapter Three, Davis states that the remaining
necessary discretions should be subject to a regime of internal
and external "checking".
The preceding ideas appear to be based upon the premise that
the exercise of discretionary governmental powers can be
prevented from becoming arbitrary by being subjected to
pre-existing administrative rules. Chapters Two and Three have
indicated seme of the difficulties in translating that objective
into an organisational reality and in a similar vein Baldwin and
Hawkins have voiced concern regarding Davis' understanding of the
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processes of administrative decision-making. Yet Davis'
ccmmitment to democratic values does not allow him to accept all
manner of administrative rules as suitable mechanisms for
specifying the criteria that should govern the exercise of
discretionary powers. To satisfy his demands the formulation of
the rules must have involved public participation and their final
content must be publicly available. Therefore, their procedural
characteristics are beginning to resemble those of statutory
provisions even if their substantive effects in law are
dissimilar.
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Apart from the "evangelical" tone of Davis' writing, and
his expansive definition of discretion (see Chapter Three),
several areas of his analysis have been subjected to critical
scrutiny. Amongst the foremost aspects of criticism attention
has focused on Davis' failure to articulate fully the meaning he
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assigns to the concept of "justice to individual parties"
Even after a close inspection of his work we are only able to
discover odd glimpses of the content he gives to that notion.
For example he seems to indicate that it covers "fairness" when
he observes,
"Of course, even the agencies that are primarily regulatory
are also concerned with problems of justice - and with
mixtures and compounds that include problems of justice. In
regulatory agencies, an ever present objective is to find the
most satisfactory accommodation of the needs of effectiveness
to the often conflicting needs of fairness, both substantive
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and procedural." (emphasis mine)
Whilst subsequently he states, " ... equality is a major
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ingredient of justice ..." Davis is even more blunt about the
topic in his sequel publication, where he declares, "the inquiry
is not into the question of what is injustice; instead we assume
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that each reader has his own conception of justice ..."
Although that may be a legitimate restriction in the scope of his
investigation, it would have been helpful if Davis had at least
explicitly stated whether he conceived the concept as spanning
both substantive and procedural components (he implicitly appears
to consider that it does as he gives the following examples of
discretionary decisions affecting justice to individuals - the
Social Security Administration's adjudication of claims for old
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age and survivors benefits which emphasises procedural
justice - and the decision of a policeman not to arrest a suspect
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when he was empowered to, which is likely to be motivated
more by considerations of substantive justice e.g. the suspect
will be subject to greater punishment by his parents than by a
juvenile court). Also it would have been interesting to know
whether Davis accepts that the requirements of justice to
individuals may vary between decision-making contexts (e.g.
according to the implications of the decision for the individual
citizen).
The circumstances surrounding the existence of a discretion
are also central to the problem of determining if that power is
excessively wide or in Davis' terminology "unnecessary", together
with assessing when such a discretion has been sufficiently
confined and structured. As he has given us little information
regarding the content he assigns to the idea of "justice to
individual parties" his analysis is unable to provide specific
guides for the evaluation of actual discretionary powers.
Instead we are offered generalisations, such as: "discretionary
power can be either too broad or too narrow. When it is too
broad, justice may suffer from arbitrariness in inequality. When
it is too narrow, justice may suffer frart insufficient
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individualizing." Combined with personal conclusions,
"my observation is that all levels of American government -
federal, State, and local - are shot through with unnecessary
discretionary power. Such power far ep^peeds what is
necessary for an industrialized society ..."
However, to discover the criteria that may contribute to the
achievement of Davis' goals we must look elsewhere, as he
acknowledged,
"
... most of the thinking that has to be done t^Qminimize
injustice in the ways indicated is yet to be done."
Jowell has added a significant contribution in this respect by
outlining what he considers to be the strategic benefits and
disadvantages of subjecting particular administrative discretions
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to control by rules ("legalisation") The advantages include
the promotion of certain interpretations of
the concept of the "rule of law", administrative integrity and
an easier life for administrators, whilst the disadvantages
contain the fears of legalism and rigidity. Nevertheless Jowell
emphasises the importance of the empirical application of these
factors because it is
"
... clearly futile to propose or oppose legal control of
administrative discretion in the abstract, for in the
abstract the relative merits of devices of legal control may
seam evenly balanced by their demerits. In assessing
whether any given administrative task ought to be subjected
to legal control, it is necessary first to recognise that
costs a^xjl benefits exist, and then to weigh one against the
In the light of the preceding chapters it can be argued that
Davis has underplayed the significance of those organisational
forces which encourage the creation of internal rules by
bureaucracies. At one point he does admit that,
"
... administrators in some circumstances have incentives
to make rules which will confine their discretionary power,
because regularization through rules can mean getting more
accomplished with less effort; application of a r^Le may be
easier than thinking out each individual problem."
Yet he pays no attention to any of the literature on
organisation theory despite its revelations about the
interactions of administrators and rules in bureaucratic
settings.
.Davis' ideas have been praised on both sides of the
Atlantic, with Professor Hepple commenting,
"
... the themes which he emphasises will be central to the
present discussion on the future of administrative law and
of local government in this country."34
other."
The reviewer was impressed with the technique of administrators
confining and structuring their discretions via interpretative
rules since these, " ... can be of considerable help to those
who wish to advise members of the public what treatment may be
Discretionary Justice as a "powerful manifesto" for renewing
legal control over the U.S. Federal agencies. In his view the
courts should take up Davis' call to seek to demand that the
agencies regulate their discretionary powers by administrative
rules; that being a perfectly constitutional strategy because,
"administrative discretion was certainly created by law, and
there is no inherent reason why the law should be unable to
3b
control it."
Indeed, it is to the legal reactions towards administrative
rule-making that we now turn in order that we may discover the
nature and effects of the different types of rules mentioned by
Davis, ccmbined with an elucidation of the recent trends in
Congressional and Judicial responses to the various categories
of rules.
An Outline Account of the Development of Federal and
Administrative Rule-making
The following history will concentrate upon the promulgation
of "legislative rules" by Federal agencies as they represent the
category of administrative rules which have attracted the
greatest judicial, political and academic controversy. In
expected."
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Moreover, Judge Skelly Wright described
accordance with their designation rules coming within this class
have the force of statute law and are the American equivalent of
British delegated legislation. Just as in the U.K., Federal
agencies must possess an express delegation of legislative power
from the legislature (Congress in the latter's case) in order to
37
be capable of making these rules. Schwartz states that such
a delegation ocurred during the First Congress over veterans'
pensions, but it was not until the consolidation of a powerful
Federal government began to occur after the Civil War that
frequent delegations were granted. Then with the dawning of
government regulation of business activities via the independent
regulatory commissions, initiated by the Interstate Gommerce Act
1887, a new era in administrative rule-making began. The
justification of these innovative grants of legislative powers
was that Congress could only establish the general principles of
regulation and expert administrative agencies were needed to
supply the detailed provisions. Nevertheless business did not
meekly accept government regulation and up until 1915
continually challenged the various agencies' legislative
rule-making together with their subsequent enforcement actions
under the Fifth Amendment's "due process" doctrine with same
success. Then in Bi Metallic Investment Co. v State of Board
3 8
Equalization the Supreme Court determined that "due process"
obligations did not apply to legislative process, vdnich Justice
Holmes characterised as being concerned with matters of general
application. Consequently, so long as legislative rules were
directed at general issues, as opposed to specific individuals,
they would not fall foul of due process procedural
requirements.
The next phase in administrative rule-making occurred with
the election of President Roosevelt and his "New Efeal"
interventionist programme in 1932. Soon the enactment of several
statutes which delegated extremely wide legislative powers to
administrative agencies was challenged before the courts on the
grounds of violating the "non delegation doctrine" vdiich required
these delegations to be subject to effective limiting standards
39
in the enabling statutes. In Schecter Poultry Corp v U.S.
this doctrine was invoked to declare unconstitutional the
National Industrial Recovery Act's delegation of power to the
President to issue codes of fair competition for industries.
However, against the background of increasing economic decline,
growing popular support for Roosevelt's ideas and eventually war,
the Supreme Court relaxed the demands of this doctrine so that
by 1943 it was virtually redundant as a restraint upon the
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delegation of legislative powers. That outcome was
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explicitly demonstrated in the case of N.B.C. v U.S. where
the Communications Act 1934, which only required the Federal
Canmunications Commission to inter alia act in the "public
interest", was upheld.
Despite the above judicial successes of the New Dealers
those persons, including particularly sections of the business
community, who opposed the substance of Roosevelt's measures
reacted by attempting to mobilise support against the procedures
adopted by the new agencies. The fulcrum of this dissent was
the American Bar Association v\hich in 1934 created a special
committee to review the practices of these agencies. It
initially proposed a new Federal Administrative Court but this
was rejected by those practitioners who feared a consequent loss
of employment. Then in 1939, under the chairmanship of Roscoe
42
Pound, the committee issued a report recommending inter alia
that all the new agencies should be under a statutory duty to
promulgate their legislative rules within one year of the
enactment of the enabling statute. Furthermore any person
"substantially interested in the effects of any administrative
rule" would have locus standi to challenge the rule before the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Although many criticisms
were levelled against the report, including its attempt to
impose uniform procedural obligations on all new Federal
agencies, a Bill containing the report's recommendations was
introduced into Congress. Verkuil commented that,
"the forces in favor of the bill were undoubtedly led by
those who were substantially opposed to (or tyrannised by)
the New Deal programmes".
Those interests were sufficiently successful in their lobbying
that Congress passed the Bill and in order to prevent it
becoming law the President had to exercise his veto over it.
In an attempt to defuse criticism of his action Roosevelt
subsequently established his own committee to consider
administrative procedures. Chaired by Dean Acheson it reported
in 1941 under the title of the Attorney-General's Advisory
44
Committee on Administrative Procedure. On the basis of
empirical research into the spectrum of Federal agencies the
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committee split into a majority and a minority with the latter
group recommending the creation of a Code of Fair Procedure to
govern agency conduct. But by that time America was at war and
attention had beccme deflected away frcm administrative procedure
reform. During 1946 congressional interest again reverted to the
administration and Representative Walter introduced a Bill based
upon the 1941 minority recommendations. On that occasion his
Bill did not discriminate against the new agencies as it applied
equally to all Federal ones and allowed for sane degree of
individual agency adaptation by specifying only minimum
procedural obligations. Consequently President Truman did not
object to the Bill and it was enacted as the Administrative
Procedure Act 1946 (hereafter for brevity referred to as the
A.P.A.). Four years later the Supreme Court pointedly observed
in Wang Yang Sung v McGrath,
"The Act thus represents a long period of study and strife;
it settles long and hard fought contentions, and enacts a
formula upon w|i^ch opposing social and political forces have
ccme to rest."
While the Act itself has remained unamended (apart from the
grafting on of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966) the
compromise upon which it was built has been virtually eroded, as
will be seen below, in terms of specific statutory schemes and
judicial reasoning.
As for the behaviour of the agencies, despite the legal
support for rule-making in the forms of the N.B.C. decision and
the passage of the A.P.A. these organisations appeared very
reluctant to engage in legislative rule-making. According to
Shapiro that was because the agencies preferred to develop their
policies via adjudication due to its supposed advantage of
allowing retrospective action, easier departure from precedents
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and less severe judicial scrutiny. Robinson has challenged
each of those assumptions and concludes, "It seems more
plausible that agency reluctance to use rule-making is due to
simple reluctance to engage in broad planning efforts than to
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any perceived advantages in one form of procedure."
Viiatever the explanation for the agencies' abstinence it is
clear that during the early Nineteen Fifties only one agency
regularly utilized legislative rule-making and that was the
Federal Communications Commission. In the case of US. v Storer
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Broadcasting Co the Supreme Court gave encouragement to the
Ccmmission's rule-making and thereby indicated the future
directions of policy-making for many other agencies. The
litigation concerned new legislative rules amending the number
of radio and T.V. stations one person could operate. After
giving notice of this proposed amendment in 1948 and after
receiving ccmments from interested parties, including the
respondent, the Ccmmission promulgated the replacement rules in
1953. Storer then challenged the lawfulness of the rules
claiming inter alia that they infringed an applicant's statutory
right to a full evidentiary hearing before being denied a
licence.*" Justice Reed for the majority began by stressing the
judiciary's deference to agencies in the following terms,
"The growing complexity of our economy induced the Gongress
to place regulation of businesslike communications in
specialised agencies with broad powers. Courts are slow to
interfere with their conclusions where reconcilable with
statutory directions."
Because of the width of the Commission's powers it was easy for
the majority to determine that the challenged rules merely
defined the public interest in protecting against
overconcentration in the broadcasting industry. Consequently, as
the Act provided that an applicant did not have a right to a
prior hearing where his application was contrary to the public
interest, Justice Reed was able to conclude that the Commission's
rules did not violate an applicant's statutory rights and were
therefore valid.
Gradually other established agencies began to appreciate the
impact of the above judgment in terms both of judicial respect
for agency rule-making, and its rejection of hearing rights
objections with their "due process" overtones. So during the
Nineteen Sixties many more agencies began to promulgate
legislative rules via the informal procedure defined in section
553 of the A.P.A. (see below for elaboration). These changes in
techniques for developing agency policies and requirements meant
a departure frcm the traditional mechanisms of individual
adjudications or formal rule-making involving evidentiary
hearings and were often objected to by affected businesses. A
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spate of cases arose for the major regulatory agencies. In
their determinations the courts upheld the agencies' use of
section 553, but with tentative indications that the judiciary
might demand more than the section's basic requirements. Later
in the first half of the Seventies the courts were faced with a
new phase of rule-making cases involving the modern agencies
responsible for safety and environmental matters and again they
allowed the rule-makers to use informal procedures. However, by
that time the judges were developing their obiter dicta from the
previous decade and ccmmon law additions were being fused onto
the procedural requirements of section 553.
Paralleling those trends towards greater agency promulgation
of legislative rules via section 553 procedures and judicial
additions to their basic requirements, Hamilton has described how
Congress has also been supplementing the procedural obligations
of rule-making in specific statutes. While noting that "the
procedural provisions of these statutes are almost unbelievably
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chaotic ...", he detailed how they have necessitated inter
alia agency consultations with advisory committees, review by
Congress and oral hearings. Hamilton thought that the individual
statutory expansions of section 553's demands had as their
underlying premise the same one that motivates the judicial
additions, namely a feeling that simple informal rule-making does
not bring about sufficient public influence and participation in
agency rule-making. Therefore, by the mid-Seventies the A.P.A.
was in—danger of losing^ its "procedural leadership" over
rule-making, to borrow Verkuil's terminology, as both Congress
and the courts altered its scope and redefined its requirements.
Now we shall examine the details of the latter development.
The Administrative Procedure Act's Requirements for Rule-making;
The Judicial Response
We must preface this section with an explanation of the
major terms and concepts used by the A.P.A. as those establish
the legal boundaries of administrative rule-making. By section
551 the word "agency" is defined as including "each authority of
the Government of the United States" with the exceptions of
inter alios Congress, the courts and various military bodies.
Consequently the term includes virtually every organisation
found within the Federal executive branch of government.
Traditionally these have been divided into independent
regulatory canmissions vdoich supervise, licence and rate-make
for businesses coming within their jurisdictions; and government
departments which have both "benefactory" and regulatory
responsibilities. Though the President has less direct legal
authority over the commissions, as the cases of Humphrey' s
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Executive v U.S. and Wiener v U.S. demonstrate, for
rule-making purposes the same principles apply.
The A.P.A.'s description of the notions of "rule-making" and
a "rule" are just as wide as its definition of an agency. To
understand the format of the statutory definitions it is vital
to appreciate that, according to Schwartz, "the Federal A.P.A.
is based upon the fundamental dichotomy between rule-making and
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adjudication." Therefore section 551 begins by defining a
rule in subsection (4) as, " ... the whole or a part of an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy, or describing the organisation, procedure, or
practice requirements of an agency and by subsection (5),
rule-making means an "agency process for formulating, amending,
or repealing a rule". Subsection (6) defines an "order" as the
"final disposition" of any matter other than rule-making, and by
subsection (7) "adjudication" is the process leading to the
creation of an order. The effect is that the statutory
definition of a rule is the foundation upon which all the
remaining definitions are based. It is an enormously expansive
definition both in functional terms and in the inclusion of
provisions which can possess either general or specific
characteristics. This latter component is important because it
reveals that the authors of the Act rejected the distinction
between concern with general and individual matters as a test
for distinguishing between legislative rule-making and
adjudicating processes proposed by the Supreme Court in the
Bi-Metallic case. Instead they adopted the test of "future
effect" as the unique characteristic of rules. This raises the
possibility that a court motivated by the general/particular
aproach could conclude that a "rule" of a particular effect was
in essence an individual order which demanded "due process"
procedural protections for the affected citizen. Hence in 1972
the American Bar Association recommended that the A. P. A.
definition of a rule be amended to delete the reference to
particular effects.
In order to promote clarity in the following examination a
functional classification of administrative rules Which is
implicit within the A.P.A. will be used to structure the
analysis of the judicial determinations.
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The classification
takes account of both legal and administrative attributes of
such rules to distinguish between (1) those which establish
statutory norms and have the force of law (legislative rules);
(2) that group which contain agencies' interpretations of
statutes and legislative rules (interpretative rules); and (3)
rules which set out agencies' procedures (procedural rules).
(1) Legislative Rules
The A.P.A. establishes two models of rule-making for this
class of rules: informal procedures (section 553) and formal
procedures (sections 556-557). Legislative rules are now
important in both a quantitative and qualitative sense. In
respect of quantity by 1973 the Federal Register contained over
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65,000 pages of legislative rules, and with the modern
legality of vague enabling statutes often basic principles are to
be found within these rules thereby giving them qualitative
stature too. This relatively recent occurrence of statutes
delegating wide powers also has another effect upon legislative
rules, namely that the legal requirement of substantive intra
vires rule-making is much more easily satisfied nowadays.
Moreover the traditional judicial demand that a legislative rule
must be "reasonable", which goes back to a 1921 case concerning
charges for customs officers' inspections on a bridge across
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Niagara Falls, appears to be of little relevance today.
Davis considers that that requirement is based upon the canon of
statutory interpretation that Congress is presumed not to
delegate the power to act unreasonably ,58 ^ w^atever j_^s
origins it does not provide an effective limitation upon
rule-making; instead the courts concentrate upon the procedure of
rule-making.
(a) Informal Rule-making - Section 553
This procedural format is the standard model for legislative
rule-making and applies unless a specific enabling statute adds
to section 553 or formal rule-making is invoked by the methods
outlined later. Frequently this model is referred to by the
colloquial expression of "notice and comment" which relates to
its major procedural components. However, subsection 553(a)
sets out a number of strategic exceptions covering certain
subject areas where legislative rules do not have to comply with
the section's requirements: these include military and foreign
affairs, together with rules affecting "public property, loans,
grants, benefits or contracts". Consequently many rules
governing important aspects of what Reich has termed "government
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largess" are not susceptible to the A.P.A.'s promulgation
procedures. Also there is a general escape clause which allows
agencies to circumvent section 553, irrespective of the subject
matter of the legislative rule, where they certify that to
observe its requirements would be "impracticable, unnecessary,
or contrary to the public interest" (s. 553 (b)(3)(B)).
Where the section does apply it mandates the publication of
notice of proposed rule-making in the Federal Register unless
affected persons are served with actual notice (s. 553(b)). The
notice must cover the time, place and nature of public
rule-making proceedings; a statement of the legal authority
i *~-~
under which the rule is being issued; and finally either the
terms or substance of the proposed rule, or a description of the
subjects and issues involved. Then the agency must "give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule-making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation" (s.
553(c)). That is the crux of public participation in informal
rule-making, consequently the agency is given a wide freedom by
the statute to determine the ways in vhich "ccmment" will be
allowed in any particular rule-making exercise. Then, after
considering ccmments received, the agency must incorporate in
the publication of the final rules "a concise general statement
of their basis and purpose". Schwartz and Wade observe on the
above procedure that,
"these provisions were modelled upon those contained in the
British Rules Publication Act 1893, and constitute a belated
effort to obtain democratisation of the rule-making process
without destroying its flexibility by imposing procedural
requirements that are too onerous."
Certainly in the formative years of modern rule-making the
courts paid great deference to agency expertise and actions. For
example in Pacific States Box Co. v White ^ the Supreme Court
applied the principle that agencies engaged in informal
rule-making did not have to prove the existence of the facts
upon which they based their rule, as adjudicators had to do with
regard to their determinations. And in Norwegian Nitrogen Co v
6 2U • an agency was allowed to utilize its own knowledge when




(which was one of the earliest cases decided
under section 553) the court refused to criticise a rule-making
procedure where the Secretary of the Interior, relying upon
departmental advice, confirmed a wildlife order six days after
notice had been given and five days before an oral hearing was to
be held! But today such judicial restraint and procedural laxity
is part of history as the ensuing cases graphically illustrate.
The notice requirement of section 553(b) came under judicial
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scrutiny in Wagner Electric Corp. v Volpe, where the
Administrator of the National Highway Safety Administration had
prcmulgated a new vehicle safety standard governing indicator
lights and hazard flashers. He had first given notice of a
proposal to change their performance criterion and the appellant
manufacturers had made written comments. When he published the
final rules they altered both performance and testing criteria,
so the appellants ccmplained that notice had not been given of
the intentions to alter testing criteria too. The Administrator
responded by issuing a new notice applying to testing changes and
the appellants again made written comments which this time argued
that the testing criteria were so closely associated with
performance ones that a new rule-making proceeding should, be held
to consider amendments to both topics together. But the
Administrator rejected the appellants' suggestion and issued
rules altering both performance and testing criteria. Thereupon
the appellants challenged the rules claiming that notice had not
been given regarding an intention to alter performance criteria.
On appeal, before the Federal Court of Appeals Washington D.C.
(where the majority of these cases are determined) Gibbons J.
held that the second notice did not cover intended changes in
performance criteria and, "the fact that seme knowledgeable
manufacturers appreciated the intimate relationship between the
permissible failure rate provisions and the performance
he declared the rules void and required the Administrator to
repeat the rule-making process comprehensively. From this case
it is clear that the courts now take a stringent attitude
towards the notice obligations and the fact that a particular
publication is adequate for many, but not all, of the interested
parties is not likely to satisfy the judges. Therefore we
should not be surprised to learn that in the later case of
Portland Cement Association v Ruckelshaus^*3 a rule purporting
to define pollution levels was struck down because the agency's
test methodology was not included in the notice details.
Levental J. stated that, "it is not consonant with the purpose
of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of
inadequate data, or on data that, to a critical degree, is known
6 7
only to the agency."
Judicial consideration of section 553(c)'s "comment"
requirements brings to the surface the judges' concern that the
Act allows agencies a broad choice of public participation
mechanisms and that often those used do not enable affected
citizens to make adequate representations. As a result the
cases demonstrate various ways in which the courts have sought
to increase the procedural opportunities for participating,
though it is always necessary to remember that procedural
challenges may be mere covert attempts to undermine the
agencies' substantive policies.
criteria, and so responded is not relevant."
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Consequently
In Walter Holm and Co. v Hardin
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the appellants were
tomato importers who sought to challenge a tomato marketing
regulation issued by the Secretary of Agriculture under the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 1937. The Act provided that
when an order regulated the size of domestic tomatoes it
automatically applied to imported ones. Advising the Secretary
was a committee nominated by domestic procedures, and in 1969
they recommended a minimum size for tomatoes. The Secretary then
gave notice of a proposed rule embodying that suggestion together
with inviting written comments. Eventually a rule incorporating
the recommended standard was promulgated and then the appellants
challenged the rule claiming that they should have been afforded
the opportunity to make oral representations. Levental J. agreed
with their claim:
"This conclusion is undergirded by basic considerations of
fairness arising out of the framework of the restriction, a
statutory pattern of self regulation by industry ... The
essential point is that a procedure not requiring an
opportunity for oral presentation to the Department on
crucial matters, and not requiring evidence in the record, is
a seedbed for the weed of industry domination ... the oral
hearing may be legislative in type, although fairness may
require opportunity for cross examination on the crucial
issues."
Therefore he granted a declaration that the appellants were
entitled to such a hearing. What is interesting about the
judgment is that it was given almost without mention of the
requirements of the A.P.A. and the Secretary's discretion under
subsection 553(c). Instead an exceedingly vague common law
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notions of "fairness" was the main foundation of the comment
procedure required. However, one explanation for the decisions
may be that the facts of the case had heavy undertones of
domestic trade protectionism and therefore the court was merely
counterbalancing them by increasing the procedural obligations of
the Secretary.
In Mobil Oil Co. v Federal Power Commission
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the
controversy centred around a rule establishing rates for the
transportation of liquid and liquefiable hydrocarbons in natural
gas pipelines. The comment procedure had been rather erratic and
consisted mainly of two conferences at which interested
businesses discussed various transportation costs. After the
appellant's contention that formal rule-making should have been
observed was rejected by the court, they claimed that the
Natural Gas Act's provision that the rule be supported by
"substantial evidence" required more than basic section 553
procedures. The court accepted that proposition and concluded,
"
... an examination of the purposes and provisions of the
substantive statute being administered may require that more
than the comparatively feeble ^otections of section 553 of
the A.P.A. may be called for."
That was a very vital development as it enabled the court to
increase the procedural obligations of the agency via a supposed
interpretation of the specific power-conferring statute. The
extent to which such interpretations can be a product of
judicial creativity was amply illustrated by the subsequent
development of the judgment. Wilkey J. considered, " ... the
type of procedure is related and proportionate to the degree of
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evidentiary support required for the agency's decision."
Consequently as the National Gas Act imposed the "substantive
evidence" standard of judicial review, which is normally
associated with adjudicating determinations, he inferred a need
for greater adjudicative techniques than mere conferences.
Furthermore he felt the ancillary common law requirement of a
"whole record" also necessitated higher procedural obligations
as,
"informal comment simply cannot create a record that
satisfies the substantial evidence test ... (which requires)
the process of testing and illumination o^inarily
associated with adversary, adjudicative procedures."
Therefore, as the Commission's procedure had failed to meet
these demands he remanded the rule back for further proceedings
in accordance with the judgment.
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Again in International Harvester Co. v Ruckelshaus the
rule-making procedure was detailed by a specific statute, in
that case the Clean Air Act 1970, by which Gongress had provided
that from 1975 pollution emitted through car exhausts should be
reduced by ninety percent frcm their 1970 levels; but this
requirement could be delayed for one year on petition to the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. After an
oral hearing at which legal representation was allowed but
cross-examination prohibited, the Administrator declined to
authorise the suspension of the standard. Thereupon the
appellants challenged the Administrator's procedure claiming
inter alia, that cross-examination should have been allowed.
Levental J. reacted by pointing out that the 1970 Act's
procedure was designed to ensure expeditious rule-making;
therefore, he distinguished between a general right of cross-
examination and a more limited form confined to " ... critical
points where the general procedure proved inadequate to probe
V 6
'soft1 and sensitive subjects and witnesses." In the
particular case he decided that the Administrator should have
allowed such limited cross-examination, and therefore he upheld
the appellants' challenge. This case repeats the judiciary's
concern that informal rule-making proceedings excluding the
basic elements of court trials may fail to provide adequate and
effective public participation.
To summarise the above decisions on comment requirements, it
seems the courts are willing to utilize almost any conceivable
device, ranging from ambiguous common law concepts like the
"whole record" to tenuous statutory interpretations, in order to
increase the procedural obligations upon agencies. Even if such
a tendency could be sympathised with when it was motivated
purely by a conclusion that section 553 was failing to provide
sufficient public input into administrative rule-making, the
judiciary's constant equating of effective public participation
with adjudicatory techniques raises serious questions about
their organisational expertise, as mechanisms like
cross-examination may practically exclude many parties who
cannot afford legal representation. It must however be
recognised that participation is usually via collective
77
bodies, hence the dominance of trade associations and large
business entities in the actions for judicial review of
agencies' rule-making.
As for the demand in subsection 553(b) that a concise
general statement of the basis and purpose of the rule be
sx
'provided this was considered in the case of Automotive Parts and
Transport had issued a rule requiring cars to be fitted with
head restraints as standard equipment. The appellants, who
feared their members would lose trade as a result, challenged
the rule, inter alia, on the ground that its concise statement
was insufficient. In reply McGowan J. gave a " ... caution
against an overly literal reading of the statutory terms
'concise' and 'general' ... (as the statement must) ... enable
us to see what major issues of policy were ventilated by the
informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to than as it
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did." But there he felt the Secretary's statement complied
with these standards. However, in Kennecot Copper Co. v
8 0
Environmental Protection Agency the court reverted to its
Mobil technique of interpreting a specific enabling statute as
requiring a higher standard of compliance. The Administrator of
the agency had promulgated a rule establishing an "air quality
standard" for sulphur oxides pollution and the appellants
responded by alleging that his concise statement did not satisfy
the judicial review provisions of the Clean Air Act 1970.
Levental J. decided that although the Administrator's statement
satisfied the demands of section 553,
"There are contexts, however, contexts of fact, statutory
framework, and nature of action, in which the minimum
requirements of the A.P.A. may not be sufficient. (And this
was one because) The provisions for statutory judicial
review contemplates same disclosure of the basis of the
agency's action."
Therefore, he upheld the appellant's challenge.
Accessories Association v Boyd.
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There the Secretary for
The two preceding cases adequately demonstrate that the
courts do not take the concise statement requirement lightly and
if it is not sufficiently comprehensive this will invalidate the
whole rule-making process. Additionally the substance of the
statement allows the courts to scrutinise the particular
agency's thinking to ensure that it is not "arbitrary or
82 83
irrational" and "unreasoned" , otherwise these defects
will also undermine the rule's validity.
It is now appropriate to consider the judiciary's reactions
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to the exceptions from section 553. Davis notes that the
largest area of exceptions cover non-legislative rules (i.e.
interpretative, procedural and general statements of policy)
(s.553 (b)(A)). Later in this chapter we shall be examining
interpretative and procedural rules but here we will concentrate
upon general statements of policy. These provisions appear to
have many similarities with our administrative guidance,
including the fact that whilst they do not establish statutory
norms they are of central importance in the exercise of
discretionary powers by bureaucratic organisations, as the case
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of Noel v Chapman highlights. The dispute concerned the
power of District Directors in the Immigration and
Naturalisation Service to grant voluntary departures to
deportable aliens under the Immigration and Nationality Act
1952. Up until 1972 the New York District Director had followed
a liberal policy in exercising that power by granting a
voluntary departure to deportable aliens who were married to
resident aliens, with the effect that the deportable spouse was
given time to apply for, and obtain, a visa to remain in the
•\
U.S.A. After Congressional pressure had been exerted on the
service they issued a policy statement to their Directors stating
that they should not routinely grant voluntary departures. Ihe
New York Director applied the policy statement to the appellant,
who challenged its legality claiming that the statement was
really a legislative rule which should have been subject to
notice and comment proceedings. Mulligan J. noted that,
"
... the distinctions between a rule as defined in s.551(4)
which must be published, and a "general statement of
policy", which is not coined in the Act, is enshrouded in
considerable smog ... ".
But they could be separated, as general statements of policy were
primarily directed at instructing the staff of an agency in the
exercise of discretionary powers and did not confer or impose
legal rights or duties on citizens. Applying that test to the
facts of the case Mulligan J. stated, "we construe the
instruction to be simply a statement by the agency of its
general policy as a guideline to the District Directors. We
cannot conclude that the instructions at issue here changed the
existing right of the appellants to have their applications for
extensions of time to depart authorised in the sole discretion
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of the District Director." Therefore the appeal was
dismissed. It appears that in the above context the court did
not want to beccme involved in the policy-making of the Service
and consequently applied a definition of policy statements which
was based upon a rigid demarcation between the legal and
administrative effects of such statements. However, in
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practical terms the relevant policy statement seems to have been
as influential upon the decision-making of the District Director
as a legislative rule would have been.
There are dicta suggesting judicial responses towards the
substance of policy statements. For example in Pacific Gas and
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Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission the challenge was
to a 'statement of policy' issued by the respondents. Because
of the possible natural gas shortage the respondent Commission
had asked pipeline companies how they would react towards a
hypothetical shortage. Some had replied that they would give
priority to contractual agreements whilst others had emphasised
the significance of the uses of the fuel. Subsequently the
Ccmmission issued their policy statement in which they said
priority ought to be given according to the uses of the gas.
Then the appellant company, who were pipeline customers, sought
judicial review of the statement claiming, inter alia, that it
was a legislative rule and should have been promulgated via the
procedure of section 553. The court rejected that argument
because the statement " ... is neither a rule nor a precedent
but is merely an announcement to the public of the policy which
the agency hope to implement in future rule-makings or
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adjudications." Nevertheless the judgement continued to
elaborate upon the differences between a court's respect for a
legislative rule produced through informal rule-making and a
policy statement which,
"... is entitled to less deference than a decision expressed as a
rule or an adjudicative order ... the reviewing court has seme
leeway to assess the underlying wisdom of the policy..."90^
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Therefore, it seems possible that in certain instances an
affected citizen might be able to succeed in challenging the
merits of a policy statement through an action for judicial
review.
Another important exception, which has already been briefly
mentioned, frcm the procedural obligations of section 553 covers
rules of all three functional categories dealing with social
welfare matters (s.553(a)(2)). Sane of the difficulties
affected citizens may face in challenging the legality of such
rules due to the breadth of the above exception are demonstrated
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in the case of Morton v Ruiz . There the respondent was a
full blood Indian who had lived near the reservation for twenty
seven years. He had claimed general assistance benefit from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs who acting on an internal directive had
refused him the benefit because he did not live "on the
reservation". The respondent then sought to challenge the
lawfulness of that interpretation of the Snyder Act 1921.
Blackmun J. in the Supreme Court agreed with the respondent's
argument that Congress' intention had been for assistance
benefit to be available to Indians living "in or near the
reservation." However, the Secretary of the Interior then
claimed that the unpublished directive was in fact a legislative
rule which was binding on the Gourt and the respondent. The
Justices accepted that contention based upon an enabling Act
passed in 1834. Furthermore they had to acknowledge that
section 553 did not apply to the directive despite their
collective view that,
"the A.P.A. was adopted to provide, inter alia, that
administrative policies affecting individual rights and
obligations be promulgated pursuant to certain stated
procedures so as to avoid the inherently arbitrary nature of
unpublished ad hoc determinations."92
All the court could do was to refuse to uphold the secret
directive in the respondent's case because it had not been
published in accordance with the publicity requirements of the
Freedom of Information Act, Section 552. Therefore, the case
reveals how agencies on occasions may not clearly indicate the
legal nature of an administrative rule in order to exploit the
ensuing ambiguity as a device to shield their determinations
frcm judicial review.
The courts have been more successful in limiting the scope of
the general escape clause contained in subsection 553(b)(3)(B).
For example, in Detroit Edison Co. v. Environmental Protection
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Agency the respondents had approved a state air quality
standards plan which allowed a temporary exception for sulphur
dioxide pollution, then several months later they "clarified" the
plan to emit this exception. V\hen the appellants challenged this
alteration the respondents argued that notice and comment was not
required as the change came within the above head of being
"unnecessary". However, Feck J. held thatthe exception was "...
inapplicable as well because of the substantial impact of the
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regulation in issue." Considering the potential breadth of
the nebulous concept of substantial impact, which the judge did
not elaborate, the courts seem to have invented a power mechanism
to prevent abuse of this escape clause. As for v^iether it will
be helpful in deterring agency abuses only time will tell.
To summarise the general trends in recent judicial attitudes
(led by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia)
towards informal rule-making, they have been directed primarily
at increasing the
opportunities and effectiveness of public participation and
strengthening judicial scrutiny of agency reasoning. The latter
response has concentrated upon ensuring that the "concise
general statement of the rules' basis and purpose" is
sufficiently detailed to enable judicial review of the
"rationality" of the agency's reasoning (as in Automotive Parts)
and therefore marks the demise of judicial deference to agency
rule formulation found in Pacific Box. In the former trend the
judges have demanded strict compliance with the notice
requirements of section 553 (e.g. Wagner), combined with a
creative attitude towards comment proceedings which has resulted
in the emergence of various hybrid procedures initially derived
frcm section 553 but then expanded through the addition of
adjudicative elements, particularly cross-examination (e.g.
International Harvester). Legitimacy has been sought for these
judicial reforms of comment proceedings by invoking ccmmon law
concepts such as fairness (e.g. Walter Holm), or by claims of
interpretation of specific enabling statues (e.g. Mobil).
The desirability of the above developments has now been
explicitly considered by the judiciary in both their unofficial
and official capacities. Judge McGowan, writing in the Tulane
Law Review, argued that Congress created the agencies because of
is own deficiences in technical expertise; therefore, it can
only have provided for judicial review as an application of the
judiciary's procedural knowledge, because,
"If the principal purpose of judicial review of agency
action is thought to reside in assuming procedural fair play
and reasoned decision-making, then we have an expertise to
bring to bear that does not derogate frcm the expertise the
agency members should have in their particular fields."95
\5>c\
Consequently he advocates the exercise of forceful procedural
supervision by the courts over agency rule-making, and fears
that the Supreme Court's recent attempt to limit judicial
procedural innovation will lead to substantive intervention
instead. But at the opposite pole stands Judge Wright who terms
the judiciary's imposition of procedural obligations going
beyond the spirit of section 553 "ad hoc review" because nobody
knows what procedural obligations will be demanded until the
Court considers that particular rule-making exercise. He
criticises that judicial response to the A.P.A. for creating a
situation of procedural uncertainty in which all agencies tend
to adopt formal procedures as the only sure way of avoiding
judicial refusal to uphold their rules. Furthermore he rejects
McGowan's belief that judges have relevant procedural knowledge;
in his words despite the fact that,
"... we may have a professional attachment to cross
examination and oral argument, we have no special expertise
in the procedure appropriate to bureaucratic
policymaking."
The Supreme Gourt has supported Wright's viewpoint in the
case of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v Natural Resources
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Defense Council Inc. There the Nuclear Regulatory
Ccmmission had given notice of their intention to promulgate a
rule governing nuclear power stations' radioactive waste
products. They invited written ccmments, with forty parties
responding, and also held a two day oral hearing at which legal
representation, but not cross-examination, was allowed. Before
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the final rule was issued the Commission approved the
appellant's operating licence in respect of a nuclear power
station in Vermont. The respondents, an environmental pressure
group, subsequently challenged both the operating licence and
the legislative rule in the courts. On appeal the District of
Golumbia Court of Appeals directed their attention to the
rule-making procedure followed by the Commission and concluded
that it was not sufficiently comprehensive, with the result that
they remanded the rule back to the Commission for further
proceedings. But the appellant contested this finding before
the Supreme Court where it was argued that the Court of Appeals
had unlawfully added to section 553's requirements. Justice
Rehnquist replied that,
"... generally speaking (s.553) of the Act established the
maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing
to have the Courts impose upon agencies conducting
rule-making procedures ... Agencies are free to grant
additional procedural rights in the exercise of their
discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to
impose„„them if the agencies have not chosen to grant
than."
In his opinion that would only occur in the exceptional case
where a rule had an individual effect and thereby came within
the Bi Metallic concept of adjudication which would then
trigger constitutional "due process" requirements. On the facts
of this case the lower court had not been justified in demanding
procedural steps going beyond section 553 and consequently the
appeal was allowed.
Rehnquist's judgement may not have conclusively settled the
question of judicial additions to section 553 as it did not
address the issue of judicial interpretations of specific
enabling statutes and as we saw earlier these are sometimes
invoked as a foundation for such extensions. Therefore, the
reasoning leaves a potentially large gap through which the
proverbial coach and horses of judicial creativity may yet
emerge. Additionally the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
has recently been reviving ana expanding the relevance of other
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aspects of the due process concept to informal rule-making
which would allow another avenue for circumventing Vermont
Yankee. For those reasons it would take a bold person to state
categorically that the high point in judicial development of
informal rule-making has been reached, but, however the judges
react to section 553 in the future its present requirements and
the nature of existing judicial attitudes towards such
rule-making are distinctly more stringent than they were fifteen
years ago when Davis praised the procedure in "Discretionary
Justice".
(b) Formal Rule-Making Sections 556-557
The A.P.A.'s alternative and antithetical model of
legislative rule-making is the procedure of formal rule-making
which essentially revolves around a full evidentiary hearing.
After notice of proposed rule-making has been given the agency
must generally allow affected persons to present their comments
"by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence,
and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a
full and true disclosure of the facts". (s.556(d)). This trial
type hearing will normally take place before an Administrative
Law Judge (formerly designated as a Hearing Examiner) who is a
full-time civil servant employed and organised independently of
the agency engaged in the particular rule-making exercise. He
usually makes a tentative decision, on the basis of the hearing
transcript and other filed documents, as to whether the agency
has established by 'substantive evidence' on the whole record
factual and legal support for their proposed rule. Subsequently
the agency can either confirm or amend his tentative
determination, but their decision must also be based solely upon
the record and be supported by substantial evidence
(s.557) Consequently Hamilton has summarised the
attributes of formal rule-making thus, "the distinction between
formal and informal rule-making procedures may be analogized in
a crude way to the distinction between a hearing before a
legislative body and a hearing before a court.
Traditionally formal rule-making could be imposed by several
mechanisms which distinguished between statutes conferring
rule-making powers before and after the enactment of the A.P.A.
With regard to the former category it was sufficient if the
enabling statute detailed a rule-making procedure similar to
sections 556-557; for example s.70 1(e) of the Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act 1938 established a procedure initially based upon
informal rule-making which could then be escalated into a formal
procedure if an interested person objected to any specific
portion of the proposed rule. In the case of post A.P.A.
enabling statutes, that Act provides by section 553(c) "when
rules are required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this
title apply" so the key to invoking formal rule-making is to be
found in the wording of the specific enabling statute. During
the early years of the A.P.A. the courts took a generous view of
presumed congressional intent to invoke sections 556-557 but
that judicial attitude has recently been dramatically reversed,
as will now be shown.
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In U.S. v Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp. the basic issue
was whether the Esch Car Services Act 1917 (which had been
amended in 1966) used language sufficient to invoke sections
556-557. By section 1 the 1917 Act provided that "after
hearing" the Interstate Commerce Commission could issue
"reasonable" rules regulating railroad freight car services. At
the turn of the century the railroad companies had produced a
code of practice which required freight cars to be promptly
returned to their owning line when emptied. However, in
practice cars were not returned expeditiously and therefore no
individual railroad invested much money in freight cars.
Consequently by the Nineteen Sixties a national freight car
shortage had developed. After an investigation in 1963 the
I.C.C. gave notice of a proposed legislative rule enacting the
code of practice in statutory form. An oral hearing was held
for fifty days at vtfiich affected parties could be legally
represented but where cross-examination was prohibited. Later a
final rule was promulgated which required the speedy returning
of freight cars. The respondents challenged the validity of
this rule claiming, inter alia, that the procedure should have
conformed to sections 556-557. When the case reached the
Supreme Court Justice Rehnquist ruled by stating that "sections
556 and 557 need be applied only where the agency statute, in
addition to providing a hearing prescribes explicitly that it
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be 'on the record' He later appeared to modify this
literal requirement by adding, "we do not suggest that only the
precise words 'on the record' in the applicable statute will
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suffice to make s.556 and s.557 applicable.
Nevertheless, he then went on to hold that the Esch Act's
wording did not indicate a congressional intent to invoke formal
rule-making.
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A year later in US v Florida East Coast Railway Co. the
Supreme Court was faced with another exercise of the Esch Act's
rule-making powers which this time concerned the imposition of a
per dian charge on railroads using other companies' freight
cars. Thus, after Senate criticism for delay, the ICC had given
notice of proposed rule-making with only the opportunity for
written ccmments being provided. When the final rule had been
promulgated the respondents raised an action claiming that the
rule-making procedure should either have conformed to section
556 or at least have involved an oral hearing. Justice
Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, repeated his views given
in Allegheny that the Esch Act's wording did not trigger section
556. Furthermore he then dismissed the respondent's claim that
'after hearing' demanded a legislative type oral hearing. This
strange conclusion was justified by the argument that as the
Act had been amended in 1966 the requirements of a 'hearing'
should be defined with regard to the A.P.A. As Rehnquist J.
had already determined that section 556 did not apply, the
relevant provision had to be section 553 which allowed purely
written representations. Consequently the Commission's
rule-making procedures were lawful.
I 6£>
Frail the two cases above it is apparent that the Supreme
Court has now decided to adopt a strict approach to the invoking
of sections 556-557. Although it proclaims that the literal
'trigger' words of section 553(c) are not needed, in both cases
it refused to allow similar words to have that effect and in
neither case did Justice Rehnquist even hint at what other forms
of wording would suffice. Additionally his unduly restrictive
k e
attitude towards t procedural content of a 'hearing' in Florida
K
hardly suggests future judicial generosity in the more burdensome
area of formal rule-making.""^ Perhaps it is possible to
justify and explain the Court's desire to limit the imposition of
formal rule-making upon agencies in terms of the onerous and
deleterious effect this might have on the process of rule-making.
After a wide ranging investigation into the impact of formal
rule-making upon agencies (vdiich revealed seme horrifying
statistics e.g. the average time period for rule-making under
section 701 Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 1938 was four years)
Hamilton concluded,
"in practice, therefore the principal effect of imposing
rule-making on a record has often been the dilution of the
regulating process^g|ther than the protection of persons from
arbitrary action."
Consequently it appears that the Courts have sought to reduce the
situations in which legislative rule-making requires sections
556-557 procedures, whilst at the same time increasing the
obligations and stringency of section 553's requirements.
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(2) Interpretative Rules
As with the other functional categories of rules the A.P.A.
utilizes the category of interpretative rules to establish
procedural obligations without defining its meaning or content.
Therefore, it is necessary to search elsewhere for a working
definition. In Schwartz's view, "interpretative rules are
statements as to what the agency thinks a statute or regulation
means, they are statements issued to advise the public of the
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agency's construction of the law it administers." Fran this
definition it is possible to abstract the three important
characteristics of interpretative rules. First, unlike
legislative rules, they do not reguire any express delegation of
power frcm Congress, instead they have their foundations in the
general responsibility of an agency to administer a particular
statutory scheme. As Davis explains, "no government in the
worldcan or does operate without administration, and an
inescapable part of administration is to give meaning to the law
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that the administrators are carrying out ..." In that light
promulgating interpretative rules is seen as an inherent function
of the administration. Leading on frcm the above characteristic
is the element of publicity, v\hich is based upon section
552(a)(1)(d) of the A.P.A., and requires the publication of
"interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted
by the agency" in the Federal Register. Presumably as
interpretative rules are meant to be the product of agency
thinking and experience Congress determined that public
participation in their formulation is not necessary and therefore
exempted them frcm the procedural obligations of section 553.
But the requirement of publicity does enable the public to
comprehend and where appropriate challenge agency interpretations
either inside or outside the courts. This
factor highlights the third characteristic of interpretative
rules and that is their preliminary and conditional nature. As
has already been explained interpretative rules are the agency's
view of the law but ultimate responsibility for determining
these questions obviously rests with the courts. Such rules,
therefore, are always liable to be overturned through a judicial
determination of the true meaning of the statute or legislative
rule, although it must be recognised that the practical and
financial costs involved in seeking an authoritative judicial
ruling may be a consideraole deterrent against that form of
challenge. Also the creation of expert agencies by Congress
raises expectations that seme degree of judicial respect for
agency interpretations will be given. Consequently the dominant
theme in the consideration of these rules by the courts has been
to define the nature of, and factors affecting, judicial
deference to interpretative rules.
The leading case on judicial attitudes towards
interpretative rules is Skidmore v Swift Co. There the
appellants were part-time night firemen for the respondent
company who claimed that their time spent at the fire station
amounted to "working time" within the meaning of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Before the Supreme Court the major issue was the
weight to be given to interpretations of "working time" by the
relevant agency Administrator. Justice Jackson noted that the
Administrator's interpretations had no statutory authority and
were not reached via adjudicatory procedures, but they "... are
made in pursuance of official duty based upon more specialised
experience and broader investigations and information than is
likely to ccme to a judge in a particular case." Therefore, he
decided that the interpretations,
"... do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgement to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance. The weight of such a judgement in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency., and its power to persuade, if lacking power to
control."
After applying these criteria to the Administrator's
interpretations he held that there was nothing in law preventing
the appellants' night work frcm amounting to "working time".
The comprehensiveness of Justice Jackson's evaluation of
interpretative rules was acknowledged thirty two years later in
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the case of General Electric Co. v Gilbert The action
concerned a claim that the appellant's sickness insurance scheme
violated Title Eight of the Civil Rights Act 1964 (prohibiting
inter alia sex discrimination in employment) by excluding
pregnancy frcm its coverage. One fundamental argument of the
respondent was that a 'guideline' issued by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission interpreted Title Eight as requiring
sickness insurance schemes to cover pregnancy. Justice
Rehnquist replied, "in short, while we do not wholly discount
the wsight to be given the 1972 guideline it does not receive
high marks when judged by the standards enunciated in
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Skidmore" , particularly because it was contrary to an
earlier E.E.O.C. interpretation of the Act. Furthermore he
believed that a contemporaneous interpretation, which this was
not, would deserve greater judicial deference. Therefore, the
majority of the court refused to follow the agency's
interpretation and declared that the appellant had not violated
the statute.




the legality of licences for oil and gas bases in Alaska wt
k
challenged. Daring 1942 the President had created a Moose Range
by Executive Order which prohibited "settlement, location, sale
or entry, or other disposition", but the Secretary of the
Interior had interpreted that legislative rule as not disabling
himself from granting mineral leases in respect of areas within
the range. Despite the fact that the Secretary's interpretation
had not been embodied within an official rule Chief Justice
Warren thought that it deserved judicial cognisance because it
"... had, long prior to respondent's application been a matter
of public record and discussion.""'"'''^ Moreover the
interpretation merited judicial respect as, "when the
construction of an administrative regulation rather than a
statute is in issue, deference is even more clearly in
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order." Therefore, he accepted the Secretary's
interpretation of the President's Order and upheld the relevant
mineral lease applications. Presumably the decision was
motivated by a belief that one part of the Executive branch of
government was in a better position to know the intention of
another part than the judiciary. While that may be so, caution
must still be observed to ensure that the Executive does not
beccme overpowerful as both legislator and judge in respect of
strategic areas of citizens' lives.
To summarise the judicial response towards interpretative
rules, the Supreme Court's main concern has been to establish a
framework within which they can assess the weight to be given to
any particular agency's interpretation of a statute or
legislative rule. In the evolving case law they have
articulated a catalogue of factors which induce judicial respect
for interpretative rules, but ultimately these provide few
limitations on the judiciary's power to replace the substance of
interpretative rules with their own views. However, the judges
do not appear to have abused their authority and content
themselves with ensuring that agency interpretations remain
inside a zone of reasonableness.
(3) Procedural Rules The function of this category of
administrative rules is to establish the procedures to be
observed by the promulgating agency when carrying out its
administrative tasks. As with interpretative rules no express
delegation of power from Congress is required for the issuing of
procedural rules, and that principle was confirmed in the early
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case of U.S. v Bailey. Procedural rules are also similar to
interpretative ones in that the A.P.A. does not require their
formulation to be subject to section 553's notice and comment
duties. The most likely explanation for this exception is to be
found in an extension of the argument used to restrict judicial
additions to the procedure of informal rule-making, namely that
expert agencies are the most qualified bodies to determine their
own procedures. The outccme was that Gongress decided public
participation in the creation of procedural rules was unnecessary
(A.P.A. s.553( 1) (D)). But they are required to be published in
the Federal Register (A.P.A. s.552(A)(1))(c)).
When the existence of procedural rules is central to the
deliberations of the higher Federal courts two major issues
generally arise; these are the extent, and basis, of judicial
enforcement of such rules. In the leading case of Vitarelli v
120Seaton supreme Court was faced with a victim of the
McCarthy era. After having been employed for two years as an
Education Advisor in the Interior Department the appellant was
suspended frcm duty for allegedly being in sympathetic
association with three persons alleged to have been members of
the Ccmmunist Party. Under a Departmental Order the Secretary
had provided a hearing procedure for employees suspended in the
interests of national security which required (a) the employee
to be given as specific information about the charges laid
against him as security interests allowed, (b) the restriction
of the hearing to relevant matters and (c) the employee to be
allowed to engage in limited cross-examination of adverse
witnesses. At the appellant's hearing all the above
requirements were violated and he, therefore, challenged the
lawfulness of those proceedings before the courts. In the
Supreme Court Justice Harlan noted that, "having chosen to
proceed against the petitioner on security grounds the Secretary
here ... was bound by the regulations which he himself had
promulgated for dealing with such cases, even though without
such regulations he could have discharged the petitioner
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summarily." His foundation tor strictly enforcing the
Secretary's rule was to be located within the nature of national
security hearings because, "... scrupulous observance of
departmental procedural safeguards is clearly of particular
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importance." However, Justice Frankfurter based his
judgement on the more general belief that, "an Executive agency
must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes
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its action to be judged." Obviously the latter approach
with its overtones of administrative morality offers the
possibility of wider application beyond the context of national
security employment hearings, and indeed subsequent cases
demonstrate this.
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Twelve years later in U.S. v Heffner the Court of
Appeals shea new light on the rationale of Frankfurter J.
regarding the judicial enforcement of procedural rules and
extended its scope over the format of rules of which the courts
would take cognisance. There the appellant was an emotionally
disturbed man who believed he had been subject to a conspiracy by
the government and former business associates. After requesting
official help without success, he claimed a number of tax
benefits that he was not eligible for in order to gain
governmental attention. He was then interviewed by Internal
Revenue Service Special Agents, who have the responsibility of
investigating possible criminal prosecutions, but was not told of
their functions or his right to legal representation.
Subsequently in an unrelated press index the I.R.S. stated that
Special Agents would in future notify suspects of those facts.
Despite this requirement, when the appellant was again
interviewed by these agents they did not comply with the
announced procedural rules. Subsequently the appellant claimed
that the evidence obtained in breach of those rules was
inadmissible in court. Winter J. began by summarising Vitarelli,
adding that in his opinion judicial enforcement of procedural
rules v®s desirable "... to prevent the arbitrariness which is
inherently characteristic of an agency's violation of its own
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procedures." This approach complements Frankfurter's
reasoning as it is prima facie arbitrary for an agency to break
its procedural promises. Furthermore the Court of Appeals was
willing to take note of procedural rules even when they were
incorporated in informal documentation, "nor does it matter that
these I.R.S. instructions to Special Agents were not promulgated
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in something formally labelled a 'Regulation' or adopted with
as it prevents agencies from being able to circumvent their own
rules via a choice or publication mechanisms.
Frcm the cases above it can be seen that the courts have
been willing to hold agencies to their procedural declarations
where they add to citizens' constitutional and statutory
protections. Nevertheless it is probably no coincidence that
these decisions concern procedural rules governing disciplinary,
and investigative, decision-making processes both of which fall
within the heartland of "due process" jurisprudence. Only the
future will disclose vdiether the judiciary are ambitious enough
to extend the preceding doctrines across other areas of the
administrative process.
Conclusion
To provide an overview of the trends in judicial responses
to the various categories of administrative rules, these fall
into two broad groups. Regarding interpretative and procedural
rules the judges have concentrated upon refining and evolving
the principles declared in the innovative cases of Skidmore
(detailing factors which encourage judicial deference to agency
interpretations of statute law) and Vitarelli (expressing
judicial willingness to demand that an agency observe its
procedural rules where they increase the rights of citizens).
However, the reaction towards legislative rules can best be
described as involving asymmetrical evolution. Agency use of
formal rule-making has now been forcefully discouraged in
Allegheny and Florida, whilst the District and Federal Courts of
Appeal have simultaneously been seeking to strengthen the duties
associated with informal rule-making (Walter Holm, Mobil Oil and
strict regard to the A.P.A."
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This was a progressive step
International Harvester/ etc.)- Against this background it is,
*
therefore, chilling to note Gellhorn and Robinson's prediction,
"We do think it likely that present trends, if continued,
will cause seme shift frcm rule-making back to adjudication
... as open power becomes vulnerable to attack, it may be to
an agency's advantage to em^Jy^y less visible methods of
applying its delegated power."
The first deduction to be made from the above examination is
that the American idea of administrative rule-making stretches
far beyond the realms of provisions which are analogous to what
we have termed administrative guidance and encompasses all rules
made by administrative agencies. Therefore, considering the
legal and practical significance of agencies' legislative rules
we should not be surprised to discover that the A. P. A. is
primarily concerned to establish the procedures required for the
lawful creation of that category of administrative rules. The
exceptions to section 553 mean that those types of administrative
rules which share similar characteristics to administrative
guidance (particularly the absence of a direct statutory basis)
namely general statements of policy, interpretative and
procedural rules, are not subject to any mandatory opportunities
for public participation in their formulation. Yet as the case
law revealed they also dealt with important areas of governmental
activity, e.g. immigration in
Noel, conservation of the environment in Udall and the
administrative investigation of suspected criminal conduct in
Heffner. Consequently the impact of these rules on
government-citizen relations explains why Davis was keen to argue
that they too should be subject to the procedure of informal
rule-making too. However, that call has largely gone unheeded as
the Federal courts have concentrated upon increasing the
obligations of agencies using informal rule-making, whilst
Gongress has subjected specific agencies to hybrid procedures in
individual enabling acts (e.g. the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety
Act 1968 which required the Federal Power Commission to
promulgate legislative rules via informal rule-making with an
'oral public hearing' incorporated in the procedure). But
neither the Federal Courts nor Gongress have made a move to
curtail the wide exceptions to section 533. Instead it has
mainly been the State courts who have sought to promote the use
of administrative rule-making procedures involving public
participation as a mechanism for the promulgation of provisions
128
comparable to administrative guidance in sporadic cases.
This development is clearly demonstrated in the case of Sun Ray
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Drive-in Dairy Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission ,
where the appellant challenged the Commission's refusal to grant
it a store liquor licence on the ground that the Commission had
not produced any administrative rules to govern the application
of their licensing power. Tanzer J. found that the 'policies' of
the Commission,
"have the quality of folklore in that unwritten rules are
passed on orally by culture carriers from one generation of
employees to another, from one level of employees to another,
without the stabilizing effect of the written word."
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He determined that this conduct was unlawful as the State
legislature's action of delegating the licensing power to the
Commission required them to produce policy guidelines via a
process of public rule-making. Furthermore the Court, inter
alia, found the following benefits of public policy guidelines,
"... they help assure public confidence that the agency acts
by rules and not from vvhim or corrupt motivation ... an
applicant for a license should be able to know the standards
by which his application will be judged before going to the
expense in time, investment and legal fees necessary to make
application ... written standards and policies are essential
to assure an acceptable degree of consistency of practice
among the personnel of the agency ... written standards
enable the decision-making body, in this case the
Commission, to make its decisions by of law rather than
for subjective or ad hcminem reasons."
Nevertheless the judiciary at both state and federal levels have
much vork to do if these ideals are to gain universal legal and
administrative recognition.
Although the Federal A.P.A. does not require public
participation in the creation of general statements of policy,
interpretative or procedural rules, section 552 obliges agencies
to publish these provisions. As the case of Morton v Ruiz
revealed, where an agency fails to observe that requirement the
courts can apply the sanction of refusing to give legal effect
to the provision. However, the case can also be viewed from the
alternative perspective as highlighting official disregard for
the publicity requirements of the Act, and a rejection of Davis'
pleas for the virtue of openness as a basic ccmponent in the
'confining' of administrative discretions.
Within the categories of administrative rules acknowledged
by the A.P.A. the courts have articulated common law principles
regarding judicial cognisance of interpretative and procedural
rules. These principles have maintained a viable balance
between protecting the legitimate interests of citizens in being
subject to fair administrative procedures and being able to rely
upon reasonable agency interpretations, with the corresponding
agency demands concerning acceptable areas of freedom to
determine their own procedures and state those interpretations
of the law which promote their official goals.
Therefore, whilst Davis saw the
strengths of administrative rule-making lying in its
incorporation of both public involvement and openness, Federal
law, as far as provisions analogous to administrative guidance
are concerned, eschews public participation and relies upon
publicity to safeguard affected citizens. Now we shall discover
how British law has responded.
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THE RESPONSES Of BRITISH GRIEVANCE-HANMJNG AGENCIES TO
ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE
PRELUDE
In the ensuing three chapters we shall be analysing the ways
in vdiich the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration
(hereafter P.C.A.), the courts and Value Aided Tax Tribunals
(hereafter V.A.T. Tribunals) have responded to the existence and
effects of administrative guidance. This task requires us to
develop a classification of administrative guidance so that the
subsequent analysis can coherently encompass a myriad of
individual pieces of guidance. The classification must be
capable of assimilating all those written provisions which fall
within our definition of guidance (as outlined in Chapter One).
Furthermore, the classification needs to be based upon classes
which all the various grievance handling agencies recognise in
order that a comparative evaluation of their responses can be
undertaken. A balance has to be attained in the construction of
classes which are neither too generalised with the result that
significant distinctions are overlooked (e.g. classes focusing
on the person to whom guidance is directed, civil servants,
citizens tep.) and classes v^iich are too particularised with the
consequence that the analysis becomes unnecessarily complex
(e.g. individual classes for each department's guidance). To
help us in our task we shall consider whether several discrete
sources of knowledge and information can contribute to the
formulation of an acceptable classification.
A natural place to begin our search for possible
classifications of guidance is with the departments whih
promulgate these provisions. Unfortunately, there appears to be
no generally recognised categorisation of guidance and even an
absence of consistency between departments in the nomenclature
used to describe these provisions (eg. Scottish Office have
termed them "guidelines""'", the Inland Revenue referred to
"departmental instructions"^, and the Home Office to "standing
3
orders" ) . Therefore, we have to look elsewhere for inputs
into a viable classification of guidance. Nevertheless because
this research is concerned with both the legal and
organisational aspects of guidance the classification eventually
adopted should, if possible, be compatible with actual
departmental usage of these provisions.
The second source of knowledge that we can consult is that
of organisation theory. However, as we learnt in Chapter Two
the different schools of thought did not place the task of
classifying guidance very high on their lists of intellectual
priorities. Consequently, we concluded that it was probably
both erroneous and presumptive to expect different disciplines
to have identical interests when examining the same
4
phenomenon. Also our classification has to focus primarily
upon the ways in which the grievance-handling agencies perceive
administrative guidance and that necessitates an emphasis on the
"legal" attributes of these provisions (that is, those features
which the persons staffing the grievance-handling agencies, many
of whcm ware qualified lawyers, considered to be significant)
and such expertise falls outside the ambit of organisation
theory. Therefore, it seems that we should turn to the legal
literature as the most likely source of fruitful insights into
C
the construction of a workable classification.
One obvious locus of knowledge is that provided by the major
text-book writers. Without repeating our general overview of
the literature contained in Chapter One, it can be noted that
the following ccmmentators have all made references to what we
5 6 V
term administrative guidance, Bradley , Craig , Foulkes ,
8 9Harlow and Rawlings , and Wade . They mention several
ccmmon examples of guidance including extra-statutory tax
concessions"^ and circulars issued by departments"'""'", but
these distinctions do not appear to be presented as the bases
for classifications of guidance. The nearest the commentators
carte to offering a classification is Foulkes' division of
"administrative rules" into classes based upon the form of
documentation the rule is embodied in ie. "Ministerial and
departmental statements", "Codes of practice" and
12
"Circulars" . Therefore, whilst the textbook writers'
comments imply the conclusion that lawyers do not consider
administrative guidance to be composed of homogeneous
provisions, neither do they establish any universally recognised
classification of guidance. Consequently we shall have to
formulate our own classification.
The following method of classifying guidance does not
pretend to be the only or definitive approach, but as the later
chapters will demonstrate it does fulfil the requirements
detailed at the beginning of this introduction. Instead of
utilising the form of documentation in which guidance is
contained as the most salient criterion of classification, our
model will concentrate upon the substance of guidance. Form has
been rejected because it may be merely a matter of departmental
practice whether a piece of guidance is promulgated via a
booklet, a circular letter or in correspondence with an
interested pressure group and such distinctions do not appear to
greatly influence the relevant grievance-handling agencies.
However, the function being performed by a piece of
administrative guidance is a more fundamental characteristic
that remains constant across a variety of forms. Hence a piece
of guidance instructing staff to make a note of the address and
age of all the members of the public they interview can be
contained in a departmental handbook, a circular to local
offices or the training notes provided on staff development
courses.
There are many different functions being performed by
administrative guidance, Craig notes, inter alia, regulating
decision-making within bureaucracies, as an alternative to
delegated legislation,- and as a method of expeditious law
13
reform . Consequently our classification must select those
functions which we believe offer the greatest insights into the
s
re^onse of all the grievance handling agencies to be examined in
this thesis. The three functions selected are those of
determining the procedures of decision-making; interpreting
statutory language; and detailing policy objectives. Each of
these functions requires the use of distinct types of expertise
and recourse to varied sources of information. For example, a
department promulgating new policy guidance would be placing
greatest weight upon political value judgments derived frcm
ministers as the basis for the contents of the guidance; this
was clearly revealed in a report of an investigation by the
P.C.A. into the disposal of surplus government land where he
observed, "in August 1980, following a Government directive, the
i %5
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rules altered ..." (emphasis mine). Whereas interpretative
guidance primarily relies upon legal knowledge derived frcm
lawyers; as the P.C.A.'s investigation into the Post Office's
interpretation of wireless licences noted, "the issue of
circular 9/67 in April 1967 was a fully considered step, and
15
rested on what was thought to be a firm legal basis."
Furthermore the grievance-handling agencies examined in this
thesis recognised these categories and accorded them
distinct significance in their own jurisprudence. Wb must also
acknowledge that the classes of procedural and interpretative
guidance have their counterparts in United States Federal law
and, as we discovered in Chapter Four, these categories have
proved useful to their courts in developing a relatively
coherent response to administrative guidance. Now we shall
elaborate on the nature of each of our categories.
First procedural guidance, this category of guidance has the
function of informing subordinate officials and/or persons
outside the department of the form of the relevant
decision-making process. An example is guidance issued by the
Ministry of Transport to its inspectors instructing them how to
conduct incognito inspections of authorised garages testing
16
facilities . The major source of information used to
construct this type of guidance is administrative and
organisational expertise, but legal ideas in the forms of the
rules of Natural Justice and criminal procedure have a
subsidiary role as the Customs and Excise compounding case
17
referred to in Chapter One demonstrated . Secondly,
interpretative guidance states the department's view of what
Ebrliament (in the case of statutes) or any other legislator (in
the case of delegated legislation) meant by enacting particular
136
language. Although ideally departments are only considering What
the legislator intended, in practice they may also be expressing
their own value judgments (eg. the Dept. of Trade's
interpretation of "plant and machinery" in the Industrial
Development Act 1966 to include seme types of wall insulation but
18
not others ); however, such guidance does not purport to
detail departmental policy. Turning now to our final class of
guidance the heritage of U.S. law is of little direct help as it
uses the category of "legislative" rules and such provisions fall
outside the scope of this research as those rules have statutory
force (they are broadly equivalent to our delegated legislation).
But Asimow has perceptively observed that because of
constitutional and cultural differences many matters which are
dealt with by legislative rules in the U.S. are provided for in
the U.K. by ministerial discretions subject to "guidelines"
19
created by departments . Therefore, our
classifiction incorporates these British provisions by containing
k
the class of policy guidance. Such guidance specifies the formal
objectives of a departmental programme and ccmmonly provides the
detailed criteria by which individual citizens' cases are
determined. One example of this type of guidance is the rules
produced by the Home Office to govern the Secretary of State's
statutory discretion under the Prison Rules 1964 to censor
prisoners' mail (the P.C.A. found that in 1967 the guidance had
been amended to prohibit prisoners corresponding with marriage




that several academic commentators have either used one of
the
classes contained in our model or provided examples of guidance
falling within it. Vvhen Jergesen was writing about the legal
effects of administrative procedures on both sides of the
Atlantic, he noted that "every administrative body spawns a
variety of procedures in the course of its work" and that a
major form of such procedures were "written instructions to
departmental subordinates concerning the management of various
21
matters within their competency." Birkinshaw in his
examination of departmental grievance resolution provides many
individual examples of procedural guidance including this
evidence regarding the D.H.S.S.,
"on the supplementary benefit side there was an internal
procedure specifying the grade of officer at which the
complaint should be handled, whether they should be marked
'urgent' or required ministerial reply and the degree of
liaison needed between head quarters in London and the local
office in rare event of head-quarters dealing with the
complaint.
He concluded that, "... most departments had well-defined
23
internal processes for complaint handling" , thereby
providing further proof of the existence of one type of
procedural guidance. As for interpretative guidance Harlow and
Rawlings offer the following explanation for its creation,
"legal language is itself an important factor in driving the
administrator towards informal rule-making. Expressed in
terms of statute and regulation, he can no longer understand
his own policies. Memoranda are not legislation, they are
necessary guides to explain the meaning the law to the
public servants who have to administer it."
Which suggests that it performs a function as universal to
the world of large scale administration as procedural guidance
does in Jergesen's view. Regarding the class of policy guidance
Galligan has noted the following occurrence,
"in vast areas of welfare, licensing and planning, similar
discretionary powers are exercised repeatedly and usually by
busy officials, boards, and tribunals. There is a tendency
in such areas to generalise policies so that they serve not
merely to decide one particular case, but^to guide decisions
in all cases to which they are relevant."
Harlow provides us with a clear example of this
organisational phenomenon at wark in her elaboration of the
process by which departments make ex gratia payments to
individuals.
"The reports of the P.C.A. and the Commission for Local
Administration show us that compensation forms part of the
day to day work of administration. Nor are decisions the
unreasoned 'administrative lawlessness' which they were once
thought to be by lawyers. Principles and guidelines help
administrators towards decisions in much £]ae same way as
precedents guide lawyers in deciding cases."
This offers further verification of the existence and
significance of this type of administrative guidance.
Frcm the diverse writings mentioned above we can see that
our individual classes underly the analyses of several legal
scholars, but that no single commentator has sought to integrate
the distinct classes into one unified classification of
administrative guidance. The functions represented by these
classes are also clearly detectable in actual administrative
practice as can be seen in the summaries of selected
investigations conducted by the P.C.A. outlined in Appendix B.
And for an even closer scrutiny of administrative practice we
can refer back to our case study of the Scottish Education
Department's Awards Branch. There, we discovered that parts of
the Branch's General Instructions fell into the class of
procedural guidance as they, inter alia, specified how
applications were to be processed and allocated duties between
the Registry and individual Territorial Sections. Furthermore
these Instructions specified the formal system of decision
checking by Higher Executive Officers and Executive Officers.
Interpretative guidance was present, inter alia, in the form of
notes issued to H.E.O.'s defining the meaning of "ordinarily
resident". During the course of the field-work the House of
Lords gave their authoritative view on the meaning of this term
in the context of the English delegated legislation governing
student grants (in the case of R .v.Barnet L.B.C., ex p.
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Shah ) and the Branch's guidance was accordingly amended.
This example showed the reliance of interpretative guidance upon
legal ideas and information. Policy guidance was in part
contained in the Branch Policy Minutes issued to all grades of
staff. One of these minutes contained the policy on awarding
grants for repeat years of study, it had recently been changed
to make the conditions of eligibility much more severe in line
with the Government's attitudes; thereby exemplifying the
predominance of political value judgments in this category of
guidance.
Lastly the method of classifying administrative guidance
used in the subsequent chapters must be explained. Guidance v^s
allocated to one of the classes according to its predominant
attributes. Therefore, if a piece of guidance set out the
policies of the department it was treated as an example of
policy guidance and mutatis mutandis for the other classes.
However, no general classification could hope to provide
completely vratertight classes and hybrid pieces of guidance,
which could be located in more than one class, were classified
according to the appropriate grievance-handling agencies
assessment of their nature. For example Home Office guidance
detailed the way in which Parole Eligibility Dates were to be
calculated. This guidance could be classed as either
interpretative (because it explained the Department's
understanding of several statutory provisions) or procedural (as
it specified the way in which officials were to calculate
particular prisoners' P.E.D.s). The P.C.A. treated the guidance
as providing a Departmental interpretation and therefore our
28
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE PARLIAMENTARY GDmiSSlCNER FOR ALMINISTRATICN
Introduction
This chapter has two main objectives which are related to
the extent that their attainment requires an examination of the
same source of information, namely the reports of investigations
conducted by the P.C.A.. The first aim is to obtain a more
comprehensive appreciation of the prevalence and major features
of administrative guidance across the whole spectrum of central
government departments. Chapter Three clearly disclosed the
significance of guidance for decision-making by the Awards
Branch, but this thesis must also consider the generality of
departments to ensure that its conclusions are not based upon a
single example which is in a minority of one concerning the
usage of guidance. Secondly, a selection of reports will be
analysed, using the classification elaborated in the preceding
prelude, to determine the ways in which the Commissioner has
responded to the various types of guidance. This will hopefully
contribute in a small way to the rectifying of the amission
noted by Harlow and Rawlings,
"the judges rely on commentators to synthesize their decisions
into sets of 'rules' and 'exceptions' capable of guiding future
conduct. By contrast little interest has been shown in
synthesizing ombudsman findings." .
As will be disclosed later, the P.C.A.'s reports do
divulge patterns and re-occuriny themes in his attitude towards
the status and significance of guidance in departmental
decision-making, vtfiich are of importance to lawyers trying to
understand the reactions of grievance-handling agencies to these
provisions.
The question may be asked, why begin your consideration of
the legal responses to guidance with a study of the P.C.A.? Our
answer is because this office has had the most frequent and
closest contact with guidance of all the agencies examined in
this thesis. The proximity of encounters has undoubtedly been
influenced by the formal povvers of the Commissioner and the
format of his investigations. By s.8(3) of the Parliamentary
Commissioner Act 1967 his investigations are not to be hampered
by inter alia the Official Secrets Acts or what is now termed
2
public interest immunity . Similarly s.7(2) gives the P.C.A.
a wide freedom to shape his method of investigation into the
form that he considers to be the most efficacious. Stacey
describes the actual method developed as, "... high quality
investigations in the sense that the Parliamentary Commissioner
sends his investigator to the department concerned to examine
the relevant files in person and, where appropriate, to
3
interview the civil servants concerned." . Consequently the
P.C.A. has direct access to the guidance applicable to
particular investigations and he often makes reference to it in
his reports.
The investigations of the P.C.A. have two major advantages
when judged frcm the standpoint of our research. First the
jurisdiction of the P.C.A. covers all the main central
government departments^; therefore, we have the opportunity to
evaluate the utilisation of guidance in the greatest range of
administrative contexts. Secondly the reports of the P.C.A. are
a practicable source of information about the general use of
guidance because of their accessibility. Although since 1981
the Ccmmissioner has returned to only publishing reports of
selected investigations this is a minor restriction compared to
the official attitude towards openness in government. Ponting
has written, "information is seen as something to be controlled
by V\hitehall and allowed outside only when it is politically
convenient ... Outside bodies are entitled only to receive the
5
minimum amount of information possible." . As we shall soon
see the publication of guidance is at best sporadic and these
reports provide the most extensive, albeit indirect, stock of
information on administrative guidance available in the public
dcmain.^
There are, unfortunately, certain limitations in the
P.C.A.'s jurisdiction which have the effect of reducing his
expose to seme forms of guidance; consequently these will be
noted so that they can be borne in mind when we consider the
general conclusions that can be deduced from his reports. The
first restriction is found in s.5(2) 1967 Act which provides
that the P.C.A. should not normally investigate complaints where
the person had a remedy available before a court or tribunal.
In regard to his exceptional discretion to investigate
complaints where the aggrieved individual had a judicial remedy
the Commissioner has been fairly generous to the individual.
For example in one case a landowner contested the Department of
Transport's interpretation of their power to pay compensation
for land which had not been ccmpulsorily acquired. The P.C.A.
said,
"while accepting that the ccmplainant had a legal remedy
through the courts to establish the principle that the money
had been wrongly witheld, and to enforce payment, I
accordingly felt no inhibition about investigating these
related matters or indeed the Department's general handling
of their ^correspondence with him during the period
concerned." .
Therefore, just because a complainant had a right of action
before the courts does not mean that the P.C.A. would refuse to
follow up a case involving guidance. However, he has applied an
inverse approach to his identical discretion concerning
complaints where the person had a remedy before a tribunal. The
strictness with which he exercises this discretion was
demonstrated in a complaint about the way the Customs and Excise
had treated hairdressers on the introduction of V.A.T.. He
declined to pursue allegations of inconsistency in Departmental
decision-making because, "as there are no special circumstances
in this case, I cannot enquire into the amount of rebate allowed
O
to the complainant or other individual hairdressers." . As
Bradley has observed this differentiation in the P.C.A.'s
invoking of section 5(2) is probably to be explained by his
separate conceptions of when it is reasonable to exercise a
9
judicial as opposed to a tribunal remedy. From our
perspective the effect of this restriction upon the jurisdiction
of the P.C.A. has been to reduce the numbers of reports dealing
with areas of departmental decision-making where aggrieved
individuals possessed the right of appeal to a tribunal.
Inevitably our comprehension of the significance of
administrative guidance in these areas has thereby been
distorted. Two fields of administration where this distortion
was very noticeable were supplementary benefits and immigration.
Few investigations in these areas were reported by the P.C.A. and
consequently we learnt little from him about the existence or use
of guidance by the D.H.S.S. and the Heme Office when carrying out
these administrative tasks. However, several commentators have
helped to ccmbat our ignorance by informing us of the actual
importance of guidance in these fields, including Hodge on
welfare benefits"^ and Blake on the operation of the
immigration system"'""''.
The second limitation which is of concern to us is found in
s.6(l) of" the Act, which prevents the P.C.A. frcm investigating
complaints made by public bodies. Consequently his reports
disclose few references to guidance regulating inter-departmental
or central government - local government relations as these only
ccme within his purview where they indirectly have an impact on
individuals. For example, neighbours of a new Post Office
complex complained that they had not been consulted by the
Department about the development. The Commissioner discovered
that development carried out under the prerogative was subject to
a non-statutory procedure of consultation with local planning
12
authorities, which had been complied with in that case
Thirdly, Schedule 3 to the 1967 Act excludes a number of
specific matters frcm the jurisdiction of the P.C.A.. Of
relevance to this research are the contractual and commercial
transactions of departments, because frcm the limited inclusion
of surplus land disposal within the Commissioner's ambit a number
of reports have revealed the significance of several
pieces of guidance (including the descendants of the infamous
13
Crichel Down Code ) governing this activity and it may be that
other guidance applies to the excluded transactions. Also under
this Schedule Crown personnel decisions are withdrawn from the
P.C.A.'s scrutiny and therefore the reports studied did not
indicate the Commissioner encountering any of the guidance (such
14
as the unpublished Establishment Officers Guide ) which seeks
to control the conduct of these officials.
It must additionally be acknowledged that the P.C.A.'s
reports demonstrated a considerable variation in the extent to
which they elaborated upon the contents of particular pieces of
guidance. In seme reports he provided a precise account of their
contents (e.g. on the Department of Trade's requirements for
15
professionally unqualified auditors ), whereas in others he
merely referred to the existence of guidance (e.g. in a case
concerning the Property Services Agency he reported that, "there
are also internal departmental instructions applicable to certain
types of land transactions that there should be pre-sale 'good
relations' consultations with the local planning
authority.""^) . We can only surmise that the Commissioner
published the degree of detail that he considered necessary to
explain his conclusions in each particular case.
Within the constraints of this research it was not possible
to read all the published reports of investigations undertaken by
the P.C.A.. Therefore, a random selection was made of one annual
volume of case reports frcm the term of office of each individual
who had held that position up until the retirement of Sir Cecil
Clothier in 1984. The reports were as follows, 1968 (Sir Edmund
Compton), 1972-73 (Sir Alan Marre), 1977-78 (Sir Idwal Pugh) and
1982 (Sir Cecil Clothier). The first and last
m
volumes were composed of selected case reports, whilst the other
two volumes contained reports of all cases investigated. Each
volume was scrutinised for references to administrative guidance
and where these were found a note was made of the particular
case report (reports which only referred to pieces of guidance
already encountered and which did not add anything new to our
understanding of those provisions or the P.C.A.'s responses to
them were discounted); a summary of these reports is contained
in Appendix B.
Some of the Fundamental Features of" Administrative Guidance as
Disclosed by the Reports of the P.C.A.
Frcm the table below it can be seen that policy guidance was
the most ccmmon form of guidance detected in our survey,
followed by procedural guidance with approximately one third
fewer references, and lastly interpretative guidance having only
a quarter as many occurrences.
Class of Number of P.C.A. Reports Referring to





Examples of this class of guidance were
virtually all the departments falling within






rules stating eligibility tor foreign income supplements to
the D.H.S.S.'s criteria entitling disabled persons to financial
18
help towards the costs of running a private car . With
hindsight it appears that certain pieces of guidance have been
controversial in their scope and application for the duration of
their operative lives, a prime example being the Inland
Revenue's 1971 White Paper announcing new concessions against
incane tax legally due but subject to a delayed assessment
19
caused by departmental error , as they have continually
20
appeared in the P.C.A.'s reports . Other policy guidance has
created initial opposition that has gradually diminished over
time, such as the D.o.E.'s early policy on withdrawing M. o T.
testing authorisation frcm garages that had been found to be
21
conducting the tests improperly on just one occasion . The
majority of policy guidance discovered was concerned with the
particular department's aims towards the public at large who
came within its responsibilities, and encompassed all the major
functions of the modern state including regulating conduct,
providing benefits (in kind or in cash) and taxing.
Consequently the guidance covered inter alia, enforcement action
against company directors failing to present annual
22 . .23
accounts ; backdating war pensions ; detailing grants for
24 . .25
students ; and regulating tax concessions . However a few
reports also disclosed guidance relating to central - local
government relationships including, the D.o E.'s policy towards
removing specific items of local authority expenditure frcm the
2 6
District Auditor's scrutiny , and Department of Education and
Science guidance on the calculation of grants for teacher
■ • 27
training students
Another facet of policy guidance concerns the legal nature
of the governmental power to which it applies. In the survey it
was discovered that twenty one references to guidance of this
type related to a statutory discretion or prerogative powsr
vested in a Minister. We have already encountered the powers to
make various types of grants and to authorise garages to
undertake M.o T. testing; yet in actuality the range of powers
is as broad as present day public administration demands and
therefore extends from the Home Secretary's authority to censor
28
prisoners' mail provided by Rule 33 Prison Rules 1964 across
the spectrum to his discretion to make refunds on t.v. licences
29
granted by s.3(3) Post Office Act 1969 . Of the remaining
references ten governed the exercise of extra-statutory
discretions, which were defined as powers existing in symbiosis
with a specific statutory power but not contained in an
enactment. These pieces of guidance were mainly found in the
field of taxation and dealt with matters such as concessions on
30
Betterment Levy for single plot landowners , Capital Gains
31
Tax on a person's main dwelling-house , and the miners' coal
32 . . .
allowance . The two remaining sets of guidance did not have
any direct connection with statutory powsrs; they dealt with the
distribution of compensation to British victims of Nazi
33
persecution , and the ad hoc Electricity Discount Scheme for
34
deprived persons . Thus, a clear majority of the policy
guidance revealed by our survey regulated the exercise of
statutory powers. This is not surprising as statutes now
constitute the primary source of governmental power. Fran the
P.C.A.'s reports it would appear that most, if not all, of the
major discretions vested in Ministers that are regularly
exercised on a large scale have been subject to elaboration in
administrative guidance. Thus providing independent
confirmation of the administrative phenomenon noted by Galligan
and referred to in the prelude to this part of the thesis.
The last feature of policy guidance that will be considered
is the extent of its publication and accessibility to affected
persons. Our assessment must be conducted with due regard to
the background of Davis' strong advocacy of "openness" as a
vital constituent in the strategy of "structuring" the exercise
of discretionary powers; and the conclusion reached in Chapter
Four that U.S. Federal law placed greater emphasis upon the
publication of provisions analogous to administrative guidance,
than in requiring actual public participation in their
formulation, as a democratic check on their contents and usage.
Returning to our survey, only a small minority of the reports
indicated that the relevant policy guidance had been made
available to the public (eleven reports in total). Furthermore,
the methods of publication were very diverse, thereby presumably
increasing the burdens faced by affected individuals seeking to
discover the existence and content of applicable guidance. The
most common medium of publication was in booklets or leaflets
distributed to the public. Three sets of guidance were
reproduced in condensed form in such publication; they were the
S.E.D.'s booklet on students allowances, the D.H.S.S.'s leaflet
on financial support for disabled drivers, and the Department of
Energy's booklet on the discount scheme for deprived electricity
consumers. Therefore, it appears that this mechanism of
publication is used where a benefit is being conferred on
certain groups within society. However in two reports it was
clear that the departments had notified affected individuals
personally (D.oE. writing to garages informing them of the
Department's policy on the use of incognito inspections), or via
their trade association (Department of Trade writing to the
Shareholders Association about the former's policy concerning
the publication of reports of investigations into companies).
Another method of publication was through circulars (adopted by
the former M.H.L.G. to detail their policy on the awarding of
costs at Inquiries and the D.E.S. on the calculation of teacher
training students grants) and it seems likely that this method
is used where other public bodies, notably local authorities,
have a direct interest in the content of the guidance along with
individuals. The remaining forms of publication were extremely
heterogeneous and included the presentation of the guidance to
official canmittees (the D.o T. gave evidence on their policy
regarding prosecutions under the Companies Acts to the Jenkins
Committee on company law reform and the Inland Revenue submitted
their guidance on the payment of taxpayers' professional costs
to the Select Committee on the P.C.A.)> the issuing of a White
Paper outlining the guidance (the Inland Revenue's approach to
the 1971 concessions on income tax); and the dissemination of
guidance in a press release (the Revenue's method for announcing
a concession on Capital Gains Tax liability for main
dwelling-houses). We can only speculate that the departments
considered that these methods had particular advantages in the
context of each piece of guidance, but what is undeniable is
that little has changed in the four decades since the then
R.E. Megarry critically observed that,
"speeches or replies to questions in Parliament,
announcements in the press, miscellaneous official
publications, letters to private organisations written by
one Government Department or another, unofficial reports and
so on^j-may all constitute the primary sources of this quasi-
law".
He believed that it should be as accessible as statute and case
law, and we shall have to consider the practicality and
implications of such an idea later in this work.
Procedural Guidance
As the earlier table indicated, twenty four P.C.A. reports
contained references to this class of guidance. Ihe first
characteristic of procedural guidance that we can examine is the
type of person towards whcm the relevant decision-making process
was directed. Nineteen of the reports disclosed guidance
regulating civil servants' conduct towards individuals whilst
the minority of the reports revealed procedural guidance
establishing the form of relations between departments and other
public bodies (notably local authorities and public utilities).
A related aspect of procedural guidance is the administrative
task being governed by this class of provision. The largest
group of reports (nine in total) indicated that the allocation of
benefits to individuals was the most prevalent activity subject
to procedural guidance. Illustrative examples of the types of
benefit programmes accompanied by such guidance were the conduct
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of medical boards determining entitlements to war pensions ;
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the granting of aid to voluntary schools ; and the payment of
3 8
compensation for redundancy . Taxation also appeared to be an
activity which was heavily governed by this form of guidance.
Four reports mentioned procedural guidance regulating officials'
decision-making in varied areas within the
two major departments concerned with the collection of revenue.
This guidance regulated inter alia Customs Officers' relations
39
with import agents , the by now infamous compounding
4U
procedure , and the Inland Revenue's procedure for preventing
tax evasion by building sub-contractors (the so-called "lump"
41
system) . Equally the disposal of surplus government land
was a fruitful administrative duty so far as the existence of
procedural guidance was concerned. The reports referred to
distinct sets of guidance on this topic regulating officials
42
working within the Ministry of Defence , the Scottish
43 44
Office , the D.H.S.S. , and the Property Services
45
Agency
Approximately the same proportion of procedural guidance was
published as occurred with policy guidance (one third).
However, it might be argued that citizens had a less weighty
claim to the openness of this class of guidance, because it
merely established the way in which the decision was reached
rather than the basis of the decision. But such a distinction
must be treated with caution as there may be good reasons why
the procedure of decision-making should also be accorded
publicity. For example, if it is assumed that a piece of
procedural guidance reflects one department's view of the best
administrative process for implementing a particular programme
then a citizen may face a great burden in discovering if his
case has been determined by that process when the guidance is
not published. Furthermore, it is only vtfien he has that
information that he can adequately evaluate his options in
responding to the decision. Consequently, in the absence of
such publicity the citizen is in a weak position vis-a-vis the
department, and he may refuse to accept the legitimacy of the
20 6
decision even when it has been reached in accordance with the
guidance; so the department are faced with a disillusioned
citizen and the latter has been subjected to unnecessary
pressures. In this situation we should also note the status
given to the procedural element of decisions by administrative
law, most clearly via the rules of natural justice, as an
indication of the importance assigned to the method by which
administrators reach decisions. Therefore, there are also
strong reasons to be concerned about the level of publicity
given to procedural guidance.
Interpretative Guidance
Eight reports contained references to this final class of
guidance. The greatest number of these pieces of guidance (six)
elaborated the promulgating department's view of the meaning to
be given to statutory provisions. Departments issued guidance
on a broad spectrum of legislation extending from the Purchase
46 47
Tax Act 1963 to the Cbuntryside Act 1968 . The remaining
two sets of guidance interpreted an extra-statutory tax
48 49
concession and a statutory licence condition
Of the above guidance six sets were published. The media
of publication were Public Notices issued by the Customs and
Excise, booklets (detailing the scope of grants under the
Industrial Development Act 1966 and rights under the Land
Compensation Act 1973), and circulars (defining the ambit of
wireless licences and the classifying of public rights of way
under the Countryside Act 1968). Only the Home Office's
interpretation of Parole Eligibility Dates, provided for by the
Criminal Justice Act 1967~^, and the Inland Revenue's
definition of entitlement to the concession regarding miners'
coal were not published. The high degree of openness attaching
to most of the interpretative guidance discovered during the
survey, which was particularly visible when compared with the
other classes of guidance, was probably a consequence of the
nature of this type of guidance. Departments seem to believe
that their implementation of programmes requires than to publish
their interpretations of ambiguous or controversial statutory
provisions (e.g. the Customs & Excise issued their guidance on
the tax liability of light fittings after uncertainty amongst
manufacturers"^, whilst the D. o E. promulgated their circular
52
on rights of way after litigation in the High Court ) .
Perhaps one explanation for this belief is that, as we shall
soon discover, there is broad agreement amongst the grievance
handling agencies that the courts have a primary role in
interpreting legislation and therefore the departments feel the
need to persuade the public to accept their own interpretations,
which of course necessitates publication. Whereas in regard to
the creation of policy and procedural guidance the departments
consider that they have supremacy in these areas and therefore
feel less obliged to publish these provisions.
The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration's
General Introduction
Before launching into our examination of the P.C.A.'s
responses it is vitally important to begin with a very brief
consideration of the background to, and nature of, this
institution in the British constitutional context, because
Responses to Administrative Guidance
without such an understanding the Commissioner's decisions and
pronouncements regarding administrative guidance will be
incomprehensible. The first Qnbudsman was created in Sweden and
according to Lundvik, "the Constitution of 1809 prescribed that
the Qnbudsman should supervise the application of laws and
regulations by judges, government officials and other public
servants and prosecute those who in their official capacity had
53
committed offences or neglected to fulfil their duties."
For over one and a half centuries this concept remained within
the Scandinavian countries. Then in the late Nineteen Fifties
it filtered through to the common law world. Britain was still
undergoing the trauma of adapting to the existence of a welfare
state bureaucracy, vhich was embodied in the Crichel Down
54 55
affair and the subsequent Franks Report. JUSTICE
concluded that they should examine the feasibility of importing
56
the idea of an ombudsman into the U.K. In 1961 their
recommendations were published in the Whyatt Report (named after
57
the committee's director Sir JOhn Whyatt Q.C.). Two
fundamental themes can be detected in the report's proposals for
a Parliamentary Commissioner. First, the objective of the
office would be to investigate and make recommendations for the
alleviation of "maladministration" affecting individual
citizens. This goal differs frcm the Scandinavian precedent
both in terms of the P.C.A.'s role vis-a-vis particular citizens
and the administration and in the notion of maladministration,
which was considered to exclude the P.C.A. from reconsidering
the merits of administrative decisions vhile requiring him to
evaluate the processes and conduct through which the decisions
ware reached. Secondly, in outlining the characteristics, and
jurisdiction, of the P.C.A. the report sought to transform a
continental ombudsman into a British Parliamentary Commissioner
who would operate within a constitutional framework of
ministerial responsibility, traditional Parliamentary
supervision of the administration and the redress of
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constituents' grievances by M.P.s. Therefore, the Gommittee
considered that the P.C.A. should have jurisdiction only over
central government departments, with restricted access to
departmental papers and subject to a Minister's veto of specific
investigations; coupled with the limited power to make
recommendations regarding the remedying of complaints, the
absence of disciplinary powers over civil servants and the
preservation of their anonymity; with complaints having to be
referred to the P.C.A. by M.P.s.. However, despite the
cautiousness of these proposals, the Government rejected the
report contending that a Commissioner would undermine the
hallowed doctrine of ministerial responsibility and add further
delays to the administrative process.
Several years later, as a redemption of a manifesto pledge
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and fortified by the experience of New Zealand, the second
government of Harold Wilson introduced a Bill which became the
Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967. Undoubtedly this piece of
legislation substantially bears the hallmark of the Whyatt
Report, with s.5(l) limiting the P.C.A. to investigating "action
taken in the exercise of administrative functions", whilst
s,12(3) repeats the Commissioner's exclusion from reconsidering
matters of merits in the following terms, "it is hereby declared
that nothing in this Act authorises or requires the Commissioner
IIO
to question the merits of a decision taken without
maladministration by a government department or other authority
in the exercise of a discretion veted in that department or
authority." But in part the Act was stronger than Whyatt's
recommendations, e.g. the P.C.A. had access to all government
papers except cabinet ones and Ministers could not veto an
investigation by him. Consequently Gregory and Hutchesson have
observed that, " ... the Office of Parliamentary Commissioner
vihtich emerged in 1967 had become something substantially
different from vdhat had been envisaged by most of its original
proponents ..." .^
Now that we have an awareness of the major stages in the
evolution of this institution and a basic appreciation of its
relationship with departments, an examination of the responses of
the Commissioner to each class of guidance can begin.
Policy Guidance
The P.C.A."s reaction towards the value judgments enshrined
in this class of guidance was firmly established in his first
significant investigation, which concerned the treatment of
former British prisoners of the Nazis by the Foreign Office.
During the Nineteen Fifties the West German government had
negotiated bi-lateral treaties with most of the Allied powers to
pay compensation to their nationals who had suffered from Nazi
persecution. In 1964 such an agreement was signed between the
German and British governments whereby the former paid £1
million to the latter for distribution, at their discretion, to
British nationals having experience this type of suffering.
\
The Foreign Office as recipients of this money decided to
distribute it themselves and therefore devised a series of rules
to guide this operation. According to Fry, the then Foreign
Secretary R.A. Butler outlined these rules to selected
backbenchers and subsequently they were canmonly referred
to as the Butler rules.^ These provisions provided that if a
national could establish that he had been incarcerated in a
concentration camp he would automatically be registered as
entitled to compensation, but otherwise he would have to prove
that he had been detained in an "institution with comparable
conditions". The Foreign Office, mistakenly, believed that all
concentration camps contained similar regimes and therefore
imposed a uniform requirement of harsh treatment for a former
detainee to satisfy the second rule. When the rules were
applied to twelve ex-servicemen who had been detained in the
Sachsenhausen concentration complex they were refused
compensation as the Foreign Office considered that their
imprisonment in the Sonderlager and Zellenbau portions of
Sachsenhausen did not meet the severity of the second rule's
demands. After lengthy protests on their behalf Airey Neave
M.P. passed the ex-servicemen's complaints to the newly created
P.O.A. In his report Sir Edmund Oompton found that the
complainants had suffered "injustice as a consequence of
maladministration" through the biased way in which the Foreign
Office had applied the Butler rules to their circumstances.
However, whilst noting the inequities of the rules he stated
that, "the Foreign Office have represented to me, I think
correctly, that as Parliamentary Commissioner I am not
r q
authorised to question the merits of the rule." sir
Edmund's conclusion on this matter is very significant as he was
accepting an extensive interpretation of s.12(3) that not only
prevented him frcm acting as an appellate body regarding the
merits of individual decisions made by departments, but also
disabled his office frcm reviewing the contents of policy
guidance. The necessary implication was that in his eyes it
was solely a matter for departments to determine the nature and
composition of this class of guidance. Additionally his
approach indicated that he was not an adherent of the strict
judicial doctrine of the fettering of discretion as Sir Edmund
did not believe that the mere existence of the Butler rules
amounted to sufficient evidence for a finding of
maladministration.
The survey of later cases has confirmed that Sir Edmund's
successors have retained and re-affirmed the Sachsenhausen
approach to policy guidance. For example when a complainant
questioned the Ministry of Q/erseas Development's refusal to pay
him an expatriates allowance towards his employment at the
University of Malawi, the P.C.A. had the following to say about
the department's guidance regulating their exercise of statutory
power under the Overseas Development and Service Act 1965;
I am precluded by the Parliamentary Commissioner Act from
questioning the merits of a discretionary decision provided
that it was taken without maladministration and my
investigation of this ccmplaint has therefore been directed
primarily to establishing whther or not, in thg^complsirwh:'s
case, those rules have been properly applied."
Similarly when an individual criticised the Department of Trade's
unwillingness to appoint him as an authorised company auditor,
under s.l61(l)(b) of the Companies Act 1948, because he failed to
satisfy their guidance regarding the experience required, the
P.C.A. was equally deferential to these provisions noting that,
"I do not think that it is for me to make an assessment of these
criteria.
During the formative years of the Commissioner, Marshall,
amongst others, drew attention to several extensions of the
P.C.A."s competence encouraged upon him by his Select
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Committee. Of direct relevance to us is the 1968
recannmendation concerning "bad rule reviews". The Committee
suggested, and the Commissioner agreed, that where a piece of
guidance which amounted to a policy rule was applied correctly
by officials but caused "hardship" to a particular complainant,
"
... it would be proper for the Commissioner to enquire
whether, given the effect of the rule in the case under his
investigation, the Department had taken any action to review
the rule. If found defective and revised, what action had
been taken to remedy the harship sustained by the
complainant? If not revised, whether there had been due
consideration by the Department of the grounds for
maintaining the rule? It would then be open to the
Commissioner to find that the complainant had sustained
injustice in consequence of maladministration if these
enquiries showed that there had been deficiencies in the
departmental process of reviewing the rule ..."
In their attempts not to infringe s,12(3) the Committee's
phraseology left a large degree of uncertainty as to the exact
extent of the P.C.A.'s authority in bad rule cases. If the
department refused to review its rule did that of itself amount
to an act of maladministration, or could the P.C.A. only make
such a finding where the department had agreed to review the
rule and he found their review process to be defective?
9J4-
Marshall seemed to favour the first view, but could not the
department invoke s.12(3) and argue that only where their
refusal demonstrated elorients of maladministration was it
permissible for the P.C.A. to condemn their decision? Harlow
has analysed this expansion of the Ccmmissioner's power in the
following terms,
"at the instigation of the Select Committee, our
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration has assumed a
ccmparable power (similar to the New Zealand Ombudsman) to
recommend changes in administrative policy or regulations,
although he exercises his rights more cautiously."
But this is not strictly accurate because the Select Committee
clearly stated, " ... it is not for the Commissioner to rewrite
68
the Government's administrative rules." And their whole
concept of "bad rule reviews" was designed to avoid that
possibility.
In practice, whatever may be the answers to the above
questions, the P.C.A. has not made much use of this extended
competence. The survey did not disclose one case where he
explicitly invoked this power. Probably the nearest he came to
utilising it was in a case where he asked the D. o E. whether
they considered there were grounds for modifying their guidance
on the payment of costs to unsuccessful objectors at Public Local
Inquiries. The department examined their guidance and the
P.C.A. reported, " ... they have decided, for reasons which I
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accept, that such a course of action would not be justified."
However Gregory has expressed the opinion that even if
departments do undertake to review their policy guidance at the
behest of the P.C.A.,
"none of this has greatly increased the likelihood of the
Catunissioner's finding maladministration, for only an
extraordinarily inept department might be expected so to
conduct its review of the -rule that the Commissioner would
find 7defects in the process subsequently described to
him."
The second limb of Sir Edmund's reaction to policy guidance,
established in the Sachsenhausen case, concerned the judicial
concept of the fettering of discretionary power by
administrators creating rigid rules to govern the exercise of
their powers (this will be elaborated upon in the next chapter).
Our survey of reports indicated that subsequent Canmissioners
have followed Sir Edmund's lead and have not incorporated an
analogous concept into their definitions of maladministration.
Indeed it can be concluded that the Commissioners have been
supporters of the use of policy guidance, because in several
reports they have acknowledged various administrative virtues
associated with decision-making regulated by this type of
provision. In the report dealing with overseas allowances
mentioned above the P.C.A. stated, "it is clear that, in drawing
up any scheme of this nature, rules have to be designed to try
and ensure that the fundamental objectives of the scheme are
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achieved." So there we discover the P.C.A. appreciating
the value of guidance in detailing the goals to be pursued
through the exercise of a broad statutory discretion. Another
related advantage of subjecting decision-making, particularly
that which takes place on a large scale, to policy guidance is
the promotion of consistency in the determination of citizens'
interactions with the administration. During one of the
Commissioner's investigations into the S.E.D. Awards Branch he
reported that, "the Department have adopted guidelines (which
have, in themselves, no statutory force) to ensure that this
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discretion is exercised fairly between applicants..." . And
such a development was not a valid ground for complaining about
the Department. Furthermore, the use of policy guidance to
provide consistency of treatment goes beyond decision-making
concerning the distribution of direct financial benefits and
extends into other areas of governmental activity, such as
licensing. The Department of Trade's power to authorise persons
as company auditors has already been encountered. When the
P.C.A. scrutinised the Department's actual exercise of this
discretion he observed that, "to achieve consistency in the
exercise of this statutory discretion and to ensure as far as
possible that persons authorised to be appointed are fully
capable of meeting the needs of present-day companies
legislation, the Department have developed criteria for measuring
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applicant's knowledge and experience." So the Commissioner
has perceived the integral benefits of policy guidance as a
mechanism for detailing departmental aims and guiding the making
of individual decisions by officials. Both of these attributes
were also present in another positive feature of policy guidance
recognised by the P.C.A., its ability to aid financial budgeting
by departments. Two Commissioners in our survey encountered the
former Ministry of Transport's guidance regulating their power,
provided by s.48 Town and Country Planning Act 1959, to purchase
property in advance of road building needs. Sir Alan Marre
commented, "I accept that it is reasonable for a department,
where
there is no statutory requirement for acquisition of property, to
217
make general rules of this kind to control discretionary
expenditure
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of public funds in advance of programme needs."
Consequently in such contexts guidance can support the tasks of
establishing and observing financial targets by allowing senior
officials to determine the frequency and extent of departmental
expenditure.
Fran the examples discussed above it is obvious that the
different Commissioners have been consistent in their approval
of the use of policy guidance by departments as a device for
regulating decision-making. The distinct benefits of guidance
mentioned in their reports can also be viewed as explanations
for the creation and utilisation of guidance in our
administrative system. However, these explanations should not
be treated as exhaustive, because they are only the views of one
institution on sane of the features displayed by a single class
of guidance.
Although the P.C.A. has not been willing to review the
substance of policy guidance, neither have departments been
given a free reign in their usage of these provisions as the
various Commissioners have followed the alternative strategy of
criticlly investigating the application of guidance to the facts
A
of individual complaints' cases. The ensuing examination will
consider how successful this strategy has been.
In two cases the P.C.A. questioned the D.H.S.S.'s original
decision not to backdate increases in war pensions due to their
guidance that, "the Secretary of State exercises his
discretionary power and authorises payment from an earlier date
only where there is substantial evidence that the claimant was
prevented by physical or mental incapacity from acting earlier,
or where the records contain evidence of misdirection or other
7S
material error on the part of the Department. The first
Z \ °\
complaint involved an ex-serviceman invalided out of the
services after the Second World War on psychiatric grounds;
during 1953 it was discovered that he was also suffering frcm
deafness and he applied for a war pension in respect of that
disability; he was subsequently examined by a Specialist who
concluded that the weakness was caused by a cold. Later the
Department's doctors suggested that the complainant be tested in
hospital but he refused because of a fear that he might be
dismissed fran his job. Fifteen years afterwards the
complainant applied for, and was granted, a war pension but the
Department refused to backdate it. hhen the P.C.A. had
completed his investigation he "... asked the Department,
however, whether there might not have been a case for arranging
further investigations in the case, the Department accepted that
the medical advice they received in 1953 must be regarded as
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incomplete..." . Consequently they agreed to backdate the
avsrd under head two of their guidance. In the second case the
complainant had undergone an amputation of one leg in 1944.
After the operation his stump was measured as six and one half
inches, this figure was then used to calculate the amount of
pension the complainant was entitled to. During 1964 the stump
was re-measured and it turned out to be four and seven eighths
inches long, which meant that he was entitled to a higher
pension; this was granted, Out again without backdating. The
P.C.A. concluded his investigation into the Department's
application of their guidance by noting, "however, as in some
other cases in which I have reported, it seems to me that the
way they have been applied to the complainant has caused him an
injustice ... [because] ... I have ascertained that the original
stump measurement in 1944 was incorrect.. Therefore he
asked the Department to reconsider the case under their guidance
and to pay the complainant interest on the increased pension he
should have received from 1944, which they agreed to do.
Similarly the P.C.A. has questioned the application of the
Inland Revenue's guidance regulating their extra-statutory
discretion to remit interest charges due on late payments of tax
which he described thus,
"... I know they are only prepared to forgo interest in
rare and special circumstances. By this is meant errors on
their p^rt that would make interest charges altogether
unconscionable, as might happen if the taxpayer had been led
to pay tax later than the due date as a direct consequence of
sane wrong or misleading answer to a question as to what was
the due date."
He found that the conplainant had received a tax demand
and wishing to dispute part of it the taxpayer had telephoned the
Inspector to ask whether a formal appeal was necessary, only to
be told that it was not. Wren the complainant returned frcm
abroad two months later he discovered a demand for the full
amount plus interest; after being contacted by the complainant
the Inspector agreed to reduce the liability but refused to waive
the interest charge. In the light of the P.C.A.'s findings that
the complainant had been misled over the appeal procedure
requirements, the Department agreed that this case came within
their guidance and remitted the interest charge.
Probably the most amazing policy guidance case discovered in
the survey also centered upon the Inland Revenue. Ihe
complainant was a retired Church of Scotland Minister who had
numerous diverse sources of income with the consequence that the
Department continually failed to calculate his tax liability
correctly. Eventually he employed a firm of solicitors who
settled his tax affairs with the Department. However, when he
claimed the solicitors' costs frcm the Department they refused,
arguing that his case did not fall within their guidance on the
payment of such costs. The guidance stated that costs would only
be paid vAiere," [they] had arisen directly out of a serious error
by the Department of the kind which no responsible person acting
in good faith and with proper care could reasonably have made or
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of the kind which becomes more serious bemuse persisted in."
Despite the complainant's protests the Minister of State at the
Treasury confirmed the Department's refusal; however he informed
the complainant that a complaint could be made to the P.C.A.
alleging that the Department had exercised their discretion
unreasonably. So, in spite of s.12(3) a government Minister was
suggesting that the P.C.A. be used as a form of appellate body to
review the reasonableness of the Minister's decision! In his
findings the Commissioner determined that the Department had
repeatedly made errors in their calculation of the complainant's
fiscal liabilities,
"... I have therefore had to consider whether this was of
such a nature as to bring it within the categories defined in
the Department's own working practice ... It seems to me that
the mishandling which has characterised the Department's
dealings with the complainant's affairs were such as to bring
the case within the ambit those where reimbursement of
agent's costs is justified."
As a result he recommended that the Department pay the complain¬
ant's solicitors fees, v\hich they agreed to do. Consequently, in
effect, the P.C.A. was ruling that the Minister's original
application of the policy guidance was not reasonable. This both
demonstrated the breadth of the nebulous concept of mal¬
administration and is one of the few instances v»here
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the Gornmissioner was willing to overule a decision personally-
approved by a Minister.
Another facet of this same strategy adopted by the P.C.A.
has been his tactic of suggesting that departments reconsider
their original application of their guidance to the
complainant's case on the basis of the additional information
discovered by his investigation. For example, in one case the
D. o E. refused to exercise their power under s.161(1) of the
Local Government Act 1972 to remove a proposed ex-gratia payment
by a local authority frcm the jurisdiction of the District
Auditor. The facts were that the authority's officers visited
the ccmplainant's flat and were so shocked by its dangerous
structural condition that they recommended she leave immediately
and offered her a council flat instead. Later they made a
closing order on the premises and the remaining tenants were
therefore entitled to compensation frcm the authority under the
terms of the Land Compensation Act 1973. However, as the
complainant had left the premises voluntarily she fell outside
the provisions of the statute, and vdien the authority asked the
Secretary of State to exercise his discretion to permit them to
make an ex-gratia payment the Department refused on the grounds
that,
"it is therefore the practice to limit the use of the
sanction generally to unlawful payments which have been made
in good faith in ignorance of the strict letter of the law,
and to ex-gratia payments where an a^hority has a clearly
defined moral liability to make them."
In this case the Department did not consider the authority
was under a moral duty to the complainant. After conducting his
investigation the P.C.A. reported that,
"I do not criticise the Department for having taken that
view. I can see that at the time it was a perfectly proper
one from their standpoint. They took due account of all the
information then available to than and I find no
maladministration in the way they reached their decision not
to sanction the proposed payment. It did, however, seam to
me that if the Department had had the benefit of all the
evidence revealed by my investigation, they might have
formed a different view on the moral liability of the
Council to make an ex-gratia payment ... I therefore put it
to the Department that they might wish to reconsider their
decision in the l^ht of the further evidence disclosed by
my investigation."
This the Department did and they eventually sanctioned the
payment. Hence we see the P.C.A. not questioning the merits of
the policy guidance nor its original application by the
Department, but instead the Commissioner successfully suggesting
that his investigation has unearthed new information upon which
they might wish to reconsider their earlier decision. Such a
hint is one which the relevant department would be well advised
to heed if their senior officers wish to avoid the likely risk
of being called before the Select Oommittee on the P.C.A. to be
closely questioned on the matter.
To dispel any possible misapprehension that the P.C.A. is
always successful in challenging the application of policy
guidance a case involving the 1971 White Paper on tax
concessions should be mentioned. Because the P.A.Y.E. scheme is
not sensitive to all income changes the Inland Revenue conduct a
review of each taxpayer's earnings and allowances after the tax
year is ccmplete and notify the individual of any rebates or
payments due. As a consequence the Write Paper excluded
assessments due under this annual review from its concessions,
except in highly unusual circumstances. The complainant started
a part-time job in August 1970 and immediately notified his tax
office, but it was not until May 1971 that his P.A.Y.E. coding
was adjusted; furthermore during the intervening time period his
employer had erroneously repaid him a portion of his tax
deductions. Eventually the Department sorted out the
complainant's fiscal affairs and demanded £102:50 for arrears.
The complainant claimed that he came within the exceptional
provisions of the White Paper but the Revenue disagreed. The
Commissioner found that the Department took a very narrow view of
the exceptional category and applied it only in those cases
where, "... the Department have repeatedly failed to make proper
use of information, or vdiere, as a direct result of official
error, the underpayment has built up over virtually the whole of
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two successive years." Despite the Commissioner's belief
that, "it seemed to me that there might well be grounds on which
the Department could treat the underpayment for 1970-71 as
exceptional under the terms of the White Paper ... on the view
they are taking of the White Paper, they have decided that it
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does not qualify to be treated as such." Therefore, no
remedy was provided for the Department's mistakes and the
Department implicitly rejected the P.C.A.'s interpretation of the
relevant policy guidance.
To conclude our assessment of this strategy we can note that
in the limited number of cases where the P.C.A. has felt the need
to challenge a department's application of its policy guidance he
has been overwhelmingly successful in obtaining a reversal of
their original decision. It seems that his most effective
tactic has been to question the factual basis upon which the
guidance was applied rather than its interpretation, because the
survey only disclosed one unsuccessful challenge and that
demonstrates the Commissioner offering an alternative view upon
the ambit of the 1971 hhite Paper. Perhaps it is no coincidence
that five of the six challenges involved guidance governing
departments' provision of remedies for their prior mistakes (e.g.
backdating war pensions, providing tax concessions
2.2.5
and paying professional advisors' fees) as the P.C.A. is the
recognised authority on determining what action is necessary to
alleviate maladministration and therefore his pronouncements in
this area would be likely to carry even greater weight with
departments.
Another aspect of the P.C.A.'s response to policy guidance
that deserves our attention is his attitude towards the
publicity and general openness accorded to this category of
guidance by departments. Fran the reports examined it appeared
that the Commissioner considered that the decision whether good
administrative practice required the contents of policy guidance
to be published was a matter which fell primarily within the
responsibility of departments. For example, in the case dealing
with the Department of Trade's power to approve company
auditors, which we have already encountered, the Commissioner
discovered that the very precise guidance created by the
Department had not been published, "... because the Department
takes the view that publication could give applicants for
authorisation the impression that the quantity of their
experience was all that mattered, whereas in fact an applicant
could still be rejected if the quality of his experience was not
adequate, or accepted if his experience although limited as to
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time was qualitatively of a high order." The Commissioner
simply accepted this proposition at face value and did not
consider whether the benefits of secrecy out-weighed those of
publication, or whether the publication of the guidance with a
caveat expressing the Department's emphasis upon quality of
experience would have been administratively feasible.
However, where the department has taken the decision to
publish the contents of its guidance the Commissioner may
express his opinion on the question whether the actual form of
publication was adequate. This occurred in relation to the
Department of Energy's non-statutory Electricity Discount
Scheme,
which provided that recipients of social security benefits would
be entitled to a 25% reduction in their electricity bills for
the winter quarter of 1977. A leaflet was issued at Post
Offices vhich stated that the reduction would be given in
respect of meter readings taken between February and April. The
complainant had his meter read in February but he was not given
a discount on that bill; when he made enquiries about this
refusal he was informed that the Scheme only applied to readings
"due" oetween February - April and that his reading had been
scheduled for January but delayed because of staff sickness. He
complained about the Department's determination of his
application. The Commissioner found no evidence of
maladministration in the application of the Department's
guidance; however, he criticised their failure to explain in the
leaflet that the Scheme only encompassed pre-scheduled readings.
So the P.C.A. was willing to provide an external evaluation of
the efficacy of the Department's actions to publicise the
contents of their policy guidance.
The P.C.A. has also articulated his attitude towards the
situation where a department does not disclose the content of
policy guidance to an affected citizen and then subsequently
applies those provisions to that individual. The then Ministry
of Transport had developed guidance to regulate its power to
appoint and remove designated vehicle testers and one part of
this guidance provided that the Ministry would not allow
applications from garages which were under the control of a
person who had been convicted of a criminal offence within the
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last two years. The complainant owned a garage which had
been approved for testing, he was then sent to prison for having
committed an unrelated offence. Three months later the Ministry
revoked the garage's authorisation on the ground that there was
no one capable of undertaking the testing. The complainant's
wife wrote to the Area Mechanical Engineer asking if the garage
could re-apply for approval if a new tester was employed. The
Engineer replied that the garage would be entitled to re-apply in
those circumstances, but he did not disclose the Ministry's
guidance regarding garages controlled by recently convicted
persons. Later the wife employed another tester and re-applied;
however, following the Ministry's guidance the Engineer refused
her application. The P.C.A. concluded that there had been no
maladministration by the Ministry when they applied their
guidance to the wife's re-application, but the Engineer's failure
to take into account his non-disclosure of that guidance to the
wife amounted to maladministration. The implication is that the
P.C.A. may determine that maladministration has occurred where a
person seeks advice from a department and the department fails to
disclose material policy guidance, which they then invoke against
that person at a later date. It can only be speculated vfaether
the P.C.A. took this strong approach in the above case because it
contained elements of forfeiture of a benefit as opposed to a
mere initial application for sane privilege.
Frcm the reports discussed above it can be concluded that
overall the P.C.A. has not been particularly vociferous in
advocating greater openness for policy guidance. One reason for
his reticence may have been the events of the Ccmpton Bassett
87affair. Briefly these were that the P.C.A. investigated a
farmer's complaint that he had been denied the opportunity to
repurchase land acquired during the Second Wbrld Whr from his
father. The complainant claimed that under the Crichel Down
rules, governing the disposal of surplus government land, the
Ministry of Defence was obliged to offer the land to him. The
P.C.A.'s investigation discovered that the Government had
secretly changed this set of guidance in 1966 and that under the
new guidance the complainant was not entitled to be given first
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refusal on the disposal . Furthermore, following his
Sachsenhausen approach the P.C.A. did not question the merits of
these changes, but confined his enquiries to determining if the
new guidance had been properly applied. The Commissioner found
no maladministration in the Ministry's implementation of the
revised guidance. Subsequently the Select Committee on the
P.C.A. considered this matter and discovered that the decisions
to amend the Crichel Down rules and not to publish the revised
guidance had been taken at Cabinet level. Therefore, the
Committee were not able to pursue their enquiries further as the
issue was perceived to be a matter of political judgement rather
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than administrative propriety. Consequently we may surmise
that the P.C.A. learnt that controversial pieces of policy
guidance may not only be created at the highest political levels
of the government but that these decision-makers may also
determine the nature and extent of openness for these
provisions. He appears to have concluded that it is for other
institutions (Parliament?) to challenge such "political"
decisions. Whilst it is quite understandable that the P.C.A.
wishes to give a wide berth to subjects which may became the
focus of party political controversy, such fears can be
exaggerated as it seems highly unlikely that the Cabinet is
directly involved in the promulgation of the majority of pieces
of policy guidance. On that basis it is an open question
whether the P.C.A. should feel freer to speak out on the
administrative implications of departments' unwillingness to
publish this class of guidance, now that his office has the
accumulated experience and prestige of nearly two decades behind
it. The answer probably depends upon the particular
commentator's conception of the ideal role of the P.C.A., a
topic vhich raises issues that will be considered in the
conclusion of this chapter.
The final facet of the P.C.A.'s response to policy guidance
that will be examined concerns the rare reports where he makes
references to the legal nature and implications of these
provisions. In one of the earliest reports studied the P.C.A.
was faced with a ccmplaint regarding the administration of
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Betterment Levy. During 1965 the Government published a
V\hite E&per presenting their proposals for a levy to be imposed
on the development value raised by the sale of land. In order to
prevent the levy being avoided by artificially arranged sales
preceding the introduction of the levy, the White Paper stated
that the ultimate legislation would contain a price formula for
land transactions (details of which were contained in the White
Paper) occurring between the date of the Paper and the entering
into effect of the legislation. The complainants both bought and
sold single plots of land for their own habitation during the
above period and were subject to Betterment Levy on the formula
prices, not the actual contractual prices. Ihey wrote to the
Minister asking him to calculate the levy on their actual gains,
but he refused. Subsequently the Land Commission recommended
that special treatment be given to such transactions and the
Minister agreed to the proposal by means of an extra-statutory
concession. The ccmplainants then complained about the
Minister's original decision regarding their requests. Wien the
Commissioner reported he stated,
"but I am not called on to express a view on the administrative
soundness of dealing with problems relating to the interim
period by a succession of special concessions, or on the
propriety of giving effect to such concessions extra-statutorily
in advance of amending legislation. My concern is with the
position of^the aggrieved persons whose cases have been referred
to me ..."
Therefore, as the concession provided a speedier relief for
the complainants' levy liabilities than the passage of
legislation, he did not criticise the Minister's use of guidance
for this task. Ihus the report disclosed the P.C.A.'s awareness
of the important questions concerning the constitutional and
administrative desirability of departments utilising
extra-statutory concessions as a mechanism for ad hoc statute
law reform. But he avoided expressing an opinion on these
matters. However, it is only fair to the P.C.A. to note that,
as ws shall discover in the next chapter, other grievance
handling agencies have also displayed a reluctance to venture
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views on this significant administrative device.
In a later report the P.C.A. was more forthright about his
attitude toverds the legality of guidance containing
extra-statutory concessions. There the guidance provided for
the remission of interest payments due on late payments of tax
in "rare and special circumstances". The Commissioner observed,
"in my Annual Report for 1977 I accepted that in adopting this
attitude the Inland Revenue were acting within the law and with
the approval of Parliament since they were carrying out a policy
which Treasury Ministers had explained to Parliament, and
Parliament had agreed to it, in the course of the enactment of
the Finance (No.2) Bill (1975)."
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If the Commissioner was
suggesting that simply because Ministers had made statements to
Parliament regarding the concession that of itself imbued the
concession with seme form of legal authority, he was expressing a
view that runs counter to the prevailing constitutional
orthodoxy on Executive power beginning with the Case of
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Proclamations . It may have been that the Commissioner's
opinion was influenced by a combination of factors, including his
deference to Parliament and an absence of legal knowledge within
his office. Today the latter emission has been rectified by
the fact that the last two Commissioners have been experienced
Q.C.s. Therefore, it could be argued that the Office is in a
much stronger position to contribute to the resolution of the
difficult dilemma over the administrative convenience of
extra-statutory concessions as opposed to their constitutional
propriety.
Procedural Guidance
The response of the P.C.A. to this class of guidance differs
fundamentally frcm his reaction to policy guidance, the most
noticeable difference being his greater willingness to question
the substance of procedural guidance. In a number of reports
discovered by the survey the Commissioner expressed sharp
criticism of procedural guidance; therefore a cross section of
his criticisms will be studied.
A circular issued by the former M.H.L.G. (73/65) provided
that where a successful objector at a Public Local Inquiry had
been represented by a professional other than a lawyer and the
local authority disagreed over the level of the representative's
fees, the dispute should be referred to the Ministry for
settlement. Established practice within the Ministry required
the lump sum bill to be sent to the Ministry's legal department
for "taxation". An objector complained about the Ministry's
successors' handling of his representative's costs. The P.C.A.
found that the D.o E. had recently changed their procedure so
that disputed bills were sent to a High Court Master for taxing;
but he criticised the old procedure for inter alia, not
requiring itemised bills, and failing to allow the objector and
the local authority to make representations to the Secretary of
State about his proposed determination before it was finalised.
He concluded, "for the reasons set out [above], I consider that
the manner in which the Department made the original order for
costs in this case did not reflect good administrative
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practice."
In another report the P.C.A. encountered the D.E.S.
guidance establishing the procedure for voluntary schools
seeking building grants under s.68 of the Education Act 1944. A
Board of Governors asked the Department to deviate frcm this
procedure in their case but the offcials refused, whereupon the
k
Chairman ccmplained to the P.C.A. arguing that the Department
were not bound by the guidance as it did not have statutory
force. Ihe Commissioner agreed about the status of the guidance
and said he would examine its "reasonableness". After his
investigation the P.C.A. rejected the ccmplaint noting, "... the
Department have a duty to ensure that proper controls exist for
the payment of grants which they are empowered to make. And as
a result of my examination I am satisfied that the methods of
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control used by the Department are reasonable." The
Commissioner's undertaking to review the Department's procedural
guidance was in stark contrast to his Sachsenhausen approach to
policy guidance. Presumably he felt that he had a more
legitimate role in scrutinising this class of guidance as
procedural matters provide the nucleus of the concept of
maladministration.
Undoubtedly the Commissioner's most severe castigation of
specific procedural guidance disclosed by the survey occurred in
the Customs and Excise compounding case which we have already
encountered earlier in this thesis. Where the Department have
what they consider to be prima facie evidence of an offence
committed by a person they may offer to compound criminal
proceedings (i .e. not to prosecute the person before the criminal
courts) in return for the payment of a financial penalty.
Obviously this activity has profound implications for the proper
functioning of the criminal justice system and personal liberty,
therefore Customs Officers are subject to a regime of guidance
regulating their use of the compounding process. In this
particular instance a woman had shipped same furniture from Hong
Rang to the U.K.. Her importers required a customs declaration
to be filled in and she had completed it incorrectly through
carelessness. A Customs Officer discovered her misstatement and
she was interviewed by investigations officers. They concluded
that she was guilty of the offence of "recklessly" completing a
customs declaration contrary to s.167(1) Customs and Excise
Management Act 1979. The officers offered to compound
proceedings for a penalty payment of £280 and the woman agreed.
Later she complained to the P.C.A. about the Department's
treatment of her mistake. He reported,
"my investigation shows that the Department's officers
are making what are tantamount to legal judgments with
insufficient understanding of the legal issues involved...
I am therefore concerned to find that the instructions given
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to officers, who have to decide whether someone has been
guilty of the offence of recklessness in competing a
Customs declaration, are fragmentary and imprecise."
The Commissioner went on to detail his criticisms of the
substance of the guidance, including its ambiguous and outdated
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definitions of the mental state constituting recklessness ,
and the procedures to be observed by officers engaged in the
ccmpounding process. Regarding the latter he criticised their
failure to include an explicit provision that suspects wsre to
be given an opportunity to obtain legal advice before they had
to decide whether to accept a compounding penalty, and the
failure to provide for the passing up to more senior officers of
difficult cases. In his own words,
"... it seemed to me that, in equity, all alleged offenders
should have the same consideration given to their cases when
a sum for ccmpounding proceedings is being decided and that
all officials should be told that if in any case they feel
that circumstances justify a lower sum for ccmpounding than
that laid down in the instructions, case should be
reported to a higher grade for decision."
This case showed the P.C.A. not merely launching a withering
attack on the substance of a department's procedural guidance
but also making wideranging suggestions for its reform. It can
hardly have been a coincidence that Sir Gecil Clothier was the
Commissioner at that time, as no other case revealed by the
survey contained such an explicit and perceptive understanding
of the relevance of legal ideas (derived from the rules of
Natural Justice and basic criminal procedure as outlined in the
former Judges' Rules) to the shaping of the administrative
process.
The P.C.A.'s critical approach to the substance of
procedural guidance displayed in the above reports is to be
commended because his Office represents the external institution
that possesses the greatest ability to scrutinise these
provisions in their departmental settings. Through a combination
of his statutory powers and the administrative experience of his
staff the P.C.A. is in a unique position to determine if
particular pieces of procedural guidance, encountered when
investigating specific complaints, conform to an acceptable
minimum standard of administrative procedure. The P.C.A. appears
to have constructed such a standard from a blend of his
jurisprudential ideas"*"^. This response of the P.C.A. to an
important class of administrative guidance must be seen as a
significant contribution towards what Bradley has described as
the Commissioner's establishment of a general social right to
good administration."*"^
We must now consider the implications of the P.C.A.
criticising the substance of procedural guidance. Did he then go
on to find that the department responsible for promulgating the
guidance had committed an act of maladministration? The answer
was no, because out of five reports"*"^ containing such
criticism only one included an explicit finding of
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maladministration. The explanation is that the P.C.A.
was concerned with the departments' overall treatment of the
complainants, consequently their issuing and observance of
defective procedural guidance was only one element in the
Commissioner's assessment of the existence of maladministration.
A positive factor such as a later procedurally correct review of
the complainant's case by a Minister was sufficient to outweigh
the harm sustained through the subordinate officials'
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implorientation of criticised guidance.
A related issue concerns the amendment of procedural
guidance criticised by the P.C.A. In three out of the above
reports the departments had altered their guidance of their own
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volition, and in the remaining two examples they agreed to
amend these provisions in the light of the P.C.A.'s
106
comments. Whilst it is a compliment to the P.C.A.'s
standing in the eyes of departments that they have been willing
to review their guidance in these circumstances, he has no means
of checking up on the effect of such undertakings. Therefore,
taking into account the fact that only a minority of pieces of
procedural guidance are published, the public cannot ascertain
whether the departments are honouring their undertakings and if
they are whether the actual amendments are merely superficial or
substantial. Ideally the Select Committee on the P.C.A. is
superbly placed to undertake this task as part of their
responsibility for monitoring general defects in the
administrative process brought to light by the P.C.A.'s
investigations. Indeed they began in a very vigorous way by
questioning the Principal Officer of the Foreign Office about
the changes in departmental guidance introduced as a result of
the Foreign Secretary's (George Brown) statements to Parliament
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following the P.C.A.'s report on the Sachsenhausen case.
The Committee's report provides plenty of fuel for suspicion
regarding the redeeming of promises concerning guidance reform
because they reported, "the Principal Officer of the Foreign
Office was unable to give Your Committee any specific indication
either of the defects of the system that the Sachsenhausen case
had brought to light or of the action being taken to mend the
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system." Yet in the face of such administrative
intransigence lor maybe because of it) the Select Ccrnmittee
sadly retreated from a rigorous scrutiny of departmental
undertakings, with the result that in the following twelve years
Gregory found only two other examples of the Gommittee pursuing
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the P.C.A. "s criticism of procedural guidance.
We can now invert our perspective on the P.C.A. "s response
towaras procedural guidance and ask the question, how does he
react to situations where officials reach decisions in breach of
their guidance? Frcm the survey it appeared that the P.C.A. was
undergoing a conversion in his attitude. An example of his
traditional response was contained in a report dealing with the
Inland Revenue. Under the Income Tax (Sub-Contractors in the
Construction Industry) Regulations 1975, introduced to deal with
the problem of tax evasion in that industry known as "the lump",
Inspectors were authorised to issue two types of tax exemption
certificates, general and specific ones. The P.C.A. discovered
that, " ... the Department's instructions tell Inspectors that
if a company is issued with a [specific] certificate but
strongly press for the issue of a [general] certificate the
papers should be referred to Head Office where the decision will
be reviewed.""''''"^ (emphasis mine.) Despite this guidance when
the complainants were issued with a specific certificate and
protested, their case was not referred upwards and the company
had to bring the dispute to the Head Office's notice via their
trade association. Subsequently they complained to the P.C.A.
and he concluded,
22^
"if Inspectors are given the power to exercise their
discretion there will inevitably be cases where, in similar
circumstances, their decisions will differ. This is one of
the reasons why the departmental instructions allcw for
reference to Head Office if an Inspector's decision is
strongly challenged ... I could only question such a
discretionary decision if I found that there was evidence of
maladministration in reaching it. I have found
none...". (emphasis mine.)
Apart from the obvious inconsistency between the Commissioner's
accounts of the requirements of the Department's guidance, he
was re-affirming his belief that breach of such provisions did
not constitute maladministration.
Yet a few months later Sir Cecil was approving a decision by
the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue to compensate
a taxpayer for professional advisor's costs incurred after an
Inspector had failed to observe an analogous piece of guidance.
In that complaint the taxpayer had been subject to a demand for
the payment of Capital Gains Tax on the proceeds of the sale of
his main dwellinghouse. In rare cases such as this,
"Departmental instructions provide that, where that section
[s.103(3) Capital Gains Thx Act 1979] may be invoked, cases of
doubt or difficulty should be referred to head office before
arrangements to list an appeal for hearing by the Commissioners
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are made." However, the particular Inspector failed to
follow the guidance and the taxpayer was obliged to employ a
Z4O
solicitor and counsel to present his appeal before the General
Commissioners. He succeeded, but the General Ccmmissioners had
no power to order the payment of his costs. When he asked the
Department directly for payment this was refused. Subsequently
he had the matter referred to the P.C.A. In his findings the
P.C.A. reported,
"The Deputy Chairman went on however to express his concern
about another aspect of the Inspector's handling of the
matter ... Had that instruction been carried out in this case
the Inspector would have been advised at a very much earlier
stage that the matter should not be pursued ... He concluded
that if the ccmplainant would provide the Department with
details of the unnecessary expenditure which he incurred
after [the date the Inspector should have referred case
upwards] they would offer to reimburse him for this."
Consequently the P.C.A. was acknowledging that breach of
procedural guidance amounted to an administrative error Wiich
might necessitate compensation, when he concluded that the above
offer was a "suitable outcome to a justified complaint". This
conclusion is hard to reconcile with his view expressed in the
previous case. Nevertheless in later reports the Commissioner
has consolidated his shift away from his earlier response, so
that he now appears to regard the failure to observe procedural
guidance as an act of maladministration. This was clearly
noticeable in the Customs compounding case where he stated, "I
find that the offer made to the ccmplainant was in accordance
with the officer's instructions and there is therefore no
question of maladministration in the form of failure to follow
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the administrative procedure laid down by the Department."
The Commissioner's conversion to the importance of officials
observing their guidance could also be detected in his comments
in a report involving amendments to the Crichel Down code where
he stressed, " ... clearly the Crichel Down rules must be
observed in this as in other such cases involving the disposal




The P.C.A.1 s response to this class of guidance has been
less controversial because of its respect for established
cons/titutional and administrative practices. For example, the
P.C.A. has accepted the legitimacy of departments creating and
utilising these provisions to guide individual decision-making.
He discovered that s.l of the Industrial Development Act 1956
gave the Secretary of State a discretion to pay grants towards
capital expenditure on "plant and machinery". The statute did
not define these terms so the Department, in association with
the Inland Revenue, developed their own interpretations which
became very refined. Wnen an application was received for a
grant towards the costs of constructing cold rocms, the
Department interpreted "plant and machinery" as only
encompassing insulation vdiich could be removed and transported
elsewhere. The complainant's company was refused its
application on the basis of this interpretation. The P.C.A.
concluded,
In applying this doctrine of separability the Department have
made fine distinctions between one type of insulation and
another ... my enquiries in this case ... have satisfied me
that it has been necessary for the Department, in exercising
their discretion under the Industrial Development Act, to
define precisely the types of machinery and plant qualifying
for grant, particularly on the borderline between plant and
buildings. And I have not found grounds which would justify
Z4Z
me in criticising them for doing so.^
Hence the P.C.A. was acknowledging the Department's need to
define an ambiguous statutory phrase in order to be able to
effect its duty of processing 150,000 applications per year.
Davis believes that this administrative requirement is universal
as, "no government in the world can or does operate without
administration, and an inescapable part of administration is to
give meaning to the law that the administrators are carrying
,, 117out....
Secondly, the P.C.A. has expressly restated the
constitutional orthodoxy that it is the function of the courts to
provide the ultimate interpretation of statutory language. A
person ccmplained that he had been refused a grant for drainage
work by his local authority, because of an interpretation of the
Housing Act 1969 prcmulgated by the D.o E.. The P.C.A. did not
criticise the Department's interpretation but noted,
"... this question of ownership in relation to grants remains
a difficult point of interpretation of the law. Only the
courts can give a definitive ruling following £j.^jgarticular
case, and no such case has yet ccme before them."
Although the P.C.A. has basically assigned the responsibility
for reviewing the substance of interpretative guidance to the
judiciary, the survey revealed that in an extreme case he was
still willing to criticise the content of this form of guidance.
A prisoner ccmplained that the Home Office were misinterpreting
the combined effects of s.49 Prison^ Act 1952 and s.60 Criminal
Justice Act 1967. Section 49 provided that where a prisoner was
unlawfully at large during any periodof his detention that time
was to be ignored in calculating the residue of his sentence,
whilst s.60 authorised the Hone Secretary to release prisoners on
licence (parole) where he thought fit and they had served at
least one third of their sentences. The P.C.A. discovered that
Home Office interpretative guidance stated that where prisoners
2,44-
had escaped and were subsequently re-captured, their Parole
Eligibility Dates (P.E.D.s) should be calculated by adding their
sentence to the time that they were unlawfully at large and
dividing by three. He concluded,
" It seems to me however that this method was a
misinterpretation of s.49 of the Prison Act 1952, and in
particular of the provision there that no account should be
taken of any time during vdiich the prisoner was absent frcm
the prison ... I suggested to the Department that in
computing the P.E.D. the proper method of calculation to
comply with the provisions of the Act, was to take one third
of only the number of days in a sentence, making allowances
for any overlap but taking no account of time at large; and
then ty^efer the date thus arrived at by the time spent at
In the light of the above findings the Home Office agreed
to amend their guidance to accord with the Commissioner's
interpretation and to review the P.E.D.s of all the prisoners
coming within the ambit of this guidance. So we learn that if
the Commissioner considers a piece of interpretative guidance to
contain a flagrant misinterpretation, he will recommend what he
believes to be the correct one and not wait for the matter to
run the gauntlet of judicial review.
The P.C.A. has concentrated his main energy on scrutinising
the development and application of interpretative guidance.
Regarding the former activity, one of the earliest reports
disclosed by the survey indicated that the Commissioner
considered that the test for the presence of maladministration
in the development of this class of guidance was the
thoroughness of the department's efforts in formulating the
provisions. The case involved the Customs and Excise's guidance
stating that ceiling tiles were liable to Purchase Tax, under
Schedule One Purchase Tax Act 1963. Before promulgating this
guidance the Etepartment had consulted the relevant trade
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association and members of the general business community.
Despite the complainant's protests they were subjected to the
tax on their tiles as a consequence of the above interpretation.
Four years later another company successfully challenged the
Department's view in the High Court. They then complained to
the P.C.A. about being governed by the discredited guidance for
that time. He rejected their protests saying,
"The test of maladministration is whether proper
consideration was given before the decision was made. As a
result of my investigation I am satisfied that the decision
to impose a tax charge on the panels was not taken lightly
and that the administrative processes leading to it were
appropriate and adequate."
This approach was again confirmed in the more recent case
centering on the Inland Revenue's interpretation of their
extra-statutory concession over ex-miners' free coal. The
Department interpreted the term "miner" in the concession
according to a definition agreed with the N.C.B.; and the P.C.A.
found no maladministration in the creation or application of
this piece of guidance."^
One apparent weakness in the P.C.A.'s scrutiny of the
formulation of interpretative guidance was his deference to the
opinions of departmental lawyers. This was vividly demonstrated
in an early case relating to the Post Office's changing
interpretations of radio licence conditions. Under the Wireless
Telegraphy Act 1949 the Postmaster General was given the power
to grant radio licences subject to conditions regulating their
use; he issued a licence for any number of radios used by
resident members of the licencee's household. According to
departmental lawyers these conditions did not cover children of
licencees away at boarding school; however, a generous
interpretation of Housemasters' households was allowed. In 1967
the lawyers changed their views and informed the Minister that a
strict interpretation of Housemasters' households should be
observed forthwith. This new piece of guidance was published as
an administrative memorandum, with the consequence that a large
public controversy arose. Subsequently the departmental lawyers
were presented with legal arguments that boarding school children
were legally resident in their parents' homes and therefore
covered by radio licences obtained by their parents. As a result
the Minister had to alter his Department's guidance yet again! A
boarding school Bursar complained to the P.C.A. about, inter
alia, the Post Office's alleged incompetence in promulgating
erroneous interpretations. But the P.C.A. dismissed this
complaint with the simple comment that, "the issue of circular
number 9/67 in April 1967 was a fully considered step, and rested
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on what was thought to be a firm legal basis." He thereby
avoided any assessment of the foundations for the lawyers'
changing advice, or their steps in formulating it. One
explanation for the P.C.A.'s cautious response may have been the
absence of legal expertise within his office. Stacey has noted,
"another unique feature of the Parliamentary Commissioner's
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office is that he does not have any lawyers on his staff."
However the appointment of Sir Cecil Clothier in 1979 seems to
have ushered in a new era as he was more willing to use his own
legal knowledge to challenge departmental lawyers'
interpretations (e.g. in the compounding case) and where
necessary to obtain Counsel's opinion on contentious legal
questions.
The final aspect of the P.C.A.'s response to this form of
guidance involves those circumstances where an official
misapplies his interpretative guidance. In another case dealing
with the Purchase Tax Act 1963 the Commissioner reported that
the Department had issued guidance stating that "hard soap and
soap substitutes" would be treated as falling outside of the
"toilet preparations" liable to the tax under Group 32 Schedule
1 of the Act. An individual proposed manufacturing a hand
cleaning pad, but before starting this venture he asked his
local Custcms office for a ruling on whether his product would
come within the above exemption. After referring his question
to their London headquarters they replied that his pad would be
covered by the exemption. On the strength of this answer the
individual invested £30,000 in production of the pad; however,
later that year two competitors who were liable to Purchase Tax
on their similar products protested to the Department. After
having all three products analysed by a chemist the Department
concluded that the individual's pads did not cane within the
concession. Subsequently he went into voluntary liquidation,
and complained to the Commissioner. He reported,
"I do not dispute the complainant's claim that he would not
have gone ahead with the manufacture or marketing of the
product if he had been given the correct information from
the outset and would thus have avoided the position whereby
his investment has failed. I therefore asked the Department
whether they were prepared to consider seme financial
compensation for the unavoidable, idep^fiable losses which
the company has suffered as a result."
The Department thereupon agreed to pay the ccmplainant
£6,000 as an ex-gratia compensatory payment. Thus the
Commissioner appears willing to hold that the erroneous
application of interpretative guidance is an act of
maladministration, which in appropriate circumstances justifies
the making of financial recompense.
Conclusion
As the institution of the P.C.A. has matured there
has been a gradual increase in the debate amongst commentators
about the lorm and strategic priorities of the office. Craig
has reduced these alternatives into three distinct conceptions
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of the desirable role of the P.C.A.. First the
traditional VJiyatt image of the Commissioner having, "... as his
main task the remedying of individual grievances caused by
127
neglect, bias, or inattention within the administration."
Secondly, the view ascribed to Bradley, that the Commissioner
o
should evolve into a form of "small claims administrative
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court". And finally, Harlow's suggestion that the P.C.A.
must assign priority to drawing, "... attention to lessons v^iich
should be learned from individual cases in order to improve
... . 129
administrative practice generally." If we seek to consider
which of the above conceptions the reports examined in this
chapter favour, difficulties are immediately encountered due to
the nature of administrative guidance. As has been noted before
a basic feature of guidance is its generality of coverage, hence
the guidance applies to everyone earning within its ambit.
Consequently when the P.C.A. makes any comments on the content
or application of a particular piece of guidance they are likely
to have an effect extending beyond the specific case under
investigation and therefore possibly be interpreted as
demonstrating the P.C.A.'s preference for the third conception
of his role.
In fact it is impossible to conclude that the responses
detailed in this chapter provide evidence that the P.C.A. gives
absolute priority to one of these roles. For example, it could
be argued that his responses to policy guidance support the
traditional idea of his office, because he has been primarily
interested in reviewing the application of this class of
2.44
guidance to individual complaints' cases and his Sachsenhausen
approach prevented him fran evaluating the substance of this
guidance. Furthermore the Commissioner indicated his
unwillingness to express a view on the question whether it was
generally desirable for departments to publish their policy
guidance by leaving the issue to the discretion of the
administrators. But the previous trends are counterbalanced
through the Commissioner's scrutiny of the process by which
interpretative guidance is created, and the content of
procedural guidance. This indicates an interest in
administrative practices and standards which are of collective
importance to all citizens and not just to the individual
complainant; a stance closer to Harlow's image than Whyatt's.
Therefore frcm the perspective of this dissertation, our
conclusions will be more positive if they focus upon the
P.C.A.'s underlying attitudes towards the various classes of
guidance. His most vigorous response has been directed at
procedural guidance where he has not only reviewed officials'
observance of it, but has criticised the procedures established
by several pieces of guidance and suggested amendments to them.
Clearly the Commissioner believed that this was the class of
guidance which he knew most about; consequently he did not defer
final judgment on the wisdom of procedural guidance to the
departments. However, both the P.C.A. and his Select Oommittee
acknowledged that the Executive (in practice Ministers and their
senior Civil Servants) had primary responsibility for the
formulation of policy guidance, subject only to the accepted
conventions of political accountability. In regard to
interpretative guidance the P.C.A. recognised the established
authority of the courts in the interpretation of legislation and
Z'SO
submitted to their definitive rulings on the validity of these
pieces of guidance.
Now we can turn our attention to the judicial reactions
towards administrative guidance and discover if they complement
or conflict with the Commissioner's responses. Thereafter we
shall be in a more enlightened position to determine if Craig's
fear, that the second conceptual model of the Commissioner's
role is likely to produce overlapping and antagonistic
130
jurisprudences, represents a realistic scenario for the
legal treatment of administrative guidance.
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In this chapter we shall be considering the extent
and nature of the judicial response to administrative
guidance. At the outset we can note both the modernity
and expanding scope of the relevant case law,with over
twenty five significant cases displaying administrative
guidance as an important element in the factual and
legal basis of the decision,of which fourteen were
decided after 1980 and eight between 1970-1980. We shall
be seeking to answer a number of inter-related questions
raised in earlier chapters of this thesis regarding the
legal status and consequences of administrative
guidance. These include:- the range of circumstances in
which departments can lawfully promulgate guidance;when
they can act upon such provisions;when guidance becomes
legally binding upon its promulgators;the circumstances
in which citizens can challenge the legality of guidance
either generally or in its specific application to
them;and whether the judiciary react differently to
guidance produced by various departments. Underlying our
critical exposition of the case law will be the desire
to ascertain the trends in judicial attitudes towards
page 1
guidance. How have they responded to the different
categories of guidance distinguished by this thesis, and
what legal doctrines have they applied or created to
provide the foundations in law for these responses?
Where have the judiciary drawn the balance between the
interests of departments and citizens in allowing the
former to create and apply guidance to individual
decisions affecting specific citizens? Finally,does the
case law reveal any significant omissions in the
reactions of the judiciary to administrative guidance?
In the light of the definition of administrative
1
guidance given earlier in this work it is necesary to
make a few comments on the scope of the ensuing case
law. Firstly,cases primarily revolving around delegated
legislation,eg.the Prison Rules 1964 made under the
authority of the Prison Act 1952 and considered by the
2
Court of Appeal in Becker v. Home Office ,fall outside
the ambit of our research. Similarly the developing body
of statutory Codes of Practice,such as those governing
police conduct made by the Home Secretary under s.67 of
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 also exceed
the limits of this work. For the same reason, that the
provisions are imbued with a "statutory" status (though
this will naturally vary acording to the terms of the
empowering Act), guidance which has been accorded a
special value in administrative decision-making by
legislation is also excluded from our deliberations,eg.
the guidance followed by the Board in R.v. Police
3
Complaints Board,ex p. Madden which they were obliged
page 2
"to have regard to" by s.3(8) Police Act 1976.
Turning now to the methodology adopted for the
discovery of relevant case law ( which was defined as
including both cases where guidance was a central aspect
of the factual and legal basis of the decision, together
with those cases which developed legal doctrines and
principles applicable to guidance eg. the refinement of
4
the British Oxygen approach to policy guidance
enunciated in v. Secretary of State for the
5
Environment,ex p. London Borough of Brent ) this task
faced the difficulty,noted previously in this work,of
the absence of a standard nomenclature for the
provisions we have called administrative guidance.
Therefore, it was not possible simply to look up the
words "administrative guidance" in the indexes of the
leading textbooks or the subject headings of the various
indices to the law reports. Instead the process was
undertaken by scrutinising the appropriate sections of
the textbooks ( eg.those dealing with the control of
discretionary powers through the doctrines of the non-
fettering principle or the prohibition against the
delegation of powers )to find references to cases coming
within the scope of our study. This source was
supplemented by a consideration of the few existing
articles touching upon guidance. The traditional methods
of legal research outlined above were augmented by the
use of the Lexis computer database in a later period of
C.
the research • This system offered a unique opportunity
to develop our own search patterns tailored to the
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discovery of cases involving guidance and freed from the
constraints,derived from the restricted scope of the
subject matter portions,of the published indices to the
law reports. Lexis revealed several important cases
7
including v. Lamb , C.P.A.G. v. Chief Adjudication
g
Officer , v. Secretary of State for the Home
9
Department,ex p. Hickling , L v. Secretary of State
1 0
for the Home Department,ex p. Anderson , and Williams
v. Home Office (No.2)^^ .
POLICY GUIDANCE
Before entering into our own examination of the
case law we must consider the work of previous
commentators so that our evaluation may be enlightened
by their analyses. The pioneering piece in this field
1 2
was Henry L. Molot's article published in 1972
This began with the premise that,
"the exercise of discretion and the capacity for policy
making often travel together. Lawyers do not always
notice the relationship because the influence of the
judicial process may have led them to believe the
shibboleths of the courts that decisions of policy are
for the legislature alone to enact."
He contemplated the ways in which the Canadian and
English courts had reacted to "tribunals" ( a term which
he used to include all public decision makers having the
authority to exercise discretionary powers ) creating
and using policy rules. Molot separated the courts'
reactions into (a) the scrutiny of the legality of the
policy rules and (b) their application of the non-
fettering principle to the particular tribunal's use of
such rules. He concluded that the English courts had
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been more tolerant of Ministers' utilization of policy
rules than where they had been adopted by licensing
tribunals or local authorities. Personally he advocated
a greater acceptance of these rules by the courts
because,
"...to encourage a tribunal to ignore its own past
experiences and the knowledge it has been accumulating
is far from efficient oy^ in tune with the idea of
administrative expertise."
1 5
In a subsequent article D.J.Galligan returned to
contemplate the English judicial attitude towards the,
"...process of adopting or developing guides by
generalising policies to give content to discretionary
power,which is constant from one decision to
another, [this] may be called "individuation" and tljig
guides that result "principles of individuation"."
After noting the growth of this tendency in many areas
of governmental activity (but without considering in
detail the reasons why this was occurring) and its
benefits , he sought to consider more closely the
jurisprudential ideas applied to these provisions.
Galligan was particularly interested in the possibility
that following the Court of Appeal's decision in Sagnata
1 7
Investments v. Norwich Corporation the judiciary might
begin to require an objective factual basis for
principles of individuation. Furthermore he devoted much
space to examining the implications of the House of
Lords' decision in the British Oxygen case in terms of
its refinement of the non-fettering principle in
relation to contemporary administrative practices. In
his view the modification of the principle was,
"...commendable both for its realism and its conceptual
attractiveness. It i realistic because it acknowledges
page 5
the inevitability of individuation in decision
making,where policy choices are made in advance but
modified and extended in the light of new circumstances.
The principle is attractive because it avoids the
conceptual difficulties of allowing policies but then
stipulating that they^gmust be just one factor to
consider in each case."
He concluded by expressing the hope that the judiciary
would promote the involvement of affected persons in the
creation of principles of individuation and their
subsequent widespread publication.
Without seeking to minimise the valuable
contributions that these commentators have made we
cannot simply accept their analyses of policy guidance
as the definitive contemporary statements on the
subject. This is because since the times of the
publication of these articles the courts have given
further consideration to guidance, and in addition there
are aspects of the judicial response which neither
commentator discussed,eg. the circumstances in which
departments may become legally bound by their own
guidance. Therefore,we must now conduct our own
examination of the case law testing both the consistency
and desirability of the judicial pronouncements,
together with the accuracy of the above commentators1
views.
(1) Direct and Indirect Challenges to the Legality
of Policy Guidance
The first theme in the case law that we shall
examine is the way in which the judiciary have dealt
with claims by individuals that particular pieces of
guidance were unlawful ( by which I mean arguments that
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the guidance was contrary to statute or common law rules
). These contentions have taken two legal forms,first
a direct challenge to the particular piece of guidance
and secondly an indirect challenge via the questioning
of a decision reached as a consequence of the
application of the relevant piece of guidance. For the
purposes of clarity both kinds of challenges will be
considered according to the type of illegality being
asserted by the plaintiff.
(a) Error of Law
A recent decision which provides a highly
significant indication of the most senior members of the
judiciary's attitudes towards direct challenges to
policy guidance on this ground is Gillick v. West
1 9
Norfolk Area Health Authority . In that case Mrs.
Gillick sought a declaration that a circular issued by
the D.H.S.S. to health authorities setting out central
government policy on the provision of family planning
services was unlawful. Mrs. Gillick based her claim of
illegality on three grounds,the most significant of
which was the violation of her parental rights over her
children. In a split decision the majority ( Lord
Fraser's speech was supported by Lord Scarman and Lord
Bridge agreed with both these speeches ) rejected each
of the plaintiff's grounds of alleged illegality. For
our purposes the most interesting aspect of the case was
the difference between the majority's willingness to
2 0
embrace such direct challenges to guidance. Both
Lords Fraser and Scarman took a generous view of the
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nature of the rights being asserted by the plaintiff and
classified them as private law ones. As Lord Scarman
noted,"Mrs. Gillick's action is essentially to protect
what she alleges to be her rights as a parent under
21
private law." Therefore they were willing to hold that
she fell outside Lord Diplock's exclusive rule
22
established in 0'Reilly v. Mackman . But Lord Bridge
disagreed,"if the claim is well founded,it must surely
lie in the field of public rather than private law. Mrs.
Gillick has no private right which she is in a position
2 3
to assert against the D.H.S.S.." Consequently Lord
Bridge's approach would subject a latter-day Gillick to
all the procedural hazards that Order 53 still entails (
Michael Beloff Q.C. has observed that the judiciary are
even now reluctant to grant discovery or order cross
examination during this form of proceedings to the
24
detriment of applicants ). However, underlying the
different perceptions of their Lordships over the
25
characteristics of public and private law rights there
appeared to be a more fundamental divergence of views as
to the desirability of the courts reviewing the legality
of policy guidance. Neither Lords Fraser or Scarman
expressed any reservations about such an activity, but
Lord Bridge did at length. He began by reaffirming,what
hopefully should be clearly established by now in this
thesis,that,"the issue by a department of government
with administrative responsibility in a particular field
of non-statutory guidance to subordinate authorities




modern administration." In his opinion,"the question
whether the advice tendered in such non-statutory
guidance is good or bad,reasonable or unreasonable
cannot,as a general rule,be subject to any form of
2 7
judicial review," with the exception, following the
2 8
Royal College of Nursing case ( which we shall
consider in detail when we discuss interpretative
guidance ),
"...that if a government department,in a field of
administration in which it exercises responsibility,
promulgates in a public document,albeit non-statutory in
form,advice which is erroneous in law, then the court,in
proceedings in appropriate form commenced by an
applicant or plaintiff who possesses the necessary locus
standi,has jurisdiction to correct the error of law by
an appropriate declaration. Such an extended
jurisdiction is no doubt a salutary and indeed a
necessary one in certain circumstances,as the Royal
College of Nursing case itself well illustrates. But the
occasions of a departmental non-statutory publication
raising,as in that case,a clearly defined issue of
law, unclouded by political,social or moral overtones,
will be rare. In cases where any proposition of law
implicit in a departmental advisory document is
interwoven with questions of social and ethical
controversy,the court should,in my opinion,exercise its
jurisdiction with the utmost restraint,confine itself to
deciding whether the proposition of law is erroneous and
avoid either expressing ex cathedra opinions in areas of
social and ethical controversy in which it has no claim
to speak with authority or proffering answers to
hypothetical questions 2<P^ law which do not strictly
arise for decision."
So Lord Bridge was advocating the view that the courts
should only allow direct challenges to policy guidance
on the grounds of error of law. But what would fall
within this chameleon concept was not explained by his
Lordship. In addition the above extract again raises the
spectre of Order 53 to deter prospective litigants in
the form,this time,of the uncertainties attatching to
the requirement of locus standi following the
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differences between the speeches of Lords Wilberforce
and Diplock in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. National
30
Federation of Self-Employed . The power that this
requirement allows the judiciary to exercise over the
outcome of challenges is graphically illustrated in our
next case.
Section 2 Finance Act 1969 imposed a new excise
duty on bookmakers and required them to pay it one year
in advance. As a result of lobbying the Chancellor of
the Exchequer announced,via a press release,an extra-
statutory concession regarding the duty that payment
would be accepted on a monthly basis. Two bookmakers
challenged the legality of the concession contained in
this piece of policy guidance in v. Commissioners of
31
Customs and Excise,ex p.Cooke and Stevenson on the
ground that it was contrary to statute law. Lord Parker
C.J. began his judgment by noting that,"...one
approaches this case on the basis,and I confess for my
part an alarming basis,that the word of the Minister is
3 2
outweighing the law of the land." However,he dismissed
the application on the finding that the applicants did
not have a sufficient interest in the matter to seek an
order of mandamus. Whilst we could criticise his
Lordship for failing to respond to a clear violation of
the rule of law by the Chancellor,his response may be
more explicable when we put it in the context of the
general judicial ambiguity towards such tax concessions.
As Williams observes," the U.K. judiciary has never
directly faced the question of the validity of
page 10
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concessions... They have,on a number of occasions,dealt
with such practices in passing,and comments have ranged
33
from condemnation to strongly favourable comment." It
may be that this judicial reluctance to criticise
unequivocally extra-statutory concessions for illegality
is motivated by their awareness of the fact that
Parliament tolerates them.
The next direct challenge to policy guidance that
we shall examine concerns the prison service. In 1974
the Home Office issued an internal circular setting out
the nature,purposes and details of a new form of
confinement for disruptive inmates called Special
Control Units. Prisoners were detained in these units
until they had completed two ninety day periods of good
vJ
behavior. The applicant had been incarcerated in such a
/\
unit at Wakefield prison and when he was released on
parole he sought a declaration that the circular
34
creating them was unlawful . His arguments were (a)the
Home Secretary had no statutory power to create
them, (b) their conditions violated the Bill of Rights
1688 by being a "cruel and uncommon" punishment, and
(c)his detention in the unit violated the rules of
natural justice. Tudor Evans J rejected each of these
propositions holding that s.12(1) Prison Act 1952 gave
the Home Secretary power to establish the Units.
Furthermore when,"judged by the standards of the English
prison system,I do not think that regime in the unit was
ii 3 5cruel. Finally,he considered that only a minimal
standard of procedural protection was required by
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natural justice in this context in that the Control Unit
Committee were obligedto consider the request to
transfer the plaintiff to the unit fairly and in
£ 36
ac^rdance with the prescribed criteria" and they had
done just that. Again it may be possible to explain this
refusal to accept a direct challenge to policy guidance
by reference to the wider context of the decision. As we
saw in Chapter One the judiciary, until very recently
and under pressure from the European Court and
Commission of Human Rights,have been very reluctant to
recognise prisoners as having justiciable rights and
Williams may have suffered a similar fate.
The last case involves an indirect challenge to
policy guidance on the grounds of illegality derived
from common law standards of criminal justice. In v.
37
Mason the appellant was asking the Criminal Court of
Appeal to grant him leave to appeal against a conviction
for burglary on the ground that the jury panel at his
trial had been subject to unlawful vetting by the
police. The court noted that the Attorney-General's
guidelines of 1974 distributed to chief constables
purported to regulate this activity. Lawton LJ refused
leave on the basis that the vetting had taken place
before the trial and therefore could not amount to a
"material irregularity in the course of the trial" as
required by the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.
Consequently,"...it is no part of our function to
criticise either the contents of [the Guidelines] or
the Attorney-General's statement entitled "Checks on
page 12
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Potential Jurors",which he issued in October 1978." So
the court seemed to be implying that it was not a
suitable forum for determining the legality or merits
of this practice despite the fact that historically the
common law has been the dominant force in shaping our
adversarial process of criminal justice.
To summarise our findings so far,we can note that
citizens have not been successful in challenging,either
directly or indirectly,policy guidance on the grounds
that its promulgators have misconstrued statutory or
common law rights. Furthermore if Lord Bridge's approach
i-n Gillick is followed by other judges,and we have seen
how the earlier court in Cooke manipulated the
procedural requirements of locus standi to defeat the
applicants' substantive claim,then virtually all direct
challenges will have to be brought via Order 53.
Consequently citizens will have to surmount the hazards
of, inter alia,time limits,locus standi,and evidential
<?
restrictions,which when aggregated will inevitably
increase the odds against successful challenges.
(b) Absence of an Evidential Basis for Policy Guidance
As we have already noted above Galligan believed
that the judiciary were willing to review the legality
of policy guidance on the basis that it was not
supported by objective evidence. In his own
words,"...one must consider the recent tendency of the
courts to penetrate areas of discretion by requiring
that policies themselves be supported by evidence of a




scrutiny. His major authority for this proposition
was the Sagnata case. There Norwich council had passed a
policy decision not to allow amusement machines within
the city as they believed these machines had undesirable
social effects on children. Subsequently the respondent
company sought a licence from the council under the
Betting,Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 to operate such
machines in the city. After an oral hearing before the
relevant committee the respondents were refused a
licence,inter alia,because of the council's policy. The
respondents appealed to the Quarter Sessions where the
recorder allowed their appeal on the grounds that the
committee had unlawfully fettered its discretion and he
was not bound to follow the committee's policy as he
had found no evidence to support it. The Court of Appeal
were only indirectly concerned with the actions of
the council as their task was to consider whether the
recorder had exceeded his jurisdiction. Edmund Davies
and Phillimore LJJ concluded that he had not erred in
law in reaching his conclusions. However, Lord Denning
MR dissented, stating that the recorder had
misunderstood the non-fettering principle and in failing
to apply the council's policy he had committed an error
of law because,
"...seeing that Parliament has entrusted the discretion
to the local authority, it must intend then that their
views should carry great weight. They are elected by the
people to to do all things proper^to be done for the
good administration of their city."
It can be argued that the primary issue of dispute
between Lord Denning and the majority was who should
page 14
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make the policy regarding licences for amusement
machines,with the former advocating the supremacy of the
council whilst the latter supported ultimate judicial
dominance. As Edmund Davies LJ stated,
"for my part,I cannot see how it is practicable in cases
such as the present for an appeal to Quarter Sessions to
be other than by way of a complete rehearing."
Whilst Phillimore LJ considered,
"no doubt speaking broadly local decisions are best
taken by local people,but if the local authority are to
be free from^ny form of check,justice and fair dealing
can suffer."
Consequently the issue of the factual basis of the
licensing policy was only a subordinate matter in the
reasoning of the judges and probably not part of the
43
ratio of the case. This view is supported by
subsequent academic comment and judicial consideration
of the decision. The writer who comes closest to
Galligan's interpretation of Sagnata is Craig who has
written:"to insist on the type of factual "backup" which
the majority appeared to demand in the Sagnata case
appears excessive."^ But even Craig is far from certain
that the decision unequivocally supports the evidential
basis requirement as his use of the term "appeared"
indicates. Others have tended to perceive the decision
as affirming variations of the non-fettering principle.
For example Beatson and Matthews state,"the implication
of the majority judgements in the Sagnata case is that
policies should not carry any more weight than any other
45relevant factor in a given case." Jowell in his
review of Lord Denning's contribution to administrative
law cites his Lordship's judgment in Sagnata (which was
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the one most favourable to the evidential basis
requirement) as an example of Denning's promotion of the
non-fettering requirement:
"the "fettering" principle,eagerly adopted by Lord
Denning in other cases,is close to his principle of
"genuine consideration" and related to the fairness
doctrine. Thus, a rigid policy against amusement a^gades
was held to be wrong in law (citing Sagnat-ar)
The Sagnata case has also been subjected to
subsequent judicial scrutiny and that too rejects the
evidential basis thesis. In R_^ v. Rochdale MBC,ex p.
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Cromer Ring Mill Ltd. the applicants sought a refund
of their rates from the respondent council. After having
received an interpretation of the legislation from their
treasurer the council refused a refund. Thereupon the
applicants' claimed,inter alia,that the council had
unlawfully fettered its discretion to pay refunds by
having regard to the treasurer's report. Forbes J
dismissed this part of the applicants' argument holding,
"I think Sagnata seems to cover this case. I cannot find
anything in the words of (the treasurer's report) which
go as far as the Court of Appeal in Sagnata. It seems to
me that what that case is saying, in essence, is that, if
the local authority applies a fixed policy in such a way
as to show that it left itself no discretion outside the
fixed policy, then that is not a proper way to
proceed."
So here we see the judiciary treating Sagnata as
authority for the non-fettering principle with no
mention of an evidential basis requirement for policies.
In conclusion Galligan was probably wrong to treat
Sagnata as establishing the firm foundations for a
factual basis obligation resting upon the promulgators
of policy guidance. And in the light of subsequent case
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law and academic comment it seems that such a basis for
challenging the legality of policy guidance does not in
fact exist.
(c) The Fettering of Decision-Making by Policy Guidance
A third basis for challenging the legality of
policy guidance is the claim that particular pieces of
guidance have the effect of,or have in fact resulted
in,the fettering of the exercise of discretionary
powers. According to de Smith the principle of the non-
fettering of discretionary powers means that,"a tribunal
entrusted with a discretion must not,by the adoption of
a fixed rule of policy,disable itself from exercising
,,49
its discretion in individual cases. In other words it
is impermissible for public bodies to pre-determine
their decisions in individual cases via preliminary
policy making where the effects of the policies are to
prevent a consideration of the merits of particular
cases ( Merchandise Transport Ltd. v. British Transport
5 0
Commission ) and/or exclude the possibility of
exceptions being made to the policies in the light of
the merits of specific cases ( A.G. ex rel. Tilley
51
v.Wandsworth LBC ). Policy guidance obviously falls
within the general scope of this prohibition because it
is one (albeit highly significant) manifestation of the
existence of policies in central departments. However,a
detailed consideration of the case law on this topic is
necessary in order to discover how the courts have
modified the non-fettering principle in its application
to the use of policy guidance by departments.
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Craig has observed that,"the extent to which a
public body is and ought to be able to adopt a
general policy,and the weight it should be entitled to
accord it,is one of the central questions within
52
administrative law." We can discern two major factors,
apart from the degree of flexibility of the policy
itself, which appear to be central to the courts' answer
to this question. First, the nature and subject matter
of the public body's discretionary power which is
regulated by the relevant policy. This is demonstrated
by the Tilley case where the applicant sought to
question the legality of the Council's policy decision
not to grant financial help (under the Children and
Young Persons Act 1 963) to families who were
intentionally homeless. Determining the policy to be
ultra vires Templeman LJ stated,
"...I am not myself persuaded that even a policy
resolution hedged around with exceptions would be
entirely free from attack. Dealing with children,the
discretion and powers of any authority must depend
entirely on the different circumstances of each child
before them for consideration."
Clearly he was unwilling to allow councils any degree of
freedom to predetermine decisions affecting children by
prior policy making. Because of the severity of this
approach in the face of actual council practices (eg. in
the field of education) his views may have to be
subjected to a restrictive reading based on the factual
context of the case; nevertheless they demonstrate how
the judiciary's acceptance of individual decision-making
governed by established policies is heavily influenced
by the subject matter of the discretionary power.
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Further support for the importance attatched to the
subject matter and the characteristics of the particular
discretionary power can be ascertained from the case of
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In re Findlay. There several prisoners challenged the
Home Secretary's new policy regarding the exercise of
his statutory discretion to grant parole to certain
categories of offenders. The applicants claimed, inter
alia,that the policy was unlawful as it fettered the
Secretary's discretion. Lord Scarman giving the opinion
of the House rejected this suggestion,along with the
applicants' other grounds,
"my Lords, I have no doubt that Tilley' s case was
correctly decided. And it may be,though I express no
opinion on the point, that the statutory duty in that
case admitted of no policy other than that every case
must be considered individually. But the duty of the
Secretary of State in this case is, as I have already
shown,a very complex one. Indeed,the complexities are
such that an approach base^ on a carefully formulated
policy could be said to be called for. There is, as I
understand the law,nothing ^^5 prevent such an
approach,where it is appropriate."
So where the power is considered a complex one ( by this
Lord Scarman appeared to mean one which involves the
need to balance a number of potentially conflicting
objectives-in that case deterrence,retribution and the
maintaining of public confidence in the criminal justice
system) the courts are more willing to tolerate the
generation of guiding policies.
The second dominant factor that is present in the
judiciary's calculus over the acceptability of policy
guided individual decision-making is the type of body
and form of administrative process being used to reach
individual determinations. For example the courts have
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tended to discourage licensing magistrates from
exercising their administrative power to regulate the
supply of alcohol in their localities by policies, in
favour of individualised ad hoc decision-making. In R_^
v. Rotherham Licensing Justices, ex p.Chapman^^ the
applicant successfully challenged a decision of the
magistrates made in pursuance of their policy not to
grant more than two "occasional licences" to one
organisation within a twelve month period. Lord Hewart
LCJ held,
"the rule itself,however,or the principle,if that word
be preferred seems plainly designed to prevent the
application of an unfettered judgment to the individual
case...That seems to me to be an abdication of the duty
of the justices impartially to consider upon the
particular Jg^cts the merits of each individual
application."
He considered that licensing magistrates should eschew
prior policy making. Perhaps this conclusion was
subconsciously influenced by the desire to discourage
the idea that members of the judiciary, at any
level,engaged in public policy making.
There are even dicta that tribunals should not
follow pre-ordained policies. In the Merchandise
Transport case Devlin LJ expressed the view that,
"...the tribunal may not in my opinion make rules which
prevent or excuse either itself or the licensing
authorities from examining each case on its merits...I
respectfully adopt what Jenkins LJ said on a similar
point in R_;_ v.Flint CC ex p.Barrett [1 957] 1A11 ER 122
a tribunal must not pursue consistegcy at the expense
of the merits of individual cases." "
However,the more frequently accepted standard governing
the use of policies by tribunals was enunciated in the




Ltd. . There the applicants disputed the legality of
the respondents' refusal to grant them permission to
construct a wharf because it was contrary to the
Authority's policy. Bankes LJ distinguished between,
"...cases where a tribunal in the honest exercise of its
discretion has adopted a policy,and,without refusing to
hear an applicant, intimates to him what its policy
is,and that after hearing him it will in accordance with
its policy decide against him,unless there is something
exceptional in his case. I think counsel for the
applicants would admit that,if the policy has been
adopted for reasons which the tribunal may legitimately
entertain,no objection could be taken to such a course.
On the other hand there are cases where a tribunal has
passed a rule,or come to a determination,not to hear any
application of a particular character by whomsoever
made. There is a distinction to be drawn between
these two classes."
On the facts of that case the Authority's policy fell
into the first category and consequently the ensuing
decision had not been unlawfully fettered. More
generally the Court of Appeal appeared to be much more
tolerant of policy-guided decisions being made by
tribunals (though they did not define the ambit of this
60*
term ) than the above decision regarding licensing
magistrates.
We may now consider how the courts have combined
the three variables (the flexibility of particular
policies;the nature and subject matter of the relevant
discretionary power;and the type of body making the
decision) to determine the extent to which central
departments can utilise policy guidance to govern their
processing of individual cases without violating the
non-fettering principle.




Minister of Labour ,the Minister had made a Statutory
Order (Essential Work Order 1942) which provided that if
specified categories of workers were dismissed for
misconduct they could appeal to local boards. If the
boards found in the workers' favour the local National
Service Officer,who was a member of the Minister's
department,had a statutory discretion to order re¬
instatement. The Minister issued policy guidance to the
Officers informing them that they should order re¬
instatement if the worker so desired. Here the
respondent company had indirectly challenged the
legality of this guidance by raising the successful
defence,to a prosecution for failing to re-instate a
worker,of the contention that the guidance unlawfully
fettered the discretion of the National Service Officer.
Lynskey J upheld this argument stating,
"in our view,the Minister cannot by instructions limit
the duties or limit the discretion of his National
Service Officer, but he must carry out his Orders,as
distinct from his instructions,and,under these
circumstances,in our view,the notice requiring re¬
instatement in,this case was invalid,and the appeal will
be dismissed."
Consequently the combination of a rigid piece of
guidance (viz. that successful appellants wishing to be
re-instated should always have their desire fulfilled)
and the,relatively unusual, fact that the statutory
discretion to order re-instatement was not vested in the
Minister,but in one of his named officials, meant that
the policy guidance had unlawfully fettered the
officer's discretion by unduly transgressing on his
freedom of decision-making. It may be hypothesised that
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the High Court took this strict line because the
granting of the statutory discretion to the
officer,rather than the Minister, was designed to
provide a decision insulated from possible political
influence and therefore the Minister's instruction was a
clear breach of this insulation. Let us now consider the
situation where guidance is given to ordinary
departmental officials.
6 3
In Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs
the government's policy on Scientology was at the heart
of the action. During 1968 the government declared that
in their opinion Scientology was "socially harmful" and
as a result,"foreign nationals already in the UK for
study at a Scientology establishment will not be granted
extensions of stay to continue these studies...".
Several Scientology students who had their applications
for extensions refused as a consequence of this policy
sought to challenge its legality,inter alia,on the
ground that it represented a fettering of the Home
Secretary's discretion. Lord Denning MR,whose judgment
was affirmed by Widgery LJ,cited the above extract from
Kynoch and said that this
"...shows that a tribunal may,in the honest exercise of
its discretion,adopt a policy,and announce it to those
concerned, so long as it is ready to listen to reasons
why,in an exceptional case,that policy should not be
applied. If such be the case with a tribunal, it is
certainly the case with the Home Secretary. ...He
must,therefore,be able to lay down general policy and
give guidance to his officers for their day to day
tasks."
Therefore,in his opinion,the Home Secretary had not
unlawfully fettered his discretion. The tone of this
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judgment is very conducive to departmental utilisation
of policy guidance and contrasts starkly with that in
Simms. Here it is made clear that Ministers can regulate
the decision-making of their civil servants by policy
guidance. Even where the policy is expressed in
mandatory and inflexible terms it appears acceptable;
indeed the ministerial policy in Schmidt's case
contained no express exceptions. The only restriction
on the use of policy guidance is that the decision¬
maker must be willing to make exceptions to the
application of the guidance in appropriate cases.
However, it must be acknowledged that the views of Lord
Denning and Widgery LJ on the legality of this guidance
were undoubtedly influenced by the nature of the Home
Secretary's underlying statutory discretion. According
to Lord Denning,
"the [Aliens Order 1953] thus gives to the Home
Secretary ample power either to refuse admission to an
alien or to grant him leave to enter for a limited
period,or to refuse to extend his stay...I think the
Minister can exercise his power for anyggurpose which he
considers to be for the public good..."
So again we see how the judiciary's determinations of
the legality of policy guidance involve a balancing of
the three factors outlined above. In contrast to the
statutory context in Simms case, the Minister here
personally possessed a wide statutory discretion which
entitled him to promulgate policy guidance containing a
fixed policy.
The most important case so far decided on the
legality of departmental use of policy guidance built
upon the decision in Schmidt without actually
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recognising the role the latter case played in
granting judicial recognition to this method of
decision-making. In British Oxygen Co Ltd. v. Minister
6 6
of Technology the appellants, inter alia, directly
challenged the lawfulness of the respondent's policy not
to make discretionary investment grants under the
Industrial Development Act 1966 in respect of items
costing less than £25. Lord Reid,whose speech was
concurred in by three other Lords,began by repeating
Bankes LJ dicta from Kynoch and continued,
"I see nothing wrong with that. But the circumstances in
which discretions are exercised vary enormously and that
passage cannot be applied literally in every case. The
general rule is that anyone who has to exercise a
statutory discretion must not "shut his ears to the
application" (to quote from Bankes LJ). I do not think
that there is any great difference between a policy and
a rule. There may be cases where an officer or authority
ought to listen to a substantial argument reasonably
presented urging a change of policy. What the authority
must not do is to refuse to listen at all. But a
Ministry or large authority may have had to deal already
with a multitude of similar applications and then they
will almost certainly have evolved a policy so precise
that it could well be called a rule. There can be no
objection to that provided the authority is always
willing to listen to anyone with something new to say-
of coursa._I do not mean to say there need be an oral
hearing."
As the respondent had complied with this obligation in
the processing of the appellants' application,the legal
challenge was defeated. At a more general level Lord
Reid's views are of great significance,as they represent
a tailoring of the non-fettering principle to the
realities of contemporary administrative processes as
67*
used by central departments . He was willing to allow
departments to develop policy guidance containing
precise rules and to use these provisions subsequently
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for the regulation of the exercise of discretionary
powers in individual cases. But how did he balance the
individual citizens' desire that their case be
determined on what they considered to be its merits with
the department's organisational objectives of uniformity
and certainty in the application of policy guidance? By
implication he was willing to tolerate the pre¬
determination of individual cases via the formulation
and application of policy guidance provided the
department was open to persuasion,on new grounds,that
its guidance should be changed. What his Lordship did
not express was the extent of the obligation on
departments to consider individual cases which on their
face appeared to fall foul of the relevant guidance.
Viscount Dilhorne,however,dealt with this point in
obiter dicta within his own speech. In his opinion,
"it seems somewhat pointless and a waste of time that
the [department] should have to consider applications
which are bound as a result of its policy decision to
fail. Representations cou]^ of course be made that the
policy should be changed."
But this approach is not so harsh as it might at first
seem because Viscount Dilhorne appeared to suggest that
departments utilising guidance were obliged to publish
its contents :"it was both reasonable and right that the
[department] should make known to those interested the
policy that it was going to follow.Consequently
those individuals who were likely to be excluded by the
terms of the relevant guidance were put on notice and
could decide whether they wished to make
representations that the policy be altered. Neither of
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their Lordships amplified upon the scope of this
procedural quid pro quo, that departments using policy
guidance must consider proposed alterations to it from
affected citizens,beyond Lord Reid's view that an oral
hearing need not be provided by the department. We must
therefore consider later judicial refinement of the
obligation.
The judiciary had to contemplate the meaning of the
duty to consider representations that established
policies should be amended in the case of R^_ v. Secretary
70of State for the Environment,ex p.Brent LBC . There the
incoming Conservative Government had announced that it
intended to reduce the level of local authority
expenditure and in pursuance of that policy objective
the Minister had discussed the issue with local
authorities. The Minister had informed the authorities
that he intended to seek a statutory power to reduce the
rates support grant of high spending authorities.
Subsequently Parliament granted him that power in ss.48-
50 Local Government,Planning and Land Act 1980. Once he
had obtained this power the Minister refused to
consider representations from particular authorities
that it should not be used with regard to them. Six
London boroughs who had their grants reduced sought to
have the cuts quashed on the ground,inter alia,that the
Minister had unlawfully fettered his discretion. Ackner
LJ concluded that the Minister had,
"...clearly decided to turn a deaf ear to any and all
representations to change the policy formulated by him
before he obtained his statutory power... In our
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judgment the Secretary of State was obliged to be ready
to listen to any objector who showed that he might have
something new to say... We accept that to be entitled to
be heard it was for the objector_to show that he had,or
might have,something new to say."
As the Minister had failed to comply with this
obligation his reduction of the authorities' grants was
quashed. For our purposes the most interesting aspects
of the judgment were the court's endorsement of the
restricted scope,acknowledged by the applicants,of Lord
Reid's duty upon decision-makers. These limitations
included (a)the Minister's freedom to observe the
declared policy, provided he remained open to persuasion
to change his views; (b) that he was not bound to hear
representations already made to him when he was
formulating his policy;(c) and that taking account of
the time already spent on past consultations,he could
fix a reasonable period within which new representations
must be made. In the context of decision-making governed
by policy guidance these factors indicate that the wider
the initial consultations departments engage in whilst
formulating these provisions , the fewer the
representations they need consider at the guidance
application stage. This inverse formula has much to
commend it both in terms of the promotion of public
participation in the creation of guidance and in the
encouragement of efficiency in the administrative
process. Though whether the individual citizen who was
not involved in such prior consultations and now has to
surmount the hurdle of establishing that "he might have
something new to say" before he can demand the right
page 28
that the department reconsider the application of their
policy guidance to his case is going to be equally
tolerant of this approach is another matter!
Finally,and very briefly,we can note indications
that the Scottish courts are also willing to accept the
legality of policy guidance governed decisions. In
Magistrates of Kilmarnock v. Secretary of State for
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Scotland the pursuers challenged the defender's policy
of not approving the appointment of Chief Constables who
had previously been serving in that force. The Secretary
of State had not embodied that policy in statutory
regulations as he could have done under the Police
(Scotland) Act 1956,but instead applied it as an
administrative policy. Lord Cameron upheld the
Secretary's actions because,
"I do not see how it could be maintained that, if an
administrative discretion is to be properly exercised in
recurrent instances,it should be improper,far less
illegal,for the authority exercising that discretion to
have regard to considerations of a general character
affecting that recurrent exercise,as well as particular
circumstances affecting the particular instance of itsexercise."
This approach is very similar to the Schmidt decision
and allows departments to use guidance without the fear
of being accused of fettering their discretion
We can now reach some general conclusions on how
the judiciary have tailored the non-fettering principle
to central departments' decision-making governed by
policy guidance. Provided that the discretion being
exercised does not deal with a topic which the courts
consider unsuitable for regulation by policies
(eg.childrens' needs as in Tilley),and that discretion
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is vested in the Minister not in a named official within
his department (Simms),the judiciary have been willing
to accept the legality of departments utilising guidance
containing precise and mandatory rules to determine the
exercise of discretionary powers in individual cases.
Two major conditions have been imposed by the judiciary
on the freedom of departments to use such guidance,first
they must be willing to make exceptions to their
policies where exceptional individual cases so demand
(Schmidt). Secondly they must consider the views of
affected citizens' who wish to suggest,on the basis of
novel grounds,that the department should change its
policies (British Oxygen); but following Brent, the
citizen has to satisfy the burden of establishing that
his representations are new ones. The above balance
is realistic in its weighing of the administration's and
citizens' legitimate interests. Departments are able to
operate administrative systems which take account of the
necessities of the bureaucratic form of organisation,
whilst affected individuals are protected by being able
to contend that their case should be treated as an
exception to the prevailing rules or that those policy
rules should be amended. However,that still leaves the
courts with a vital role in reviewing the observance of
this balance by departments. Because as Galligan
astutely observed,
"...the risk is that the requirement of considering each
case to determine whether an exception or modification
should be made,may be reduced to a mere formality,^
which the interested party himself plays no part."
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It is suggested that just as the judges scrutinised the
defendant's contention that she had acted on national
security grounds in Council of Civil Service Unions v.
carefully examine departments' claims that they have
complied with the above requirements. Finally,it is
pertinent to note the judicial pronouncements that the
corollary to departments basing their decision-making
upon policies is the publication of their contents (Lord
Denning in Schmidt and Viscount Dilhorne in British
Oxygen). Again it can be argued that the courts should
strictly enforce such an obligation, so that where a
department seeks to defend a decision made on the basis
of unpublished policy guidance the courts will strike it
down as the product of a fettered discretion,because in
those circumstances the affected individual can neither
make effective representations that his is an
exceptional case nor that the guidance should be
changed.
(d) The Unlawful Delegation of Discretion by Policy
Guidance
Where guidance unlawfully provides for the exercise
of a discretionary power by a person other than the
rightful donee it might,at first glance,be thought that
such guidance falls within the ambit of the category we
have termed procedural guidance (see the Prelude
preceding Chapter Five) as it is specifying the form of
the decision-making process. However, we shall be
examining examples of this guidance within our analsis
of policy guidance, because the case law indicates that
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Minister for the Civil Service
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so they should
commonly such guidance does not merely determine who
shall make the ultimate decision but also details the
criteria which govern the making of that decision.
Thus we may consider what factors have influenced the
judiciary in their response to complaints based on this
head of illegality.
7 6
In Jackson Stansfield and Sons v. Butterworth the
plaintiff was a builder who was suing for damages under
a contract he had performed to repair the defendant's
garage. The latter party contended that the contract was
void as there was no valid licence in existence for the
building work as required by Regulation 56A of the
Defence (General) Regulations 1939. The court discovered
that the Minister of Works had in fact delegated the
power to grant licences to local authority officers
subject to conditions laid down in unpublished
circulars. In this particular instance the relevant
officer had granted the plaintiff an oral licence. The
majority of the court concluded that such an oral
licence did not satisfy the requirements of the
Regulations,which they believed demanded a written one.
Furthermore,Scott LJ determined that the purported
licence was also invalid due to its origins as the
product of an unlawful delegation of power from the
Minister to local authorities. He stated his reasoning
thus,
"delegatus delegare non potest,but the intention to
delegate power and discretion to the local authorities
is clear. The method chosen was convenient and
desirable,but the powe^? so to legislate
was,unfortunately,not there."
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Hence his decision indicates that if a minister seeks to
pass on,by means of guidance, some of his statutory
functions to a person outside of those whom he can
lawfully delegate powers to any decision made as a
consequence of that guidance may be declared void by the
courts. Scott LJ even appeared willing to set aside
private legal relationships between individuals where
they were significantly influenced by the unlawful
guidance;thereby reminding us of Megarry's observation
that such provisions not only affect individual/state
relationships but also those between
7 8individuals/individuals . Perhaps Scott LJ1s strict
approach to the constitutional propriety of such
decision-making,which he also demonstrated in Blackpool
79
Corporation v. Locker , can be traced back to his
8 0
chairmanship of the Committee on Ministers' Powers
with its inherent concern about the alleged emergence of
administrative despotism (see Chapter One).
In H.Lavender and Son Ltd. v. Minister of Housing
81
and Local Government the applicants indirectly
challenged the defendant's policy on this ground by
questioning the validity of a decision made in pursuance
of it. The Minister had the statutory duty of
determining appeals against the refusal of planning
permission for specific developments by planning
authorities. Where the appeal related to mineral working
in certain categories of fertile agricultural land his
policy was to refuse the appeal "unless the Minister of
Agriculture,Fisheries and Food is not opposed to such
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working". Willis J upheld the applicants' contention,
saying "that means,as I think,that the Minister has by
his stated policy delegated to the Minister of
Agriculture the effective decision on any appeal within
the agricultural reservations where the latter objects
8 2
to the working." So Willis J was not willing in the
case of Ministers of the Crown to adopt an approach
analogous to the rule in the Interpretation Act 1978
whereby the powers of one Secretary of State may be
8 3
exercised by any other Secretary of State. Instead
each Minister could only exercise those powers conferred
on his own office.
Another case where the applicant indirectly
challenged policy guidance on the basis that it provided
for an unlawful delegation of power was v. Secretary
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of State for the Home Department ex p.Hickling . Under
rule 9(3) Prison Rules 1 964 (SI 1 964 No388) the Home
Secretary had a statutory discretion to permit women
prisoners to have their babies with them in prison. By a
non statutory Circular Instruction issued in 1983 he
provided that prison governors were to determine whether
prisoners could have their babies with them in special
prison units and that this power was subject to criteria
laid out in the Instruction. The applicant had
permission to keep her baby in such a unit with her
withdrawn by a governor in accordance with the above
guidance. She sought a declaration,inter alia,that the
governor had unlawfully terminated her permission and
that only the Home Secretary personally could reach such
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a decision. Sir Edward Eveleigh giving judgment for the
Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's arguments
because,
"it is not correct to treat this case as one where the
Secretary of State has delegated his authority to
terminate permission to be in a mother and baby unit. He
has himself laid down conditions which must be fulfilled
if a mother is to remain in the unit. The conditions
with which we are concerned in this case are so
straightforward that it must be right to a^low the
governor to decide if they are not being kept."
In other words he believed that where the junior
official was in a better position to apply guidance,due
to his factual knowledge of the particular case,compared
with that of the promulgator of the guidance then to
allow the junior official to make the ultimate decision
would not per se amount to an unlawful delegation of
power. On this basis,most delegations via guidance would
be lawful because those officials at the interface of
departmental/public contact, particularly where they
involve oral exchanges (eg.Customs Officers),are likely
to have a greater appreciation of the factual background
of the individual case than their superiors who have not
had direct contact with the relevant citizen. What is
surprising about the judgment is that it did not
expressly refute the applicant's claim that prison
governors could not be treated in law as the alter ego
of the Home Secretary, since in both constitutional and
organisational terms they must fall within that category
of civil servants who are so treated. Perhaps the
court's omission can be explained by the extempore
nature of its judgment.
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We can conclude that except where a particular
statute authorises the delegation of powers or a rule of
law allows it (eg. the rule providing for the inter-
changeability of Secretaries of State), the most
significant factor affecting the legality of delegations
is the relationship between the delegator and the
delegate. From the above case law, it seems that where
guidance purports to delegate power to a person outside
the department of the delegator (whether he be a fellow
Minister or local authority officer) the courts are far
more likely to quash any decision made in pursuance of
that guidance,than where the delegation is to a junior
official within the department. This appears to be a
manifestation of the exception to the non-delegation
rule that,according to de Smith,
"the courts have recognised that the duties imposed on
Ministers and the powers given to Ministers are normally
exercised under the authority of the Ministers by
responsible officials of the department. Public bus^gess
could not be carried on if that were not the case."
Such an approach is eminently sensible and realistic
when judged by the practices of the Secretary for State
for Scotland in delegating the routine processing of
student grants to territorial officers as disclosed in
Chapter Three. In such a context the policy guidance
both authorises individual officers to act in the
Secretary1s name and informs them of the norms they must
use to determine individual entitlements.
(2) Judicial Enforcement of Policy Guidance
There now seems to be an emerging body of case law
that provides the conceptual basis for the courts to
page 36
require departments to observe the contents of their
publicly promulgated policy guidance at the instigation
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of affected individuals. The case which established
the legal foundations of this requirement did not itself
deal with central government, but as we shall see its
ratio has subsequently been applied to departmental
8 8
guidance. Re Liverpool Taxi Owners' Association
concerned the statutory power of Liverpool council to
licence taxi cabs. In August 1971 the chairman of the
relevant sub-committee gave an official undertaking that
no more taxi licences would be granted until legislation
restricting the activities of mini-cabs in the city had
been obtained from Parliament. Five months later,and
without consulting the applicants,the council resiled
from that policy undertaking and purported to approve an
increase in taxi licences. The applicants sought orders
from the court to oblige the council to observe its
undertaking. Lord Denning MR invoked the public law
doctrine of "fairness" to demand,
"so long as the performance of the undertaking is
compatible with their public duty,they must honour it...
At any rate they ought not to depart from it except
after the most serious consideration and hearing what
the other party has to say;and then only if they are
satisfied that the overriding public interest requires
it. The public interest may be better served by
honouring their undertaking than by breaking it. This is
just such a case."
Apart from the situation where policy undertakings
purported unlawfully to delegate statutory powers to
another body his Lordship did not indicate where their
performance would be contrary to law. However,it is
implicit in the above extract that in the generality of
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situations Lord Denning believed that fairness required
public bodies to observe their declared policies. The
public body is given the freedom to depart from such
undertakings where exceptional factors so
necessitate,provided they have given individuals,who
have been relying on the undertaking,an opportunity to
be heard. Presumably such representations should be
allowed to encompass arguments that the policy ought
not to be changed,or if such a change is necessary,that
the new policy should not be applied to a particular
individual. Roskill LJ also invoked fairness to
determine the illegality of the council's actions:"it
seems to me, therefore, that now to allow the council to
resile from that undertaking without notice to and
representations from the applicants is to condone
unfairness in a case where the duty was to act
9 0
fairly." Sir Gordon Willmer agreed,that the council
were legally obliged to observe their undertaking,
without specifying the origins of this obligation or
citing any case law
As a backdrop to the Liverpool Taxi case it is
relevant to note Lord Denning's long campaign (in
91
decisions such as Robertson v. Minister of Pensions ,
92
Wells v. M.H.L.G. ,and Lever Finance Ltd. v.
93
Westminster City Council ) to transfer the private law
94
concept of estoppel into the realm of public law. This
has generally been resisted by his judicial colleagues
(see Megaw LJ in Western Fish Products Ltd. v. Penwith
95
District Council ) as inapplicable to the context of
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public decision-making. But fairness,which is a public
96
law concept ,appears more acceptable to the judiciary
even though it is capable of achieving the same results
as Lord Denning sought to obtain in earlier cases via
estoppel!
In the case of v. Secretary of State for the
97
Home Department, ex p.Khan the leading judgment of
Parker LJ was substantially based upon Lord Denning's
use of fairness in Liverpool Taxi and directly applied
the reasoning in that case to departmental policy
guidance. The applicant wished to obtain approval for
the immigration of his brother's son whom he intended to
adopt. He acted upon a piece of policy guidance in the
form of a circular letter issued by the respondent
which,inter alia,purportedly detailed the criteria
governing the Secretary of State's discretion to admit
such children. It later transpired that the Secretary
had decided to refuse entry clearance for the child on
the basis of other policy criteria. Consequently the
applicant sought to challenge the decision on the
grounds that the Secretary was bound by the criteria
articulated in his guidance. Parker LJ upheld this
contention:
"there can,however,be no doubt that the Secretary of
State has a duty to exercise his common law discretion
fairly. Furthermore,just as,in the Liverpool Taxi
case, the corporation was held not to be entitled to
resile from an undertaking and change its policy without
giving a fair hearing so,in principle,the Secretary of
State,if he undertakes to allow in persons if certain
conditions are satisfied,should not in my view be
entitled to resile from that undertaking without
affording interested persons a hearing andg^hen only if
the overriding public interest demands it."
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Dunn LJ reached a similar conclusion,but applying the
landmark case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses
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Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation he determined that the
Secretary's guidance specified the "relevant"
considerations regulating the discretion to admit
children for adoption. In his opinion,
"the cases cited by Parker LJ show that the Home
Secretary is under a duty to act fairly,and I agree that
what happened in this case was not only unfair but
unreasonable. Although the circular letter did not
create an estoppel,the Home Secretary set out therein
for the benefit of applicants the matters to be taken
into consideration,and then reached his decision on a
consideration which on his own showing was irrelevant.
In so doing in my judgment he misdirected himself
according ^OO own criteria and acted
unreasonably."
The dissentient,Watkins LJ,did not disagree with the
principles of law applied by his colleagues,but he
considered that the circular letter could not be read as
specifying the criteria governing the Secretary's
discretion.
The use of fairness by the court in Liverpool Taxi
and the majority in Khan to require the promulgators of
policy guidance to follow its terms in subsequent
decision-making affecting individuals is to be welcomed.
From the perspective of citizens it enables them to plan
their lives with a greater degree of certainty regarding
the likely response of central departments to their
chosen courses of action. This state of affairs,it can
be noted,is a fundamental requirement of contemporary
expositions of the "rule of Law" (eg.the writings of Lon
101L Fuller and the jurisprudence of the European Court
1 02
of Human Rights ). Furthermore the departmental
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obligation to observe guidance ensures that particular
individuals are not arbitarily discriminated against by
departments,or their officials,failing to correctly
adopted by Lord Denning and Parker LJ expressly
recognises the legitimate interests of departments in
being able to alter their policy guidance where the
public good (presumably as determined by the political
value judgments of the minister)so demands. Consequently
the fear which underpinned the judicial reluctance to
countenance the transferring of estoppel to the public
law realm,namely that of disabling public decision¬
makers from being capable of responding to altered
circumstances,does not arise under this formulation of
the requirements of fairness. Neither are those
individuals who have been relying on the earlier
guidance totally sacrificed to the needs of the new
policy era,because the department is obliged to consider
representations that their cases should still be
determined according to the former guidance. This
obligation placed on departments has echoes of the duty
to consider representations required by British Oxygen.
There is also a degree of symmetry about that decision
and Khan in that the former demonstrated clear judicial
acceptance of the organisational need for policy
guidance and the cost in terms of the reduction in
weight given to the merits of individual cases,whilst
the latter enables individuals to seek judicial





where the department is refusing to observe them.
Consequently both the promulgators and subjects of
guidance are in principle bound by its terms.
(3) Judicially Required Public Participation in the
Formulation of Policy Guidance
There is no direct case law dealing with the
important issue of whether policy guidance,or at least
the application of such provisions,can be challenged on
the ground that the public generally or a section
thereof were not consulted prior to the promulgation of
the guidance. By analogy Craig has suggested that Bates
103
v. Lord Hail sham is persuasive authority as to how
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the courts would respond to such a challenge. There a
group of solicitors challenged the making of a piece of
delegated legislation establishing a new basis for
calculating professional fees on the ground that the
defendant had violated a common law duty to consult all
solicitors. Megarry J dismissed their claim,
"let me accept that in the sphere of the so-called
quasi-judicial the rules of Natural Justice run,and that
in the administrative or executive field there is a
general duty of fairness. Nevertheless these
considerations do not seem to me to affect the process
of legislation,whether primary or delegated. Many of
those affected by delegated legislation,and affected
very substantially,are never consulted in the process of
enacting. nt±hat legislation;and yet they have no
remedy."
However,it may be that despite some factual similarities
to the scenario posed above this case is not so relevant
to policy guidance because of the different
constitutional context in which guidance is created
compared to that of delegated legislation. Megarry J
could well have been influenced in his judgment by the
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desire to prevent the courts from trespassing on the
sacred territory of parliamentary sovereignty,by
requiring additional procedures for the enactment of
statutory norms in cases where Parliament had not so
decreed. But such a consideration is inapplicable to
guidance as it is not statutory in character and
Parliament has no involvement in its creation.
Therefore,we may obtain a more realistic indication of
likely judicial responses from the case law on guidance
itself.
Some of the cases analysed previously contain dicta
that have a bearing on whether fairness could be invoked
to underpin a requirement for public participation in
the formulation of policy guidance. Lord Denning's
judgment in Liverpool Taxi (see above) could be read as
requiring a public body,which has announced a policy,to
hear representations on why the policy should not be
altered from individuals or groups who have been relying
upon it. Such a duty would not arise when the body first
developed a policy but only when it engaged in
revisions of that policy. This judgment may not in
practice establish a sufficiently firm foundation for a
general duty to consult because of the limited scope of
the policy at issue in that case,namely one primarily
affecting only taxi cab and mini cab operators. Where a
policy affects a far wider range of groups in society
(which much policy guidance will because of its national
coverage) the courts may well be less willing to impose
extensive consultation requirements on departments.
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Also the judgment of Ackner LJ in Brent L.B.C.
could be interpreted as providing an incentive for
departments to consult interested persons before
promulgating policy guidance which they intend to
utilise to govern discretionary decision-making. He held
that,
"the Secretary of State is under no obligation to listen
again to representations made to him when he was in the
process of formulating th^g policy,hence the reference
to "new representations"."
Consequently the more extensive the initial
consultations the less onerous need be the duty to hear
representations against the content of policy guidance
at the application stage.
Craig is a strong advocate of the imposition of
consultation obligations upon departments engaged in
guidance creation;"consultation is of such importance in
this area precisely because we feel that validation
through the standard political mechanism of the House
1 07
may be unworkable,inappropriate,or both." Furthermore
he believes consultation offers the advantages of
"instrumental" benefits (ie.the production of higher
quality guidance through the infusion of the ideas of
more groups and individuals), together with
"developmental" rewards (ie.personal self improvement)
for those who participate in the process of
1 08
consultation. Whatever the many advantages of
increasing the involvement of the public in the creation
of policy guidance there appears little evidence that
the judiciary are willing to generate a general duty to
consult. We should not be too critical of this failure
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when it is juxtaposed with the similar omission on the
part of the far more interventionist American Federal
judiciary noted in Chapter Four and also in Stewart's
major evaluation of the role of contemporary U.S.
There does not appear to be any detailed
consideration of this form of guidance in the British
academic literature,therefore our examination of the
case law will have to create its own framework of
analysis. We shall consider those issues revealed by the
cases to be the dominant factors in determining the
trends in judicial responses to this category of
guidance. However,as we will soon discover the questions
faced by the judiciary in their deliberations regarding
the legal significance of interpretative guidance are
not identical to those encountered in their
consideration of policy guidance. These differences can
be explained by the unique characteristics of the
distinct categories of guidance which inevitably affect
the legal status of particular types of guidance.
(1) Judicial Supremacy in the Interpretation of
Statutory Language
Undoubtedly the pivotal fact underlying the
judicial response to both indirect and direct challenges
to the legality of interpretative guidance has been the
judiciary's declared constitutional role as the ultimate
and supreme interpreters of statutory language (whether





Lord Reid said in Padfield v. Minister of
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Agriculture,Fisheries and Food ,"...the policy and
objects of the Act must be determined by construing the
Act as a whole,and construction is always a matter of
111
law for the court." Scarman LJ repeated this
sentiment in the context of interpretative guidance
112
during his judgment in H.T.V. v. Price Commission ,
"...the interpretation of legislative language remains a
question of law. It is,therefore,a matter for the
courts,unless their jurisdiction has been expressly
excluded. And it takes very clear language to exclude
the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court..."
Therefore it is not surprising to learn that the
dominant form of challenge to the legality of
interpretative guidance is the contention that the
department have misinterpreted the legislative will and
consequently the court should substitute its
interpretation for that contained in the guidance.
In v. Greater Birmingham Appeal Tribunal, ex
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p.Simper the applicant indirectly challenged an
interpretative rule of the Supplementary Benefits
Commission which had been applied by the respondent
tribunal. The rule provided an interpretation of
Schedule 2 of the Ministry of Social Security Act 1966
to require the automatic deduction of any exceptional
circumstances benefit awarded from the amount of a long
term supplement a claimant might become entitled to. The
applicant argued that Schedule 2 merely gave the
Commission a discretion to ensure that there was no
overlapping benefit^ being paid. Cusack J agreed with
the applicant's interpretation and quashed the
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tribunal's decision applying the Commission's guidance.
Indirect challenges can also be brought in relation
to guidance which purports to interpret delegated
legislation as the Scottish case of M' Lean v.
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Paterson demonstrated. The Scottish Milk Marketing
Scheme had the legal status of delegated legislation
made under the Agricultural Marketing Act 1931. If a
milk producer was not registered with the Scottish Milk
Marketing Board or exempt under s.13 of the Scheme as a
small producer,and he sold milk he committed a criminal
offence. The Board issued a circular defining small
producers as those who did not sell milk to more than
six neighbours in one day. The appellant,who was not a
registered producer,sold milk to twenty neighbours on
one particular day and he was convicted for so doing. He
appealed on the ground that the Board's guidance was
erroneous in law. Lord Wark rejected the Board's claim
that the guidance was merely an interpretation of the
Scheme,
"...it is, I think,evident that it is ultra vires,at
least so far as the limitation of the term "neighbours"
to six persons is concerned. Such a limitation appears
to me to be not an interpretation but an alteration of
the term and of the section. Moreover, I think
that the question of the interpretation .cif- the section
is one for the Court in the last resort."
Instead he concluded that the guidance was not an
exhaustive definition of small producers,but an
indication of the Board's view of who fell into that
category which could be supplemented in appropriate
cases by including other specific producers.
Therefore,the appellant's conviction solely on the basis
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of the guidance should be quashed. Whilst his Lordship's
strict attitude towards the Board's guidance may have
been motivated by the consideration that it was in
practice defining the ambit of criminal liability,the
case does illustrate how even guidance interpreting
delegated legislation can be brought within the scope of
judicial scrutiny.
Recently we have seen the House of Lords
countenance a direct challenge to interpretative
guidance in the Royal College of Nursing case (which has
already been referred to obliquely in our discussion of
policy guidance). There the College sought a declaration
that guidance issued by the D.H.S.S. stating that it was
lawful under the Abortion Act 1 967 for nurses to carry
out abortions via the induction procedure when acting
under the general direction of a qualified doctor was
wrong in law. Whilst their Lordships disagreed over the
correctness of the guidance (a majority of 3 to 2
considered it to be correct),not one of them questioned
the propriety of the action. However,in the Divisional
Court Woolf J considered that the College had locus
standi because it provided insurance for its members
(which would presumably be affected by the range of
duties they performed) and that nurses generally had an
interest in the guidance because they were employed by
bodies subject to supervision by the department (who
would therefore be likely to follow the guidance?).
Even though 0'Reilley had yet to be decided Woolf J
expressed the view that,"...in my view,it would have
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been much better if in this type of case proceedings
were brought by way of judicial review under RSC Ord
53,when[sic]the court has the same power to grant a
117declaration." He believed Ord 53 had the advantages
of (a) requiring leave to apply to be obtained
(obviously this is of benefit to the department not the
prospective challenger of guidance), (b) speed in
obtaining a determination of the legality of the
guidance,and (c)more generous locus standi requirements.
The views of Woolf J were taken up by Lord Bridge
in his speech (n the Gillick case (see above). His
Lordship was the only member of the House to devote much
attention to the propriety of direct challenges to the
legality of administrative guidance and, as we have
already noted,he wished to restrict the involvement of
the courts in reviewing these provisions. The whole
tenor of his speech was to limit judicial consideration
to "errors of law" (by which he appeared to mean
misconstructions of statutory and common law rules) and
avoid examining the reasonableness of guidance where it
dealt with questions of "social and ethical"
controversy. Consequently it may be hypothesised that if
Lord Bridge's views are followed by the courts in the
future the judiciary are likely to exercise their
important discretions under Ord 53 to deter direct
challenges to policy guidance,because the composition of
these provisions is primarily constructed of the types
of value judgments his Lordship wished to avoid having
to review. In contrast they will be more amenable to
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applications concerning interpretative guidance as their
contents are far closer to the pure questions of law
which his Lordship felt most secure in reviewing.
In practice the courts have already demonstrated a
greater readiness to question the substance of
interpretative guidance compared to their response to
policy guidance. As we have seen they substituted their
own interpretations of the "true" meanings of the
legislation in Simper, M'Lean,and only failed to do so
in Royal College by a majority of one. Whilst they
refused to overturn any of the policy guidance
questioned on the grounds of alleged error of law. We
can only conclude that the judiciary's assumed role as
the final arbiters on the meaning of statutory language
has placed them in a position of dominance with regard
to the content of interpretative guidance;whereas the
inverse is true of policy guidance because there the
judiciary have recognised that the donee of the
discretionary power should have the predominant role in
determining the way in which the power will be exercised
(eg.Schmidt and British Oxygen).
(2) Judicial Support for Departmental Use of
Interpretative Guidance
Although the cases discussed above indicate the
ultimate supremacy of the judiciary in the
interpretation of statutory language,the judges do not
appear to be averse to departments utilising
interpretative guidance,at least where the courts can
rule on its accuracy. In J&J Colman Ltd. v.
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Commissioners of Customs and Excise the appellants
had issued a "notice" informing importers of the
department's interpretation of the phrase "goods from
the Commonwealth preference area" found in s.2(2) Import
Duties Act 1968. The Court of Appeal agreed with the
respondents that this notice was too restrictive in its
scope,but Lord Denning MR stated whilst,
"the Customs authorities cannot,by these notices,make
the law or alter it. Their notices afford valuable
guidance to commercial men,because they show what
evidence will satisfy the Customs authorities. Parcels
which conform to them will pass without question. But
the notices are not conclusive. It is open to the owner
to dispute the matter before a referee or the. qcourt
under s.260 of the Customs and Excise Act,1952."
He appeared therefore to be implying approval of
interpretative guidance because of its potential value
in enabling individuals to determine the attitudes of
departments to questions of law and thereby plan their
actions accordingly.
Woolf J also expressed support for guidance in the
1 20
case of Crake v. Supplementary Benefits Commission ,
where the applicant challenged the respondents'
interpretation of the controversial concept of "co¬
habitation" found in Schedule 1 Supplementary Benefits
Act 1 976. He was not himself willing to provide an
authoritative definition of the concept; instead he
concluded,
"...I should say that there is a supplementary benefits
handbook which sets out guidance to claimants,and
that,very conveniently has a paragraph (paragraph 21 )
dealing with the problem as to when couples should be
treated as living together as husband and wife,and it
sets out no doubt what the tribunal were referring to as
the criteria. What they are,in fact,are admirable
signposts to help a tribunal,or indeed the commission,to
come to a decision whether in fact the parties should be
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regarded as being within the words "living together as
husband and wife" ... it appears to me that tlji^ approach
indicated in the handbook cannot be faulted."
The views of Woolf J are not only interesting because
they demonstrate a member of the judiciary praising the
content of departmental interpretative guidance (we can
note how the guidance in this instance was a paradigm
example of the fact that all guidance is not composed of
precise rules,see Chapter One,but here contained five
factors which could be considered according to the
particulars of each case in order to help reach a
conclusion whether the claimant was a co-habitee). Woolf
J's dicta are also of significance because they indicate
that he thought the use of interpretative guidance in
departmental decision-making was helpful. Unfortunately
he did not explain what this help consisted of,but it
may well have been in the promotion of consistency in
determining individual claimants' entitlements when one
takes account of the background to this case (ie. public
disquiet about the methods and criteria being used to
reach decisions on the status of claimants by different
local offices). These two cases reveal judicial
encouragement for the utilisation of publicly
promulgated interpretative guidance by departments. The
judges appear to have considered the beneficial aspects
of such a form of decision-making to be both internal
(ie. to help improve the quality of officials'
determinations) and external (ie.enabling individuals to
comprehend the department's interpretation of statutory
provisions).
page 52
(3) The Imbuing of Interpretative Guidance with
Legal Effects
Going beyond mere support for departmental usage of
guidance,there are dicta which suggest a willingness on
the part of some members of the judiciary to infuse
acceptable interpretative guidance (ie.those pieces
which the courts consider do not demonstrate an error of
law) with a degree of legal effect. As a consequence
such guidance must be taken into account by the relevant
decision-maker and a failure to do so may result in the
quashing of any individual determination made without
regard to the guidance. Two legal doctrines,which we
have already encountered,have been used to achieve this
requirement. First, the doctrine of relevant
considerations as articulated in the Wednesbury case.
Scarman LJ invoked this doctrine to oblige a local
authority to pay heed to interpretative guidance issued
1 22
by a department in Bristol District Council v. Clark
The council purported to exercise its statutory powers
under the Housing Act 1957 to evict the respondent from
his council house for rent arrears. He claimed that the
decision was ultra vires due to the council's failure to
consider the purposes of their statutory powers as set
out in the department's circulars. The learned Lord
Justice held,
"I do not think it possible to rely on those circulars
as imposing any direct statutory duty on a housing
authority;but I think they are a good indication as to
the purposes to be served by the Housing Acts and as to
what are relevant matters within the language of Lord
Greene MR in the Wednesbury case to be taken into
account by a local authority serving to quit on
a council tenant in arrears of rent."
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However,he found that the council had in fact considered
all relevant matters and so he decided in favour of the
council. Scarman LJ1s resort to the doctrine of relevant
considerations is almost identical to the later judgment
of Dunn LJ in Khan's case, where the latter demanded
that the Home Office observe its policy guidance. One
may,therefore,deduce that both Lord*, Justices placed a
significant emphasis on decision-makers paying attention
to relevant guidance (even if it was not produced by the
actual decision-maker as in Clark) whether it be of the
policy or interpretative variety.
The second doctrine which has been invoked is that
of "fairness" and this has been deployed in the slightly
different factual context of requiring the promulgator
of interpretative guidance to continue applying that
guidance in subsequent decision-making. In H.T.V.
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v.Price Commission the applicants claimed that the
Commission had unlawfully changed their interpretation
of the phrase "total costs per unit of output" as found
in the statutory Price Code (made under the Counter
Inflation Act 1973). Up until 1975 the Commission had
interpreted(the report does not elucidate whether this
interpretation was formally promulgated, but it was
certainly known by the companies)the Exchequer Levy
charged to independent television companies as a cost,
but then they decided that it should no longer be
classified as such. Lord Denning MR considered that the
Commission's statutory powers meant that they bore major
responsibility for interpreting the Code,we should note
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that generally departments do not possess a similar
authority with regard to their legislative powers. He
then extended the substantive effects of the fairness
doctrine,which as we have seen he had first expounded in
the Liverpool Taxi case,to demand of the Commisssion
"...if they regularly interpret the words of the Code in
a particular way-they should continue to interpret it
and apply it in the same way thereafter unless there is
some good cause for departing from it. ...It cannot be
estopped from doing its public duty. But that is subject
to the qualification that it must not misuse its
powers :and it is a misuse of power for it to act
unfairly or unjustly towards a private citizen where
ther^^is no overriding public interest to warrant
11.
Consequently his Lordship determined that the Commission
were bound by their earlier interpretation of the Code.
Scarman LJ differed in his perception of the
Commission's powers because he considered that it was
for the courts to interpret the Code.
"However obscure the jargon,it is the language used or
approved by Parli ment,itself a representative non¬
technical body. If Parliment uses it,the courts must be
prepared to give it meaning:and tjh,:^s in the ultimate is
a legal,not a technical process."
On that footing he reached an interpretation similar to
the Commission's earlier view of the Code. However,as a
secondary basis for his decision he stated,
"if therefore, the meaning of the term "total cost per
unit of output" is for the Commission,not the courts,to
determine,the Commission cannot now say the Exchequer
Levy is not a cost included in the term without laying
themselves open to the criticism that they are acting
inconsistently in the same subject matter. But
inconsistency is not27necessarily unfair. Is this
inconsistency unfair?"
His answer was that it would be unfair because of,inter
alia,the consequent erosion of the companies profit
that
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margins. Goff LJ agreed with the applicants' contention
on the grounds of both judicial interpretation and the
requirements of fairness.
The above judgments indicate the willingness of the
judiciary,in appropriate circumstances,to oblige public
bodies to follow their own interpretations. The
difference between them depends on how one calculates
whether in a specific instance fairness requires the
observance of a declared interpretation. Lord Denning
would demand observance "unless there is good cause for
departing from it" ; whilst Scarman LJ appeared to leave
the question for individual ad hoc determination
according to the circumstances of each instance. To the
extent that Lord Denning's phraseology is slightly more
favourable to consistency it may be given our support.
The House of Lords considered the H.T.V. case in
their decision on R^ v. Inland Revenue Commissioners,ex
12 8
p.Preston and proposed a third formulation of the
test for when fairness necessitates consistency in
official actions. Preston claimed that an inspector in
the special investigations section of the Revenue had
undertaken,on behalf of the department,not to continue
an investigation into the taxpayer's affairs in
consequence of the taxpayer agreeing to withdraw claims
for certain tax allowances. Four years later another
inspector sought to re-assess the taxpayer's liabilities
for share dealings that had occurred in the earlier
period. The taxpayer requested a declaration that the
Revenue's conduct was unlawful due to its violation of
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the requirements of fairness. Lord Templeman gave the
opinion of the House (in which Lord Scarman concurred)
holding that,
"...the H.T.V. case and the authorities there cited
suggest that the commissioners are guilty of
"unfairness" amounting to an abuse of power if by taking
action under s.460[of the Income and Corporation Taxes
Act 1970] their conduct would,in the case of an
authority other than Crown authority,entitle the
appellant to an injunction or damages based on breach of
contract or estoppel by representation. In principle I
see no reason why the appellant should not be entitled
to judicial review of a decision taken by the
commissioners if that decision is unfair to the
appellant because the conduct of the commissioners is
equivalent *-°i29 a breach of contract or
representation."
But on the facts of this case he could not find such a
representation made by an official of the
Revenue,therefore the taxpayer's claim was dismissed.
From our standpoint what is fascinating about Lord
Templeman's opinion is his reformulation of the criteria
for determining when inconsistency between initial
statements by a department and subsequent actions will
be held to amount to illegal unfairness. He equated this
calculation with the private law concepts of breach of
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contract and estoppel . Whilst this may be a sensible
attitude towards situations where there is a proximate
relationship between the citizen and the department
reflected in personal assurances given to the citizen,it
may be less applicable to instances where the citizen is
seeking to rely on impersonal representations contained
in interpretative guidance. Furthermore,the onus is
placed on the citizen to demonstrate that the
department's conduct amounts to a hypothetical breach of
contract or estoppel,whereas under Lord Denning's test
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in H.T. V. once the citizen has established that the
public body normally follows a particular interpretation
it is up to that body to prove that it has "good cause"
for departing from that interpretation. Taking these
factors into account we can suggest that Lord Denning's
test is the most appropriate one for determining when
departments are legally required to follow their own
interpretative guidance.
Procedural Guidance
The only commentator who has directly considered
the legal significance in the U.K. of procedural
1 31
guidance is Jergesen . He concluded that,"in Britain
judges operate on the edges of a system that is for the
1 32
most part the responsibility of others..." . The
institutions that he believed played a more central role
in enforcing procedural guidance were the P.C.A. (see
Chapter Five for our study) and the Council on
1 33
Tribunals . The general judicial perception of such
provisions was,in his opinion,that,
"the power of government agencies to run themselves is
thought to be an inherent one,existing independently of
statute. ...Internal procedures are normally published
as departmental circulars or orders to
subordinates,elucidating the steps to be taken by agency
personnel in dealing with matters within their
competence. Their violation is solely a^^natter for the
internal discipline of the department."
We shall now consider whether his conclusions regarding
the limited cognisance which the judiciary have given to
procedural guidance are an accurate reflection of the
contemporary trends in the case law.
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(1) Judicial Scrutiny of the Contents of Procedural
Guidance
One area of administration where there has been an
undoubted increase in the willingness of the judiciary
to examine and where necessary condemn the substance of
this type of guidance is that of prison management.
Beginning with R_;_ v. Hull Prison Board of Visitors,ex p.
1 35
St. Germain the courts started to reverse their
earlier reluctance to become invoved in prisoners'
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grievances (eg. displayed in Arbon v. Anderson ).
There eight prisoners challenged the legality of
"awards" (ie.punishments) imposed on them by the Board
arguing that the disciplinary procedure had violated the
minimum standards required by natural justice and
fairness. On the preliminary question of whether it had
a supervisory jurisdiction over the Board the Court of
Appeal concluded that it did. One factor which helped
the court in reaching that conclusion was a piece of
guidance issued to prisoners facing a hearing before a
board of visitors. According to Megaw LJ,
"Form 1145 is not, as I understand it, a form which has
statutory authority;but no doubt it has the approval of
the Secretary of State. It sets out in simple language
the procedure which the prisoner can expect to be
followed when he appears before the board of visitoy|^
...This,to my mind points to a judicial proceedings."
Consequently he determined that the Board was amenable
to judicial review via the prerogative orders. In
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St.Germain (No2) the Court of Appeal found that the
Board's procedure had "substantially" infringed the
requirements of fairness by preventing all the
prisoners' attempts to cross examine the sources of
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hearsay evidence admitted by the Board. Therefore,most
of the Board's awards were quashed. To the extent that
the Board were following the procedure detailed in the
Home Secretary's guidance,the court's criticisms of
their proceedings can also be regarded as an implied
castigation of the contents of that guidance.
The House of Lords were faced with the intricacies
of the prison administrative system in Raymond v.
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Honey . The respondent prisoner had sent a letter to
his solicitor containing an allegation against a prison
official and in accordance with departmental
instructions it had been stopped. Thereupon the
respondent sent a letter to the courts seeking to have
the appellant governor committed for contempt of court
because of his interference with the respondent's legal
communications. The governor then stopped the letter to
the courts and this action for contempt arose out of
that act of censorship. Before the House the governor
argued that his actions were authorised by the Prison
Rules (Rule 34(8) stated that prisoners were not allowed
to communicate with any person in connection with legal
business except with the leave of the Home Secretary)
and by procedural guidance in the form of Standing
Orders (Order 29 provided that prisoners were not
allowed to bring court proceedings against officers
until they had exhausted prior internal grievance
procedures). Lord Wilberforce considered that there were
two legal principles which applied in this situation.
"First,any act done which is calculated to obstruct or
interfere with the due course of justice,or the lawful
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process of the courts,is a contempt of court.
... Secondly,under English law,a convicted prisoner,in
spite of his imprisonment,retains all civil rights which
are not taJ^p away expressly or by necessaryimplication."
He then assessed the department's instructions to the
governor in the light of these principles.
"In my opinion, there is nothing in the Prison Act 1952
that confers power to make regulations [sic] which would
deny,or interfere with,the right of the respondent,as a
prisoner,to have unimpeded access to a court. ...The
regulations [sic] themselves must be interpreted
accordingly otherwise they would be ultra vires... The
standing orders,if they have any legislative force at
all cannot cjp|i^er any greater powers than the
regulations..."
Consequently he determined that the governor's actions
per se were unlawful as they amounted to a contempt of
court. Lord Bridge took a more critical view of the
Prison Rules than Lord Wilberforce,because in the
former's eyes,
"this rule-making power is manifestly insufficient for
such a purpose and it follows that the rules, to the
extent that they would fetter a prisoner's right of
access to the courts,and in particular his ripjxj: to
institute proceedings in person,are ultra vires."
So he was willing to find both the Governor's actions
and the statutory rules purporting to authorise those
acts unlawful.
Whilst this decision again reveals the emerging
intervention of the judiciary on behalf of prisoners it
also graphically illustrates a conflict between the
judges as to the degree of probing they will undertake
of the hierarchy of statutory and non-statutory norms
regulating prisoners' rights. Consequently their
Lordships' decision produced the absurd and unjust
result that the governor was found to be acting in an
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unlawful manner by correctly following procedural
guidance,in the guise of Standing Orders,and none of
their Lordships was willing to venture a word of
criticism of that guidance!
In v. Secretary of State for the Home
1 43
Department,ex p.Anderson the High Court demonstrated
that it had overcome the House of Lords' reluctance to
question the legality of procedural guidance. The
applicant,who was another prisoner,claimed that he had
been unlawfully denied the right to consult a solicitor.
The assistant governor of his prison had refused to let
him be visited by a representative of his solicitor,
because he had not initiated any internal grievance
about the matter he wished to obtain legal advice on.
According to Standing Order 5A(34) prisoners were only
allowed such meetings where the prisoner had already
ventilated such a grievance (this so called simultaneous
ventilation rule had replaced the prior ventilation rule
operating in Honey' s case due to the European
•fs
Commission of Human Right's decision in the case of
1 44
Silver v. U.K. ). Robert Goff LJ,giving judgment for
the court,applied Lord Wilberforce's principles in the
following manner;
"it must,we consider,be inherent in the logic of the
decision [in Honey] that an inmate's right of access to
a solicitor for the purposes of obtaining advice and
assistance with a view to instituting proceedings should
be unimpeded, in the same way as his right to initiate
proceedings by dispatching the necessary documents for
that purpose by post is unimpeded. ...As it seems to
us, a requirement that an inmate should make such a
complaint as a prerequisite of his having access to his
solicitor,however desirable it may be in the interests
of good administration,goes beyond the regulation of the
circumstances in which such access may take place,and
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does indeed constitute an ^pediment to his right of
access to the civil courts."
Therefore,the court granted a declaration that,inter
alia,Standing Order 5A(34) was ultra vires. This
decision is to be commended for the manner in which the
court faced up to the reality of the administrative
system operating in the prison service and did not
treat the assistant governor's action as an isolated
event, but had regard to the legality of the procedural
guidance which was the foundation of his conduct. As a
result he was not personally subject to judicial censure
for observing the guidance issued to him by his
departmental superiors and the offending piece of
guidance was in essence destroyed by the declaration
thereby preventing its future application to other
prisoners' requests.
These cases clearly show judicial scrutiny of
procedural guidance in this area of central government
administration growing in scope and severity. The
judiciary have invoked the,by now familiar,concepts of
natural justice and fairness to provide the benchmarks
for their evaluations. In addition the somewhat nebulous
notion of citizens' "civil rights" has also been
resorted to by the judges as a measurement of the
legality of these provisions (whatever its precise
contents this requirement is likely to be classified as
a public law right and therefore normally enforceable
only via Order 53,as happened in Anderson). We can
speculate that a major motivation behind this judicial
trend has been the decisions of the European Court and
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Commission for Human Rights in the series of cases
brought before them by British prisoners (see Chapter
One). Even though those decisions are not binding
precedents upon our domestic courts they vividly
demonstrated how the earlier judicial response was
lagging far behind contemporary international standards
of basic human rights and may well have stimulated our
judiciary to provide a more effective domestic remedy
1 46
for similar complainants . Furthermore the European
cases increased the knowledge of domestic commentators
and practitioners about the nature of the complex regime
of norms governing prison administration thereby
facilitating legal actions in our own courts. There does
not appear to be any a priori reason why an analogous
form of scrutiny should not be extended to other pieces
of procedural guidance (the Customs and Excise guidance
on compounding procedures would be ideally suited to
evaluation in terms of the requirements of fairness and
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elementary criminal procedure ). However,such a
development is in practice dependent upon public
awareness of the existence of guidance and the
willingness of the judiciary to counte nance such
actions.
(2) Judicial Enforcement of Procedural Guidance
The converse of the judicial trend examined above
occurs where courts intervene,to require departments to
observe their published procedural guidance,or at least
determine decisions made in violation of those
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procedures to be unlawful. This development in the
judicial response to guidance is of very recent origin
and really only entered our domestic law in 1984. Prior
to that time there does not appear to have been any
distinct legal principle demanding the observance of
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such guidance,as the case of R_;_ v. Lamb demonstrated.
There the Home Office had issued guidance in the form of
a circular (No.109/1978) setting out the procedure which
the police should follow when using photographs to help
witnesses identify criminal suspects. That guidance had
been ignored in the investigation of the appellant's
alleged criminal behaviour and subsequently he had been
convicted on the basis of evidence derived from visual
witnesses. The Court of Appeal quashed his conviction on
the ground that it was unsafe but Lawton LJ observed,
"[counsel] has not suggested that the mere fact that
there was a breach of a paragraph in the Home Office
circular,entitles the appellant to have his conviction
quashed. He puts his case on a more sensible basis. He
says that the fact that there was a breach, is a factor
which has to be taken into account by this court when
deciding whethejp^g the verdict is either unsafe or
unsatisfactory."
So the court's evaluation of this breach was undertaken
without the benefit of any explicit legal framework
establishing when it is desirable that public officials
should observe procedural guidance-even where the
procedure is designed to protect the reputation and
possibly the liberty of individuals. Perhaps this
failure was due to the limited exposure of the criminal
courts to procedural guidance (if so their experience is
likely to be even less in the future now similar
provisions are embodied in the statutory Codes issued
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under the P.A.C.E. Act). Consequently we should look to
the civil courts as the dominant forum for the
elaboration of relevant principles.
It was the Privy Council,in the first instance,
which directly confronted the question of whether there
were circumstances where the common law required the
observance of procedural guidance by the promulgating
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department. In A.G. of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu the
respondent challenged a deportation order made against
him by the Government of Hong Kong on the ground that he
had not received a fair hearing prior to the order being
made. His basis for arguing that he was entitled to a
hearing satisfying the demands of fairness was that he
had a "legitimate expectation" of such a hearing. This
expectation,he claimed,had its origins in a statement
read out to a group of protesting individuals by a civil
servant in which the Government pledged to accord
interviews to all illegal immigrants from Macaou before
deciding whether to deport them. The Privy Council
accepted his contention and held,in the words of Lord
Fraser,
"in the opinion of their Lordships the principle that a
public authority is bound by its undertakings as to the
procedure it will follow,provided they do not conflict
with its duty, is aiy^licable to the undertaking given by
the Government..."
Their reasoning was that,
"...when a public authority has promised to follow a
certain procedure,it is in the interests of good
administration that it should act fairly and should
implement its promise,so long as implementation does not
interfere with its stautory duty. The principle is also
justified by the further consideration that,when the
promise was made,the authority must have considered that
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it would be assisted in discharging its duty fairly by
any representations from int^^sted parties and as a
general rule that is correct."
Consequently the Privy Council was attaching legal
effects to a procedural undertaking that was addressed,
again note how guidance can be disseminated in a variety
of informal ways, generally to a section of the
population,rather than to the respondent personally. The
nature of those effects can be interpreted on two
levels.
At the most specific level the decision can be
said to demonstrate the judiciary treating procedural
guidance which provides for a hearing to be given to
individuals prior to a determination affecting them as
creating a legitimate expectation of the opportunity to
be heard which will allow those individuals to challenge
any subsequent decision reached without a hearing.
Secondly,and at a more general level,the opinion can be
read as establishing a legal requirement that public
bodies observe their procedural guidance whatever its
content. As Jackson commented,"the most significant
feature of [the case] may well be not that it extended
the scope of the right to a hearing but that it enforced
against a public authority a statement of intent made by
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that authority..." . This latter perspective is more
in keeping with the breadth and generality of the
language used by Lord Fraser in the extracts above.
Furthermore it replicates the requirement (and
exceptions) laid down for the observance of policy
guidance in Liverpool Taxi which provided the
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intellectual origins for much of his Lordship's
reasoning. Therefore,it may be hypothesised that the
Privy Council was just as concerned to protect
individuals "in the interest of good administration"
from the apparent arbitrariness of deviations from
declared procedures as the Court of Appeal had been to
ensure that public bodies did not inexplicably abandon
their announced policies. Hence this decision
established a potential foundation and framework for the
judicial enforcement of procedural guidance.
The first application of Shiu in our domestic law
occurred in Khan and supported the widest interpretation
of the Privy Council's reasoning. The circular letter
distributed by the Home Office in Khan' s case not only
contained the policy guidance considered previously but
also procedural guidance derailing the investigations
the department would undertake via the D.H.S.S. and
local social services departments to ascertain if the
applicants would be suitable adopters. Therefore,a
second strand of Mr. Khan's claim was that the
department's decision was unlawful because they had
failed to carry out the procedures required by their
guidance. Parker LJ accepted this argument holding,
"[Shiu] is,of course,not binding on this court but is of
high persuasive authority. In my view it correctly sets
out the law of England and should be applied. I have no
doubt that the Home Office letter afforded the applicant
a reasonable expectation that the procedures it set
out, which were just as certain in their terms as the
question and-.answer in Mr. Ng's case, would be
followed..." .
In his judgment this reasonable/legitimate expectation
was sufficient not merely to provide Mr. Khan with locus
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standi but also to entitle the latter to succeed in his
substantive claim. As the Home Office's guidance
established procedures going beyond those of a basic
hearing (ie. creating an inspection system involving two
central departments and relevant local authorities) the
Lord Justice obviously understood Shiu as creating the
legal principle that all forms of procedural guidance
should generally be observed and not merely that
guidance providing for a hearing produced a legitimate
expectation that such a hearing would be granted. The
dissentient,Watkins LJ,did not deny the applicability of
Shiu but sought to distinguish it on the facts of Khan's
case. So it can be said that the widest interpretation
of Shiu has received endorsement in the Court of
Nevertheless when the House of Lords considered the
concept of legitimate expectation a few months later
(without being referred to Khan which had not then been
reported) in the C.C.S.U. case there were obiter
statements that would give a more restrictive scope to
the enforcement of procedural guidance via this concept.
There the basis of the appellants' contested legitimate
expectation was the previous conduct of the Foreign
Office in consulting the unions about working practices
at G.C.H.Q.,but some of their Lordships used the
occasion to elaborate upon the ambit of this rather
nebulous concept. Lord Fraser invoked his opinion in
Shiu to support the view that a legitimate expectation




behalf of a public authority" . Such a definition
would not undermine Parker LJ1 s use of the concept in
Khan. However, Lord Diplock's view was that a legitimate
expectation could only be said to develop in such
circumstances where the individual "has received
assurance from the decision-maker [that a benefit or
advantage] will not be withdrawn without giving him
first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending
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that they should not be withdrawn" . This conception
of the relevance of legitimate expectation to procedural
guidance would appear to restrict it to guidance that
only provides for a right to a hearing and has echoes of
the narrow interpretation of Shiu. Consequently it would
be a regressive step after the decision in Khan. Perhaps
Lord Diplock's views can be treated either as obiter
dicta in the light of the type of legitimate expectation
actually being asserted by the appellants, or as a
statement of the use of this concept as a means of
establishing locus standi rather than a substantive
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ground for reviewing the legality of decisions
To summarise this aspect of the judicial response
towards procedural guidance we can observe that Parker
LJ's judgment in Khan provides the English courts with
the basic framework for the legal enforcement of this
form of guidance. Whatever the method of promulgation
(c/f the informality in Shiu) and irrespective of the
nature of the procedures detailed by the guidance (c/f
the elaborate investigatory process specified in Khan)
the legal presumption is that the promulgator will
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observe those procedures. But the presumption is not
competely irrefutable and will give way where the
department's "statutory duty" so requires. What the
Privy Council meant by that phrase was not made clear.
However, it may be suggested that it is analogous to the
concept of "public interest" which the Court of Appeal
invoked as the caveat to the enforcement of policy
undertakings in Liverpool Taxi a decision which,as we
have already noted,was heavily relied upon by the Privy
Council. Such a meaning would enable the department to
change its procedural guidance where it deemed the
public good would so require. Yet in the normal course
of events,if a department failed to follow its
procedural guidance,any subsequent decision would be
liable to be quashed by the judiciary for violating the
legitimate expectations of individuals relying on those
provisions. Consequently Jergesen's view that the
violation of these provisions is not a matter for
judicial contemplation is no longer an accurate picture
of contemporary jurisprudence.
(3) Departmental Reliance Upon Procedural Guidance
The final case that we shall examine is not only
interesting because it demonstrates a Secretary of State
invoking the existence of procedural guidance as the
satisfaction of a statutory duty,but also its revelation
of judicial naivety in comprehending the responses of
bureaucratic organisations towards administrative
guidance of all forms. The case of Child Poverty Action
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Group v. Chief Adjudication Officer and Another
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centred around the extent of the Secretary of State's
duties under s.27(1) Supplementary Benefits Act 1976
which stated,"lt shall be the duty of the Secretary of
State to make arrangements with a view to ensuring that
benefit officers and other officers of his concerned
with the administration of this Act exercise their
functions in such a manner as shall best promote the
welfare of persons affected by the exercise of those
functions." As a consequence the Secretary had
promulgated a manual for use by his officials explaining
"the law and administration" of the social security
scheme which contained 16,000 paragraphs! This manual in
part established a procedure for communicating decisions
of insurance officers to benefit officers. However,a
review by the Social Security Inspectorate in 1983
indicated that about 1 % of unemployed people claiming
supplementary benefits might not have received their
full entitlement due to a widespread failure of clerical
officers to follow the above procedural guidance. The
Secretary of State conducted two national publicity
campaigns to draw the attention of the 1 7,000 odd
affected claimants to the need for them to apply for
their full entitlements, but because of the
administrative costs involved ( £4:8 millions) he
decided not to instruct his staff to search through all
the relevant case papers to track down the affected
individuals. The C.P.A.G. and the G.L.C. brought this
action arguing,inter alia,that the Secretary of State's
decision not to instruct his officials to try and
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identify the affected claimants was a breach of his duty
under s.27. The Court of Appeal rejected that
proposition and interpreted the Minister's duty as
being,in the words of Sir R. Cumming-Bruce,simply,
"...a general administrative duty concerned with the
promulgation of procedures which will best promote the
interests of the various classes of claimants. It is
accepted that the administrative guidance incorporated
in the voluminous and detailed instructions given by the
Secretary of State would have achieved the desired
affect if they had been followed. ...The words are not
apt to impose a duty not only to issue sensible
instructions but also to institute a policing activity
involving hunting through millions of cases...".
Hence the court appeared to think that the Secretary of
State had satisfied his duty to make "arrangements"
merely by issuing comprehensive guidance. However, if
the court had been aware of informal organisational
behaviour (see the theoretical writings on this topic
discussed in Chapter Two and the empirical analysis of
its existence in the S.E.D. considered in Chapter Three)
they would have appreciated that simply issuing
instructions to members of complex organisations is not
sufficient of itself to guarantee a uniform observance
of those provisions,and that they must be accompanied by
training programmes and hierarchical reviews of
subordinates' actions by their superiors. There was no
evidence that the Secretary of State's manual
established such administrative structures and to that
extent it could be argued that he had not made suitable
"arrangements" for the exercise of his officials'
functions. The court's attitude may be explained by
their relative ignorance (eg. when compared with that
page 73
displayed by the P.C.A.) of the organisational realities
existing within departments. This is a potential
weakness underlying not only their reactions towards
administrative guidance but the whole concept of
judicial review.
The analysis of the case law contained in the
previous sections of this chapter has provided the
detailed answers to most of the specific questions posed
at the beginning of our examination. Therefore,in this
conclusion we shall consider the main themes in the
judicial response to administrative guidance underlying
those answers. We can note that the judiciary have
become increasingly tolerant of the promulgation and use
of guidance by departments. All three categories of
guidance have received judicial approval as the cases of
British Oxygen (policy guidance),Crake (interpretative
guidance) and C.P.A.G. (procedural guidance)
demonstrated. The identity of the particular department
which promulgated the guidance does not appear to be a
significant factor amongst those which influence the
judicial response to guidance. Undoubtedly the matter
which is of primary importance in determining that
response is the substantive content of the individual
piece of guidance. This is because, if the substance of
such a provision violates any of the relevant
principles of public law (eg. the non-delegation
doctrine as in Jackson Stansfield),or the modified
CONCLUSIONS
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versions of those principles which have been evolved to
regulate guidance (eg. the non-fettering principle as
refined in British Oxygen),the courts are able to
prevent departments from acting upon the offending piece
of guidance.
As we have seen affected citizens can challenge
allegedly unlawful administrative guidance either
directly,or indirectly via an attack on individual
decisions reached in pursuance of the particular
guidance. The cases discussed highlight only one case
(Anderson) in which a direct challenge to the legality
of the content of a piece of guidance resulted in a
declaration that the provision was ultra vires. Other
notable direct challenges which ultimately failed in the
House of Lords include British Oxygen, Royal College of
Nursing, and Gillick. Furthermore,as we have already
mentioned,if the dicta of Woolf J in Royal College and
Lord Bridge in Gillick are taken up by their judicial
colleagues, citizens wishing to bring such direct
challenges are almost certainly going to be required to
utilise the Order 53 procedure. Consequently the
procedural obstacles facing these challenges will
increase rather than decrease with,as a corollary,a
likely reduction in the success rates of direct
challenges. However,the cases examined showed that
citizens were successful in their use of indirect
challenges in eight actions (Stansfield, Simms, M'Lean,
Colmans, Lavender, Simper, St Germain, and Raymond).
These indirect challenges had occurred in several
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heterogeneous types of proceedings including,(a)
defences to criminal charges (M'Lean, Simms), (b)
defences to civil actions (Stansfield), (c) civil
actions initiated by citizens impugning the validity of
decisions made in consequence of the application of
unlawful guidance (Colmans etc.). Again, where the
citizen seeks the quashing of a departmental decision
applying unlawful guidance via a prerogative order,they
will now have to utilise the Order 53 procedure.
Following Lord Bridge's comments and the Court of
Appeal's judgment in C.P.A.G. the judiciary may be
reluctant to accept that representative actions brought
by interest groups have the required locus standi so the
onus is placed upon affected citizens to litigate
individually. We can hypothesise that the judiciary have
been more amenable to indirect,as opposed to
direct,challenges aimed at administrative guidance
because they can see the concrete harm suffered by
citizens where departments have utilised unlawful
guidance. By contrast direct challenges may involve
abstract claims of illegality without the occurrence of
actual harm (eg. in Royal College there was no evidence
that any nurse had been prosecuted for procuring an
abortion under the Offences Against the Persons Act
1861) and as Lord Bridge said in Gillick the courts
should avoid "proferring answers to hypothetical
questions of law".
The converse of the above judicial response to
administrative guidance has been the recent trend in the
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case law towards the legal enforcement of these
provisions. There are now dicta that a legal presumption
exists that departments should observe their promulgated
guidance irrespective of what category of guidance is
involved as the cases of, Khan (policy guidance),H.T.V.
(interpretative guidance),and Shiu (procedural guidance)
demonstrate. The circumstances in which departments can
depart from the requirements of their promulgated
guidance are also very similar; where the "overriding
public interest demands it" per Parker LJ in Khan, where
there is an "overriding public interest to warrant it"
per Lord Denning in H.T.V. , and where observance would
"interfere with its statutory duty" per Lord Fraser in
Shiu. The content of the phraseology of these caveats
may be subject to elaboration by the judiciary in future
cases, but it is likely that the judges will leave
departments with a fairly wide area of discretion
because they are in a better position to make such value
judgments,under the direction of Ministers,than the
courts. The similar features of this legal presumption
and its ancillary exceptions across the categories of
guidance is not that surprising when we consider the
common origins of the presumption which are to be found
in the judgment given by Lord Denning in Liverpool Taxi.
All the major judgments developing the judicial
enforcement of guidance make reference to Lord Denning's
innovative application of the doctrine of "fairness" to
achieve this requirement, and it is "fairness" together
with the allied concept of "legitimate expectation"
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which provide the legal foundations for this
presumption.
Finally,to summarise the trends in the case law we
can state that there is an emerging legal presumption
that departments will observe their promulgated
administrative guidance,but this is subject to an
overriding exception that departments can depart from
such guidance where the public interest so necessitates.
Furthermore affected citizens can challenge the legality
of guidance either directly or,with a greater chance of
success,indirectly on a number of grounds including;the
unlawful delegation of decision-making powers
(Lavender),the fettering of the exercise of
discretionary powers (Simms),the incorrect
interpretation of statutory language (M'Lean),and the
establishing of decision-making procedures which fall
below the minimum standard prescribed by the common law
(Anderson). Consequently the judiciary have,to some
extent unconsciously, established the basis for a
coherent and relatively comprehensive legal response to
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VALUE ADDED TAX TRIBUNALS
Introduction
In this chapter we shall examine the responses
towards administrative guidance of the final domestic
grievance handling agency to be considered by this work
and that is a tribunal system. Such an institution
deserves a place in our research because as Birkinshaw
has noted tribunals are now,"...a central feature of
dispute resolution by adjudication in cases involving
departments and individuals..." . However, we must
further appreciate that the historical debate over the
conceptual nature of tribunals has not yet ended. Within
a quarter of a century two official committees had
considered this question and reached diametrically
opposed conclusions. The Donoughmore Committee perceived
tribunals to be extensions of their sponsoring
departments and signified this conclusion by terming
them "Ministerial Tribunals" ; whereas the subsequent
Franks Committee expressed their understanding of
tribunals in the following manner,
"tribunals are not ordinary courts,but neither are they
appendages of Government departments... We consider that
tribunals should properly be regarded as machinery
provided by Parliament for adjudication rather than as
part of the machinery of administration."
Undoubtedly this latter Report both legitimised and
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established the contemporary orthodoxy regarding the
fundamental characteristics of tribunals. As Wraith and
Hutchesson wrote,Franks,
"...represents a watershed between a recent past when
tribunals were regarded as unavoidable expedients and a
future where they are coming to be accepted for what
they really are-|n important part of the judicial system
of the country."
But not all commentators accept the universal
applicability of the above conceptual model of
tribunals. Farmer,in particular,has strongly argued that
the Franksian model does not adequately take account of
the "Policy Orientated" type of tribunal. These
tribunals he contends differ dramatically from the
Franksian,or as they are sometimes referred to "Court
Substitute" form of tribunals,because of their lack of
independence from their sponsoring departments. As
Farmer states the basic difference between the two types
of tribunals,
"...is to be found in the power which the minister
retains to issue directions to such tribunals. In
practice these directions may relate to procedure or,of
vital significance here,to policy. In this latter case
it is tl^e minister and not the tribunal who determines
policy."
Despite Farmers' post Fulton prediction of an expanding
usage of policy orientated tribunals by government this
evolution has been rather hesitant in its arrival. But
more recently Baldwin claims that the "independent
Regulatory Agency",an institution sharing many similar
features with policy orientated tribunals,offers great
potential as an instrument of government in a decade
epitomised by the "privatisation" of public assets
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becausefor Conservatives it provides a means of
public control that may be substituted for
7
nationalization.
Nevertheless, the majority of existing tribunals
are more likely to resemble the Franksian model than the
policy orientated form;consequently this work will focus
upon a tribunal system falling within the first
category. Furthermore by choosing such a system we shall
facilitate the comparison between the responses of the
courts and the tribunal towards administrative guidance
as the latter body will be performing broadly analogous
functions to those of the former;hence our findings will
enable us to further our knowledge of the extent to
which such tribunals both replicate judicial reasoning
and perceive the relationship between individuals and
central departments.
Inevitably the next issue which this research had
to face was the selection of a particular tribunal
system for detailed scrutiny. With 103 different
tribunal systems falling under the general supervision
g
of the Council on Tribunals in 1 985 it was clearly
9
impossible to examine all the various tribunals! Three
factors were considered to be dominant in determining
the selection process. First it was clearly necessary
for the tribunal to encounter administrative guidance in
its decision-making. Secondly the decisions of the
tribunal had to be readily accessible in order that they
could be analysed. Thirdly it was important to avoid
tribunals which had already been subjected to exhaustive
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study (eg. the former Supplementary Benefit Appeal
1 0
Tribunals ) both to prevent any possible duplication of
research and to increase our general awareness of the
different types of tribunals. The tribunal system
eventually selected was that of Value Added Tax
(hereafter V.A.T.) Tribunals because it satisfied the
above conditions in the following ways. In the light of
our research into the P.C.A. (Chapter Five) we learnt
that the whole area of taxation demonstrated a
considerable use of administrative guidance by the two
departments concerned with the collection of taxes.
Therefore,it seemed a reasonable prediction that a
tribunal determining questions of taxation would be
likely to encounter guidance during its deliberations.
However,as Oliver has noted, the official reporting of
11
tax tribunal decisions is not very well developed.
Hence V.A.T. Tribunals stood out as an exception to the
norm as selected decisions given by them are published
annually by H.M.S.O.. Furthermore there does not appear
to be any published research on the decision-making or
1 2
jurisprudence of these tribunals.
The Legal Background to V.A.T.
V.A.T. replaced Purchase Tax,which had originated
as an emergency war time measure during 1941,in April
1973. There were two forces encouraging this
change,firstly the inherent weaknesses of Purchase Tax
(namely its exclusion of liability to pay tax on the
obtaining of services and its taxation of exported
goods),and secondly Britain's membership of the European
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Communities which necessitated a degree of harmonisation
of consumer taxation. Therefore,Parliament created
V.A.T. by Part 1 of the Finance Act 1972. Pinson
summarises its method of application in these terms,
"V.A.T. is a tax on the final consumption of goods or
services which is collected by instalments. The tax is
charged on the "value added" by a taxable person at each
stage in the process of production. In practical terms
the "value added" is the profit (including wages) of the
taxable person computed on an invoice basis. Thus,in
effect the instalment of tax due at each stage is the
amount chargeable on the difference b^ween the cost of
acquisition and the proceeds of sale."
The advantage this form of tax offers over a simple
sales tax is that ultimately only non-business consumers
pay the levy.
The scheme for the assessment and collection of
V.A.T. will now be briefly outlined in terms of the
statutory provisions. Although most legislation
involving V.A.T. has been consolidated in the Value
Added Tax Act 1983 we shall primarily refer to the 1972
Act as that is what the tribunal decisions discussed
below applied. By s. 1(1 ) Finance Act 1 972 (now s.1(1 ) V.
A.T. Act 1983) V.A.T. was levied on the supply of goods
and services in the U.K.. However,s.2 (s.2) provided
that only supplies of taxable goods and services by a
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taxable person were liable. Where a person paid
V.A.T. on the supply of goods or services used by him
for the "purpose of a business" he could reclaim that
amount as input tax according to s.3 (s.14) . Section 9
established a standard rate of tax at 10%, but that has
been increased to 15% by s.9(1)(a) 1983 Act. Those goods
and sevices which were to be taxed at a zero rate were
C
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specified in s.12 and Schedule 4 (s.16 and Schedule 5),
whilst those exempted from V.A.T. were listed in s.13
and Schedule 5 (s.17 and Schedule 6). Where a taxpayer
did not submit returns to the Commissioners or provide
them with satisfactory documentation they could assess
him for that amount of tax which they calculated to the
"best of their judgment" under s.31 (now Schedule 7) to
be due. By s.37 the department was given powers of
entry and search (Schedule 7), and s.38 (s.39) created
several offences relating to the unlawful evasion of
Value Added Tax. At this juncture we can comprehend
Mainprice's criticism that,"what the Government was
careful not to publicise in 1972 is now plain:the
legislation in the 1972 Finance Act is only the
1 5
framework for V.A.T.." As we shall soon discover this
technique of enactment has had direct effects upon the
nature and legal status of the guidance promulgated by
the Commissioners.
The Characteristics of V.A.T. Tribunals
Separate tribunals with jurisdiction over each
constituent part of the U.K. (subject to V.A.T.) were
created by Paragraph 1 Schedule 6 of the Finance Act
1972 (now Para.1 Schedule 8 V.A.T. Act 1983). But
unity was brought to the system by appointing a single
President with responsibility for all tribunals. The
President was to be a person qualified for office as a
Crown Court Recorder and his appointment was to be made
by the Lord Chancellor. For the era of our research the
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Presidency was occupied by Lord Grantchester Q.C.. He
obtained the Treasury's consent to the establishment of
a tribunals headquarters in London with regional offices
in Belfast,Edinburgh and Manchester. Whilst the
tribunals also conduct hearings in Birmingham,Cardiff,
Leeds,Exeter,Newcastle and Castletown (for the Isle of
Man). Each tribunal is to be composed of a Chairman and
at least one other Member. Panels of Chairmen and
Members for the English and Welsh,Northern Irish,and
Scottish tribunals were created with a minimum of one
full time Chairman for each panel. Full time Chairmen
were to be appointed by the Lord Chancellor, or his
appropriate judicial equivalent in the other legal
systems of the U.K.;whilst other tribunal members were
to be nominated by the Treasury.
The substantive jurisdiction of V.A.T. Tribunals
was originally specified in nine grounds of appeal
detailed in s.40(1) Finance Act 1972. These grounds
contained matters such as disputes over the registration
of persons liable to pay the tax (s.40(1)(a));and
contentions regarding the amount of output tax due from
a taxpayer (s.40(1)(c)) or conversely the sum of input
tax a taxpayer could reclaim (s.40(1 ) (d)). Over the
years these grounds were gradually extended so that
today there are thirteen grounds of appeal. This process
appears to be a never ending one as s.24 Finance Act
1985 recently added another ground to take account of
the Commissioners new power to impose penalty payments
on tardy taxpayers. At the current time tribunals can
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hear appeals based upon approximately fourteen different
matters. However,as Pinson observed,routinely,
"many of the disputes relate to the classification of a
particular ^gpply,ie whether it is taxable or zero rated
or exempt."
The provisions governing the interlocutory,hearing
and decision-making stages of tribunals determinations
are found in the V.A.T. Tribunals Rules 1986 (Order
1986/590). They provide that the appellant must normally
lodge an appeal within 30 days of receiving the
Commissioners' letter containing the disputed decision.
Within a further 30 days the Commissioners must serve a
statement of the grounds for their decision. The parties
to the appeal then exchange any relevant documentation.
An appellant must be given at least 1 4 days notice of
the timing of the hearing. The hearing is an oral one
before a duly constituted tribunal whose Chairman and
other Members have been selected by the President from
the appropriate panels. At the hearing the appellant can
be represented by anyone of his own choice(quite
frequently appellants are represented by an accountant
rather than a lawyer)and he bears the burden of proof in
the proceedings. According to the President proceedings
before any particular tribunal should observe the
following form,
"the appellant or his representative will be entitled to
address the tribunal, call witnesses, produce documents,
cross-examine any witnesses called by the Commissioners,
and make a second statement closing his case. The
appellant himself may give evidence. The representative
of the Commissioners will be entitled to address the
tribunal,call witnesses,cross-examine any witnesses
called by or on behalf of the appellant (including the
appellant if he gives evidence) and make a second
statement closing their case. The tribunal may question
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any witnes^ (including the appellant if he givesevidence)."
The chairman of the tribunal may announce an oral
decision at the end of the hearing,but a written letter
containing the tribunal's findings of fact,decision and
supporting reasons will always be sent to the appellant.
The tribunals have the power to award costs against a
party to the appeal;however, it is not their policy to
award costs against a wholly successful party. Finally
if a party considers that the tribunal has made an error
of law they have a right of appeal on such a point to
the High Court,or its equivalent in other jurisdictions.
Now that we have considered the formal constitutional
position of these tribunals we can begin our study of
their jurisprudential response to administrative
guidance.
The Responses of V.A.T. Tribunals to Public Notices
""
(1 973-1982)
As we have already noted our earlier research on
the P.C.A. indicated that the Commissioners issued
Public Notices in which they,inter alia,announced their
1 8
views regarding the legal liabilities of taxpayers
These Notices seemed a likely source of administrative
guidance,therefore the department was contacted to
obtain further information concerning them. It was then
\
discovered that in relation to V.A.T. the Commssioners
A
had created an extensive body of Notices with an
elaborate up-dating mechanism. At the time of the
initial research there were 22 Notices supplemented by
50 leaflets. The Notices covered a diverse range of
page 9
subject matters. For example Notice 712 entitled "Second
-hand works of art, antiques and scientific collections"
explained its scope thus,
"V.A.T. is normally chargeable on the full value of
goods sold by a taxable person. But for second-hand
works of art,antiques and scientific collections there
is a special scheme whereby,subject to certain
conditions,tax is chargeable only on the margin by which
the selling price of the article exceeds its purchase
price. ... This Notice explains what types of goods are
covered bypthe scheme,how it works and what records must
be kept."
Whilst Notice 708 entitled the "Construction Industry"
stated,
"This Notice deals with the application of V.A.T. to the
construction industry,and in particular to the
construction,alteration,and repair or maintenance of
dwelling accommodation, commercial and industrial
buildings and of civil engineering projects such as
roads,bridges and tunnels..."
Leaflets dealt with even more specialist activities such
as SHP 10 which explained the
"...arrangements whereby V.A.T. incurred on materials
and certain other goods and services used in (self-build
projects) may be reclaimed from HM Customs and Excise
where the work 2^as been carried out by a voluntary
organisation..."
Consequently we can conclude that both Notices and
leaflets demonstrated many features resembling those
of the model guidance outlined in earlier Chapters of
this work. These included their generality of coverage
in that they applied to all taxpayers coming within
their ambit eg. Notice 708 governed all businesses
engaged in the construction industry and not just
company x. Furthermore none of these publications had
been subjected to any Parliamentary proceedings and most
of their contents were not derived from the exercise of
page 10
5 so
delegated legislative powers (eg. in the General Guide
to V.A.T. Notice 700 the Commissioners stated that 9 out
of 80 pages were the product of delegated legislative
powers). Finally,as we shall see in greater detail
below,the Commissioners claimed that these provisions
reflected the working norms under which they actually
22
administered V.A.T..
The next step was to ascertain those cases where
V.A.T. Tribunals had considered the legal significance
of these Notices. This was done by scrutinising the
reported decisions of the tribunals over the first
decade of collection of the tax. Such a time-scale was
lengthy enough to reflect any evolutions in the
responses of the tribunals and neatly encompassed the
currency of Part 1 Finance Act 1972. During the former
period of the research access to tribunal decisions via
Lexis was not available and therefore the searching had
to be conducted manually. This process repeated the
techniques used to identify P.C.A. cases for Chapter
Five and involved examining all decisions for the
relevant years and noting those which raised novel
issues concerning Notices. Out of 296 reported decisions
20 were found which fundamentally revolved around
Notices or connected issues (these are listed in
Appendix C). Subsequently the accuracy of this searching
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was extended by a use of Lexis
From the cases found by the above methods it became
clear that the dominant factor determining the response
of tribunals to Notices was the nature of the power
page 11
exercised by the Commissioners when promulgating the
particular provisions. So our ensuing analysis of those
responses will be based upon that distinction.
a. Public Notices (or parts of them) issued under
statutory authority
The case of A L Housden v. The Commissioners of
24
Customs and Excise vividly demonstrated the reaction
of the tribunals to Notices, or as there parts of
Notices,which were the product of legislative powers. By
s.30(3) 1972 Act the Commissioners were granted the
power to make Regulations and Notices establishing
approved methods of calculating taxable turnover.
Exercising that power the Commissioners published Notice
727 together with associated supplements which,inter
alia,contained the details for calculating the turnover
of businesses supplying both standard and zero rated
supplies. One requirement of this method was that,"the
initial stocks you are holding when you begin to use
Scheme B must not be included". The appellant entered
into a contract to purchase an existing business in
September 1979,started to trade in early November and
completed the purchase later that month. She used the
above method of accounting but sought to claim for
initial stock. The department refused her claim and she
appealed on the ground that as she did not have legal
title to the stock when she began trading she fell
outside the above restriction. The tribunal concluded
that,
"in assessing the legal effect of Notices it is
important to bear in mind what was said by Woolf J in
G.U.S. Merchandise Corp. Ltd. v. The Comms. [1980] 1 W L
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R 1508 in particular relation to Notice 727,"in
considering these Notices it has to be borne in mind
that they are far from being the normal form of
delegated legislation. Although they do set out what is
, in effect,a statutory scheme,they also contain advice
and recommendations which are of no statutory effect."
In the judgment of the tribunal [the above requirement]
has statutory,or quasi-statutory,effect...we take the
view that the provision... is not a provision to which
a test of reasonableness is open to be applied by a
V.A.T. Tribunal."
Consequently the tribunal considered they were bound to
apply the restriction,and further rejected the
appellant's argument on the interpretation of "holding"
by declaring it to mean possession not full legal
ownership. Therefore,it is apparent that where tribunals
encounter Notices derived from statutory powers,whether
primary or delegated,they generally understand
themselves to be obliged to apply the terms of those
provisions.
However,the task of determining if any particular
requirement of a Notice has this effect is no simple
2 6
mechanical task as Douglas Howard ■Miller v. The Comms.
showed. Under s.14 1972 Act the Commissioners were given
the power to make Orders creating a scheme whereby the
retail sellers of second hand goods,bought from members
of the public, only had to pay tax on the difference
between the purchase and sale prices. Using that power
the Commissioners made the V.A.T.(Works of Art,Antiques
and Scientific Collections) Order 1972 (1972/1971). That
Order in turn authorised the Commissioners to specify
the book-keeping requirements of the Scheme in a Notice.
This the Commissioners did in paragraph 18 of Notice 712
which they later purported to amend by a publication
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entitled "V.A.T. News No.2". During 1976 a control visit
was made to the appellant's business and it was
discovered that he had failed to comply with the
accounting requirements. He subsequently appealed
against the ensuing assessment. The tribunal expressed
their concern about this contorted process of
legislating in the following words.
"The publication of "V.A.T. News No.2" does not even
purport to be a Notice,let alone a Notice published for
the purpose of the Treasury Order... We have some doubts
whether [it] should properly be regarded as a Notice
published for the purpose of the Treasury Order and,in
connection therewith,we draw attention to the fact that
other Notices,published by the Commissioners under
powers entrusted to them were altered by a publication
entitled "V.A.T. News Amendment Leaflet No.1".
However,the tribunal dismissed the appeal because the
appellant's books did not comply with the demands of
Notice 712.
The tribunal's concern about the Commissioners'
methods of legislating gives fuel to Mainprice's
constitutional apprehension that,
"...with the advent of V.A.T. a much more objectionable
procedure has been instituted namely legislation by
departmental notice. This system short circuits
Parliament completely and the process is so simple that
it is doubtful if more than a handful of Members of
Parliament have any idea of the way in whiclUgtheir
legislative function has been eroded by its use."
Not only may M.P.s be unaware of the scale of this form
of legislation, but they also have no knowledge of the
contents of such subordinate legislation as it does not
come under the scrutiny of the Joint Committee on
Statutory Instruments nor is it laid before the House.
Therefore,we may begin to hear distant echoes of Scott
LJ's criticisms of multiple stages of delegated
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legislation expressed in Blackpool Corp. v. Locker ,
with regard to the statutory elements of Notices. On a
more prosaic level there surely ought to be fears about
the difficulties of distinguishing between the statutory
and non-statutory portions of Notices. The Commissioners
have not adopted on a wide-scale any variations in
typefaces to differentiate between the various
elements,as occured in the Directives given to the
N.E.B. and considered in Booth & Co.(International) Ltd.
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v. National Enterprise Board , which might be one
solution to the problem. And as we shall see further
below this problem of differentiation is a fundamental
flaw in the current usage of Notices.
Where a tribunal has determined that a requirement
of a specific Notice has statutory status and therefore
prima facie the tribunal is bound to apply its demands,
one strategy that a taxpayer can adopt is to challenge
the vires of the relevant part of the Notice. But the
chances of such a challenge being successful do not
appear to be great because of the breadth of the
language in which the Act and Orders delegate power as
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Robert Vulgar v. The Comms. confirmed. There,as we
have already learnt from Housden, s.30(3) 1972 Act
provided,"Regulations under this section may make
special provision for such taxable supplies by retailers
of any goods or of any description of goods or of
services or of any description of services as may be
determined by or under the Regulations..". The 1972
Order then provided the details of the various schemes
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would be set out in Notices, and once a taxpayer had
elected to account under one of the schemes he must do
so for at least one year. The appellant began to account
under Scheme G,but after a few months he concluded that
it required that he pay too much tax so he sought to
transfer to another scheme. The Commissioners,in
accordance with the Order,refused to allow him to
transfer and he appealed on the basis that Scheme G was
ultra vires the Act as it necessitated the payment of
tax on exempt transactions. The tribunal dismissed his
appeal noting,
"...it is inherent under a special scheme that the
amount of tax payable thereunder by a retailer for an
accounting period is most unlikely to be the same as
would have been payable by him for that period if he had
not adopted any special scheme and had accounted for tax
on each and every supply made by him during that period.
... In our view,in default of special circumstances,a
retailer cannot legally complain if the tax payable by
him under a scheme is more than the sum which he
otherwise would have had to pay,as he voluntarily
elected to adopt the scheme."
The reluctance of the tribunal to declare the scheme
ultra vires may be explained both by the freedom of
action granted to the Commissioners by s.30(3) and the
relative diffidence towards decisions of the department
exhibited by the tribunals during the early years of
their existence.
Some members of the tribunals were more willing to
subject the determinations of the Commissioners to a
closer scrutiny as was highlighted by the majority
decision in J H Corbitt (Numismatists) Ltd. v. The
Comms. ^- There the appellants had sought to account
under the Margin Scheme (c/f Miller) which according to
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A.3(5) V.A.T. (Works of Art etc.) Order 1 972 did not
apply,"...to any supply by a person unless he keeps such
records and accounts as the Commissioners may specify in
a Notice published by them for the purpose of this Order
or may recognise as sufficient for those purposes." The
department concluded that the appellants' books did not
comply with either of these requirements and assessed
them for tax under s.31(1). At the appeal the
Commissioners argued that the tribunal did not have
jurisdiction to review their discretion to approve
c
acounts under the second limb of the above Article. The
minority of the tribunal agreed with the Commissioners'
view and relying on an earlier unreported decision
concluded that Order,
"...confers upon the Commissioners an administrative
discretion,which they and they alone can exercise,as to
the evidence which they recognise as sufficient for the
purpose of the concessionary scheme."
But the majority disagreed:
"...once we have jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the appeal, then we have power to go into all matters
relating to the appeal de novo and to substitute our
decision for that of the Commissioners. It is not,in the
judgment of the majority,sufficient to say that merely
because the quantum of an assessment as part of the
chain of calculation by which it is reached involves a
discretionaryj^^y the Commissioners,then such a
discretionary decision cannot be reviewed by a
tribunal..."
Subsequently the Commissioners pursued the matter
to the House of Lords where the majority took a very
narrow view of the tribunals' jurisdiction and supported
3 6
the decision of the minority above . Lord Lane (with
whom Lords Diplock,Simon and Scarman agreed) began by
repeating the established perception of the response of
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tribunals to the statutory aspects of Notices.
"it cannot be and is not disputed that the V.A.T.
tribunal has no jurisdiction to review the requirements
as to books and records which the Commissioners have
laid down in the various appendices to the Blue Book [a
colloquial name for Notices derived from the colour of
their covers]. Their task on an appeal is confined on
this aspect to an inquiry whether the trader's books and
records_in fact comply with the requirements of the Blue
Book."
He then went on to deal with the tribunals' jurisdiction
regarding the second limb of A.3(5):
"the two halves of the article are part of the same
system of approval or non approval of records,the first
is set out in terms in the order,the second in the shape
of a more flexible discetion. In neither case is there
room for review by the tri^gnal except on the matters of
fact as I have indicated."
The underlying rationale of his Lordship's decision was
revealed by his later comments that,
"if it had been intended to give a supervisory
jurisdiction (like that asserted by the majority of the
tribunal) one would have expected clear words to that
effect in the 1972 Act. But there are no such words to
be found. Section 40(1) sets out 9 specific headings
under which an appeal may be brought and seems by
inference to negative existence of any general
supervisory jurisdiction."
The dissentient Lord Salmon took an antithetical
attitude:
"for myself, I do not agree that such a case calls for
what is sometimes referred to as supervisory
jurisdiction in the High Court...it would be quite
unnecessary and wrong for the Company to take the
extravagant course of invoking the High Court's
jurisdiction to review what the Commissioners had done
since they have the statutory right of appealing to the
tribunal against the Commissioner's decision under the
second part of A.3(5)."
The tone of the majority of their Lordships can
have done little to inspire the confidence of those
members of the tribunals who were disposed to subject
the Commissioners' administrative and legislative powers
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to a penetrating examination. Indeed the majority seemed
almost to be influenced with a pre-Franksian desire to
curtail the activities of tribunals and place the major
responsibility for protecting citizens against the
administration with the superior courts.
However,Parliament has now intervened on behalf of
V.A.T. Tribunals by enacting s.40(6) V.A.T. Act 1983
which effectively over-rules the majority's decision in
Corbitt. This provides,"where an appeal under this
section is against a decision of the Commissioners which
depended upon a prior decision taken by them in relation
to the appellant,the fact that the prior decision is not
within subsection (1) above shall not prevent the
tribunal from allowing the appeal on the ground that it
would have allowed an appeal against the prior
decision." We shall now have to await any possible
judicial interpretation of this subsection to discover
if the senior judiciary have taken the hint from
Parliament concerning the authority of these tribunals.
To summarise the response of the tribunals to those
parts of Notices which they determine to be the product
of legislative powers (and Miller shows the potential
complexity of this task-involving the construction of
primary and secondary legislation together with assorted
departmental publications),unless the taxpayer can
establish the ultra vires nature of these provisions (a
virtually impossible eventuality as Vulgar showed),then
the tribunal are obliged to apply the provisions of the
Notice (as that part of Lord Lane's opinion in Corbitt
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which was not over-ruled by Parliament confirmed).
Therefore,let us now examine whether a similar reaction
occurs in relation to Notices which are not the product
of legislative powers.
b. Public Notices (or parts of them) issued as a
consequence of administrative responsibilities.
The major portions of most Notices do not owe their
origins to legislative powers conferred upon the
Commisioners,but instead have their antecedents in the
administrative duties of the department. To clarify the
responses of tribunals to these Notices the latter will
be sub-divided into two categories which we have used
previously and which are recognised by the Commissioners
and the tribunals-they are interpretative guidance and
policy guidance.
1. Interpretative Guidance
The first issue we must address is the basis
upon which the Commissioners seek to justify their
promulgation of this type of Notices. A direct answer to
this question was provided in the case of Grimsby and
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District Sunday Football League v. The Comms. . There
the tribunal endorsed the departments' view that,
"the Commissioners of Customs and Excise,who are charged
with the care and management of V.A.T. are entitled to
interpret the V.A.T. legislation and to issue
guidance,by means of Public Notices or otherwise,on
their views on the liability to the tax of particular
supplies or classes of supply of goods or services. In
the absence of contrary judgments by the V.A.T.
Tribunals or higher courts,they are entitled t^2enf°rce
payment of tax in accordance with their views."
So the Commissioners believe that their executive
responsibility of administering the tax entitles them to
develop relevant interpretative guidance. This should
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not come as a surprise to us in the light of the earlier
research discussed in this work. After all, we noted
Professor Davis' opinion that the interpretation of
legislation was at the heart of the administrative
process. What is more novel about the above statement is
that the Commissioners were expressly acknowledging the
contingent status in law of their interpretative
guidance. Furthermore, they were accepting that it was
for the tribunals,in addition to superior courts,to rule
on the validity of the guidance. Therefore,it seems
likely that in the light of the expense and procedural
difficulties involved in obtaining a judicial
determination of taxpayers' legal rights, tribunals
would be the major forum for decisions upon the
propriety of these Notices. But before we examine
whether this prediction is true we must briefly consider
how the parties to tribunal proceedings seek to use such
Notices in their arguments regarding the interpretation
of the statutory requirements of V.A.T..
Although we might expect the Commissioners to be
arguing that their Notices contain the correct
interpretation of the law and taxpayers to be disputing
that view,the reports do not reveal such a neat picture.
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In Mansell Youell Developments Ltd, v. The Comms. the
appellants purchased land,obtained planning permission
for it, then a related company built houses on the land
and finally that company sold the houses whilst the
appellants sold the land on which the dwellings stood.
The appellants claimed that they were in substance
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supplying a zero rated supply,namely "the construction
of a building" under Group 8 Schedule 4 1 972 Act. The
Commissioners disputed this arguing that,as their Notice
708 stated, "construction" required a contractual
relationship between developer and builder which did not
exist in this case. The tribunal agreed with the
Commissioners' interpretation of the Act. So in that
appeal the Commissioners were using their guidance as we
would have predicted. However,in Astric Products Ltd. v.
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The Comms. the appellants claimed that their equipment
came within a class of goods said to be exceptions to
Schedule 7 Finance (No. 2) Act 1 975 by Notice 742. But
the Commissioners submitted that,
"whether or not the Dry-Bed equipment fell within Item 1
of Group 1 was a pure question of construction of the
words of the statute,as to which Notice 742 could not
help the Appellant. This was only intended a general
guide and it in no way constituted the law."
Again the tribunal accepted the Commissioners'
interpretation, but suggested they consider using their
legislative powers to exempt medical goods like these.
There the Commissioners were seeking to diminish the
stature of their own interpretative guidance in a
situation where it was contrary to their line of
argument before the tribunal! They have even gone so far
as to submit that their guidance may be erroneous, as
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happened in The B.B.C. v. The Comms. . Section 3(1 )
1 972 Act entitled taxpayers to reclaim tax paid by them
on purchases for their business. Notice 701 stated that
subject to exceptions,"where an employee pays
expenses,including V.A.T.,that tax can be treated as
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input tax by the employer if the employee has been
reimbursed for his expenditure." The appellants paid a
subsistence allowance for their employees working away
from home that was based on their seniority, and from
1973 an additional amount for any V.A.T. incurred. The
Commissioners refused to allow the additional sums to be
reclaimed as input tax arguing (a)there had been no
supply to the B.B.C. as required by s.3(1) and (b) if
"the present case complies with the conditions set out
in the Notice to enable the Corporation to treat this
tax as input tax,then the Notice is at variance with the
law and the Commissioners are not bound by it." ^ The
tribunal upheld the Commissioners' first submission.
Nevertheless the second ground revealed the
Commissioners expressly acknowledging that their
interpretative guidance may not always be accurate.
Conversely,and this is already to some extent
apparent from the cases above,taxpayers have argued that
Notices specify the correct view of the law. For example
in Keith Brian Kennell v. The Comms. the appellant
sought to obtain repayments of tax paid on materials
and services used in the construction of his home.
Section 3 Finance Act 1973 provided that, "...a person
constructing a dwelling,lawfully and otherwise than in
the course of a business carried on by him..." could
reclaim such tax. The appellant claimed to come within
that section by virtue of Notice 708 in which the
Commissioners defined such an individual as one who
"exercises some measure of control over its
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construction". The tribunal applied that definition to
the appellant's circumstances and decided in his favour.
Therefore, the practice of parties in using
interpretative guidance before the tribunals does not
demonstrate a symmetrical pattern, with the
Commissioners always seeking tribunal approval and
application of their Notices, and taxpayers ceaselessly
challenging these provisions. Instead both groups appear
to invoke such Notices on a tactical basis,citing them
when they consider they support their current line of
argument and trying to distinguish or undermine them
when they stand in their way. However,the fact that both
groups make regular references to these provisions is
yet another demonstration of their significance in
state/citizen relations.
To turn now to the major themes in the tribunals'
response to these Notices,the basic reaction of
tribunals throughout the period of research was to
affirm that they were not bound by the interpretations
contained within these pieces of guidance. By
continually articulating this view the tribunals were
clearly signalling their independence from the
department. The strongest exposition of this standpoint
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occurred in Normal- Motor Factors—Ltd: v. The Comms.
where the appellants sought to rely upon Notice 700 to
entitle them to reclaim tax paid by their clients on
repair work carried out under the appellants'
guarantees. The tribunal replied,
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"moreover we think it cannot too often be repeated that
these tribunals will not use Public Notices,which do not
pretend to have any legal weight,as aids to the
interpretation of the Finance Act 1 972 and^ny statutes
directed to be construed as one therewith."
Consequently that tribunal was saying that in its
opinion tribunals would not even consider utilizing
Notices as an element in their construction of the
statutory demands of V.A.T.. However,most tribunals have
taken a somewhat softer line by confirming their freedom
to depart from Notices, but also considering the
interpretations put forward in them. For example in
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Darlington Borough Council v. The Comms. the
appellants claimed that their provision of an abattoir
and related services should be zero rated as a
consequence of the interpretations provided in Notice
749. The tribunal,whilst holding that these provisions
did not support the appellants' contentions,stated,
"the views expressed in this and similar Public Notices
issued by the Commissioners are not,nor are they
intended to be,declaratory of the statutory provisions
and express no more than the Commissioners' opinion from
time to time as to the interpretation of the Finance Act
1972 and various orders and regulations made thereunder.
Such opinions are not binding upon these
tribunalsrnevertheless we should say at this point that
having considered the passages in Notice 749 to which we
were referred in argument,these passages seem to us
adequately t^|n<3 accurately to explain the legal
position..."
And in one decision the tribunal expressly adopted the
interpretation contained in a Notice. The appellant in
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Raymond Walle v. The Comms. contested the
Commissioners' decision that the construction of a
summerhouse in his garden was not a "building" for the
purpose of being zero rated under Schedule 4 1972 Act.
He relied upon Notice 708 on which the tribunal
page 25
commented,
"this passage does not,of course,have any binding effect
in law and in our view it broadly speaking succeeds in
its aim as being a useful guide for traders and others.
It does its best to do, in order to help the general
public, what judges have in the past refrained from
doing,namely to define the term "building". On page 6
there is an actual reference to summerhouses,and the
passage suggests that where such summerhouses... are not
permanently attatched to a concrete base they should be
standard rated and nc^ zero rated. We find this to be a
sensible suggestion."
They then went on to apply that test to the appellants'
summerhouse and concluded that as it satisfied the
criteria the appeal should be allowed. Thereby they were
demonstrating that whilst they were not obliged to
implement the department's interpretative guidance they
would endorse those provisions which,in their opinion,
correctly amplified the statutory requirements.
Conversely,where the tribunals did not agree with
the department's Notices there has been a consistent
trend in their decisions indicating a distinct
reluctance to openly condemn the erroneous provisions.
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In En-tout-cas Ltd. v. The Comms. the appellants were
specialists in the construction of sports facilities.
During 1 973 the Commisioners produced a supplementary
Notice,to 708 dealing with the construction industry,
which stated,"supplies in the course of the construction
of a hard suface tennis court (or swimming pool) which
forms part of, or stands in the grounds of, a
school,university,hospital or municipal recreation
area,a club,hotel,holiday camp or similar establishment
are zero rated." Applying this Notice the Commissioners
assessed the appellants for tax at the standard rate on
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the construction of a tennis court and pool built in the
grounds of private homes. The appellants disputed the
assessment arguing that such works came within Group 8
Schedule 4 1 972 Act irrespective of where they took
place. The tribunal agreed with that submission:
"...we have come to the conclusion that the distinction
sought to be drawn by the Commissioners between a work
executed for a "public" client and a work executed for a
"private" client is untenable. We are unable to accept
[the Commissioners' Counsel's] argument that some
underlying principle of social merit runs through
Schedule 4... Accordingly, in so far as the
Commissioners' decision depends on the distinction set
out in the,. Notice I have read,we are of opinion that it
is wrong."
Therefore,whilst the tribunal were willing to reverse
the Commissioners' decision regarding the particular
assessments; they refrained from condemning the
departments unsubtle attempt to alter Parliaments
intention through the guise of "interpretation", or even
directly criticising the language of the Notice.
Likewise in the B.B.C. case,where the Commissioners
suggested that their Notice might be erroneous,the
tribunal avoided castigating the provision,
"...nor do we think it is necessary to express any view
about the validity of the Public Notice, or as to the
extent,if any,to which the Commissioners would be bound
by it if it were invalid,because in our view [the
Commissioners' Counsel's]first submission is correct."
57Also in Guardia Shutters Ltd. v. The Comms. where a
manufacturer of a substitute for secondary double
glazing successfully challenged the Commisioners'
view,expressed in Notice 715,that the installation of
double glazing amounted to an "alteration" of a building
and was therefore chargeable at zero rate,the tribunal
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made no adverse comments as to the validity of the
Notice.
However,more recently the decision in Stirlings
5 8
(Glasgow) Ltd. v. The Comms. reflects a sharp contrast
with some of the earlier cases (particulary B.B.C. with
which it has many legal similarities). Notice 700
provided,"if your employees are reimbursed for the cost
of petrol they buy for business use by mileage
allowances based on the actual distances they travel on
business journeys you can count as input tax the V.A.T.
fraction of the allowances...". The appellants paid
their travellers a fixed weekly petrol allowance but
still claimed input tax in relation to it. The
Commissioners refused to accept such a claim. Before the
tribunal the Commissioners argued,inter alia,that there
had been no supply of the petrol to the appellants as
required by s.3 1 972 Act. The tribunal accepted the
Commissioners' proposition but also went on to express
their,
"...doubts in relation to the operation of paragraph 4
[of the Notice]... At best these provisions leave the
reader in doubt on the basic requirement that there must
be a supply to the taxable person,as required by s.3(3)
(a);at worst these provisions are inconsistent with
s.3(3)(a)... We therefore feel it would be unsafe to
apply the provisions of paragraph 4,in respect that it
seems to involve concessions by the Respondents which
are not warranted by the terms of the Act."
Hence in an inverse response to the approach of the
tribunal in B.B.C. this tribunal went out of its way to
highlight the defects,as it saw them,in the Notice,
thereby alerting both the Commissioners and other
taxpayers to the potential dangers of relying upon that
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Notice as an accurate exposition of the law.
The above cases indicate that the tribunals have
been rather diffident in condemning those parts of
Notices which they consider contain erroneous
interpretations. This suggests that they have placed
greater emphasis on the particular dispute before them
rather than its wider precedential value in regard to
other taxpayers faced with analogous circumstances and
purportedly subject to the same Notice (eg. all
constructers of sports facilities or installers of
double glazing). This response of the tribunals may have
been encouraged in part by their immaturity compared
with the heritage and experience of the Commissioners
?
and subsequently by the unsymathetic attitude towards
K
their powers displayed by the House of Lords in
Corbitt. But whatever its origins if it persists (c/f
the altered approach in Stirlings) such an attitude
represents a lacuna in the response of these tribunals
towards interpretative guidance.
The tribunals have also had to deal with appeals
where the taxpayer has sought to assert that this type
of Notice has a legal significance going beyond a
persuasive value in the interpretation of statutory
language. Two forms of legal reliance upon these Notices
have been proposed, (a) where the taxpayer has sought
the restitution of monies paid to the department and (b)
where he has claimed that the department are estopped
from denying him a tax advantage as a consequence of a
statement contained in a Notice. Looking first at those
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cases in category (a),the appeal of the Grimsby and
District Sunday Football League,which has already been
encountered,is the prime example of this utilisation of
Notices. Schedule 5 1972 Act provided that,"the
grant,assignment or surrender of any interest in or
right over land or of any licence to occupy land..." was
exempt from V.A.T. . In Notice 749 issued in 1 972 the
department stated that the letting of football pitches
was exempt under the above Schedule. Then a few months
later they reversed their view. Relying on the latter
Notice the appellants paid tax on their hiring of
pitches for the next eight years. However,after a
tribunal ruling that such rentals were indeed exempt the
appellants sought the restitution of the tax they had
paid as a consequence of relying upon the latter Notice.
The tribunal accepted the Commissioners' argument that
it did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal based on
such a claim because following the earlier tribunal
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decision of Roger Kyffin v. The Comms. ,
"...to order recovery of money paid voluntarily under a
mistake of law could not be within the jurisdiction of a
V.A.T. tribunal:the proper forum would be the High Court
in proceedings asking for a judicial g^review of the
disputed decision of the Commissioners."
This application of Kyffin does not appear to be
entirely warranted because there the tribunal was
determining whether it should exercise its discretion to
allow an appeal,based upon a mistake of law,lodged
outside of the 30 day notification period. The former
tribunal did not unequivocally deny that it had
jurisdiction over such claims,but in the light of the
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legal principle that,
"there is no general right of recovery of money paid
voluntarily under a mistake of law. And a payment of
duty not exigible is a voluntary payment (see William
Whiteley Ltd. v. [1909] 26 T.L.R. 19. ... Under these
circumstances the tribunal considers that the exercise
of a discretion to extend time under Rule 18 would be a
supererogatory exercise which would produce no material
end result,and this is a cogent reason for refusing to
exercise such discretion."
However, if we accept that even if a tribunal were
to appraise itself of a claim analogous to that advanced
in Grimsby it would fail as a consequence of this
general principle of law,we are faced with an issue
which has repercussions far beyond this tribunal system
and potentially encompasses all individuals who act on
the basis of interpretative guidance. Because as Birks
confirms the current position in the law of restitution
is that,
"...those who pay by mistake of law, or even under no
mistake at all but simply because they despair of making
their view prevail against the position taken by the
bureaucratic machine,must on this view be ,said to have
no hope whatever of obtaining restitution."
And as it is apparent from the above tribunal decisions
that individuals who rely on interpretative guidance
which is later declared to be erroneous are likely to be
treated as having acted "in mistake of law", they are
consequently not able to reclaim any monies paid in
accordance with the terms of the guidance. This
application of the principles of restitution seriously
disadvantages those individuals who rely upon this form
of guidance in their relations with departments.
Birks has criticised the assessment of public bodies
liability to restitution under the same principles as
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those applicable to private individuals due to the
fact,that in his opinion,they fail to give sufficient
weight to the constitutional norm which,"outlaws all
levies taken without the consent of Parliament,not
6 4
merely levies obtained by unlawful threats." Craig has
also attacked the existing rules governing restitution
and proposes,
"given the complexity of much modern legislation and the
greater ability of the public body to interpret and
understand it an argument can be made that in certain
areas at least the "risk" ,-of a misconstruction should
lie with the public body."
We may suggest that where a department promulgates
interpretative guidance it should be held to have
assumed the risk and associated burdens of an
independent judicial body subsequently declaring that
guidance to be wrong and individuals seeking the
repayment of monies paid in reliance upon those
provisions. After all, the department is in the best
position to know whether it has given enough thought to
its guidance and if it sincerely believes the
interpretation accords with the legislator's intent.
Unless the department is satisfied of these matters it
should not be issuing the guidance. A critic of this
view might,in the context of V.A.T.,point to the
availability of tribunal determinations for taxpayers
who are uncertain as to the accuracy of departmental
Notices. However,the burdens for a lay person seeking to
challenge an interpretation of the Commissioners even
before a tribunal should not be minimised,both in terms





The second category of reliance upon these Notices
is where the taxpayer claims that the department are
estopped from denying him a tax advantage outlined in
such provisions. In the Normal Motor Factors case the
appellants tried to argue that the Commissioners were
estopped from refusing to allow them to reclaim V.A.T.,
paid by their customers,as input tax because of Notice
700. This was a somewhat surprising claim because the
relevant part of the Notice stated the taxpayer was not
entitled,"to deduct the tax on another person's inputs
even if he paid for them"! But after observing that the
Notice contained the following caveat on its inside
cover,"the law concerning V.A.T. is in the Finance Act
1 972 and orders and regulations made under the Act.
Nothing in this Notice overrides the legal
requirements.",the tribunal concluded,
"...that,in our judgment,goes far to prevent any
estoppel from arising even if misleading statements
should happen to occur in the text. But we have examined
the relevant paragraph...and nowhere can we find
anything which might,in our judgment,have led the
Appellant into thinking that input tax waSg^properly
deductible in the circumstances of this case."
So the tribunal appeared to be implying that the
caveat,which most Notices contain at their beginning,was
a suitable antidote to any asserted estoppel.
Furthermore the later case of G.U.S. Merchandise
6 7
Corp. Ltd. v. The Comms. has seemingly given the
Commissioners an even wider immunity from claims of
estoppel. The appellants provided free items,such as
teaspoons,to attract and retain customers. They
L
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discussed with officers of the department whether these
items would be chargeable to tax and the latter said
they would not be chargeable. Three years later the
Commissioners sought to assess the appellants for tax on
these items. Before the tribunal the appellants
argued,inter alia,that the Commissioners were estopped
from now charging V.A.T.. After citing several judicial
decisions culminating in Southend-on-Sea Corp. v.
6 8
Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd. ,the tribunal declared,
"in our judgment,however,having regard to the
authorities to which we have referred,and to the
mandatory nature of ss.1 and 2 [1972 Act],an estoppel
cannot lie against their provisions. Moreover,having
regard to the passage from the judgment of Lord Parker
CJ quoted above,we have reached the conclusion that an
estoppel cannot lie so as to hinder the exercise of a
statutory discretion... sc^ that no estoppel can lie
against the Commissioners."
Consequently,in the eyes of the tribunal,the statutory
framework of V.A.T. provided the Commissioners with a
general protection against claims of estoppel. The
courts were not given an opportunity to consider this
point because by the time this case reached the Court of
Appeal the appellants had dropped all mention of
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estoppel as a ground of appeal. Therefore,pending such
an examination the Commissioners have protection against
similar claims irrespective of whether the particular
Notice contained a caveat or not. Whether an appellant
would fare better before either the tribunals or the
courts by basing his demand,that the department should
observe their published statements,on the public law
concept of fairness (c/f Chapter Six for a detailed
analysis of the judicial application of this concept to
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administrative guidance) rather than estoppel is a moot
point.
To summarise the above responses towards Public
Notices, the reports affirm the fact that the tribunals
are the major forum for determining the legal effects of
these provisions; particularly when contrasted with the
limited judicial consideration of similar issues (there
were only three court decisions involving Notices during
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the decade of the research period ). Furthermore,these
decisions go far towards establishing the independence
of the tribunals from the department. Not only because
of their often repeated view that they did not consider
themselves bound by the Commissioners' interpretations
contained within the Notices (eg.Darlington Borough
Council),but also because of their amenability to
persuasion,by taxpayers,that the Commissioners' views
were erroneous (eg. En-tout-cas and Guardia Shutters).
However,this response demonstrated the weakness,from the
taxpayer's perspective,that the tribunals appeared
relatively unconcerned about the universal impact of
their decisions,as was manifest in their reluctance
directly to condemn those portions of Notices containing
wrong interpretations. The potential consequences of
this were that other taxpayers were not alerted to the
dangers of relying upon those passages and the
Commissioners were subjected to less pressure to amend
their Notices. Secondly,through the importation of
common law principles (notably those governing
restitution and the inapplicability of estoppel to
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statutory powers) the tribunals refused to accede to the
contentions of taxpayers that these Notices should be
treated as having some substantive legal effects (Normal
Motor Factors and Grimsby Football League). Therefore,
subject perhaps to the export of the judicial concept of
fairness to this tribunal system,taxpayers seem destined
to be more successful in challenging the content of
Notices before the tribunals,than in having them imbued
with legal consequences extending beyond a mere
endorsement of the accuracy of the interpretations
contained within them.
2. Policy Guidance
The final (and least numerous though equally
interesting) form of Notices are those which express the
Commissioners' views on how they will exercise various
extra-statutory discretionary powers which they have
assumed. These Notices,or parts of Notices,do not
clearly state that their provisions are in law extra-
statutory concessions, nor do they attempt to justify
this administrative practice. Consequently taxpayers may
be unaware of the status of these Notices when they
invoke the terms of these provisions before tribunals.
If so,as we shall see below,they may be in for an
unpleasant shock as a result of the tribunal classifying
the Notice as a piece of guidance of this type.
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In David Wickens Properties Ltd. v. The Comms.
the appellant argued that his reconstruction of a house
should be treated as a zero-rated transaction because
Notice 708 stated,"a person will also be regarded as a
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person constructing a building,and therefore able to
make a zero-rated grant of a major interest in that
building under the provisions of Item 1 of Group 8 [1972
Act],if he carries out or commissions a work of
substantial reconstruction to such a building." The
Commisioners disputed that claim as they
argued,.paragraph 20 is merely an extra-statutory
concession.Accordingly the company is not entitled to
rely thereon in these proceedings and this tribunal
cannot go into this appeal,in so far as it is based on
such paragraph." After determining as a matter of
statutory interpretation that acts of reconstruction did
not fall within the above Schedule, the tribunal
responded to the Commisioners' argument in the following
L
terms,
"in our opinion it is most undesirable that a tax on
consumption,such as V.A.T.,should be administered on the
basis of extra-statutory concessions which are not
advertised as such. Decisions of the Commissioners with
regard to an extra-statutory concession cannot be
challenged in the courts. A taxpayer has little or no
warning of the trap into which he can fall if an extra-
statutory concession is not clearly stated to be purely
a matter which the Commissioners alone can administer
and decide."
So the tribunal impliedly agreed with the Commissioners'
assertion that policy guidance elaborating extra-
statutory concessions could not be examined by the
tribunals.
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Another tribunal in Cando 70 v. The Comma.
expressly concluded that it had no jurisdiction to
consider a Notice defining such a concession. Section
3(1) Finance Act 1975 had authorised the registration of
self-build housing groups for V.A.T.,thereby enabling
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them to reclaim tax paid on their building materials
etc.. Without legislative approval the Commissioners
extended a similar privilege to groups constructing
other new buildings in Notice SHP 1. The appellants were
converting their church into a combined church and
social centre and sought registration under the terms of
the Notice. The Commissioners refused because the
appellants were not constructing a new building as
required by the terms of their Notice. The tribunal's
judgment gave an indication of the scale of reliance
upon such Notices when it disclosed that nationally 600
groups had sought registration under this single
Notice,which goes some way towards demonstrating the
significance of such concessions within the tax system.
The tribunal then concluded,
"...we start from the clear conclusion that there is no
statutory basis for SHP 1 ...the whole circumstances of
this appeal seem to the tribunal to add force to what
has been said by the courts in many previous
cases,namely that it is essential that persons should be
taxed by statute and not untaxed by extra-statutory
concession. ... If we have any such jurisdiction we
think it can be only under the general provisions of
s . 40(1 ) (a)[1 972 Act];and under those provisions we are
confined to consideration of what is contained in the
Act itself and we cannot assume jurisdiction over the
extra-statutory provisions of SHP 1."
Therefore,the tribunal was construing its enumerated
grounds of jurisdiction as disabling it from examining
these Notices because their non-statutory basis meant
that they fell outside the ambit of the specified heads
of appeal.
From the above cases,it seems clear that the
tribunals consider that their limited statutory
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jurisdiction prevents them from reviewing,let alone
reconsidering on a de novo basis,the application of
Notices detailing extra-statutory concessions. But the
position of the dissatisfied taxpayer may not be as
vulnerable to the whim of the Commissioners as the
tribunal in Wickens believed it to be. This is because
as earlier chapters of this work have revealed other
agencies are available to scrutinise the Commissioners'
utilisation of such Notices. For example,following the
House of Lords' decision in v. Inland Revenue
7 6
Commissioners,ex p. Preston , there is no a priori
reason why the courts should not hold the Customs and
Excise Commissioners to be legally bound by these
Notices (c/f Chapter Six). Furthermore,in the realms of
actual experience,the P.C.A. has investigated the
Commissioners' use of extra-statutory concessions in the
assessment of V.A.T. to ensure that maladministration
77has not been present (and c/f Chapter Five).
To summarise the responses of the tribunals to
Public Notices we can state that they have differed
fundamentally according to the type of guidance
contained within the particular Notice. Those elements
of Notices establishing interpretative guidance were
subjected to the most severe scrutiny by the
tribunals, who asserted their superiority over the
Commissioners in determining the correct interpretation
of the legislative foundations of V.A.T.. The tribunals
CONCLUSIONS
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reinforced this claim both by regularly repeating the
fact that they were not bound by these parts of Notices
(eg.Darlington) and by their willingness to approve
interpretations proposed by taxpayers (eg.Guardia
Shutters). Even the Commissioners openly acknowledged
the dominant role of the tribunals in ruling on the
accuracy of their interpretative guidance in Grimsby.
Consequently this reaction in essence replicates on a
more limited scale the fiercely defended constitutional
role of the courts to provide the ultimate and most
authoritative interpretation of the legislative will.
Furthermore,the tribunals have maintained this stance
even in the face of potential legislative
reversal,because as Mainprice concluded,"on many
occasions when the Commissioners have suffered a defeat
in a V.A.T. Tribunal they have used the statutory
instrument procedure to alter the law so their
7 8
interpretation is restored," which may be yet another
reason why historically the tribunals have been rather
reluctant to directly criticise Notices containing
erroneous interpretations.
As for the Notices containing policy guidance
relating to the Commissioners' assumed extra-statutory
concessions, the reports disclosed the tribunals
construing their limited jurisdiction as debarring them
from scrutinising the department's application of this
form of guidance. Such a response is of general
significance to the whole of this work because it again
provides evidence of the link between the legal nature
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of a rules regime regulating a governmental programme
and the accessibility of the various grievance handling
agencies. As we discovered in our research on student
grants, the choice of a regime of administrative
guidance in Scotland had the effect of discouraging
judicial challenges by aggrieved applicants,whilst the
utilisation of delegated legislation in England and
Wales facilitated the invocation of the judiciary eg.
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R. v. Barnet L.B.C.,ex p.Shah . Here we learn that the
use of the different forms of guidance within one
departmental programme can have an analogous effect upon
the availability of remedial agencies. For example
whilst the tribunals have been unwilling to consider
policy guidance (eg.in Wickens) the P.C.A. has
8 0
investigated its application ,whereas an inverse
response has occurred in relation to interpretative
guidance, with the tribunals determining its accuracy
and the P.C.A. expressly refusing to enter into a
consideration of the Commissioners' interpretation of
81
the law . Therefore,once more we see the importance of
administrative guidance not merely as an expression of
citizens' entitlements in the eyes of the
administration, but also as a weighty factor
affecting the competence of remedial agencies to
intervene on behalf of citizens.
The reports did not divulge any case where a
tribunal encountered procedural guidance. Presumably the
absence of this form of guidance from the contents of
Notices is explicable because the Commissioners use the
page 41
18 \
latter to express their opinion (whether derived from
statutory or administrative powers) regarding the rights
and duties of taxpayers and not to specify the
procedural obligations of their officers.
When we evaluate the above responses in terms of
how the tribunals draw the strategic balance between the
interests of the department and taxpayers, they may
appear somewhat diffident in their willingness to
confront the department when compared with the boldest
decisions of the courts (eg. in R_^ v. S.S.H.D. ,ex p.
Khan^ and A.G. for Hong Kong v. Shiu*^) . This
conclusion may be supported by their reluctance to
directly criticise erroneous interpretations in Notices
(eg.En-tout-cas) ; the refusal to imbue such Notices with
substantive legal effects (eg.Normal Motor); and their
restrictive construction of the limits of their
jurisdiction to prohibit them from examining policy
guidance (eg.Cando). However,to a large extent these
decisions in favour of the department have been induced
by the judicial supremacy over the tribunals manifested
in the right of appeal on a point of law from a tribunal
to the High Court. This has ensured that the tribunals
implement common law principles (as they did with regard
to restitution in Normal Motor) and remain within their
jurisdiction (which was defined restrictively by the
majority of the House of Lords in Corbitt). Neither of
these considerations can be said to have provided the
tribunals with any judicial encouragement to magnify the
intensity of their scrutiny of the Commissioners'
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actions.
As a final topic of interest we can contemplate
what our knowledge of the administration and
adjudication of V.A.T. has contributed to our general
concern with the public's awareness of the existence
and content of administrative guidance affecting them.
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter Public
Notices represent an almost paradigm example of
accessible and open guidance. However,as this research
has revealed,they suffer from one basic flaw in that the
Commissioners' have failed to adequately distinguish
between the different forms of guidance contained within
the Notices. Although some attempts have been made to
differentiate between interpretative guidance and
statutory based obligations (eg.Appendix A of Notice 712
on the Margin Scheme for Antiques utilises bold type for
statutory requirements and light type for
interpretations),they are the exception (eg.paragraph 18
of the same Notice does not state that its demands have
statutory authority). But no effort whatever has been
applied to clarifying the distinction between parts of
Notices containing interpretative guidance and those
establishing policy guidance towards extra-statutory
concessions. For example,there is nothing to distinguish
the language of paragraph 19 of Notice 708 on the
Construction Industry being interpretative guidance (as
was contended by the Commissioners in Mansell Youell)
and paragraph 20 defining an extra-statutory concesion
(as the Commissioners argued in Wickens). Moreover
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Notice SHP 10,which is the successor to the Notice
elaborating the concession for voluntary self-build
groups that was at the heart of the appeal in
Cando,still makes no reference to its nature and is
positively misleading in its explanation of appellate
rights in the light of the above tribunal's decision
that it had no jurisdiction over such guidance!
The need for clarity in the separation of the
different types of guidance is essential if the citizen
is to be able to effectively plan his response to those
provisions which he believes to be adverse to his
interests. Because as this and previous chapters have
shown,without such information he cannot realistically
consider (a) the grievance handling agencies which have
competence over the particular piece of guidance (see
the above discussion on the unwillingness of V.A.T.
tribunals compared with the P.C.A. to examine policy
guidance) and (b) the types of arguments he can deploy
against the relevant piece of guidance (ie.it would be
permissible to urge a tribunal to substitute its view
for that of the Commissioners regarding a piece of
interpretative guidance, but useless to deploy such a
contention towards that part of a Notice having
statutory status). Consequently the lesson we must learn
from our study of V.A.T. is that it is not sufficient
merely to demand the publication of administrative
guidance,one must also stipulate that the promulgators
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In this final chapter we shall engage in a
retrospective overview of the research contained within
the earlier chapters. Our purpose will not be simply to
repeat the specific findings concerning the
organisational and legal attributes of administrative
guidance which have already been discussed in the
separate parts of this thesis. We shall concentrate upon
comparing the degree of harmony and/or dissonance in the
responses of the various grievance handling agencies to
these provisions;and their compatibility with the
organisational features of departmental usage of
guidance. On the basis of these conclusions proposals
for the future legal treatment of administrative
guidance will be suggested.
In the light of this research we can now
restate,with the benefit of increased empirical evidence
and understanding,our belief in the importance for
contemporary public law of the creation and usage of
administrative guidance by central government
departments. This is because of the fundamental
significance of these provisions in the departmental
assessment of citizens' entitlements and liabilities
1
(eg. the determination of liability to V.A.T. ;the
page 1
circumstances in which prisoners can obtain legal
2 3
advice ;and the granting of student awards ),which has
inevitably necessitated the development of the
jurisprudence of the different grievance handling
agencies to take account of guidance (eg. the judicial
adaptation of the non-fettering principle to policy
4
guidance regulated decision-making in British Oxygen ;
the P.C.A.'s evolution of the Sachsenhausen
5
doctrine ;and the supremacy over interpretative guidance
g
asserted by V.A.T. tribunals ). Furthermore our belief
is bolstered by the increasing level of practical and
academic legal interest which has been exhibited in
guidance during the currency of this research project.
The judiciary have,at last,begun to grapple with the
legal implications of guidance in major cases,
including the House of Lords' examination of D.H.S.S.
7
guidance in Gillick ;the Privy Council's enforcement of
0
procedural guidance in Shiu ;the Court of Appeal's
9
scrutiny of procedural guidance in Anderson and
their application of much of the above Privy Council
1 0
reasoning in Khan ;and the High Court's approval of
11
interpretative guidance in Crake
On the academic plane,in 1983 Craig uttered the
following plea,
"...there are areas in which administrative institutions
will develop rules or something closely akin to
them,even if they are not expressly empowered to do so.
...The precise status of such rules may be unclear;they
may be unknown to the public and they are often subject
to no external scrutiny. ...we should recognise their
existence,the absence of controls-over them and consider
what should be done about them."
His concerns were amplified in the following year by
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Harlow and Rawlings' examination of the way in which the
Home Office used unpublished guidance to regulate the
verification of immigrants' claims via X-ray and
virginity testing. In their words,
"secretive administration allows government to secure
goals politically difficult or impossible to achieve
through the democratic process. No doubt Mr Rees [the
Minister., of State] understood this as well as K C
Davis."
Turpin has subsequently noted that similar provisions
govern other important discretions including the
statutory power to grant naturalization to aliens
(s.6(1 ) British Nationality Act 1981 ) and the
prerogative power to issue passports. Consequently,
"...such rules may supplement the law in allowing
concessions to which there is no legal entitlement or in
laying down the conditions on which discretionary
benefits will be granted. A statement of the relevant
legal rules will therefore often give an incomplete
account of the circumstances
^ ^in which claims are
admitted by the administration."
Most recently Baldwin and Houghton have declared their
apprehension that,
"there is now discernible a retreat from primary
legislation in favour of government by informal rules.
Each time a government confronts a difficult regulatory
task, it seems to come up with a new device:a code of
practice,guidance note,circular,approved code,outline
scheme,statement of advice,departmental circular-the
list goes on. ... Our concern is that informal rules are
too free from control by Parliament,executive,judiciary
or any other source and thatj ^ this freedom is
increasingly open to exploitation."
Whilst Baldwin and Houghton encompass a far wider range
of provisions within their category of administrative
rules (including statutory codes of practice and
voluntary codes of self-regulation issued by private
commercial bodies) than our definition of administrative
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guidance contains, their analysis,like the one utilised
by this work,is premised upon a functional
classification of such provisions. However,whereas they
consider only the judicial response to these
administrative rules, this work,for the reasons
explained in Chapter One,has pursued a more expansive
conception of those agencies which establish norms
recognised by modern public law and therefore we have
also analysed the reactions of the P.C.A. and a major
tribunal system towards administrative guidance.
The Organisational Context of Administrative Guidance
When the knowledge gained from Chapters Two ,Three
and Five is aggregated we can conclude that a minimum
level of administrative guidance will always have to be
created and used by departments to regulate the
decision-making of their large staffs. As the writings
of the various organisational theorists demonstrated,
the formal structure of bureaucratic organisations with
authority distributed between hierarchical grades
necessitates the use of such provisions as one means by
which the senior officials seek to control the
behaviour of the junior officials in order to achieve
rational/efficient decision-making. The S.E.D. case-
study revealed in detail how one departmental body
actually utilised guidance to attain similar objectives.
Moreover,the investigations of the P.C.A. confirmed the
widespread usage of guidance to govern officials'
decision-making across the whole spectrum of
departmental administration, from the D.H.S.S.'s
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guidance specifying the circumstances in which financial
help towards the running costs of cars owned by disabled
1 6
persons would be provided ,to the Home Office's
guidance elaborating the method by which prisoners'
i 7
parole eligibility dates should be calculated
The proportion of guidance falling within the
different functional classes of guidance will vary from
department to department according to the nature of the
particular programme they are administering. Numerous
factors play a part in determining this proportion,but
from our research one fundamental determinant appears to
be the form of the legal foundations of the programme.
Chapter Three showed that where the programme is based
upon a broad statutory discretion then the bulk of the
guidance will be of the policy class,as it is necessary
to explain the goals to be sought through the exercise
of that power in individual casesjwhereas programmes
implementing detailed statutory provisions (as is the
case with student grants in England and Wales) will
primarily utilise interpretative guidance to clarify the
meaning of statutory language for officials (c/f the
interpretative guidance on the mandatory grant
regulations produced by the D.E.S. noted in Chapter
Three).
Additional guidance is created when departments
use such provisions to secure other aims. These
objectives are extremely heterogeneous and encompass
,inter alia, the subjection of individuals to a form
of treatment which would not be politically
page 5
acceptable if made public (see Harlow and Rawlings
above)junofficial law reform by means of guidance which
does not accord with the intention of the legislator
1 8
(Megarry criticised this practice in 1944 but we have
still encountered it in current departmental
administration eg. the Commissioners' purported
o
introduction of a distiction between the V.A.T.
k
liability of public and private sports facilities in En-
1 9
tout-Cas Ltd. );and what Baldwin and Houghton have
termed Commendation,which occurs where departments seek
20
to pursuade others to act in a certain way . According
to the ethical,political and legal acceptibility of the
objectives and content of such provisions, their
discovery by commentators may lead to public causes
celebres (eg the Legal Action Group/Observer's expose of
the L Code's illegal instructions to Legal Aid
21
officers ). Our research on the various grievance
handling agencies did not encounter many examples of
such controversial uses of guidance,but,as we shall see
below,only a fraction of the total amount of
administrative guidance ever reaches the public domain
and this factor may have reduced the agencies' exposure
to such provisions.
To use a metaphor,we can describe the totality of
guidance created by departments as constituting a world,
the majority of which is composed of uncharted oceans to
which the population have virtually no access and the
minority of pieces form the continents which are
gradually being explored by the population. Chapter
page 6
Three vividly demonstrated the differences between the
quantity and nature of guidance governing decision¬
making at the various levels within the S.E.D. Awards
Branch, compared with the summarised form which was
available to the public in the annual guide. Such an
unbalanced relationship between the quantity and quality
of guidance available to officials as contrasted with
that made accessible to the public was replicated in
programmes being administered by other departments,
including social security benefits paid by the D.H.S.S.
and industrial grants disbursed by the Department of
22
Trade and Industry . Moreover Chapter Five showed that
roughly two-thirds of all policy and procedural guidance
encountered by the P.C.A. had never been published in
any form. This discrepancy between the scale of the
creation of guidance by departments and the public's
awareness of the existence and use of these provisions
results in a greater vulnerability of the latter group
when they have dealings with departments. As we have
discovered, citizens cannot adequately assess their
entitlements if the basic principles governing the
23
particular programme are not published . Nor can they
rationally analyse the remedies open to them to
challenge unsatisfactory determinations by departments
before the various grievance agencies if they are
unaware of the content and form of guidance governing
24
those determinations . Therefore,later in this chapter
we shall be examining how the position of citizens can
be strengthened by increasing the availability of
page 7
information regarding the guidance used by departments.
However,public law does not restrict its cognizance
of administrative guidance to the minority of provisions
which are publicly promulgated. Chapter Five indicated
how the powers of the P.C.A. enabled him to scrutinise
the internal guidance used by officials,and even the
courts have occasionally examined unpublished guidance
which has been obtained during pre-trial interlocutory
25
proceedings (eg. in Khan ). These responses are to be
welcomed as they prevent departments from being able to
completely shelter their guidance from outside review by
non-publication.
The Legal Implications of Administrative Guidance
Irrespective of whether a remedial agency is being
asked (directly or indirectly) to enforce the observance
of a piece of guidance or declare its invalidity, two
factors are of primary importance in determining the
response of the agency. They are the functional content
of the specific provision (ie. is it a piece of
procedural,policy or interpretative guidance?),and the
powers/jurisdiction of the agency. The interaction of
these factors has provided the framework for the
jurisprudence of the various agencies' responses towards
the different categories of guidance analysed in earlier
chapters. One consequence of this interaction is that
each agency demonstrates a greater willingness to
criticise the substance of that class of guidance which
it considers falls within its own special area of
page 8
expertise. Therefore,the P.C.A. has been most strident
in his condemnation of procedural guidance which he
considers to fall below his standard of "good
2 6
administrative practice" . As Ganz observed, the
P.C.A. "...plays a most important role in raising the
standards of administrative procedure by means of
persuasion on a case to case basis with results which no
2 7
court or statute could achieve." The courts displayed
their strongest willingness to substitute their views
for those of depatments where they were faced with
interpretative guidance,because of their assumed
constitutional role as the final arbiters of legislative
2 8
intent. Likewise V.A.T. tribunals adopted an analogous
stance towards interpretative guidance issued by the
29
Commissioners. Conversely all three agencies exhibited
most reluctance to attack the substance of policy
guidance. Lord Bridge indicated the judicial attitude
towards such challenges in Gillick;the Sachsenhausen
30
case established the P.C.A.'s unwillingness to
question the content of policy guidance; and in
31
Cando 70 the inability of V.A.T. tribunals to
scrutinise this class of guidance was expressed. The
underlying explanation of this reaction may be found in
the ancient constitutional practice whereby the
parliamentary accountability of Ministers provides the
dominant mechanism for the questioning of departmental
3 2
policies. This is reflected in the ostensible
concentration upon issues of legality rather than merits
33
during cases of judicial review ,and the enactment of
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ZU
section 12 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967. The
outcome is that citizens face a virtually impossible
task in seeking to encourage the agencies to review and
if necessary condemn the content of this type of
guidance.
Harmony between the reactions of the agencies can
be detected in other facets of their deliberations
regarding guidance. A high degree of unity occurred in
their common acknowledgement that ultimately it was for
the courts to rule on the meaning of legislative
language and thereby determine the validity of
34
interpretative guidance . The P.C.A. expressly stated
so in a case involving interpretative guidance issued by
35
the D.o.E. , and V.A.T. tribunals asserted a similar
right subject to an appeal on a point of law to the
. 36
courts
As for procedural guidance,we have already noted
I
above that the P.C.A. examined these provisions to
assess whether they conformed to good administrative
practice. That standard incorporates legal values
derived from origins as diverse as elementary criminal
37
procedure ,and Scottish property sale and conveyancing
3 8
procedure . Indeed, the case law revealed that the
courts have the ability to review the legality of these
provisions where the power of decision-making is
39
subject to the obligations of procedural fairness . So
far they have concentrated upon guidance establishing
the procedures for the disciplining of prisoners ;
consequently their scrutiny has been to ensure that the
page 10
process contains basic components of the adversarial
40
system of justice,including cross examination and
41
access to legal advice . However,there is great
potential for the cross-fertilization of ideas
concerning the essential norms of administrative
procedure between the evolving standards of good
administrative practice and procedural fairness. The
courts and the P.C.A. agencies also share another
similarity in their responses to procedural guidance and
that is in the emerging demand that departments follow
the requirements detailed in such provisions. The P.C.A.
has found that the failure of officials to observe these
42
requirements amounts to an act of maladministration
and the judiciary have quashed decisions taken in
43
violation of such procedural undertakings ; the sole
distinction between their reactions has been that the
courts only enforce published guidance whereas the
P.C.A. equally applies the requirement to unpublished
provisions.
From his earliest investigations the P.C.A.
accepted the utilisation of policy guidance by
4 4
departments to determine individual citizens' cases
More recently the judiciary have also clearly stated
their approval of this method of decision-making in the
45 46
landmark cases of Schmidt and British Oxygen . But
the investigative powers of the P.C.A. have enabled him
to subject officials' application of policy guidance to
a far more rigorous quizzing (including the finding of
47
historical facts which the department had neglected )
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than the innovative judicial decision of Khan would
allow. The major exception to the harmony of the
agencies' responses has been the conclusion of V.A.T.
tribunals that their enumerated grounds of jurisdiction
do not encompass policy guidance and that consequently
they are unable to examine the creation and application
48
of these provisions by the Commissioners.
The general consistency of the agencies' responses
to administrative guidance is significant for two
important reasons. First it alleviates,at least for the
strategic activities of the creation and application of
guidance, Craig's apprehension that the adoption of a
liberal view of his jurisdiction by the P.C.A. might
result in conflict with the courts due to "...the
development of two views upon the same subject matter
which are inconsistent, or the application of the same
4 9
view in an inconsistent manner." So the P.C.A. should
be encouraged to continue investigating complaints
involving guidance where he has special expertise (eg.
procedural guidance regulating decision-making not yet
subject to procedural fairness) or a greater ability to
penetrate the complexities of the administrative process
(eg. departmental application of unpublished policy
guidance ). Secondly,and more generally,the congruous
nature of the responses indicates that despite the
minimal number of overt cross-references between the
recorded decisions of the separate agencies, they share
a common core of values concerning the basic necessities
of efficient and good administrative practices.
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In particular we can note that all the agencies
have generally approved of the use of administrative
guidance by departments. The reason for this appears to
be that each agency has recognised the
organisational/administrative necessity for these
provisions. Hence the P.C.A. has acknowledged that
policy guidance enabled departments,to define the aims
of their programmes"^; encourage consistency in
51
decision-making ; and regulate the expenditure of
monies (a requirement which is likely to be of great
52
significance in these days of cash limits) . For
similar reasons the judiciary sanctioned the utilisation
of these provisions in British Oxygen. They also
supported the creation of interpretative guidance to
guide officials towards an understanding of
vague/complex statutory phrases in Crake; and V.A.T.
tribunals replicated that view in Grimsby Football
53
League . In C.P.A.G. the courts validated the creation
of procedural guidance to establish the methods by which
officials should perform their duties.
The obligations placed upon departmental use of
guidance by the agencies can be seen to be compatible
with existing organisational practices. For example,the
judicial tailoring of the non-fettering principle to
departmental discretionary decision-making in Schmidt
and British Oxygen shares many features with the actual
processing of student grant applications by the Awards
Branch. As we have seen,the territorial officers were
bound by an extensive array of precise administrative
page 13
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rules,but hard cases could be passed up to the senior
executive officers who possessed the power to dispense
with the detailed rules and determine the case in
accordance with the underlying values of the scheme. By
unknowingly,following the dictates of Lords Denning and
Reid, by having regard to applicants' claims that their
cases should be treated as exceptions to the rules or
that the policy governing the scheme should be changed.
However,our research on the Awards Branch suggests that
citizens should not expect the British Oxygen duty to
produce many changes of fundamental policies by
departments;instead citizens should concentrate upon
seeking to persuade departments that their cases are
exceptional and ought not to be determined according to
the ordinary rules.
The agencies' scrutiny of the application and
observance of guidance by of^cials can also help to
reinforce the monitoring of junior of^cials' behaviour
by senior management. As Chapter Three indicated,
departments may well have elaborate checking systems,but
these cannot detect all the detrimental effects of
informal organisational behaviour. External agencies,
particularly the P.C.A.,can play a useful secondary role
in discovering and highlighting these inevitable
tendencies. An example of this was the P.C.A.'s finding
that zealous inspectors were ignoring their procedural
guidance and using defective vehicles when conducting
54
incognito inspections of garage testing facilities.
such a procedure the Awards Branch were, albeit
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From their accumulated wisdom (whether derived from
regular exposure to the practices of different
departments in the case of the P.C.A. or through the
evolution of relevant legal values by the judiciary) the
agencies are able in appropriate contexts to improve the
quality of departmental processes by their review of
procedural guidance. As we have already seen one area
where this has been particularly noticeable is that of
prison administration.
Overall,therefore,the responses of the different
agencies have been complimentary to the best practices
of departments in the creation and use of guidance. The
restraints and requirements mandated by the agencies
cannot be viewed as unrealistic in their demands when
compared with the organisational needs of departments.
Nevertheless,they have provided a level of protection
for citizens against the ever present dangers of
55
officials rigidly applying guidance or arbitrarily
departing from it~^.
Turning now to the lessons which can be learnt from
the judicial consideration of provisions analogous to
administrative guidance in the U.S.A.,these relate
primarily to the procedural and interpretative forms of
57
guidance. In Vitarelli v. Seaton Frankfurter J
required the Secretary to follow his procedural guidance
because,"...an Executive agency must be rigorously held
to the standards by which it professes its action to be
5 8
judged." Twenty four years later Lord Fraser,on behalf
of the Privy Council, determined that the Hong Kong
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government was legally obliged to respect its procedural
promises because of,"...the principle that a public
authority is bound by its undertakings as to the
5 9
procedure it will follow..." . The similarity of
reasoning suggests that the contemporary common law
conception of administrative morality now demands that
in the absence of exceptional circumstances public
bodies must respect their proclaimed procedures. This is
to be welcomed as it enables citizens to ensure that
their cases are processed according to established
procedures. Furthermore the fact that Vitarelli has been
6 0
applied in subsequent U.S. cases should give added
reassurance to our judiciary that Parker LJ1 s
incorporation of the Shiu principle into domestic U.K.
law can be extensively invoked without crippling central
government administration.
As we saw in Chapter Four the U.S. Supreme Court
has expounded a set of criteria which it utilises to
determine when the contents of interpretative guidance
will be endorsed by the judiciary. Jackson J said they
included,(a)the thoroughness of consideration;(b)the
validity of the reasoning;and (c)the consistency of
6 *1
views,underlying the promulgator's guidance. The
British judiciary have not yet expressly articulated the
factors which they use to assess such guidance
(eg.those motivating Woolf J's approval of the tests for
"co-habitation" found in the Supplementary Benefits
f.)
Handbook ) • Therefore,the American practice should
stimulate our judiciary into openly formulating the
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criteria which they apply,so that departments can
comprehend what they must seek to do in order to create
guidance which will receive judicial support, and also
to enable citizens to gain a clearer understanding of
the circumstances in which they can successfully
challenge this form of guidance before the courts.
On the basis of this research we can suggest a
number of other developments in the responses of the
various agencies that would not necessitate
legislation,but the consequences of which would fortify
the position of citizens against the potential abuse of
guidance by departments. (a)The courts should not be
deterred by Lord Bridge's dicta in Gillick from
reviewing the legality of guidance which appears prima
63 64
facie to be illegal (eg. as in Cooke and Anderson )
as the adaptation of the general principles of legality
to the phenomenon has not prevented the legitimate use
of these provisions by departments. In addition the
judiciary should consolidate the existing application of
65
the concepts of fairness and legitimate expectation to
require the observance of all three classes of guidance
by of ficials; furthermore the case by case extension of
this requirement ought to enable the judiciary to refine
the factors entitling a department to claim that it
cannot observe its guidance because of the demands of
"public interest".
(b)V.A.T. tribunals must overcome their reluctance
to condemn those parts of Public Notices which contain
erroneous interpretations. The resulting benefits will
page 17
include the alerting of other taxpayers to the
inaccuracies and thereby prevent them from relying upon
a misunderstanding of the law which may entail the
irrecoverable payment of excess monies in taxation^.
From this would also ensue pressure upon the
Commissioners to rewrite their interpretative guidance
so that it accords with the tribunal's declared view of
the law.
(c)The resources available to the P.C.A. need to be
strengthened so that he has ready access,either within
or outwith his staff,to the knowledge of lawyers. This
will enable him to make up his own mind as to the
thoroughness with which departments have created their
interpretative guidance,without having to rely on the
6 7
assertions of departmental lawyers . Also his Select
Committee should revitalize their scrutiny of the
outcomes of departmental undertakings to review their
guidance,given as a consequence of the P.C.A.'s
criticism of those provisions during investigations into
alleged maladministration. At present there is no
systematic monitoring of these undertakings and the
public do not know if they are being honoured or
ignored.
Legal Responses to Administrative Guidance in the Future
To conclude this thesis we shall examine
the emerging debate concerning the alterations in
departmental practices which are necessary if
administrative guidance is to be accorded full





Craig has argued that the only viable
method by which such provisions can gain legal
"validation" is through the imposition on departments of
a statutory duty to consult with interested persons
prior to the promulgation of guidance.
"The central issue becomes one of validation by this
indirect method or not at all. However,imperfect a
surrogate such consultation is felt to be (and I am not
implying that it is in fact so imperfect) the choice is
between legitimation or control through this indirect
mechanism or quietly closing one^ eyes and pretending
that the problem does not exist."
His advocacy of consultation is also replicated in the
general discussion regarding the contemporary priorities
70
of public law by many commentators. But Baldwin and
Houghton reject the idea of a statutory obligation to
consult because,
"...just as legislators are in a poor position to set
substantive standards for administrative rule¬
making, they are also ill^ituated to lay down detailed
procedural requirements."
Instead they recommend the judicial application of
common law duties requiring consultation and the
subsequent publication of guidance,as they believe this
form of legitimation is more flexible and can react to
the "bureaucratic realities" of departmental
administration.
It is surely questionable if our judiciary has the
capacity to forge such fundamental changes in civil
service attitudes and practices without the endorsement
of Parliament in the form of legislation. Logie has
already catalogued the problems facing,and weaknesses
72
of, judicial enforcement of consultation procedures.
And secretiveness is so ingrained in the mentality of
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British public administration ,that measures short of
an express statutory reversal of the present presumption
in favour of secrecy are almost inevitably doomed to
74
failure. As Rowat has warned,even in a legal culture
far more conditioned towards openness than our own, the
mechanisms necessary to ensure access to government
documentation must be elaborate:
"...the lesson of American experience is that a
comprehensive right of public access cannot be
successfully established unless the matters which may be
kept secret are spelled out by statute in limiting
detail and there is provision for appeal against the
witholding of document^., in order to ensure that the
right can be enforced."
Therefore,the most efficacious strategy for
securing the full legal and constitutional acceptibility
of guidance would be for Parliament to enact a Freedom
of Information Act,to be policed by an information
7 6
ombudsman ,which inter alia provided for public access
to guidance generally issued to all officials
administering a programme. This right would enable
interested citizens to read and copy the internal
manuals which are the bibles that govern most
77
departmental decision-making. Such a development
would significantly increase the acceptability of
guidance for two reasons. First citizens' comprehension
of the nature of departmental use of guidance would be
greatly strengthened, thereby facilitating the resort
to grievance handling agencies (particularly the courts)
where departmental practices violated the standards
established by the agencies (eg. officials following
procedural guidance which infringed the norms of
page 20
procedural fairness). Secondly,at present the substance
of policy guidance is virtually free from scrutiny by
outside bodies,but the availability of such provisions
under a Freedom of Information Act should promote public
discussion regarding them both inside and outside of
Parliament. Consequently a statutory duty of
consultation would only be necessary if these
7 8
deliberations were ignored by the departments. The
outcome of this strategy would be to ensure that
administrative guidance fulfilled its potential in
producing co-ordinated movements rather than nervous
twitches in our governmental anatomy.
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APPENDIX A
AWARDS BRANCH FIELD-STUDY : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The materials upon which Chapter Three was
based,were gathered during the early part of 1983. Their
collection utilised the concept of participant
observation which according to McCall and Simmonsis
not a single method but rather a characteristic style of
research which makes use of a number of methods and
techniques-observation,informant interviewing, document
analysis, respondent interviewing and participation with
self analysis." It had the object of
discovering.what is fundamental or central to the
people or world under observation" ,so that a
qualitative analysis of the particular organisational
situation could be produced.
Inevitably the empirical research was subject to
conditions of access which in this case included,inter
alia,the author having to "sign the Official Secrets
Acts";limitations on the ability to examine individual
case files and policy papers;and respect for the
anonymity of civil servants and applicants. Whilst the
first two restraints have undoubtedly influenced the
quantity and nature of the materials upon which the
chapter was constructed,the general ethics of social
science research would have independently mandated the
latter restriction.
The research began in January when all the
available published materials concerning the Branch's
administration of the Scheme were scrutinised (eg.
P.C.A. reports,Annual Guide to the Scheme and S.E.D.
organisational charts). Then a list of six areas of
interest covering the Branch's experience of
administrative guidance was drawn up on the basis of
the information gathered from the documentary analysis.
Topics encompassed by the list included the reasons for
the particular form of rules regime governing the
programme;the extent and nature of intra-Branch guidance
;staff attitudes towards that guidance;and the system of
guidance revision. Thereupon personal contact with the
senior officers of the Branch was established and after
discussing the orientation of the field-work it was
agreed that the author would be permitted to interview
different officers within the Branch. However,prior to
the interviewing the author was allowed to attend a two
week training course,held in the Branch,for several new
Executive and Clerical Officers. Sitting in on the
training course was an extremely rewarding experience as
it enabled a comprehension of the formal structure and
terminology of the organisation to be acquired before
the actual detailed questioning of officers began.
Furthermore it had the unanticipated consequences of
providing an extended period of contact with junior
officers during which their perceptions of the Branch's
administrative process could be discovered,whilst
simultaneously reducing the "threat" presented by the
author qua an "outsider" as members of the organisation
became more used to his presence.
In the light of the information gained during the
training course an interview guide containing eight
fields of interest (including the differences underlying
the various types of intra-Branch guidance;the grounds
upon which decisions to publish Branch guidance were
made;the nature of appeals/complaints to the Branch) was
drawn up. That guide was then used as the basis for a
series of in depth "unstructured interviews" with
officers of different grades within the Branch. The
interviews were unstructured in the sense that they were
not intended to be confined to a specific range of
questions with delimited answers, but were designed
"...to elicit from the interviewee what he consider[ed]
to be important questions relative to a given topi^c,his
descriptions of some situation being explored." The
officers were selected via a snowball approach of
following up leads and recommendations derived from
earlier stages of the field-work or prior interviews.
Over the ensuing three weeks ten officers (covering
every grade from Executive Officer to Principal)
voluntarily agreed to be interviewed,with each session
lasting on average between two to three hours (the
longest continued for four hours and ten minutes without
a break). The explanations and comments of the
interviewees were recorded in contemporary jotting notes
which were subsequently converted into a daily diary
each evening. It should also be stated that the
territorial officers came from different sections in
order to reduce the possibility of collecting
unrepresentative insights. After the interviews had been
completed an assessment of the totality of received
information was undertaken and that was supplemented by
a final materials gathering visit at the beginning of
April.
To conclude the author would like to express his
gratitude to those persons who enabled his access into
the Branch,particularly the Senior Principal of the
Awards Branch,and to the staff of that organisation.
Additionally he desires to thank Professor A W Bradley
who initially established the possibility of the study
and Dr D Nelken for his continuous and invaluable
support during the actual field-work.
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PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER CASE REPORTS
licy Guidance
Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration
1968 H.C. 129 (1968 - 1969)
1. C.206/68 Foreign Commonwealth Office P.31
A post-Sachsenhausen case. The Department had created the 'Butler Rules'
to govern the distribution of compensation to British victims of Nazi
persecution. Complainant critised the way in which his application for
compensation had b een handled by the Department. The P.C.A. found the
Department's conduct amounted to maladministration and they agreed to
review the complainant's case.
2. C.445/68 Home Office P.47
The complainant was a prisoner. He wrote to a marriage bureau but the
Assistant Governer of his prison refused to allow the letter to be posted
under rule 33 of the Prison Rules 1964. The Department then promulgated
a general departmental rule that prisoners should not be allowed to
communicate with marriage bureaux. The prisoner complained about the
withholding of his letter; however, the P.C.A. found no evidence of
maladministration as the Department were merely following their depart¬
mental rule.
3. C.364/68 Ministry of Housing and Local Government P.69
In 1968, at the instigation of the Land Commission, the Department ann¬
ounced an extra-statutory concession for citizen's buying and selling a
single plot of land for their own habitation from liability to Betterment
Levy. The complainants complained of delay in granting them relief from
2
hardship. The P.C.A. did not wish to express a view on the propriety
of the Department making this concession, and found no maladministration.
4. C.665/68 Board of Trade P.113
The Department operated an extra-statutory scheme for the repayment of
assets to hiers of persons whose property had been confiscated during the
s/
Second World War. The complainant had been refused repayment under the
terms of the scheme and complained to the P.C.A. The Commissioner
found that the Department had applied those terms without maladministra¬
tion, but after reviewing the complainant's case they decided to repay
the assets to the complainant.
5. C.599/67 Ministry of Transport P.114
The Minister had a statutory power to appoint and remove approved vehicle
testing stations (under the Motor Vehicles (Test) Regulations 1969). He
had developed a policy provisions that he would not approve applications
from garages which were under the control of a person who had been con¬
victed of any criminal offence within the preceding two years. Complain¬
ant applied for approval but was refused in accordance with the above
provision. The P.C.A. found that in the circumstances of her case the
Ministry had applied their policy guidance in a manner amounting to malad¬
ministration. Therefore the Ministry agreed to reconsider her application.
6. C.133/68 Ministry of Transport P.131
Government policy on the awarding of costs to parties appearing before
Public Local Inquiries was set out in M.H.L.G. circular 73/65. Com¬
plainants applied to the Minister for their costs to be paid but he refused
on the basis of the rules contained in the above circular. The P.C.A.
found no maladministration as those rules had been properly applied.
C.227/68 Ministry of Transport P.139
Under s.48 Town and Country Planning Act 1959 the Minister had a
discretionary power to purchase property from non owner-occupiers in
advance of the issuing of a compulsory purchase order. However, the
Ministry had created general rules governing the circumstances in which
this discretion would be exercised. The complainant requested the
Ministry to purchase this property before the issuing of a compulsory
purchase order but they refused. The P.C.A. concluded that there had
been no maladministration as the Ministry had simply applied their general
rules.
First Report of the P.C.A. for 1972-1973 H.C.18 (1972-73)
C.86/G D.H.S.S. P.98
Under article 65 Royal Warrant the Secretary of State had a discretion
to backdate the payment of war pensions from before the time of the
successful application o^ appeal. He had developed policy guidance to
regulate the exercise of the discretion. Complainant sought the back¬
dating of his pension, but the Department refused. The P.C.A. suggested
that the complainant's case did come within one of the categories of the
guidance and the Department agreed with his conclusion. Consequently
the pension was backdated and the P.C.A. considered that such an outcome
remedied the injustice the complainant had suffered as a result of depart¬
mental maladministration.
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9. C.38/G Inland Revenue P.128
In 1971 the Government published a 'White Paper' (Cmnd. 4729) setting out
the circumstances in which they would not collect income tax legally due
but subject to delayed assessment because of departmental error. The
complainant sought the benefit of the above concession but it was refused
because her level of income fell outside the limits in the White Paper.
The P.C.A. rejected any suggestions of maladministration as the Department
had properly applied the terms of the concession.
10. C.191/B Department of Trade and Industry P.181
This Department bad the statutory duty of enforcing the Companies Act 1948.
Their predecessor had created guidance regulating the bringing of prosecu¬
tions against companies and their officers, which had been presented to
the Jenkins Committee on Company Law. The complainant criticised the
Department's failure to prosecute the directors of a particular company.
In the light of his investigation the P.C.A. concluded that the Depart¬
ment's conduct in failing to implement their guidance had resulted in
maladministration; however, he could not calculate the degree of injustice
suffered by the complainant and anyway there was no remedy available to
alleviate it.
11. C.196/G Department of Trade and Industry P.200
Under s.168 Companies Act 1948 the Department had a discretion to publish
reports into the of specific companies. During 1965 the
Department's predecessors published their guidance govening the exercise
A
of that discretion. The complainant complained that this guidance was
not followed in relation to one such report. The P.C.A. found that
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special circumstances prevailed in this case and that there had been no
maladministration.
Fourth Report of the P.C.A. for 1972-1973 H.C.290 (1972-73)
12. C.248/G Department of the Environment P.52
Another complaint concerning M.H.L.G. Circular 73/65. Complainant
objected to a compulsory purchase order before a Public Local Inquiry
but it was confirmed by the Department. He sought to have his costs
incurred at the Inquiry paid, but the Department refused his request under
the terms of the above circular. The P.C.A. suggested that the Depart¬
ment might review their policy guidance which they did; however, they
decided nsfc to change its provisions. Therefore, the P.C.A. could not
make a finding of maladministration.
13. C.521/G D. o. E. P.88
Another complaint involving the Department's statutory power to appoint
and remove approved vehicle testers. The Department's relevant guidance
also provided that the power to remove a garage's designation would be
invoked for a single failure to comply with the requirements of the test.
The complainants lost their designation through an application of the
above guidance and complained to the P.C.A. He found that the guidance
was applied impartially and no maladministration had occurred.
14. C.329/G D.H.S.S. P.100
Departmental guidance specified the conditions of eligibility for financial
help towards the running costs of private cars owned and used by severely
6
disabled persons. The complainant condemned the Department's refusal to
provide him with such support. The P.C.A. found no maladministration as
the complainant's case had been determined in accordance with the relevant
guidance.
15. C.552/G Inlagnd Revenue P.159
Up until 1970 the Department had operated an 'ex gratia' scheme for paying
interest on delayed repayments of overpaid estate duty. After that year,
the scheme had been abolished. The complainant had to wait two years
for the Department to repay her. She complained to the P.C.A. about
their refusal to pay her interest. The P.C.A. found the Department un¬
willing to pay interest and therefore concludedthat the complainant had
suffered injustice as a consequence of maladministration.
16. C.478/G Department of Education and Science P.22
In their circular 18/66 the Department set out the factors to be consid¬
ered in calculating the grant payable to students on teacher training
courses. The complainant challenged the application of the above formula
to his own circumstances. The P.C.A. concluded that parts of the circular
were ambiguous; however, as the Department had agreed to give the com¬
plainant the benefit of the ambiguity and to revise the circular, the
Commissioner considered such actions to b« a satisfactory outcome.
Fifth Report of the P.C.A. for 1972-1973 H.C.406 (1972-73)
17. C.66/T D.o.E. P.70
Another complaint concerning the Department's application of their
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guidance governing their statutory discretion to buy in advance 'blighted'
property. The P.C.A. investigates whether the Department have reviewed
these rules, discovers that they have and finds no maladministration.
18. C.419/G D.H.S.S. P.103
The Department may direct hospital authorities to make 'ex gratia' pay¬
ments to patients who have suffered as a reult of negligent treatment if
certain conditions are met. Complainant alleges that he should be given
such a payment. The P.C.A. rejects his allegation of maladministration
as the Department correctly applied those conditions to his case.
19. 380/G Inland Revenue P.135
Another complaint involving the 1971 White Paper providing concessions
regarding delayed assessments of income tax due. The White Paper
expressly excluded most assessments of income tax due under the P.A.Y.E.
scheme and levied within two years of the liability arising. The com¬
plainant argued that he should be treated as an exception to this prov¬
ision and the P.C.A. agreed. However, the Department refused to grant
him the concession.
20. C.471/G Scottish Education Department P.180
The Secretary of sfate had a statutory discretion (under s.12 Education
(Scotland) Act 1969) to pay an allowance to students in full time educa¬
tion and he had developed an extensive set of administrative rules to
govern the exercise of that discretion (see Chapter Three for case-study).
The complainant was refused an allowance and complained to the P.C.A.
The Commissioner found no evidence of maladministration as the application
had been determined in accordance with these provisions.
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First Report of the P.C.A. for 1977-1978 H.C.126 (1977-78)
21. C.258/K D.H.S.S. P.60
Another complaint concerning the Secretary of State's prerogative power
to backdate war pensions. The P.C.A. concludes that the complainant's
situation comes within the guidance authorising the exercise of the
discretion and that the Department should make an 'ex gratia' payment of
interest on the arrears of the pension.
22. C.454/77 D.H.S.S. P.40
The Secretary of State had a statutory discretion to backdate the time at
which a married woman was deemed to have elected to pay full national
insurance contributions. He had produced guidance to regulate the
exercise of this power. The complainant criticised the unwillingness
of the Department to backdate her election. The P.C.A. discovered that
her case had been decided in accordance with the guidance and, therefore,
he did not condemn the Department's decision.
23. C.480/77 Home Office P.155
Under s.3(3) Post Office Act 1969 the Secretary of State had a discretion
to make refunds on surrendered t.v. licences. The Secretary published
details of the limited circumstances in which he would make refunds,on
the back of licence forms. The complainant applied for a refund but it
was refused. He complained to the P.C.A. about the Department's inter¬
pretation of the guidance printed on the licence. The P.C.A. concluded
that the wording of the guidance was ambiguous, but that the complainant's
interpretation was an unreasonable one. Therefore, the Commissioner
9
made no finding of maladministration ; nevertheless, the Department
agreed to re-draft their guidance.
24. C.451/K InUxnd Revenue P.165
The Department informed the Select Committee on the P.C.A. of the circum¬
stances in which they would pay a taxpayer's costs in employing professional
advisers to settle his fiscal liabilities (see H.C. 488 (1975-76). The
complainant claimed that the Department should pay his costs. The P.C.A.
found that they had assessed the complainant's claim in accordance with
the above criteria and there had been no maladministration.
Another complaint involving the Department's guidance governing students'
allowances. The complainant protested at the way in which the Department
took account of his foreign earnings. After the P.C.A. began his invest¬
igation the Department changed their guidance to accord with English
practice. However, the Commissioner found no maladministration in the
treatment of the complainant.
26. 15/507/77 Department of Energy P.48
In 1977 the Department operated the non statutory Electricity Discount
Scheme which gave social security claimants a twenty five percent re¬
duction on their winter electricity bills. The complainant criticised
the Department's refusal to accord him a discount on his heaviest meter
reading. The P.C.A. concluded that the published details of the scheme
25. C.126/77 S.E.D. P.268
Third Report of the P.C.A. for 1977-1978 H.C.246 (1977-78)
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were ambiguous, but could be justified because of the ad hoc nature of the
scheme. Therefore, the Department's apology to the complainant was a
sufficient remedy for him.
27. 15/589/77 Ministry of Overseas Development P.236
Under the Overseas Development and Service Act 1965 the Minister had a
power to make contributions towards the salaries of persons working over¬
seas. The Ministry created the non statutory British Expatriates and
Public Service Supplementation Scheme within the four corners of the
above discretions. The complainant was refused an award under the scheme
and had his case referred to the P.O.A.. The Commissioner found that
the Ministry had determined his case by applying the rules of the scheme
and consequently dismissed his complaint.
28. IB/637/77 Inland Revenue P.246
The Inland Revenue are willing to remit interest payments on overdue tax
liabilities in a limited number of circumstances, according to non
statutory policy criteria. The Department refused to remit the com¬
plainant's interest charges incurred through erroneous information given
by a member of the Department. The P.C.A. investigated and the Depart¬
ment reconsidered their initial decision, with the outcome that they
agreed to remit the interest charges.
2/515/77 Department of Trade P.273
Under s.161 CompaniesAct 1948 the Secretary of State had a discretion to
Fifth Report of the P.C.A. for 1977-1978 H.C.524 (1977-78)
11
approve professionally unqualified persons as company auditors. The
Department had developed an extensive regime of administrative guidance
to regulate the exercise of this discretion which, inter alia, detailed
the experience required of applicants. The complainant was refused
approval and complained to the P.C.A.. The Commissioner found that he
had been treated on the same basis as all applicants and dismissed the
complaint.
30. 3A/633/77 D.H.S.S. P.79
The Secretary of State had a discretion under s.33 Health Services and
Public Health Act 1968 to provide severely disabled persons with small
motor cars. Department rules specified categories of eligibility. The
complainant applied for a car with an automatic gearbox but the Department
would only provide her with a car containing a manual gearbox. She
complained to the P.C.A. who found that there had been no maladministration
as the Department had assessed her case in accordance with the above rules.
S.29 Finance Act 1965 allowed relief from Capital G^ins Tax in respect of
increases in the value of a taxpayer's main dwellinghouse for the last
twelve months of ownership. During 1974 the property market experienced
an extensive depression so the Department announced that as c\n extra-
statutory concession the above period would be enlarged to twenty four
months; however, if the property was not sold within that period then
only the statutory relief would be granted. The complainant applied for
Seventh Report of the P.C.A. for 1977-1978 H.C.664 (1977-78)
31. IB/656/77 Inland Revenue P.179
c\
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relief in respect of the last three years of ownership and was granted
twelve months relief. He complained to the P.C.A. who examined whether
the Department should have been willing to consider cases falling outside
the ambit of the concession. The Commissioner accepted the Department's
view that they were bound by the terms of the statute and the concession
and dismissed the complaint.
32. C.133/81 D.o.E. P.38
The Secretary of State had a discretion under s.161(1) Local Government
Act 1972 to remove ultra vires payments from the purview of the District
Auditor. The Department had guidance regulating the exercise of this
discretion which provided that it would be used where, inter alia, the
local authority were under a clearly defined moral duty to make the pay¬
ment. A Council applied for approval of an ex gratia payment to a
pensioner they had rehoused but the Department refused. The P.C.A. found
no evidence of maladministration in the actions of the Department but
suggested that they might re-consider the application in the light of the
evidence produced by his inquiry. The Department agreed and later approved
the payments.
33. C.653/80 Inland Revenue P.79
Another case concerning the application of the Department's guidance
governing the payment of taxpayer's professional advisers costs. The
complainant had sought the payment of his costs but the Department and
the Minister had refused. However, the Minister had informed the taxpayer
P.C.A. Selected Cases 1982 Volume One H.C.132 (1981-82)
13
that he could complain to the P.C.A.. This he did and the Commissioner
concluded that the complainant came within the Department's guidance;
subsequently the Department agreed to pay the costs.
Procedural Guidance
Report of the P.C.A. for 1968 H.C.129 (1968-69)
1. C.831/67 Foreign and Commonwealth Office P.29
In 1966 the Department announced a non statutory procedure, whereby the
divorced parents of British children could register 'caveats' with the
Passport Office. The effect of such a caveat was that the Office would
notify the parent of an application for a passport for the child and delay
the issuing of a passport until the parent had been able to take steps to
secure his/her legal rights over the child. The complainant registered
a caveat over his son in 1966 but through a failure in the Office he was
not notified of an application for a passport for the child. The Office
issued the passport and the child was taken to America by his mother.
Later the complainant had his case referred to the P.C.A. who found mal¬
administration by the Office which had caused the complainant to suffer
an injustice which could not be remedied.
2. C.169/68 Ministry of Transport P.136
Departmental instructions to staff employed as vehicle examiners provided
for the conduct of incognito inspections of garages testing services.
These instructions stated, inter alia, that defective vehicles should not
be used. The complainants were subjected to such an inspection and sub¬
sequently had their authorisation withdrawn by the Department. They
complained to the P.C.A. about the conduct of the inspection. The Comm¬
issioner found that provocative methods had not been used and there was
no evidence of maladministration in the inspection of the complainants.
However, the P.C.A. did discover that some examiners were using defective
vehicles in breach of their instructions, but the Department had agreed
to these instructions.
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First Report of the P.C.A. for 1972-1973 H.C.18 (1972-73)
3. C.88/G Customs and Excise P.4
Departmental instructions stated that customs officers should not return
official forms for minor corrections to import agents. The complainants
had one of their forms altered by an officer and complained to the P.C.A..
The Commissioner stated his approval of the above instructions and rejected
all suggestions of maladministration.
4. C.223/G Department of Education and Science P.8
Under the Education Act 1944 the Secretary of State had a statutory discre¬
tion to pay up to eighty percent of the costs of building work undertaken
by voluntary aided schools. The Department had a booklet detail ing the
procedures to be followed by schools applying for building grants. The
complainant, a chairman of the Governors of a voluntary aided school,
challenged the procedures and the Department's unwillingness to accord
exceptional treatment to his school. The P.C.A. concluded that the pro¬
cedures were reasonable and that there was no evidence of maladministration
in the Department's refusal to waive those procedures for the benefit of
the complainant's school.
Because of the prerogative powers of the Crown central government depart¬
ments are not bound by the Town and Country Planning Acts. However, they
observed the non-statutory Circular 100 procedure uAuc-U required the depart¬
ment proposing to engage in development to consult the local planning
authority. The complainants, who were neighbours of a proposed Post Office
5. C.458/B D.o.E. P.21
sorting complex, complained that they had not been consulted by the
relevant department. The P.C.A. found that the Post Office had observed
the terms of Circular 100 and therefore dismissed the complaint.
C.56/G D.o.E. P.46
M.H.L.G. circular 73/65 provided, inter alia, that the Secretary of State
would determine the costs of successful objectors represented before
Public Local Inquiries by advisors other than lawyers. The Department
had an 'ad hoc' practice of referring such bills to their legal division
for 'taxing'. The complainant objected to the taxed bill approved in his
case by the Department. After completing his investigation the P.C.A.
criticised the way in which the Department had been determining this
category of costs but noted that a new procedure for taxing them by H^gh
Court Masters had been introduced by circular 69/79.
Third Report of the P.C.A. for 1972-1973 H.C.178 (1972-73)
C.316/G D.o.E. P.81
The complainant protested about the absence of publicity concerning a
town by-pass scheme put forward by the Department. The P.C.A. discovered
that the Department had complied with their existing practices regarding
publicity, but that subsequently new departmental rules had been promul¬
gated requiring greater information to be disclosed to the public.
Fifth Report of the P.C.A. for 1972-1973 H.C.406 (1972-73)
C.497/G D.o.E. P.48
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Under the Highways Act 1959 the local highways authority was not responsible
By s.207 of the above Act frontages could app eal to the Secretary of
State to determine the cost of making up. The Department's procedure for
determining such appeals was based upon written representations from the
appellant and the local highways authority. The complainant/appellant
wrote to the Department and asked at what level in the organisation his
appeal would be determined. The Department informed him at Assistant
Secretary rank. Later the Department changed their procedure and the
appellant's appeal was decided by a Principal. The appellant complained
to the P.C.A. about this change in the procedure for determining his appeal.
The Commissioner dismissed the complaint stating that it was for the Depart¬
ment to appoint officials to act in the name of the Secretary of State.
9. C.791/K D.o.E. P.31
Another case involving circular M.H.L.G. 73/65. The complainants
criticised the way in which the Department refused their application for
costs. The P.C.A. discovered that the Department did not fully observe
the circular's provisions and, therefore, were guilty of a procedural
shortcoming. However, he did not consider such a defect amounted to
maladministration.
10. C.260/77 D.H.S.S. P.108
The complainant, who was a war pensioner, protested about the procedure
followed by a Medical Board. The P.C.A. found that internal working
instructions detailing the prior provisions of information to persons
for roads until they had been made-up at the expense of the frontagers.
K
First Report of the P.C.A. for 1977-1978 H.C.126 (1977-78)
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appearing before Boards had not been observed and that there had been a
breach of standing instructions to Medical Officers concerning the con¬
duct of the Board. The Department apologised for their failings.
11. C.29/77 Department of Transport P.306
The Department operated a non statutory procedure for Heavy Goods Vehicles
driving schools to block book driving tests in advance. When the fee for
tests was increased in August 1976 the Department informed the schools'
trade association that advance bookings at the old fee would not be accepted
for dates after the beginning of September 1976. The complainants, a
driving school, objected to the above arrangements. The P.C.A. criticised
the poor publicity for the new arrangements but rejected any suggestions
of maladministration.
12. C.90/77 Department of Transport P.309
By s.234 Customs and Excise Act 1952 where a vehicle excise licence had
been issued in return for a cheque which was later dishonoured the licence
was deemed to be void from issue and the Department were required to write
to the registered keeper within seven days demanding the return of the
licence. The complainant paid a garage to obtain two licences for him.
Subsequently the cheques written by the garage were dishonoured. Instead
of writing to the complainant the Department followed a non statutory
procedure of trying to obtain payment from the garage. Eventually these
attempts failed and the Department wrote to the complainant, four months
after the licences had been issued, informing him that they were void.
He complained, inter alia, about the Department's delay in communicating
with him. The P.C.A. upheld this aspect of the complaint noting that the
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Department were trying to help the complainant. Furthermore, the
Commissioner reported that the Department had abandoned their non statutory
procedure of pursuing third parties.
Third Report of the P.C.A, for 1977-1978 H.C.246 (1977-78)
13. 15/351/77 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food P.9
Under s.28 Agriculture Act 1970 the Secretary of State had a statutory
discretion to provide, inter alia, capital grants towards the provision
of water supplies for farming businesses. The Department issued a book¬
let setting out the terms on which grants would be made available, one
of which required prior approval of schemes by the Department. The
complainant had an underground pipeline installed and then sought a grant.
His application was refused because it had not been submitted in accordance
with the above procedure. He complained to the P.C.A. about the Depart¬
ment's handling of his application. The Commissioner expressed his app¬
roval of the procedure and rejected the complaint.
Fifth Report of the P.C.A. for 1977-1978 H.C.524 (1977-78)
14. 3B/132/77 Department of Transport P.281
Up until 1977 the transfer of cherisjed registration marks for vehiclesA
was undertaken via a set of non statutory rules. Then, because of law
enforcement problems, the Road Vehicles (Registration and Licensing)
Regulations 1971 were amended to provide a statutory basis for such
oJ
transfers. The complainant criticised the lack of transition, arrange¬
ments made by the Department. The P.C.A. agreed that genuine enthusiasts
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had suffered from this lacuna, but he could not question the Department's
id
decision not to provide transition^ arrangements.
Seventh Report of the P.C.A. for 1977-1978 H.C.664 (1977-78)
4/36/77 D.o.E. P.38
The Property Services Agency had acquired a country estate from the
Ministry of Defence. Several years later the P.S.A. sold the estate, on
the open market, to a property developer. The complainants, an amenity
group, protested about the manner and nature of the sale. The P.C.A.
found the P.S.A. had internal departmental instructions regulating
discussions with local planning authorities over the disposal of P.S.A.
properties. In the Commissioner's view this sale violated those pro¬
cedures- and demonstrated maladministration. However, no remedy could
be provided for the complainants; but the Agency had agreed to revise
their departmental instructions.
P.C.A. Selected Cases 1981 Volume One H.C.132 (1981-82)
C.384/81 Ministry of Defence P.6
In 1980 the Government sent out a directive to all departments changing
the Crickel Down rules governing the disposal of surplus public land.
From August onward land should always be offered back to its former private
owners unless the character of the land had materially changed. The
complainants applied to buy some surplus land from the Ministry. With¬
out consulting the Property Services Agency the Ministry agreed to the sale
which was in violation of the new rules. When the Ministry discovered
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their mistake they informed the complainants that they could not buy the
land. The P.C.A. criticised the Ministry for failing to enquire about
the relevant rules but concluded that the complainants had not suffered
any injustice.
17. C.180/81 Department of Employment P.21
The handbook which the Department issues to all its Unemployment Benefit
Offices restricts the questions, from members of the public, about redun¬
dancy payments that ordinary officers should answer. The complainant
asked about his entitlement to redundancy payments at an ordinary office
and was referred to a special redundancy payments office. He complained
to the P.C.A. about his treatment by the Department. The Commissioner
dismissed his complaint with the conclusion that any failure in commun¬
ications should be attributed to the complainant.
18. C.865/80 D.H.S.S. P.57
The 'fuel direct' scheme operated by the Department was designed to pre¬
vent claimants having their electricity cut off because of growing arrears
in their electricity bills. Under the scheme the Department paid a
proportion of a claimant's weekly benefits directly to their local elec¬
tricity board. The complainant was within the scheme when her office
was told not to make any more payments under the scheme to the London
Electricity Board. Later the complainant had her electricity cut off
and she complained to the P.C.A. about the Department's treatment of her
case. He criticised the Department for shortcomings in their behaviour
but these did not amount to maladministration.
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19. C.483/80 Scottish Home and Health Department P.96
The complainant protested about the way her offer to buy a property being
sold by the Department was handled. The P.C.A. upheld her complaint find¬
ing that the existing Departmental guidelines to staff was inadequate.
To remedy the complainant's injustice the Department have given her an
exgratia payment of £100 and have issued additional guidelines to their
staff.
P.C.A. Selected Cases 1981 Volume Two H.C.327 (1981-82)
20. C.1/81 D.H.g.g. P.36
The relevant public body in this case was a specialist organisation under
the control of the D.H.S.S., This organisation had a statutory power
to deal in land but was subject to guidance issued by the Secretary of
State. The organisation failed to clearly follow that guidance with the
consequence that the complainants were unable to acquire property being
sold by the organisation. The P.C.A. considered the organisations'
failures amounted to maladministration, but did not recommend financial
compensation to remedy the complainants' injustice.
21. C.911/80 Home Office P.54
The complainant, a prisoner, protested about a number of matters including
the censoring of his mail. The P.C.A. found that one letter from the
complainant's daughter was by tbe prison authorities even though
it did not contain any material which was required to be withheld under
Departmental standing orders. The Commissioner considered an apology
from the Department to be a suitable remedy.
4-35
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P.C.A. Selected Cases 1981 Volume Three H.C.484 (1981-82)
22. C.544/81 Inland Revenue P.68
To prevent building sub-contractors evading income tax Parliament required
contractors to deduct income tax unless the sub-contractor had an exemp¬
tion certificate (S.70 (7) Finance (No. 2) Act 1975). Tax Inspectors
had a discretion to (a) refuse a sub-contractor an exemption certificate;
or (b) give him a limited exemption certificate; or (c) award him a
general exemption certificate. Departmental instructions told Inspectors
that if they gave a sub-contractor a limited certificate and he strongly
pressed for a general one the case should be referred to head office.
The complainant was initially awarded a general certificate but when it
was renewed he was only given a limited one. Despite his protests the
Inspector refused to grant him a general certificate. The P.C.A.
criticised the Inspector for failing to pass the case up to his head office
and the Chairman of the Board of the Inland Revenue has apologised to the
complainant.
23. C.486/81 Customs and Excise P.6
Departmental instructions regulated officers offers to 'compound' pro¬
ceedings against persons suspected of breaking the law. These instruct¬
ions provided, inter alia, who was to make the decision to compound
proceedings, what financial penalty should be imposed on the person, how
the person should be interviewed and what legal rights they should be
accorded. The complainant had proceedings against herself for allegedly
'recklessly' completing a customs declaration (contrary to s.167 (1)
P.C.A. Selected Cases 1981 Volume Four H.C.8 (1982-83)
11
Customs and Excise Management Act 1979) compounded for a penalty payment
of £280. She complained to the P.C.A. about her treatment by the Depart¬
ment. The Commissioner was extremely critical of the contents of the
instructions with the consequence that the Department agreed to repay
the complainant her £280 and amend their instructions in the light of the
P.C.A.'s views.
C.871/82 Inland Revenue P.92
Exceptionally, under s.103 (3) Capital Gains Tax Act 1979, a person's
sale of their main dwellinghouse could be liable to C.G.T., Departmental
instructions stated that difficult cases involving s.103 (3) should be
referred to head office. The complainant had his sale assessed for
C.G.T. under the above section, but after employing counsel he success¬
fully appealed against the Inspector's assessment to the General Commiss¬
ioners. He complained to the P.C.A. about the Inspector's actions.
The P.C.A. reported that the Deputy Chairman of the Board of the Inland
Revenue had acknowledged the Inspector's failure to pass the case upwards
and, therefore, the Department would pay the complainant's legal costs.
The P.C.A. considered this a satisfactory outcome.
Interpretative Guidance
Report of the P.C.A. for 1968 H.C.129 (1968-1969)
1. C.316/68 Customs and Excise P.20
After consultations with the relevant trade association the Department
issued guidance stating that in their view 'translucent panels identi¬
fiable as lighting diffusers" fell within Group 14 Part I Schedule I
Purchase Tax Act 1968 as "fittings of a kind used for domestic or office
lighting". Subsequently the complainants were subjected to purchase
tax being levied on their products by the local office of the Department.
Several years later the Department's interpretation was successfully
challenged by another company before the High Court. The complainants
then protested to the P.C.A. that the Department's interpretation
amounted to an act of maladministration. The Commissioner concluded
that the test for maladministration in the creation of interpretative
guidance was the consideration given to the interpretation prior to its
promulgation, and applying that test there had been no maladministration
in this case.
2. C.261/68 Post Office P.94
Under the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 the Postmaster General was empowered
to issue licences for radios. The conditions of the licences stated that
they covered any number of radios used by "resident members of the licen-
cees' household". Internal guidance issued to Post Office staff stated
that regarding boarding schools the above condition was interpreted to
cover all the pupils residing with a housemaster. In 1966 the Post
Office's solicitors proposed a narrow interpretation of the condition
which necessitated each pupil purchasing his/her own licence. During
2
the following year this new interpretation was sent to all schools in an
administrative memorandum issued by the Department of Education and
Science (No. 9/67). The new interpretation caused many protests and
alternative interpretations were sent to the Post Office. Later that
year the Post Office again revised its interpretation and decided that
in its view boarding school pupils were covered by their parents' licen¬
ces. A school bursar complained about the Post Office's conduct in
issuing the above memorandum. The P.O.A. rejected any suggestion of
maladministration as the memorandum had been based on clear legal advice.
3. C.209/G Customs and Excise P.A
Under Group 32 of Schedule I Purchase Tax Act 1963 "tot let preparations"
were liable to purchase tax. By their Public Notice No. 78 the Depart-
the Commissioners to contain abrasives or other special ingredients for
the removal of excessive dirt". The complainants proposed to manufac¬
ture hand cleaning pads and asked their local office if they came within
the above interpretation. The office informed theo; that they did and
the complainants began manufacturing the pads. Several months later the
Department changed their opinion of the nature of the pads and subjected
them to purchase tax. The complainants critise the advice they received
from the local office. After examining the Department's files the P.C.A.
concluded that the original decision on the nature of the pads constituted
an act of maladministration and the Department agreed to give the complain¬
ants an ex-gratia payment of £6,000 as compensation for the injustice they
Fourth Report of the P.C.A. for 1972-1973 H.C.290 (1972-73)
ment e-xc\oAe.<A T!soap substitutes which are shown to the satisfaction of
3
had suffered.
4. C.264/G Home Office P.119
Section 60 Criminal Justice Act 1967 provided that the Secretary of State
might release a prisoner on licence, where the Parole Board had so recom¬
mended after the prisoner had served at least one third of his sentence.
By s.49 Prison Act 1952 any time during which a prisoner was unlawfully
at large should be ignored when calculating his remaining period of deten¬
tion. Standing Orders interpreted these two statutory provisions to
provide that when calculating the Parole Eligibility Date of prisoners
who had been unlawfully at large staff should add the time at large to
the length of sentence and divide by three. A prisoner complained to
the P.C.A. about this interpretation. The P.C.A. expressed his view
that the above method was a misinterpretation of the law and proposed his
own interpretation. The Department accepted the P.C.A.'s method and
agreed to reconsider the complainant's case on that basis.
5. C.20/G Department of Trade and Industry P.165
Under s.l Industrial Development Act 1966 the Secretary of State had a
discretion to make grants towards approved capital expenditure on "plant
and machinery". Departmental guidance elaborated the boundaries of
plant and machinery to the extent of establishing what type of insulation
would qualify for a grant. The complainants criticised the Department's
decision to award them a grant for only certain of their cold stores.
The P.C.A. reported that the large scale of application for grants necess¬
itated the Department's development of detailed guidance and that this had
been applied without maladministration to the complainants' applications.
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Fifth Report of the P.C.A. for 1977-1978 H.C.524 (1977-78)
6. 4/409/77 D.o.E. P.42
The Countryside Act 1968 required surveying authorities to re-classify
public rights of way formerly classified as Roads Used as Public Paths
(R.U.P.P.). The Department issued a circular interpreting the Act as
allowing R.U.P.P. to be classified as footpaths or bridleways or byeways.
In 1975 the British Horse Society successfully challenged that interpret¬
ation before the courts. Subsequently the Department considered issuing
a new circular setting out the classifications available to surveying
authorities and consulted local authority associations and other inter¬
ested groups about its contents. The complainants, an amenity group,
protested to the P.C.A. about, inter alia, the delay involved in the
Department's promulgation of the new circular. The P.C.A. criticised
the Department for the time taken in producing the new circular but he
did not consider that it amounted to maladministration.
7. 1A/164/78 Inland Revenue P.214
Extra statutory concession No. A7 offered by the Department allowed ex-
miners to receive their free coal (or a cash payment in lieu thereof)
without having to pay income tax on it. By an agreement with the National
Coal Board the Department had produced a definition of 'a miner' for the
purposes of the concession. The complainant had started off life as a
miner but had retired as a colliery manager and, therefore, had not been
accorded the benefit of the concession. He complained of his treatment
Seventh Report of the P.C.A. for 1977-1978 H.C.664 (1977-78)
to the P.C.A.. The Commissioner found that the Department's application
of their definition to his case did not involve maladministration.
P.C.A. Selected Cases 1982 Volume Three H.C.484 (1981-82)
C.856/80 Department of Transport P.80
When the Department voluntarily acquire land they often agree to provide
restoration work in addition to financial compensation, however, neither
this work nor the financial arrangements of purchase are governed by
the Land Compensation Act 1973 which applies to compulsory purchase. The
complainant had part of his land compulsorily acquired and he sold another
part voluntarily. He complained about the Department's dealings with
his land and the content of their booklets setting out their rights and
obligations. In response to the P.C.A.'s investigation the Department
agreed that their booklets were defective and agreed to revise them.
They also settled their financial dealings with the complainant and the
Commissioner concluded that these measures provided a satisfactory out¬
come of the investigation.
APPENDIX C
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